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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Overview 
This dissertation is concerned with the intersection between ethics and the interpretation of texts. 
That is to say, with the extent to which the act of interpretation can be and ought to be 
understood as a matter of ethics, and, conversely, with the extent to which ethics can be and 
ought to be understood as a matter of hermeneutics.  It has not always been the case that ethics 
and hermeneutics (the art of interpretation) were considered possible philosophical bedfellows – 
the contemporary view that their intersection comprises an important site for philosophical 
inquiry has only recently been made possible largely via the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer in the 
second half of the 20th century.  Although the intersection of ethics and hermeneutics is no longer 
dominated merely by Gadamer’s philosophy, his work remains a philosophical touchstone for 
those who wish to trace out other, critically different views on the matter.   
This dissertation provides a thorough critical reconstruction and hermeneutical evaluation 
of Gadamer’s oft-repeated, yet under-explored, claim that the process of interpretation requires 
phronēsis (practical wisdom).1  I argue not only that this claim is the unique conceptual 
centerpiece of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, already attested to in the epigram above, 
but also for a particular view of how to understand Gadamer’s retrieval of the ancient Greek 
                                                
1 Although there have been many articles and chapters written on this topic, it is still noteworthy that 
presently there exists no book-length study on Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis.  
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concept.  In particular, I argue for a “strongly ethical” understanding of Gadamer’s retrieval of 
phronēsis, and therewith I outline the conceptual basis for a “hermeneutic ethics.”  Gadamer 
scholars have only recently begun to emphasize the ways in which Gadamer’s philosophy is 
primarily concerned with ethics, and not with mere epistemological or metaphysical problems, or 
with mere questions of historical interpretation of particular classical texts.2 
 My argument for this view of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is straightforward enough.  It 
proceeds by working within Gadamer’s own framework in order to show the necessity of the 
view that I articulate of his retrieval of phronēsis.  By taking Gadamer on his own philosophical 
terms – specifically, on his own terms regarding the nature of concepts and the relationship of 
language to history and tradition – I am able to show that the retrieval of phronēsis for 
hermeneutics must be understood in a strongly ethical sense, whether or not Gadamer himself 
fully explored or understood this.  Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis says more and entails more 
than he himself seems to have realized.   
In particular, Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis, according to his own hermeneutical 
presuppositions, is the retrieval not of an abstract concept, or of a clearly defined piece of 
terminology invented by Aristotle, but rather it is the retrieval of a whole great historical 
tradition of thinking about and wrestling with the phenomena named by that ancient Greek word.  
Gadamer’s claims about the nature of concepts and their relationship to history and tradition very 
clearly point in this direction.  However, Gadamer does not appear to have fully grasped how 
those claim “apply” to his own retrieval of phronēsis.  Therefore, by re-retrieving the concept of 
                                                
2 Two examples that emphasize an ethical reading of Gadamer’s work, and which I refer to occasionally 
in the dissertation, are the following: P. Christopher Smith, Hermeneutics and Human Finitude; and the 
recent book by Monica Villhauer, Gadamer’s Ethics of Play: Hermeneutics and the Other. 
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phronēsis in a “Gadamerian” manner, I am able to argue for a view of “hermeneutic ethics” that 
is deeply indebted to Gadamer, but which points in relatively unexplored or long forgotten 
directions, and toward new possibilities for thinking through the general relationship between 
ethics and the process of interpretation.    
The Question: What is the Relationship between Ethics and Interpretation? 
Since at least Schleiermacher it has become commonplace for modern hermeneuticists to affirm 
the unity of “understanding” and “interpretation,” and to reject the possibility that reading could 
ever be an interpretation-free activity for human beings.3  Put baldly, wherever and whenever 
reading occurs, it does so on the basis of some interpretive (not yet explicit) framework, “lens,” 
“tradition,” or hermeneutical apparatus, and so on.  Thus the English word “reading” can today 
also mean “interpretation” - for example, when one says that another’s “reading” (i.e., their 
interpretation) of something was not very good.   
However, what has been far less of a common concern, at least until very recently, is to 
consider the act of reading and interpretation as an ethical matter.  I do not mean (1) that one’s 
interpretation of a text may have ethical consequences - for example, in the way a biblical text or 
political speech can be interpreted in such a way so as to seemingly countenance some unjust 
behavior or institution.  Recognition of that kind of connection between interpretation and ethics 
                                                
3 Thus for all their disagreements, both E.D. Hirsch in his Validity in Interpretation and Gadamer are in 
agreement about this particular unity, at least.  For an historical overview of Schleiermacher’s role in 
affirming the unity of “understanding” and “interpretation,” see sections II.3.1.A.i-ii of Gadamer’s Truth 
and Method, titled “The prehistory of romantic hermeneutics,” and “Schleiermacher’s project of a 
universal hermeneutics.”  I will refer to the structure of Truth and Method throughout the dissertation in 
this way, where, for example, “II.3.1.A.i-ii” refers to Part “II,” chapter “3,” section “1,” and subsections 
“A.i-ii.”   
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has been present at least since Plato, who criticized the traditional Greek muthoi for ethical 
reasons.4  Relatedly, neither do I mean (2) that there is a way of reading that up-builds or informs 
one’s ethical character and behavior, such as reading for “edification.”  That insight has been so 
pervasive that it might well be said that “edifying” literature is at the very core of our Indo-
European literary heritage.   
As important as they are, neither of those two types of an intersection between reading 
and ethics comprise the focus of this dissertation.  Rather, I mean that the interpretive act itself is 
one which may have an ethical dimension or basis to it.  This would mean, among other things, 
that in the consideration of what constitutes a truly exemplary reader or interpreter, we would 
partially have to consider his or her ethical-interpretive virtues and vices in some form or 
another.  Ubiquitous in the works of late ancient and medieval commentators and spiritual 
writers, for example, the idea that an appropriate understanding of a text could be, at least 
partially, dependent on one’s character, may strike us today as utterly foreign, moralistic, and 
obviously incorrect.  “Foreign,” because it has generally not even been a topic of discussion in 
modern and contemporary philosophy until very recently; and “obviously incorrect,” for the 
related reason that the act of interpretation has been viewed by modern philosophers merely as 
one particular epistemic problem with little connection to supposedly extra-epistemic matters 
such as one’s ethical character.  Finally, “moralistic,” because one may fear that in beginning to 
ask about the intersection between ethics and the act of interpretation, we may be led into 
                                                
4 It is worth noting that Plato is following a trend of criticism that can be seen already in the works of the 
tragedians, as well as lyric poets such as Pindar.  Perhaps it would be better to view Plato, even at his 
most “radical,” as a Greek philosopher who stands within the tradition of Greek “religion” (admittedly a 
complicated term to apply here), which seemingly from the start was a tradition alive with self-critique 
and re-innovation of its understanding of the gods and their behaviors. 
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erroneously speculating about the ethical character of another interpreter or scholar qua 
interpreter - an “ad hominem” attack if ever there was one.  Nevertheless, the connection 
between reading and ethics is one which Hans-Georg Gadamer, by appealing to the concept of 
“phronēsis,” began to inquire into through his seminal work of 1960, Truth and Method; and it is 
that connection that I wish to probe more deeply.  What I hope to offer at the end of the 
dissertation is a coherent and compelling account of a “hermeneutic ethics,” which can be 
viewed (1) as a natural extension of the concept of phronēsis from its Greek historical 
development, and which (2) avoids any of the worries just stated. 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter One sets the philosophical stage by reconstructing Gadamer’s hermeneutic view about 
the nature of conceptuality, thereby explaining why and how phronēsis qua philosophical 
concept will be approached throughout the rest of the dissertation in the way that it is.  In a 
certain respect, this chapter offers an account of the “methodology” of Gadamerian thinking, to 
the extent that there is one.  The chapter begins by asking the question “what is a concept 
according to Gadamer?” and then proceeds by reconstructing what I take to be the unique 
hallmarks of Gadamer’s hermeneutic understanding of the concept.  I organize these chief 
features under the three headings of “history,” “experience,” and “dialogue,” and give an account 
of their role in the formation and nature of conceptuality according to Gadamer’s work.  Aside 
from accurately representing key features of Gadamer’s philosophy, the philosophical goal of 
this chapter is to show just what it means to speak of a philosophical concept as a “tradition” for 
which one may be responsible.   
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 The next two chapters (Chapter Two and Chapter Three) then apply this hermeneutic 
understanding of conceptuality in a concrete historical direction, and introduce the topic of 
“phronēsis” explicitly.  Over the course of this long historical exploration, I make a contribution 
to the intellectual history of the development of ancient Greek ethics by showing the historical 
background and intellectual contexts out of which Aristotle would eventually articulate his 
influential understanding of “phronēsis.”  Chapter Two explores the earliest etymological and 
intellectual roots of “phronēsis” in three figures across three different domains: that is, Homer 
(poetry), Hippocrates (medicine), and Heraclitus (pre-Socratic philosophy).  Chapter Three then 
shifts into the specifically Athenian intellectual climate of 5th/4th century BCE.  In this chapter I 
first show how the concept of phronēsis provided an important site of contention (one among 
many to be sure) between the philosopher Plato and the rhetorician Isocrates.  Second, I show 
how Aristotle’s own account of phronēsis, as put forward in Nicomachean Ethics VI, can be 
fruitfully interpreted and understood on the basis of this historical context.  The result of this 
chapter shows concretely how Aristotle ought to be understood as both participant, inheritor, and 
(re-)founder of an intellectual tradition concerning phronēsis. 
 Chapter Four explicitly begins the process of tying together the work done in previous 
chapters with the main philosophical problematic of the dissertation - that is, the question of to 
what extent the interpretive act itself has an ethical component to it.  Gadamer’s famous retrieval 
of phronēsis has been much discussed, both in its own right and, to some extent, in connection 
with Aristotle’s own analysis of the concept.  However, having previously shown (in Chapter 
One) what it means to understand a concept as a kind of tradition - and, in the case of phronesis 
(in Chapter Two and Chapter Three), the basic outlines of the developing tradition as it occurred 
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from Homer to Aristotle - we are put in a much better philosophical position (in Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five) to understand and critically evaluate Gadamer’s own retrieval of that tradition.   
Thus in chapters Four and Five, I articulate a view of Gadamer’s retrieval of the concept of 
phronēsis for hermeneutics via a close re-reading of key sections of Truth and Method, as well 
through an engagement with several of his later writings, and by considering the status of 
Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” in general. 
In Chapter Four I analyze Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis in Truth and Method by 
showing how it functions as an answer to a particular question or problem – namely, the so-
called hermeneutical problem of “application” (Anwendung); a problem, which Gadamer refers 
to as the “fundamental problem of hermeneutics.”5  According to Gadamer’s view, 
understanding – insofar as it requires an act of “application” – is a kind of praxis, or the 
performance of a concrete act.6    Gadamer scholars have not always been clear enough about the 
complexity and difficulty of the concept of hermeneutic application, and I hope to make the 
retrieval of phronēsis more intelligible by first clarifying the nature of hermeneutic application 
and showing precisely why it necessitated Gadamer’s turn to Aristotle.  In Chapter Five, I 
explicitly offer a “strongly ethical” interpretation of Gadamer’s retrieval of Aristotle, both in 
Truth and Method, and for his “philosophical hermeneutics” generally.7  Although the great 
majority of attention to Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis has centered on Truth and Method, I 
                                                
5 Cf. the sub-section title in Truth and Method, II.4.2. 
 
6 Thus Gadamer speaks of “interpretation” as a “process” or “performance” (Vollzug). 
 
7 This “ethical view” is opposed, for example, to the view that Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis is merely 
metaphorical, or ought to be understood in merely Heideggerian terms – i.e., as an existential structure of 
Dasein.  
8 
 
 
 
hope to show why this focus on Truth and Method is insufficient, and, furthermore, why drawing 
from Gadamer’s later writings in particular reveals his strong concern for a “hermeneutic ethics” 
grounded in the concept of phronēsis.   
 Finally, in the Conclusion, I begin to articulate one way in which Gadamer’s work 
needs to be critically extended for an adequate hermeneutic ethics.  Although Gadamer’s 
retrieval of phronēsis opens up one basic way forward for thinking about the intersection of 
ethics and interpretation, the (missing) role of virtues of character and affectivity in relation to 
phronēsis haunt this retrieval.  In this last chapter, then, I indicate, albeit only provisionally, the 
outlines of what I would call an “emotionally healthy hermeneutics” via a retrieval of the 
“phrēn” (heart) as relevant for a hermeneutic ethics grounded in “phronēsis.”   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CONCEPT AS TRADITION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
“Whatever I say, it is not my word alone” – Plato, Apology, 20e 
 
This dissertation comprises a series of hermeneutical studies on the concept of 
phronēsis.  What a “concept” is, however, requires some clarification; and, specifically, what a 
concept is for a philosophical hermeneutics such as Gadamer’s.  In other words, how does 
Gadamer understand the nature of a concept (Begriff), and what are the unique or defining 
features of a hermeneutically well-grounded conceptuality (Begrifflichkeit), on which our 
following studies on the concept of phronēsis will be based?  Stated another way, the task of this 
first chapter is to clarify what it means to think (hermeneutically) in concepts, or perhaps even to 
clarify the way or “method” of hermeneutic thinking.  The thinker of Truth and Method, we will 
see, was not without his method(s). 
 Although the real analysis and explanation will only be given throughout this chapter, 
it may be useful to state, in a general way, the most essential features of a hermeneutical account 
of a concept: namely, the essential roles played by (1) history, (2) experience, and (3) dialogue in 
the languages that support our philosophical thinking and the development of concepts.  By 
highlighting these three unique, interrelated facets of Gadamer’s approach to the nature of 
concepts, this chapter will argue that concepts are best understood as dynamic hermeneutic 
traditions. 
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 The structure of the chapter is as follows: I take “history, “experience,” and “dialogue” 
each in turn, detailing their function in a Gadamerian account of concept (re-)formation.  For 
each, I will also briefly discuss some of the relevant historical context in which Gadamer’s 
thinking moved and developed.  Providing at least a small glimpse into the historical background 
of Gadamer’s thinking about concepts has the benefit also of serving as one concrete example of 
how conceptual thinking necessarily develops in relation to history, experience, and dialogue.  
As an overview of the chapter, I offer the following schema (with the immediate historical-
intellectual contexts in the parentheses).  The most essential features of Gadamer’s 
understanding of the concept are: 
1. History (Begriffsgeschichte vs. Problemgeschichte) 
2. Experience (Phenomenology vs. Characteristica Universalis) 
3. Dialogue (Question and Answer vs. Weltanschauung) 
For the reader acquainted with the structure of Gadamer’s magnum opus Truth and Method, the 
structure of this chapter may seem rather familiar.  The last sections of Part Two (II.4.3 A – C), 
which together fall under the heading “Analysis of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein 
[historically effected consciousness],” repeat the movement of thinking from history to 
experience, and culminating in dialogue.1  Methodologically, then, this chapter is precisely as it 
should be: for the concept of “wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein,” which I will explain below, 
                                                
1 These sections of Truth and Method come just after the sections that retrieve Aristotle’s concept of 
phronēsis in order to discuss the “hermeneutical problem of application”: thus this dissertation in a way 
simply reverses this movement.  This structure shows up again in the latter sections of Part Three of Truth 
and Method (i.e., III.5.2.C – 3.A) where the movement of thought proceeds from history and experience 
to dialogue. 
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is fundamental to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and so analyzing the nature of conceptuality on that 
basis is just what one should expect.2    
 The relevant literature for this chapter, aside from Gadamer’s 1960 Truth and Method, 
is comprised of three late essays.3  The first is his 1992 programmatic piece on language, 
“Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language.”  The second and third are his two sorely 
neglected “Begriffsgeschichte” (History of Concepts) essays of 1969 and 1970: 
“Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie,” and “The History of Concepts and the Language of 
Philosophy.”4 
History: Gadamer’s Methodological Commitment to a Certain “Begriffsgeschichte” 
Setting the Historical Scene: the Emergence of an Historical Consciousness 
In his 1887 work, On the Genealogy of Morals (Moral), Nietzsche, speaking of concepts 
(Begriffe), declares that, “only that which has no history can be defined.”5  His rhetorical flourish 
                                                
2 As Donatella Di Cesare puts it, “the concept of effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte) is the central 
point around which the theoretical part of Truth and Method turns.  After he overcomes the 
instrumentalism of historical consciousness, Gadamer spends the rest of the book exploring the 
consequences for historical and linguistic experience that arise from the new consciousness of effective 
history” (Gadamer. A Philosophical Portrait, 93).  Cesare does not, however, link the discussion of 
Gadamer’s terminology to the matter of “Begriffsgeschichte” as I am here. 
 
3 I am in no way claiming that these are the only texts that discuss the subject matter of this chapter, but 
such comprehensiveness would be both exhausting (for writer and reader alike) and unnecessary given the 
stated aim of telling the reader what understanding I myself have come to about the matter (Sache). 
 
4 Aside from the works just listed, I will also draw on some of the following pieces of Gadamer’s work:  
“Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie”; “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy”; “Die 
Philosophie und ihre Geschichte”; “Historik und Sprache” (in which Gadamer discusses with the 
Historian Reinhart Koselleck – the primary developer of “Begriffsgeschichte” after Gadamer); “Semantics 
and Hermeneutics”; and especially the late (1992), programmatic essay, “Towards a Phenomenology of 
Ritual and Language.” 
 
5 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, II.13.  
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here works by exaggerating the tension between “history” and “definition” – an exaggeration 
symptomatic of the philosophical period in which an “historical consciousness” was emerging.6  
Despite its exaggeration, the quote remains instructive nonetheless.  There is indeed a fear that if 
our very words and concepts are themselves historical creatures “on the move,” then we cannot 
truly fix, stabilize, universalize, or objectively justify the philosophical claims that we make.7  If 
our concepts have their own historicity, then, so this anxious line of thinking goes, the 
universality of a concept’s meaning seems to be lost.8  Indeed, not just philosophy, but the act of 
communication itself seems then to be historically relativized by the influx of an historical 
awareness.  Nietzsche showed something of this in his “genealogy” of the concepts (Begriffe) of 
good and evil (Böse), and today the debates surrounding the various problems of 
“incommensurability” (e.g., the incommensurability among competing natural-scientific 
paradigms) show that we are still grappling with the philosophical consequences of the last 200 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
6 By “historical consciousness” I refer to that, post-Hegelian period in which there arose an explicit 
awareness – on the part of philosophers, historians, theologians, philologists, etc. – of the effect of history 
and historical context on a past writer or thinker’s work.  Slowly, over the course of the 19th and early 
20th centuries, the consequences of this consciousness for oneself as present writer or thinker began to 
come into view (e.g., am I myself not also shaped by history and a historical context?).  However, as we 
will see, it was Gadamer’s work that most clearly analyzed this situation. 
 
7 This is just what Nietzsche declares in the passage from which the quote is taken: today (heute), it is 
impossible to say (zu sagen) why we “punish” (strafen). 
 
8 In contemporary hermeneutic literature, the reaction to this kind of thinking has generated renewed 
attempts to fix the meaning of the hermeneutic object – e.g., to the author’s intention.  Cf. E.D. Hirsch’s 
Validity in Interpretation.  For a more recent, and highly nuanced, view about that status of authorial 
intent, and one which maintains some Gadamerian inspiration, see Pol Vandevelde’s The Task of the 
Interpreter: Text, Meaning, and Negotiation. 
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years.9  In this respect at least, we might do well to think less in terms of the “end” of modern 
philosophy, and rather of the “rise” of an historical consciousness, which knows very well the 
idiosyncrasies and differences between centuries, texts, cultures, and thinkers, and all too little of 
that which binds us together.  Gadamer’s work is explicitly, self-consciously situated within this 
particular context.  How then does his understanding of the concept and of conceptuality take 
shape in light of an historical consciousness? 
Gadamer’s understanding of the concept is bound up with the development of German 
historiography at the turn of the 20th century, which, in part, sought to respond to the apparent 
problem of historical consciousness.  In Part Two of Gadamer’s Truth and Method, the chapter 
titled “Historical Preparation” traces the various counteracting attempts made by late 19th 
century German historians and philosophers to develop a method (Methode) that could serve as 
guarantor of historical objectivity.  In this way, the claim of Nietzsche’s aphorism would lose its 
rhetorical force via the counterweight of an objectifying method, which would fix the meaning of 
terms despite their apparent historical plurality.  In particular, the Neo-Kantian development of a 
“Problemgeschichte” (history of problems) and Wilhelm Dilthey’s Critique of Historical Reason 
– a title to be taken expressly in the Kantian sense of “critique” – functioned in this regard.10  
With respect to a “history of problems” (Problemgeschichte), Gadamer notes that, “the 
                                                
9 For a helpful hermeneutical discussion of the problem of “incommensurability,” see Chapter One of 
Richard Bernstein’s Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. 
 
10 In truth the German philosophers and historians were reacting not so much to Nietzsche as to Hegel’s 
philosophy of history, which is indeed the ground zero for Western philosophy’s historical turn.  
Moreover, it was Hegel’s 1827 Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, which provides the 
first instance – perhaps his coinage – of the word “Begriffsgeschichte.”  Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction 
to the Philosophy of History (trl. Leo Rauch), 9.  With respect to Gadamer, one might say that his 
position, which we will articulate below, lies “between Nietzschean genealogy and Hegelian sublation.” 
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methodological claim [or hope] of the history of problems is striking. Once we establish the 
identity of those problems that extend throughout the history of philosophy as the perpetually 
recurring, fundamental questions of human thought, we then gain a firm foundation against the 
danger of foundering in historical relativism.”11 
Yet in Truth and Method Gadamer systematically shows how this very claim or hope of 
such historiographic methods founders in light of the insight into a historicity at work in even the 
most rigorous of methodologies.12  Alasdair MacIntyre echoes Gadamer’s move here:  “The 
teaching of method is nothing other than the teaching of a certain kind of history.”13  What then 
does this mean for Gadamer’s own work?  Does Gadamer have no “method” for handling the 
historical element of concepts?  Should we understand Truth and Method to be arguing for a kind 
of historical relativism about language?  Indeed, Gadamer does not have a “method,” if this is 
taken to mean a procedure for controlling or neutralizing historical nuances, differences, and 
particularities.  It must be acknowledged, for example, that the 5th century Athenian polis is not 
“the same” as the nation-state of 19th and 20th century European and American political 
philosophy – and so the “problems” raised in one context cannot simply be taken as identical to 
those raised in another.   
                                                
11 Gadamer will undercut this through the “critical” or “destructive” work of “Begriffsgeschichte,” 
through which one can call into question the universal “identity” of such “recurring problems” throughout 
history.  Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 1. 
 
12 I will not discuss here the details of Gadamer’s engagements with the Neo-Kantian historians here.  For 
an overview, see Jean Grondin, “The Neo-Kantian Heritage in Gadamer,” in Neo-Kantianism in 
Contemporary Philosophy, 92-112. 
 
13  Bernstein, 53.  Bernstein cites the source as MacIntyre’s essay, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic 
Narrative and the Philosophy of Science,” but he specifies that the quote comes from the “original 
typescript.”  I am unable to verify the location of the quote outside of Bernstein’s citations. 
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That said, Gadamer’s “history of concepts” (Begriffsgeschichte) remains a kind of 
methodos or philosophical path of thinking, the implementation of which can be found at work 
throughout his writings.  Gadamer’s specific form of “Begriffsgeschichte” helps to correct our 
understanding of the role of history in our concepts, and shows how progress in thinking is still 
possible without denying the great role that differing historical contexts play in that thinking.  
What then exactly is Gadamer’s understanding of “Begriffsgeschichte” (history of concepts)? 
Gadamer’s “Method”: Between Begriffsgeschichte and Problemgeschichte 
In the short paper “Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity. Subject and Person,” presented in 
1975, Gadamer speaks explicitly of this “methodology”: 
Now, I have long followed the methodological principle (den methodischen Grundsatz) 
to undertake nothing without giving an account of the history of a concept.  One must 
take into account the anticipations of our language (der Vorgreiflichkeit unserer Sprache) 
for our philosophizing by seeking clarity about the implications of the concepts with 
which philosophy is concerned.14 
Perhaps such a claim would be surprising for those who suppose that Gadamer’s work is 
“against” or “opposed” to the employment and necessity of scholarly “methods” in the 
Geisteswissenschaften.15  Indeed, one might be tempted to write off the comment above were it 
                                                
14 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Subjektivität und Intersubjektivität. Subjekt und Person,” 87-9. Boldface mine.  
The essay has been translated into English as “Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity,” Continental Philosophy 
Review, vol. 33 n.3 (2000), pp. 275-287.  The quote can be found on page 276.  See also David Vessey’s 
helpful paper which originally alerted me to Gadamer’s remark here.  David Vessey, “Gadamer’s 
Interpretive Practice,” presented at the 2014 NASPH meeting, can be found online at 
http://www.davevessey.com/Gadamer_interpretive_Practice.pdf.  
 
15 Gadamer comments in the “Forward to the Second Edition” of Truth and Method: “I did not remotely 
intend to deny the necessity of methodical work within the human sciences…”  The question is rather 
whether, for philosophy, there could be such a procedure that would remove the burden of actual thinking 
or guarantee “results” (Ergebnisse).  And what does “results” mean for the human (or social) sciences?  
Cf. Truth and Method, xxvi. 
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not repeated very clearly and consistently throughout his works, e.g., in his 1960 Truth and 
Method: 
Key concepts and words which we still use acquired their special stamp [in the past], and 
if we are not to be swept along by language (nicht von der Sprache trieben lassen will), 
but strive for a reasoned historical self-understanding (ein begründetes geschichtliches 
Selbstverständnis), we must face a whole host of questions about verbal and conceptual 
history (von Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte).16 
Or again in his 1977 autobiography, Philosophical Apprenticeships:  
The history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte) seems to me to be a precondition 
(Vorbedingung) for responsible critical philosophizing in our time, and it is only along 
the route of the history of words (Wortgeschichte) that the history of concepts can move 
forward.17 
The autobiographical context of this last quotation concerns Gadmaer’s role, together with 
Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, in editing and contributing to the Historisches Wörterbuch 
der Philosophie, as well as the Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte.18  In fact, one of Gadamer’s 
principal contributions to the discipline of history involves his association with 
“Begriffsgeschichte” as a form of historiography.  However, that is not to say that Gadamer 
understood “Begriffsgeschichte” in the same way that historians, such as his student Reinhart 
Koselleck, did.19  As we will see, Gadamer expressly denies that it is best understood as a new, 
                                                
16 Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke Band 1. Hermeneutik 1: Wahrheit und Methode, 15. 
 
17 Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships, 148.  The original German version, Philosophische 
Lehrjahre. Eine Rückschau, was published in 1977 by Vittorio Klostermann.  Cf. Philosophische 
Lehrjahre, 183. 
 
18 Gadamer took over the journal after its founder, Erich Rothacker, died.  Gadamer was also active in 
founding and editing other journals, such as the Philosophische Rundschau (founded in 1953 with Helmut 
Kuhn), but these do not necessarily tie themselves to the issue of “Begriffsgeschichte.” 
 
19 István M. Fehér is thus right to say “what Gadamer calls ‘conceptual history’…is in some sense his 
method,” but what I am saying in this chapter is that the emphasis must be placed on the “what Gadmaer 
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competing form of “historiography.”20  Rather, Gadamer’s advocacy of “Begriffsgeschichte” – 
transformed, as we will see, by his difficult concept of “wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein” – 
is a philosophical position rooted in his (transformed) understanding of the nature of history and 
our philosophical or intellectual relation to the past.  As we will see, Gadamer denies that an 
“historical consciousness” can ever actually engage its historical object (e.g., a past text) without 
itself being a participant in the very history that it seeks to “objectify.”  This means that every 
engagement with the past, even where it seeks to let the past speak “on its own terms” – and 
indeed we must do our best to make that possible – is always already a re-appropriation or 
“application” of that past.21  The words we use today to translate the words of the long past are 
themselves words born from all the days in between that separate us from that past.22   
Is the historical past of philosophy “gone” or is it somehow still “with us?”  If the Neo-
Kantian approach of “Problemgeschichte” seemed to ground the past of philosophy in a timeless, 
                                                                                                                                                       
calls…” and not on “Begriffsgeschichte” as a term as such.  Cf. István M. Fehér, “Love of Words - Love 
of Wisdom. Philology and Philosophy from a Hermeneutical Perspective,” 1.  Today, for example, as one 
can see in journals like Contributions to the History of Concepts that although Koselleck and the English 
philosopher-historian Quentin Skinner shape the journal’s philosophical heritage, it is not clear how much 
of a real link remains to Gadamer’s position.  For a discussion of the concept of “Begriffsgeschichte” as it 
pertains to historians and to the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, as well as (some of) 
Gadamer’s efforts in this area, see the following articles: Jan-Werner Müller, “On Conceptual History”; 
Melvin Richter, “Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas”; and Melvin Richter, “Conceptual History 
(Begriffsgechichte) and Political Theory.’   
 
20 “What the history of concepts as philosophy [Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie] is concerned with, is 
not the history of philosophy [Geschichte der Philosophie].”  We will have occasion to explore this 
comment below.  Cf. Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 13. 
 
21 I will discuss Gadamer’s concept of “application” (Anwendung) in Chapter Four in more detail. 
 
22  One could wonder to what extent the general neglect of our late ancient and entire “medieval” 
philosophical history has contributed to a present misunderstanding of both ourselves as philosophers and 
our understanding of its Western origins in classical Athens. 
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a-historical grappling with “universal problems” (such as “the problem” of freedom or 
knowledge), the radical historicism of a history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte) seemed, by 
contrast, all too ready to emphasize the profound “past-ness” of an historical work by articulating 
– often in staggeringly detailed scholarship – the vast differences of the contexts in which 
various philosophers lived and worked.23  Gadamer is explicit about this competition between 
Problem- and Begriffsgeschichte: “in so far as the history of concepts [Begriffsgeschichte] seeks 
critically to overcome the naïve mirroring of oneself that we find in the hypostasizing of the 
“problem,” the impression may arise that the history of concepts involves a radicalization of 
historicism.”24 Although Gadamer will deny the accuracy of this impression, we can gain a sense 
for how this wrong impression arises in the first place by offering the following example: 
To treat the concept of “freedom” as a constant and universal “problem” of philosophy 
presupposes that we who inquire into this problem already have discovered and properly 
described a stable, determinate “object” (Gegenstand) for philosophical investigation – namely, a 
suprahistorical, universal concept of “freedom.”25  However, a glance at the history of the 
                                                
23 The German “Problemgeschichte” approach found its English counterpart in Bertrand Russell’s 
Philosophy and its Problems, which R.G. Collingwood, the English counterpart to German 
“Begriffsgeschichte,” criticized heavily in his Autobiography.  As a “reception history” it would be 
interesting to trace the subsequent influence – and lack of influence – which Collingwood and Russell had 
on English-speaking historians and philosophers respectively.  Where exactly A.O. Lovejoy’s “history of 
ideas” fits in would likewise have to be taken into account in such a study.  Cf., Elizabeth A Clark’s, 
History, Theory, Text. Historicism and the Linguistic Turn.  See also, Chris Lawn, “Gadamer and the 
dialogue between philosophy and its history.”   
 
24 Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 2. 
 
25 Gadamer discusses this example in both his “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie” and “The History of 
Concepts and the Language of Philosophy.”  The opening paragraphs of “Begriffsgeschichte als 
Philosophie” clearly echo Hegel’s introductory comments in the Encyclopedia concerning the problem of 
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concept of “freedom” calls into question the commensurability, let alone identity, of that concept 
across even a small sample of philosophical epochs.  Is (1) the modern hunt for an uncaused 
cause (or “free choice”) in light of the apparent determinism of nature really the same (or 
commensurate) problem of freedom that is at issue when (2) a theologian speaks of the freedom 
of being “yoked” to Christ, or when (3) the Stoics and Epicureans speak of the “eleutheria” of a 
stable, unperturbed soul, or when (4) Plato has Socrates consider the, at once moral-ethical and 
social-political, difference between the “free citizen” (as member of a polis) and a slave or a 
“slavish” person, and so on?26  
Gadamer’s understanding of a “history of concepts,” however, is importantly different 
from either a “history of problems,” or a history of concepts qua mere radical historicism, which 
merely proliferates the (awareness of) historically different understandings of a concept.  Rather, 
Gadamer’s advocacy for the work of radical historicism is only one, albeit necessary, “critical” 
moment within a larger philosophical whole:  “the disintegration of the identity of the problem 
does not lead to the total instability of arbitrary opinions and dogmas, into which the history of 
philosophy would then dissolve.  Rather, reflection on the history of concepts entails an 
intensified, critical consciousness of historical tradition, and the appropriation of the essential 
                                                                                                                                                       
the “beginning” of philosophy and of determining its true “Gegenstand.”  Gadamer echos this again at the 
beginning of his published lectures, Der Anfang des Wissens. 
 
26 To take a different example, one can think of the easy confusion that can occur when discussing 
Platonic “ideas” alongside Locke, and in a 21st century classroom of undergraduates who have their own 
conception of “idea” in play as well. 
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content of that tradition.”27  The ongoing “appropriation of the essential content” of a tradition 
names, for Gadamer, the movement of conceptual thinking.  In order to see how this works, we 
need to stress that at the heart of Gadamer’s own form of “Begriffsgeschichte” is his 
understanding of “wirkungsgeschichte” (effective history) and especially of 
“wikrungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein” (historically effected consciousness).  Thus to proceed 
further with our explanation of the role of history in concept (re-)formation, we need first to 
explain how Gadamer uses these two terms. 
Wirkungsgeschichte and Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein 
The term “effective history” or “historical effect” (wirkungsgeschichtliches) – 
traditionally understood as a reception history – when applied to a text, highlights the continuous 
impact (Wirkung) of that text throughout its various historical receptions by those who receive it 
from those who hand down (überliefert, tradit, paradidōsi) the text.28  The meaning of Plato’s 
Symposium, for example, cannot be simply fixed or identified with its original historical context 
because, as a work (ergon), which continues to work (i.e., it is wirklich, and is in a state of 
energeia), we cannot study the Symposium merely as a “past” historical “object.”  Plato’s 
Symposium is not “past” because it is still speaking somehow into today’s world – not in spite of, 
but because of the 2,000+ years of its being handed down.  Strictly speaking, the Symposium is 
not “a book” but a tradition and an effect or force to be reckoned with.  Gadamer is explicit here: 
                                                
27 Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 2.  See also the quote from 
Gadamer’s autobiography given just above. 
 
28 The history of Plato’s Symposium includes, for example, its eventual contact with 18th and 19th English 
romanticism through Percy Bysshe Shelley’s translation of “The Banquet,” which Mary Shelley 
published in bowdlerized form in 1840.   
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the true “object” (Gegenstand) of hermeneutics is our linguistic (sprachlich) tradition 
(Überlieferung) – which is not and cannot become an actual “object” (Objekt) for us.29 
Likewise, the concepts and words that we today use to read, translate, understand or 
interpret Plato’s Symposium are first given to and transformed by us through our teachers, who in 
turn received and transformed them through their teachers, and so on.30   The “hermeneutic 
situation” of the present forms the occasion for the further effect and working out of the past 
through its continual (re-)application or (re-)appropriation. 
And yet mere awareness of “Wirkungsgeschichte” – qua a history of reception – is not 
what Gadamer means with the cumbersome phrase “wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein.”  It is 
one thing to simply recognize that a text or concept that is handed down into varying historical 
contexts and varying hermeneutic situations is always read and understood differently 
throughout those contexts.  But what is the nature of this “recognition”?  For Gadamer it is the 
sudden recognition (anagnōrisis) that we too will approach those same texts or concepts 
differently through being historically and hermeneutically situated.  Gadamer phrases this in 
                                                
29 See the section of Truth and Method, “Language as determination of the hermeneutic object” 
(III.5.1.A). 
 
30  Thus we are already beginning to have enough distance from the turn of the 20th century to be able to 
detect a clear difference in the concepts and language employed by W.D. Ross to interpret Plato and 
Aristotle from those in many circles today.  Soon someone will have to write a piece of intellectual 
history concerning the revival of English language Aristotle scholarship from the late 19th century to the 
late 20th.  We will need such a history when the interpretive concepts employed by those earlier scholars 
ceases to really be the language we speak any longer.  Such a situation is already prefaced with 
emergence of new English translations of the Greek texts. 
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quasi-Hegelian language: there are philosophical consequences for an historical consciousness 
that “becomes aware of itself” as an historical consciousness.31  
What then specifically is an “historically effected consciousness” 
(wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein)?32  In speaking of an historical consciousness that has 
become aware of itself, Gadamer opens his section on “historically effected consciousness” in 
Truth and Method by critiquing the presumption that this “becoming aware of itself” entails, in 
the style of a Reflexionsphilosophie, any rising above the effect or impact of history.  One might 
be tempted to think, in this vein, that once we recognize the force of history on our 
interpretations and translations of Plato or Aristotle or a sacred scripture, we must then search for 
a way to circumvent or deaden the force of that history in an effort to win back an objectively 
true interpretation or translation that would remain valid universally.  However, what Gadamer 
means by saying that “understanding proves to be a kind of effect and knows itself as such,”33 is 
that such knowledge is precisely the knowledge of one’s limitations, and the knowledge that one 
cannot control or master the effect of history as such: 
We are not saying, then, that history of effect must be developed as a new independent 
discipline ancillary to the human sciences, but that we should learn to understand 
ourselves better and recognize that in all understanding, whether we are expressly aware 
                                                
31 “Understanding proves to be a kind of effect and knows itself as such.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
336.   
 
32 Gadamer says that “wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein is something other than inquiry into the 
history of a particular work’s effect – as it were, the trace a work leaves behind” – i.e., something other 
than reception history, although reception history is important precisely because it brings into focus the 
continuity of a text over time as an unfolding tradition.  Cf. TM, 336. 
 
33  Gadamer, TM, 336. 
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of it or not, the efficacy of history is at work…even where faith in method leads one to 
deny one’s own historicity.34   
 This then is the first meaning of a historically effected consciousness:  namely, to 
recognize our own limitations as a finite human consciousness that is what it is thanks to the 
tradition into which it (partially) awakens and (partially) re-forms.35  Gnōthi Seauton.36   
 The second meaning of “historically effected consciousness” concerns not primarily 
the limits of human understanding, but rather of what kind of understanding is indeed possible 
for finite humans and how it is so.  Put baldly, human consciousness is historically limited in 
such a way that it is always already involved or participating in the history that it seeks to 
understand.37  Gadamer summarizes this by describing the manner in which human 
understanding “belongs” (zugehörig) to that with which it is engaged – be it a text, artwork, etc.  
To take the same example as above, we have already seen how Plato’s Symposium is not a fixed 
historical object wholly residing in 5th century Athens, but is rather a 2,000+ year old tradition.  
                                                
34 Gadamer continues: “Our need to become conscious of effective history is urgent…but this does not 
mean that it can ever be absolutely fulfilled.  That we should become completely aware of effective 
history is just as hubristic a statement as when Hegel speaks of absolute knowledge, in which history 
would become completely transparent to itself and hence be raised to the level of a concept.”  Gadamer, 
TM, 300ff. 
 
35 For his full critique of Reflexionsphilosophie, see Gadamer, TM, 336-341. 
 
36   Cf. Eliza G. Wilkens’ excellent work, “Know Thyself” in Greek and Latin Literature for a taxonomy 
of the various ways the imperative was understood throughout the classical period.   
 
37 Thus Gadamer proceeds in the same way as when he turns the “negative” recognition of hermeneutic 
“prejudices” (Vorurteile) into a “positive” ground for any understanding whatsoever.  Some 
presuppositions can be reformed or rejected, but there is no dispensing with the whole of one’s 
“interpretive glasses” as such.  The discussion of “Vorurteile” however remains abstract until it is 
connected to the nature of historically effected consciousness, and so I have not seen any need to discuss 
it here. 
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Whoever reads the Symposium, then, belongs to its world, and further “effects” or unfolds that 
tradition.  The point to be emphasized is that the text is not a static historical “object” which the 
reading “subject” stands over against as it studies it and searches for its “meaning.”  Richard 
Bernstein, commenting on Gadamer, aptly writes that, “it is important to reiterate that a tradition 
is not something “naturelike,” something “given” that stands over against us.  It is always “part 
of us” and works through its effective history…The task of effective historical consciousness is 
to bring to explicit awareness this historical affinity or belongingness.”38   
With this understanding of a “historically effected consciousness” in place, we need to 
ask what follows from this where concepts and language as such is concerned; and how does this 
further illuminate our understanding of Gadamer’s unique form of “Begriffsgeschichte”?   
Gadamer’s Hermeneutical Understanding of Begriffsgeschichte 
We have already noted that the effectiveness of history, which gives shape to and is 
entwined with our understanding, is at work also in our interpretive and thinking concepts.  We 
can see this clearly, to take a different example, by reading a work of history from the 19th 
century.  Such a work is for us often just as revealing about that author’s own presuppositions 
and hermeneutic situation as the historical subject matter the author discusses (e.g., The Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire).  Or again, glancing at different versions of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica from the last 150 years – an ostensibly objective encyclopedic display of history, 
ideas, persons, and places, etc. – can reveal how the historical period that put together a 
particular version viewed its contents.   
                                                
38 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 142.  Bernstein clarifies this statement elsewhere by 
noting, as we already have, the limited or finite nature of this human awareness of the effect of history. 
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At the same time, Gadamer notes that historical naiveté about the concepts through which 
one thinks and interprets something “becomes truly abysmal when one starts to become aware of 
the problems it raises and so demands that in understanding history one must leave one’s own 
concepts aside and think only in the concepts of the epoch one is trying to understand.”39  
Instead, a truly “historically effected consciousness” is a consciousness that is alive to (1) its 
limitations and (2) its “belonging” together with whatever it is seeking to understand – and just 
because, or to the extent that it is alive to this, it is set on the path of a more human(e) encounter 
with the hermeneutic “other” (e.g., a text).  It is a consciousness that does more justice to the 
hermeneutical situation in which we recognize ourselves as being historically “effected” (set in 
motion), and as always already engaged in a hermeneutical task of “application.”40  In light of 
this, Gadamer cannot be appropriately called either an “historical determinist” or an “historical 
relativist,” for what binds reader and text is not just the historical tradition as a “past” which 
continues to work itself out in our words and deeds as a vis a tergo (force from behind).  It is also 
the bond of a mutual concern for a particular subject matter (Sache), and which thereby 
necessarily involves the reader in a dialogue with the text about that shared matter.41  What we 
need to stress now is that to discuss or share something in common presupposes, among other 
                                                
39 Gadamer, TM, 398. 
 
40 I will save a discussion of the concept of “application” – which forms the heart of Gadamer’s retrieval 
of phronēsis – for Chapter Four of this dissertation.  Suffice it to say, Gadamer is not talking about such 
naïve “applications” as those which try to make a past text (e.g., Aristotle’s Ethics or Politics) “relevant” 
by forcing it to speak the language of contemporary, Rawlsian-inspired political liberalism.  That kind of 
“updating” has its place to a certain extent, but Gadamer is concerned to show a kind of application that is 
unavoidable, even for the classicist who wishes “only” to “understand” the text “on its own.” 
 
41 I will say more about this “Sache” in the next section on “experience” and concept formation. 
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things, (1) a common language, and (2) a mutual involvement in the subject matter.42  But what 
is the relationship between 1 and 2; that is, between word and subject matter (Sache)?  This 
question leads us back to (and will conclude) our discussion of Gadamer’s relationship to 
“Begriffsgeschichte” and “Problemgeschichte.” 
We can see a beginning of how Gadamer will ultimately transform both 
“Problemgeschichte” and “Begriffsgeschichte” by looking to his early writings.  As early as 
1924, well before his explicit articulation of an historically effected consciousness, Gadamer was 
already beginning to formulate his understanding of the nature of concepts, and of the historical 
character of language.  As the entry for “Begriffsgeschichte” in the Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie points out, Gadamer had argued early on for the necessity of a “hermeneutische 
Problemgeschichte” through the route of a “hermeneutische Begriffsgeschichte.”43  With his 
later developed understanding of an “historically effected consciousness” in play, Gadamer was 
eventually also able to speak both of his “methodological” commitment to Begriffsgeschichte, 
and also of “the real truth of Problemgeschichte.”44  If human consciousness involves its 
“belonging” together with the history or tradition that has shaped it, then the “history of 
problems” approach maintains some truth insofar as it sees the past as potentially having present 
                                                
42 I will discuss how a “common language” is both a presupposition and an ongoing task between 
hermeneutic partners in the third section of this chapter - on “dialogue.”  To understand the other requires 
that we work to create as much as already employ a “common language.” 
 
43 HWP, “Begriffsgeschichte,” 806.  As an aside, the HWP entry for “hermeneutics” was written by 
Gadamer in the style of a “history of concepts.”  On the language of “hermeneutische 
Problemgeschichte,” as well as Gadamer’s early critiques of his Marburg teachers, see his “Metaphysik 
der Erkenntnis” and “Zur Systemidee in der Philosophie.” 
 
44 For the expression, see Gadamer’s essay “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 
12. 
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relevance.45  The trouble, for Gadamer, with a “history of problems” is not that it appropriates 
the past, but that it tries to deny that what it is doing is indeed an appropriation or retrieval and 
not an ahistorical insight into a timeless philosophical problem.  Contrariwise, the trouble with a 
mere “Begriffsgeschichte” – i.e., one not transformed by an “historically effected consciousness” 
– is that its critical historicism, which rightly detects a naiveté on the part of traditional 
“Problemgeschichte,” thinks that it itself forestalls the task of hermeneutic application by 
providing such detailed, nuanced histories.46   
For Gadamer, human historical-conceptual thinking is neither to think in terms of a series 
of eternally recurring, universal problems, nor in terms of a mere bricolage of discrete “histories” 
each with clear, closed temporal boundaries that preclude any ongoing relevance or “effect.”  
The awareness that we are (co-)participants in an ongoing tradition which we are constantly re-
forming, transforms our approach to the past of that tradition:   
To think historically means, in fact, to perform the transposition that the concepts of the 
past undergo when we try to think in them.  To think historically always involves 
mediating between those ideas and one’s own thinking.  To try to escape from one’s own 
concepts in interpretation is not only impossible but manifestly absurd.  To interpret 
means precisely to bring one’s own preconceptions into play so that the text’s meaning 
can really be made to speak for us.47   
                                                
45 “We still acknowledge the legitimacy of the intention of the history of problems – namely, to recognize 
one’s own questions appearing in history.”  Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of 
Philosophy,” 2.  
 
46 Gadamer thus acknowledges that a nuanced feel for historical difference is not what separates 
“Begriffsgeschichte” from “Problemgeschichte.” Cf. “The History of Concepts and the Language of 
Philosophy,” 12-13. 
 
47 Gadamer, TM, 398. 
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In other words, the performance (Vollzug) of hermeneutics is the task of concrete 
application, which mediates between the hermeneutic poles of familiarity and strangeness at 
work in our conceptual engagement with the text.  Just as he was explicit in naming “sprachliche 
Überlieferung” (“linguistic tradition”) as the “Gegenstand” of hermeneutics, here too Gadamer is 
clear about the “Vollzug” of hermeneutics:  “the linguisticality of understanding is the concretion 
of historically effected consciousness.”48  The consideration of the place of history in our 
language is not merely accidental to a Gadamerian approach to concepts, but rather is its exact 
philosophical center.  Understanding a text involves one in the task (Aufgabe) of making its 
meaning concrete in and for the present hermeneutic situation in which one lives.  Just as the 
historically effected consciousness recognizes that it “belongs” to the world of the text, so too it 
recognizes that the text “belongs” to, or must be given a place in the world of the interpreting 
reader.  Or still better, it is to recognize that in the mediation of the world of the text and the 
world of the reader, there arises (indeed already has arisen) a common world, which binds the 
two together in a dialogue about some matter (Sache):  “There can be no speaking that does not 
bind the speaker and the person spoken to.  This is true of the hermeneutic process as well…this 
process is simply the concretion of meaning itself.”49  And again, “the text is made to speak 
through interpretation.  But no text and no book speaks if it does not speak a language that 
reaches the other person.  Thus interpretation must find the right language if it really wants to 
                                                
48 Gadamer, TM, 391. 
 
49 Gadamer, TM, 399. 
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make the text speak.”50  The (naïve) attempt to “only” interpret the text “on its own terms” on the 
basis of its “original” historical meaning in fact lacks an appropriate self-understanding of one’s 
position as reader/interpreter, as well as  an actual involvement in the claim to truth of the text.51   
We can summarize what we have learned here so far by stating the consequences for 
Gadamer’s “Begriffsgeschichte” approach insofar as it is grounded in two-fold outcome of an 
“historically effected consciousness” – viz., the awareness (1) of one’s finite, historical position 
as interpreter (i.e., one’s limitations), and also (2) of one’s communality with the hermeneutic 
object (i.e., one’s belongingness).  The necessary task of cultivating an (always limited and 
historically situated) understanding of the historicity of a text – viz., not only its “original” 
production, audience, and author, but also the history of its effect or reception – is only “one 
moment” of understanding.  The other “moment” or element involves the necessary continuation 
of a genuine dialogue with the text (concerning which we will say more below).  Gadamer 
summarizes the matter thus:   
Projecting a historical horizon, then, is only one moment in the performance of 
understanding; it does not become solidified into the self-alienation of a past 
consciousness, but is overtaken by our own present horizon of understanding.  In the 
performance of understanding, a real fusion of horizons occurs – which means that as the 
historical horizon is projected, there simultaneously occurs its sublation (Aufhebung).  
                                                
50 Gadamer, TM, 398. 
 
51 “We think we understand when we see the past from a historical standpoint – i.e., transpose ourselves 
into the historical situation and try to reconstruct the historical horizon.  In fact, however, we have given 
up the claim to find in the past any truth that is valid and intelligible for ourselves  Acknowledging the 
otherness of the other in this way, making him the object of objective knowledge, involves the 
fundamental suspension of his claim to truth.”  Gadamer, TM, 302-303. 
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We designate the controlled performance of such a fusion as the vigilance (Wachheit) of 
an historically effected consciousness.52 
 There are two consequences to this last sentence, which equates a “controlled 
performance” of interpretation or understanding with a kind of “vigilance.”  A discussion of the 
first and largest issue, i.e., the nature of a hermeneutic ethics, will have to wait for a later chapter 
of the dissertation, since it concerns Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis, and the explicit discussion 
of the central hermeneutic problem of application, which we have here only alluded to.  The 
second issue is specific to the task of this chapter, and will motivate our turn to the next section:  
namely, the “fusion of horizons” spoken of in the quote just above entails that the text and the 
interpreter participate in a shared conversation about some thing or matter (Sache).  It is the 
shared matter of concern that must be brought into focus, and concerning which the interpreter 
must understand the text as trying to speak truthfully.  Trying to appreciate the historical 
situation of a text is therefore simultaneous with the effort to understand the experience of some 
subject matter (Sache) about which the text speaks.   
Gadamer’s form of “Begriffsgeschichte,” therefore seeks to “concretize” concepts that 
have become ossified and abstracted from their historical origins in ordinary, living language – 
where language is close to life, and where the fluid metaphorical extension of language takes 
precedence over its univocally fixed occurrence in technical discourse:  “The Aufklärung 
achieved by the history of concepts – which revives the enduring connections between concepts 
                                                
52 Boldface and translation mine.  Gadamer, GW 1, 312.  The “simultaneity” Gadamer speaks of is to be 
taken quite literally – one does not “first” study the text historically and then “second” become involved 
in a dialogue about its meaning.  Rather, even when the attempt is simply to offer a philological 
commentary on a text, or in the “mere” translation of a text, both “moments” of understanding can be 
found for one who knows how to look.  
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and the natural usage of language – consists in the concretization of the conceptual meaning of 
assertions and the freeing of this meaning from dogmatic distortions.”53  To make something 
concrete again is to open up a field of concrete experience and phenomena – and so too to open 
up “the varieties of historical experience” (to modify William James’ phrase).  Put broadly, 
becoming aware of the history or tradition in which our concepts develop is to gain a heightened 
self-understanding of our place as human thinkers: “Begriffsgeschichte ist begriffliche 
Aufklärung” although “kann begriffliche Aufklärung immer nur partial sein.”54  This 
“conceptual enlightenment” - whose pursuit is the responsibility of today’s thinker - is “partial” 
because we do not stand over against history as its objective onlookers, but as we have seen, are 
(in the ontological sense) an historically effected consciousness.55  What is more, just because we 
understand ourselves as participants in a process of handing-down (i.e., in a tradition), we also 
understand that we will - one way or another - hand-on the tradition, and the responsibility for it, 
to those who come after us.  With respect to “conceptual enlightenment,” then, future thinkers 
will always already find themselves with the task of needing to “re-concretize” the inherited 
conceptual language in the face of their own hermeneutic situation - that is to say, in the face of 
their own present concrete experience of the phenomena that shape the subject matter (Sache) of 
a past thinker’s work.  With this we have come to the next basic component of Gadamer’s 
                                                
53 Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 5. 
 
54 Gadamer, “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie,” 244-245. 
 
55 “The meaning of philosophical concepts is not determined through any arbitrary decision as to what 
they are to designate.  Rather, philosophical concepts acquire their meaning from their historical origin 
and from that ability to give rise to new meaning which these concepts themselves possess by virtue of 
the fact that philosophical thinking always takes place in linguistic forms.”  Gadamer “The History of 
Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 1-2. 
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understanding of the concept - that is, the role of experience in the (always a re-)formation of 
concepts.  
Experience and “the Conceptuality of the Concept” 
In this section of the chapter, I first introduce the basic “phenomenological” understanding of 
conceptuality (Begrifflichkeit), which forms the lasting point of departure for Gadamer’s 
subsequent thinking about the nature of concept (re-)formation and its relationship to experience 
and history.  After a brief introduction, I meet this introductory task through a careful discussion 
of the meaning of “Begrifflichkeit” in one of Heidegger’s early Marburg lecture course – the 
first, which Gadamer was to attend.  After this, I move next to a discussion of the details of a 
Gadamerian account of conceptuality and concept formation by comparing two key places in 
Truth and Method, as well as looking to his late essay “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and 
Language.” 
To the Things Themselves:  Gadamer’s Phenomenological Inheritance of “Conceptuality” 
In a short autobiographical piece, Gadamer reflects back on the historical situation in 
which he wrote his 1928 Habilitationschrift on Plato’s Philebus under Heidegger’s direction: 
Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations of the Philebus.56  Upon returning 
to the universities after the First World War, Gadamer describes the hollowness of pre-war 
cultural, philosophic, and scientific attitudes: “This was the end of an age: the age of liberalism, 
the unlimited belief in progress, and the unquestioned leadership of science within cultural life.  
                                                
56 Cf. Gadamer, Gadamer and Hermeneutics, 13-19. 
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All of this perished in the War’s battles of material.”57  What emerged for Gadamer as a 
philosophical alternative, as for so many other contemporary German (and later French) 
philosophers, was the quasi-rallying cry of the bourgeoning phenomenological movement 
(Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger) – “zu den Sachen selbst!”58  In this well known phrase, we find a 
proper philosophical point of departure for putting forward a Gadamerian account of 
“conceptuality” (Begrifflichkeit) and of “concept formation” (Begriffsbildung), whose internal 
engine of development or determination is the concrete experience of “phenomena” or “things.” 
 The young Gadamer was captivated by the cry “to the things themselves!” just as the 
Italian Renaissance thinkers, in the midst of a flourishing reading culture, cried “ad fontes!” in 
their retrieval of classical texts.59  To return to the things themselves was methodologically 
decisive for Gadamer’s conceptual engagement with (the subject matter of) Plato’s Philebus:  
This allowed me to completely subordinate my philological-historical research to my 
interests in the subject-matter, and also to set aside the problematic of what was then 
known as “value-ethics.”  It allowed me, where possible, to go back to the subject matter, 
to the phenomena…“Phenomenological Interpretations of the Philebus” thus means a 
description of the phenomena themselves, which seek on this basis the conceptual 
expression that the phenomena have found in Platonic thought.60 
                                                
57 Gadamer, Gadamer and Hermeneutics, 14. 
 
58 The influence on Gadamer of “phenomenology,” together with Dilthey’s historical reflections and the 
German translation of Kierkegaard, are together described by Gadamer as “a critical turn against 
academic philosophy: the Problemgeschichte of Neo-Kantianism and Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology.”  Gadamer, Gadamer and Hermeneutics, 15. 
 
59 Cf. Gadamer’s short excursus in Truth and Method on the conceptual history of this Renaissance 
phrase, and the philosophical and spiritual traditions that support the imagery of an emanating fountain 
(Plotinus) and of the need to always return to the wellspring of life (“as the deer longs for water, so my 
soul…”). Gadamer, TM, 502. 
 
60 Gadamer, Gadamer and Hermeneutics, 16. 
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In the case of the Philebus, that required a phenomenological description of various “Sache,” qua 
phenomenological forms of pleasure and knowledge, in order to philosophically participate in 
the real subject-matter or “problematic” of the work (i.e., “Sache,” here qua hermeneutic 
“Scopus” or intention) – namely, the question of a humanly good life within the intertwinement 
of pleasure (hēdonē) and understanding (phronēsis).61 
 Over some time the complexity of issues involved in his early “phenomenological 
investigations” of Plato’s late dialogue began to emerge for Gadamer.  Looking back on his early 
work on Plato at the age of 89, Gadamer writes:  
I then found myself confronted with a problem that would later lead me to a fundamental 
problem of hermeneutics – the linguisticality of understanding.  How is it possible, I 
asked myself at the time, to make a Greek text like Plato’s Philebus, a text which asks 
about the good in human life, speak anew from the fundamental experience of our own 
life-world?  It was necessary to make the concepts used by the Greeks speak again.  If we 
simply translate and repeat the Greek concepts, we would not discover ourselves in 
them…62 
In these reflections we find an expression of the task of this section of the chapter – namely, to 
clarify the relationship between experience (of phenomena) and the (re-)formation of the 
concepts that guide and support our thinking.  In doing so we will gain a fuller appreciation of 
what Gadamer meant by describing his form of “Begriffsgeschichte” as “an integrating moment 
                                                
61 That Sache can, in Gadamer, refer both to “phenomena” and to the hermeneutic grasp of the question 
the text (implicitly or explicitly) gives expression to, is no accident.  For how phenomena can be said to 
pose questions, cf. David Vessey, “Gadamer’s Interpretive Practice.” 
 
62 Gadamer, Gadamer and Hermeneutics, 16f.  
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in the movement of philosophical thinking, a way to reveal its inherent conceptuality 
(Begrifflichkeit).63 
Specifically, what does Gadamer mean by speaking of “conceptuality” (Begrifflichkeit) 
or the “conceptuality of the concept” (die Begrifflichkeit des Begriffs)?   We can recognize the 
phenomenological sense of this language by turning, briefly, to Martin Heidegger’s first lecture 
course given at Marburg in 1924, and now published as Basic Concepts of Aristotelian 
Philosophy.   In this course, the first course that the 24-year-old Gadamer attended, we find a 
clear alignment of “Begrifflichkeit” with “experience” and phenomenality.  
 At the very outset of the course, Heidegger describes the purpose of the lectures as 
“purely philological” (rein philologisch), and in stark contrast to any kind of philosophy as 
such.64  The Freiburgian Heidegger immediately distances himself from the style and methods of 
his Marburg colleagues by flatly declaring that the course will not involve any 
“Problemgeschichte.”65  Instead, the “entirely philological” purpose of the course is meant to 
discuss and appropriately prepare the way for a later philosophical engagement with Aristotle 
and with the philosophical concepts that are central to his thinking.  However, although 
Heidegger recommends that his students read Werner Jaeger’s works on Aristotle to gain their 
                                                
63 Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 14. 
 
64 “unsere Behandlungsart ist nicht philosophisch, die Resultate keine Philosophie.”  Heidegger, GA. 18, 
333.  Translations taken from Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (trl. Robert 
Metcalf and Mark Tanzer).  
 
65 “Keine Philosophie- und Problemgeschichte.” Heidegger, GA. 18, 332. 
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bearings, it becomes clear that the “philology” practiced in the course is something quite 
different from anything one would have expected at that time. 
 On the one hand, Heidegger defines “philology” as “the passion for knowledge of what 
has been expressed,” and he defines “conceptuality” (Begrifflichkeit) as “the substance 
[Substanz] of all scientific [Wissenschaftlichen] research” – both rather benign, introductory, 
expressions.66  On the other hand, however, these expressions are also given a precise 
“phenomenological” sense through the explanation of just what is meant by the term “basic 
concept” (Grundbegriff), which forms the title of the course.  For Heidegger here, the expression 
“basic concepts” has a double meaning – it refers both (1) to the vocabulary that is central to a 
particular thinker, and so which should be discussed in any “introductory” course (here, e.g., on 
Aristotle), as well as (2) the “basis” or “ground” or “soil” (Grund, Boden) of those “basic 
concepts.”  What is the “basis” or “soil” from which a concept (particularly here an “Aristotelian 
concept”) emerges?  To answer that question is the “philological” intent of the lecture course. 
 Specifically, Heidegger proposes that “the things [or matters] themselves” (die Sachen 
selbst) are the basis of “conceptuality.”  A “basic concept” then can be investigated by 
considering “how the matter is experienced” (wie die gemeinte Sache erfahren ist).67  Offering 
the example of Aristotle’s concept of “kinesis” (motion, Bewegung), Heidegger the philologist 
(shall we also say phenomenlogist?) tells his students that  
We must, therefore, ask what is meant by the concept of movement, in the sese of that 
which is concretely experienced [konkret erfahren] in the concept as it is meant.  What 
                                                
66 Heidegger, GA 18, 4, 6. 
 
67 Heidegger, GA 18, 13. 
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did Aristotle have in mind when he thought of movement?  Which moving phenomena 
[Bewegungsphänomene] did he have in view?...We do not ask these questions with the 
aim of gaining knowledge of a conceptual content [Begriffsinhalt], but rather we ask how 
the matter meant is experienced…68 
Concrete experience, then, forms the “soil” or “ground” of conceptuality, and so when 
Heidegger, throughout the course, speaks of the “Bodenständigkeit” (earthiness, indigenous, 
native, down-to-earth) character of conceptuality, it is primarily concretely lived experience that 
is at issue, and which needs to be exhumed if the students are going to be shown not how to 
“cognize” and play with Aristotle’s words like prefabricated game pieces, but rather to “see” 
(sehen) and “determine” (bestimmen) the matters (die Sache) or the phenomena oneself with the 
same “originality and legitimacy” (Usprünglichkeit und Echtheit) as Aristotle.69 
 At the same time, the “concrete experience” is expressed through language since “that 
which is originally seen is primarily addressed.”70  In Heidegger’s course, this involves 
consideration not only of how Aristotle “addresses” the phenomenon of movement – i.e., how 
does to he talk about it?  What language does he use? – but also of considering what “claim” 
(Anspruch) is ultimately made about movement.  The philologist – or better, the hermeneut – 
must ask, concerning Aristotle, “in what way is a phenomenon like movement addressed so as to 
                                                
68 Heidegger, GA 18, 13.    
 
69 Heidegger, GA 18, 14-15.  We must understand “Ursprünglichkeit” here in the same phenomenological 
sense as “Grund” or “Boden” – experience is the “origin” (archē) and so “legitimate basis” of every 
concept.  The romanticized “originality” of an artist in relation to her or his peers, for example, is not 
what is at issue here; and neither too are we concerned with a merely chronological or historicized sense 
of “original.” 
 
70 Heidegger, GA 18, 14. 
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accord with the guiding claim of the matter seen?”71  Heidegger repeatedly summarizes this 
account of conceptuality by distinguishing its “three aspects” as (1) the basic experience 
(Grunderfahrung), (2) the guiding claim (führenden Anspruch), and (3) the prevailing 
intelligibility (herrschende Verständlichkeit).72 
 With this we can see the sense behind Heidegger’s reaffirmation at the end of his 
introduction that his course is “preliminary” to philosophy insofar as one must first have a firm 
grasp on the “matter” (Sache) under discussion, and/or what is “meant” with a particular concept 
in philosophy before one can actually philosophize.73  The “soil” of thinking and of 
conceptualization is concrete experience, and one who does not “begin” there will not approach a 
philosophical text like Aristotle’s in the correct way.74  Heidegger summarizes this approach 
later in the course: 
The genuine interpretation [die eigentliche Interpretation] occurs in the right way, then, 
only if it is fulfilled on the ground of explicit conceptuality, if the interpretation is 
retrieved [wiederholt], is understood in accordance with the ground [Boden].  Therein, a 
general hermeneutical principle [ein allgemeiner hermeneutischer Grundsatz] appears, 
                                                
71 Heidegger, GA 18, 14. 
 
72 Heidegger, GA 18, 270.  “Prevailing” here means the particular ethos or historical situation in which a 
phenomenon or “matter” is addressed and how so.  Heidegger view Aristotle’s “endoxic method” as an 
engagement with this “prevailing intelligibility” or “doxa.”  In other words, we come to “see” phenomena 
via how it is addressed – and prior to any philosophizing this means addressed in the “down-to-earth” or 
“native” manner of the wider cultural environment as well as one’s intimate relations to those who teach 
one first to speak, and with whom one “tries out words.” 
 
73 Heidegger, GA 18, 7. 
 
74 But when do we have the “correct” grasp of our experience?  Thinking does not wait in its hunt for 
answers.  We will see how this informs Gadamer’s account of concept formation below. 
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that every interpretation is only genuine in retrieval.  Only then is it a putting-forward 
of that which no longer stands there.75 
The “retrieval” – as with so much terminology in his course – requires a phenomenological 
understanding as well.  It is by discovering and engaging with the experiences – the “soil” of 
concepts – that one is able to offer an interpretation of a past philosopher’s work.  This remains a 
legitimate task for interpreters even when it must be acknowledged that such a “recovery” or 
“unearthing” of an “original experience” necessarily involves some change.76  With this 
determination of “conceptuality” in terms of experience, and with the recognition that the 
interpretation of another thinker’s use of a “basic concept” requires a retrieval of its “basis” or 
“soil” in experience, we have hit upon the crux of a Gadamerian account of concept (re-
)formation.  What, after all, is experience as such; and (how) is it possible to “retrieve” the 
“matter” or “the things themselves” that were at issue in a past thinker’s texts such that our 
reading or understanding of that text stands a chance of being “genuine” –i.e., allowing the voice 
of the past (with its articulation of its experience of “the things themselves”) to speak into today 
(with our, perhaps radically different, experience and articulation)?   
To the Details Themselves: Experience, Metaphor and Concept Formation 
                                                
75 Heidegger, GA 18, 270. 
 
76 To what extent did Heidegger understand this?  See Gadamer’s comment in 1992: “When the elderly 
Heidegger came up on deck during a boat trip through the Aegean and saw through the morning mist the 
contour of an island slowly emerging, it was for him as if he thought “being” for the first time as the 
Greeks did.  He wrote me then: “We still think the Greek world not Greek enough.”  That surely did not 
mean that we should ourselves think as the Greeks did…”  Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of 
Ritual and Language,” Language and Linguisticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 41f.  I leave open the 
question as to whether Heidegger seriously intended, naively or romantically, to “think like a Greek” (or, 
later, to “think like Parmenides”). 
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Concept re-formation is intimately tied to experience; and yet although the importance of 
experience in the formation of concepts has long been recognized, Gadamer writes in Truth and 
Method, “however paradoxical it may seem, the concept of experience [Erfahrung] seems to me 
one of the most obscure we have.”77 For Truth and Method this obscurity is the result of two 
interrelated issues:  
(1) the neglect of the historicity of experience, and  
(2) the determination of experience along the lines of the logic of subsumption and  
induction. 
I will discuss each issue in turn.   Now Gadamer himself does not explicitly link together these 
two issues – they are found in two different parts of Truth and Method, separated by nearly a 
hundred pages of intervening material.  In Part Two II.4.3.B (“The concept of experience 
(Erfahrung) and the essence of the hermeneutic experience”), the task is to recover the “inner 
historicity” of Erfahrung (issue number one listed above).  The second discussion in Truth and 
Method comes much later, towards the end of the book in Part Three III.5.2.C (“Language and 
concept formation”), in which the task is to argue for a positive role (even the essential role) of 
metaphor and of metaphorical “transference” (Übertragung) in the process of concept formation, 
as opposed to the mere subsumption of a particular under a pre-given universal (number two 
listed above).  We are asking philosophically, then, what the relationship really is between the 
                                                
77 Gadamer, TM, 341.  Thus Gadamer’s approach, as we will see, is to argue that the problem with 
traditional accounts of concept formation stems from a mistaken (viz., restricted) understanding of 
experience. 
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discussion of “experience” (Erfahrung) in Part Two of Truth and Method, and the explicit 
discussion of “concept formation” (Begriffsbildung) in Part Three.   
What Gadamer calls “Erfahrung” (experience) in Part Two of Truth and Method is 
neither the romantic “Erlebnis” of an “aesthetic consciousness” (criticized so roundly in Part 
One of the book), nor the reduction of experience to essentially bald “sensation” of immediately 
given sense-data – an abstraction criticized by Gadamer in his “Begriffsgeschichte” essays as 
well as in Truth and Method.78  By contrast, Gadamer argues that a more fitting understanding of 
“Erfahrung” – and thereby of the process of concept formation that is guided by experience – 
requires a description of the “inner historicity” of human experience (die innere 
Geschichtlichkeit der Erfahrung).79  Gadamer’s description of this “historicity” of experience 
involves two interrelated insights:  human experience is (1) less a “result” of “sense data” and 
much more so an ongoing process of becoming “experienced,” which, hermeneutically speaking 
(2) does not begin from any zero point, but rather always entails the general re-formation of the 
tradition and language through which our experiential world is articulated and (limitedly, 
partially) understood.  These two points raised in Truth and Method, are summarized and echoed 
throughout Gadamer’s writings on conceptuality and conceptual history, for example, in the 
untranslated essay “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie”: 
                                                
78 And criticized by many phenomenologists.  In his essay “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie,” GW II, 
80 Gadamer uses the English word “sensation” when discussing understanding of experience in the 
“empiricist” sense it has had since the 17th century, and which grounds the methodological work of the 
natural sciences. 
 
79 Gadamer, TM, 342. 
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Begriffsbildung ist – hermeneutisch gesehen – durch schon gesprochene Sprache ständig 
mitbedingt.  Wenn das aber so ist, dann ist es der einzige philosophisch-redliche Weg, 
sich das Verhältnis von Wort und Begriff als ein unser Denken bestimmendes Verhältnis 
bewußt zu machen.80 
A philosophically robust account of concept formation cannot abstract from the concrete 
experience in which we always find ourselves as already speaking and thinking about our 
experiential life-world from out of a particular language and tradition.  In truth, concept 
“formation” is always a “reformation.”  To treat (1) the formation of concepts, and (2) the 
historicity of the language we think through, as two different philosophical issues, distorts the 
nature of human experience as a tradition-supported openness to new, or further, experiences.  
Put differently, our understanding of the role of experience in the formation of concepts will 
necessarily be transformed by a “wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein.”81   
 With respect to experience, our language displays a dual hermeneutical role. That is, 
our concepts and words can – and do – both (1) distort our experiences and generate false 
problems, and (2) ground and guide our experiencing life itself insofar as the supposed 
immediate givenness of “sense-data” is in fact already understood through the mediating role of 
language.82  The demand of modern scientific knowledge, Gadamer argues, has narrowly 
focused on this first “distorting” role of language here, as one revealing the need for an objective 
                                                
80 Gadamer, “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie,” 80.  “Hermeneutically, the formation of concepts is 
always partially conditioned through an already spoken language.  But if that is so, then the only 
philosophically honest path is to become aware of the relation between word and concept as a relation 
that conditions our thinking.” (Translation mine) 
 
81 Gadamer echoes this:  “This is precisely what we have to keep in mind in analyzing historically 
effected consciousness: it has the structure of experience (Erfahrung).” Gadamer, TM, 341. 
 
82 Likewise, our concepts themselves are grounded in prior experiences and reformed in light of further 
experiences. 
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methodology for checking and verifying the truth of experience.83  By contrast, Gadamer argues 
that the telos of undergoing or suffering experience does not (exclusively) lie in its serving as 
data for the acquisition of scientific knowledge.  As with the “pathei mathos” and the “hope” of 
Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, Gadamer seeks to recover the moral, ethical, social, and 
humanistic telos of experience – that of becoming “an experienced person.”  What does this 
mean? 
 On the one hand, there is the understanding of experience as contributing to the 
formation of concepts through the constant (re-)confirmation of the experience one already has 
(e.g., the sun has risen today, as it has yesterday, and the day before).  The result of this type of 
experience, as Aristotle tried to show in his famous image of the battle route in his Posterior 
Analytics 2.19, is the formation of general conceptual structures, which ground “knowledge” 
(epistēmē, Wissenschaft).  For Gadamer, however, this misses the nature of the process of 
ongoing experience in which prior experience is overturned by some new experience:   
If we thus regard experience in terms of its result, we have ignored the fact that 
experience is a process.  In fact, this process is essentially negative.  It cannot be 
described simply as the unbroken generation of typical universals…Language shows this 
when we use the word “experience” in two different senses: the experiences that conform 
to our expectation and confirm it, and the new experience that occurs to us.84 
In other words, a “new experience,” which unsettles our previous understanding of some matter 
(Sache, phenomenon), gives us a new, broader horizon in which both the old and the new 
                                                
83 Gadamer traces this “fixation” back to the rise of modern science in Francis Bacon who analyzed, 
among other “prejudices,” the so-called idoli fori, which stem from the “false” use of conventional 
language.  Cf. Gadamer, TM, 344f. 
 
84 Gadamer, TM, 347f. 
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experiences of that matter are held together in a more comprehensive understanding.  Experience 
in this sense is a process of “determinate negation” (bestimmte Negation).85  To acquire a broader 
horizon is also to be given a new space in which one can have further experiences.  The new 
experience, and the understanding of the matter that it generates, also makes possible its own 
further overturning by some further experience:  “The truth of experience always implies an 
orientation toward new experience.  That is why a person who is called experienced has become 
so not only through experiences, but is also open to new experiences.”86  Or again, “experience 
has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is 
made possible by experience itself.”87   
This concept of experience – as the ongoing process of openness to further experience on 
the basis of past experience – highlights the “historical” character of finite human persons:   
Experience in this sense belongs to the historical nature of man…experience as a whole is 
not something anyone can be spared.  Rather, experience in this sense inevitably involves 
many disappointments of one’s expectations and ony thus is experience acquired…Every 
experience worthy of the name thwarts an expectation.  Thus the historical nature of man 
essentially implies a fundamental negativity that emerges in the relation between 
experience and insight.88 
                                                
85 Gadamer, TM, 346. 
 
86 Gadamer, TM, 350.  Gadamer continues: “The consummation of his experience, the perfection that we 
call “being experienced,” does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything and knows 
better than anyone else.  Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is 
radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn 
from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and learn from them.” 
 
87 Gadamer, TM, 350.  Gadamer draws heavily on Hegel throughout this discussion. 
 
88 Gadamer, TM, 350. 
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The insight (Einsicht) that emerges from experience, then, is not primarily the acquisition of 
units of information, but rather a form of self-understanding, since one now has a sense for the 
limitedness and deceptiveness of one’s own previous understanding of things.  To undergo an 
experience in this sense, is to learn “not this or that particular thing, but insight into the 
limitations of humanity…Genuine experience is experience of one’s own historicity.”89  This 
kind of insight is, at the level of experience, just that kind of self-understanding that we 
discussed above under the heading of an “historically effected consciousness.”  Recognizing that 
we read, interpret, understand, think, and re-form concepts by always already participating in a 
process of receiving and “handing on” a tradition is, at the level of experience, to be open to the 
new or the different precisely because one recognizes one’s own limited experience; and this too 
is something “learned” through experience.  
 For the purposes of this chapter, now, the question needs to be asked how precisely this 
conception of experience applies to the process of concept (re-)formation in general.  Gadamer 
notes that one does not form a concept once and for all because one’s experiencing life is never 
finished or completed – unless one is precisely closed to experience.90  Even then, such possible 
                                                
89 Gadamer, TM, 351.  Here is a good example of near synonymy, or at least wide overlap, over 
Gadamer’s expressions “finitude,” “limitation,” and “historicity” – we might also use the words 
“situatedness” or, in a Heideggerian fashion, “facticity.” 
 
90 In Truth and Method, at the end of the section on “Experience” and just prior to the transition to the 
section on “Platonic dialogue,” Gadamer determines hermeneutic experience in terms of the moral 
(moralische) experience of the I-Thou (Ich-Du) relationship.  Of course, hermeneutically, the “Thou” is 
here the tradition cum text.  But does the textual perspective exhaust Gadamer’s insights? I do not think 
so.  Gadamer’s “hermeneutics” stands in the tradition of Buber, Rosenzweig, Kierkegaard, etc. just as 
much as, and perhaps even more so than the phenomenological one.  This will become important again in 
later chapters where we discuss Gadamer’s retrieval of “phronēsis.”  Gadamer is not willing, as 
Heidegger was, to neglect the ethical-moral tonality of “phronēsis” in making it into an ontological 
structure of Dasein.  Cf. Gadamer, TM, 352-354ff.   
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closure can never be total (pathei mathos) even in the most dogmatic person (“he who does not 
listen will be made to feel”).91  Articulating what this means for concept reformation requires 
that we turn now to Part Three of Truth and Method and its section, “Language and Concept 
Formation.”  
In the section of Truth and Method titled, “Language and Concept Formation,” Gadamer 
puts forward an argument that can be found in many contexts throughout his work.   Put 
abstractly, this is to argue for the mutual enrichment of something “general” in relation to 
something “particular” in order to counteract any reductive logic of subsumption that treats all 
particulars as merely something to be subsumed under a general.  More specifically, at the level 
of concepts and natural language, this means that it is inappropriate to understand our use of 
concepts as though they were already fixed, and so presenting us only with the task of subsuming 
our encounters with particulars under the correct general concept or word.  Rather, according to 
Gadamer here, with every particular speech act, the general concepts and words used are 
themselves enriched by the particular - and singular - encounter with the matter (Sache) at issue:  
“A person who speaks - who, that is to say, uses the general meanings of words - is so oriented 
toward the particularity of what he is perceiving that everything he says acquires a share in the 
particularity of the circumstances he is considering.”92  For example, however true that it is that 
someone who “writes” must already have some pre-understanding of what “writing” is in 
general, nevertheless, with every new, particular writing situation, the general concept of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
91 Gadamer often refers to Aeschylean tragedy in this context.  Cf. Gadamer, TM, 350ff. 
 
92 Gadamer, TM, 427. 
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“writing” undergoes its own further re-formation by being particularized, concretized, or applied.  
The academic who, while being rather familiar with scholarly writing, must write to a friend 
whose wife has just died, discovers how little they really know how “to write.”  In discovering 
that “so, this too” is writing, one’s general understanding or familiarity with the concept of 
writing undergoes a whole reformation.  A constant re-formation of concepts is at work just as 
much as experience itself is an ongoing process:   
The general concept meant by the word is enriched by any given perception of a thing, so 
that what emerges is a new, more specific word formation which does more justice to the 
particularity of that act of perception.  However certainly speaking implies using pre-
established words with general meanings, at the same time, a constant process of concept 
formation is going on, by means of which the life of a language develops.93 
So far, Gadamer’s words may seem just like a classic account of concept formation that 
emphasizes the role of “induction.”  But Gadamer is clear that this is not primarily what he is 
trying to bring to light, but instead it only serves as the backdrop for his engagement with the 
“metaphoricity” of language, and of the role that metaphor plays in concept formation.  Put 
another way, the role of induction in concept formation results in the abstraction of a generic 
universality from multiple particular experiences of some phenomenon.  However, the 
(Aristotelian) interest in how knowledge of a universal essence arises through induction does not 
completely exhaust the process of concept formation.  For, according to Gadamer, concepts are 
also formed and reformed through the linking together of multiple experiences via a process of 
“metaphorical transference.”   To use classical language, what we often grasp in our experience 
                                                
93 Gadamer, TM, 427-428. 
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of two different particularities are their commonalities per accidens, and not the abstraction of a 
universal substance:   
If a person transfers an expression from one thing to the other, he has in mind something 
that is common to both of them; but this in no way needs to be generic universality.  
Rather, he is following his widening experience, which looks for similarities, whether in 
the appearance of things or in their significance for us.  The genius of linguistic 
consciousness consists in being able to express these similarities.  This is its fundamental 
metaphorical nature, and it is important to see that to regard the metaphorical use of a 
word as not is real sense, is the prejudice of a theory of logic that is alien to language.94 
This lengthy quote is one of the few places where Gadamer explicitly links together his account 
of experience, which we discussed in the previous section, with his account of concept 
formation.   To say “this here, is like that, there” is not the same thing as saying “these are two 
particular cases of some universal concept.”  For one may only mean to draw two particularities 
together via metaphor and analogy.  To give an example:  on the one hand, we can say that in our 
particular encounters with both a “pencil” and a “pen” that we learn to subsume these under the 
general concept of “writing instrument.”  And yet, what is this general concept of “writing,” and 
what “writes”?  When Plato, in the Philebus, has Socrates say that our experience (as the 
combining of mnēmē and aisthēsis) writes itself on our soul, his metaphorical use of the verb 
graphein, far from obscuring the nature of “writing” and of “experience,” in fact gives us the 
opportunity to begin to see more deeply into the nature of both.95  In fact, Socrates goes further 
in his metaphor here by noting that when experience writes itself on to our lives “truly,” it 
generates true understanding and true logoi; and when our experience writes falsely or 
                                                
94 Gadamer, TM, 428. Boldface mine. 
 
95 Plato, Philebus, 39af. 
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deceptively, it generates a deceptive language and understanding.  Here we are a long way off 
from the universal, objective use of concepts that would methodically ground a modern scientific 
study of “writing” or “experience,” but that obviously does not mean that our conceptual 
horizons have not been expanded (“ausbreitenden Erfahrung”), or that we have not gained some 
understanding about the “writing” and “experience” via the metaphorical use of language.96 
For Gadamer, an incomplete and truncated understanding of concept formation occurs 
when the formative process is narrowly described in abstraction from the life of living, ordinary 
language with all of its expressions, metaphors, evocations, and overtones.97  Words and 
concepts are not tools that are fashioned in order to do a job, and which one picks up and puts 
down at will, as if from a mental storehouse of language, because, in part, words and concepts 
are in a constant process of (re-)formation.  Even the formation of a “technical term” or an 
artificially constructed sign-system is always born out of living language, and must continue to 
be related back to living language if it is really going to speak:  “however great the distance 
between the technical term and the natural use of language, the connection with the living 
language always remains constitutive for the meaning of concepts.”98  Philosophical concepts 
always maintain a connection to the resonances, overtones and the “metaphorical” meanings in 
                                                
96 Or at least one could gain a deeper understanding if we were to spend more time on the example given 
here.   
 
97 For more on this see Joel Weinsheimer’s “Gadamer’s Metaphorical Hermeneutics,” Gadamer and 
Hermeneutics, 181. 
 
98 Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 5-6.  We will see this in great 
detail in the next two chapters of this dissertation, in which I reconstruct a history of the concept of 
phronesis. 
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living language, on account of, as Gadamer puts, “the intimate unity of speech and thought.”99  
One does not “first” construct a language, and “second” proceed to think by its means - rather, 
the constant reformation of philosophical thoughts occurs right alongside the constant re-
formation of the language we have inherited and participate in.  It is easy to lose sight of this 
when the words we inherit are so smoothed over, ossified, and restricted in their meaning that we 
no longer have any awareness of their original metaphorical connection to living language - for 
example, that we speak of the “legs” of a table, or that the Euclidean word for a mathematical 
“angle” is taken over from the “bend” in a person’s knee.  On the one hand, becoming (partially) 
aware of such connotations, origins, and metaphorical resonances may be trivial and unnecessary 
in order for the discipline mathematics to do its job.  On the other hand, at least in the realm of 
philosophy, it is always an open question as to whether becoming more aware about the 
historical life of ordinary languages that always resounds in our concepts is important for 
thinking.100   As we will see in the coming chapters of this dissertation, the whole process of the 
formation of the concept of phronesis from Homer to Aristotle is highly dependent on a highly 
creative interplay and interweaving between metaphorical, analogical, poetic, scientific, and 
philosophical contexts of language use. 
                                                
99 Gadamer, TM, 430. 
 
100 Gadamer is explicit: “Admittedly, this does not yet prove that there exists any need to become 
critically conscious of such residual connections...The task of the questioning pursued in 
Begriffsgeschichte can scarcely lie in a total historical elucidation that would suspend language’s self-
forgetfulness in its full self-consciousness.  Rather, it is just this self-forgetfulness of language that 
legitimates the limited nature of such elucidation.”  And later “While concept-historical analysis can 
promise no unequivocal answers here, it can nevertheless reveal the openendedness of what can be 
questioned…”  Gadamer, “The History of Concepts and the Language of Philosophy,” 6, 8.  
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In fact Gadamer goes further in arguing for the significance of the link between 
philosophical concept-words and ordinary language.  It is not just a question of potential 
significance, because philosophical thinking always finds itself with the actual task of making 
itself communicable to the other in conversation.  This is so even, or especially, where there is 
the greatest amount of philosophical stammering and “need” for language (Sprachnot).101  
Insofar as we participate in a historico-linguistic tradition, philosophical thinking follows the 
trail of the re-formation of its concepts while one becomes an experienced person and an 
experienced thinker, who is struggling to appreciate more and more what this participation 
(methexis) means.  One can say the same thing, and much more simply, by affirming that 
philosophical thinking is not and cannot be performed as a “monologue” just as no one 
philosopher or thinker is the master of language.  Concepts are always reformed in “dialogue” – 
be it the dialogue with the past or with one another.102  Thus in a late lecture Gadamer can say, 
“without bringing concepts to speak and without a common language, I believe we will not be 
able to find the words that can reach other persons.  It is true that we usually move “from word to 
concept,” but we must also be able to move “from concept to word” if we wish to reach the other 
person...Only in this way, too, will we be able to hold ourselves back so that we can allow the 
                                                
101 Gadamer often cites the example of Heidegger’s stammering here.  Criticizing Heidegger’s rebuke of 
what he called “the language of metaphysics,” Gadamer (1) denies that there ever has been such a thing as 
the one “language” of metaphysics, and then goes on to say (2) “what Heidegger wished to say is 
certainly that he lacked the language to express what he wanted to say…’I am speechless’ means 
basically that one has encountered something surprising and unexpected, for which the appropriate 
expression is lacking to say what one wants to say.” Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and 
Language,” Language and Linguisticality in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 40. 
 
102 Plato, as Gadamer likes to point out, referred to “thinking” as a “dialogue of the soul with itself.”  How 
is this a “dialogue”; who are the partners here?  See Paul Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another for robust 
philosophical suggestion. 
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other person’s views to be recognized.”103  By bringing into awareness the hermeneutical role of 
dialogue with the other for the continual re-formation of concepts, we have reached the 
culmination of this chapter.  I will conclude by discussing the place of dialogue in concept 
formation, and by summarizing the function of this chapter as a whole. 
 
Concluding with Dialogue: From Gadamer (back) to Phronēsis  
In his paper, “Gadamer’s Interpretive Practice,” David Vessey helpfully summarizes several 
aspects of what we have discussed in the first two sections of this chapter: “When performing a 
history of concepts ‘in their conceptuality’ we need to trace the concepts back to their motivating 
phenomena; that is the only way we can understand them.”104 Vessey here highlights many of the 
basic concepts that have oriented this chapter – viz., Begriffsgeschichte, conceptuality, and 
experience.  For the purposes of concluding this chapter, Vessey’s statement also draws out a 
lingering issue; and one, which provides the context for concluding this chapter with a brief 
discussion of Gadamer’s concept of “dialogue” and its role in concept reformation: namely, what 
is it to trace a concept “back” to its “motivating phenomena”?  What is the philosophical sense of 
this phenomenological “back”; and how is such a tracing back to be accomplished?   
                                                
103 Gadamer, “From Word to Concept: The Task of Hermeneutics as Philosophy,” The Gadamer Reader, 
120. 
 
104 David Vessey, “Gadamer’s Interpretive Practice,” 9-10.  Vessey explicitly notes Gadamer’s 
“Begriffsgeschichte” essays in this regard:  “in his Begriffsgeschichte essays” Gadamer says that “we 
should be seeking the phenomena that motivate the text.” (Vessey, 10). 
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These questions are not directed toward Vessey per se, but rather toward Gadamer, whom 
Vessey is paraphrasing.105  Gadamer, e.g. in his essay “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and 
Language,” speaks of “the path back to the original Greek experience of language” and of “the 
original experience of the world that resides in the language and development of the Greeks.”106  
If Gadamer is not slipping into a kind of romantic naiveté about the possibility for such an 
“original experience” – which he is not – then we will need to explicate just how Gadamer 
understands the issues involved here.  The orienting concept, which will guide my response to 
the matter just raised, and which will conclude this chapter, is of course Gadamer’s 
understanding of “dialogue” and “language as conversation.”  What then is, and how does, the 
concept of dialogue, which has indeed already been functioning in the background throughout 
this chapter’s two previous sections, relate to the reformation of concepts and the “conceptuality” 
of the concept? 
Now an historically effected consciousness, as we have said, recognizes that within the 
limitations of human self-consciousness, the linguistic tradition(s) in which we speak and think 
will, in part, function as a vis a tergo (force from behind).  However, at the same time, an 
historically effected consciousness also recognizes that, through our belonging to the shared 
world of a linguistic tradition (e.g., the shared world that makes reading a text possible), and 
                                                
105 In fact, following the quote from him just above, Vessey goes on to ask a different, though somewhat 
related, question – one which concerns the sense behind Gadamer’s claims that phenomena “speak” by 
“posing questions” to us, and the hermeneutical consequence of this view.   
 
106 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” Language and Linguisticality in 
Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 41.  I already hinted at this issue above in the discussion of Heidegger and his 
concern with explicating “basic” concepts.  The phrases I quoted from Gadamer here are also directed 
toward an engagement with Heidegger.  In fact, we will see how this forms a point of departure from 
Heidegger for Gadamer. 
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through the ongoing nature of human experience (as openness to the new), language will also 
always function as a vis a fronte (force from the front).  That is to say, it is a force coming from 
the voice of the other who faces us, be it the speaking of a living human other, or the speaking of 
the text to us.107  Put hermeneutically, a “vis a fronte” in the form of linguistic tradition is you 
speaking to me.  Language, for Gadamer, is fundamentally what issues forth from a “Thou” (Du) 
as an address to an interlocutor (e.g., a reader) who then responds.  “Language as conversation” 
therefore orients Gadamer’s phenomenological description of the human experience of language, 
and guides his hermeneutical reflections.108 In Truth and Method this element is made explicit:  
“Hermeneutical experience is concerned with tradition.  This is what is to be experienced.  But 
tradition is not simply a process that experience teaches us to know and govern; it is language – 
i.e., it expresses itself like a Thou.”109  The experienced hermeneut is not primarily the one who 
“knows” what the other is saying, but rather the one who is capable of letting the other speak 
about the shared matter of concern (Sache) in ways that may be quite different from how one 
understands things oneself. 
Now with respect to the reformation of concepts in philosophy, it has become easy to 
neglect this dialogical basis of thinking, for example, (1) when we, post-Cartesians, presuppose 
the nature of thinking to be the monological work of a solitary, disembodied ego; or (2) when we 
                                                
107 Cristina Lafont, in her work, The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy, speaks in just this way 
about Gadamer’s philosophy of language.  Cf. The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy (trl. Jose 
Medina), 78-80. 
 
108 For a clear statement, see Gadamer, “Reflections on my Philosophical Journey,” Library of Living 
Philosophers: The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (ed. Lewis Hahn).  (Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1996), 45. 
 
109 Gadamer, TM, 352. 
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use concepts or terms that have become ossified or restricted in their meaning through a neglect 
of their history and their connection to human experience; or (3) when we allow the fixity of 
thought in writing, which in our day is mostly read silently, to cloud over the connection of that 
writing to living communication and the continuation (continuity) of the dialogue in which the 
text expresses itself.110  Rather, for Gadamer, thinking – even, as Plato calls it, “the dialogue of 
the soul with itself” – is always the participation in a conversation handed down in and through 
the historical tradition.   
Understanding the dialogical nature of thinking, and making this conversation explicit, is 
the task of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a form of philosophy:  “Every attempt of thinking is an 
attempt to converse…In the end, and also in philosophy, language remains conversation – 
conversation of the soul with itself or also with the other.  Philosophy does not know any true 
sentences that one only has to defend and that one tries to prove as the stronger.  Philosophy is 
rather a continual self-overcoming of all its concepts, as [wie] a conversation is a continual self-
overcoming [Selbstüberholung] through the answer of the other.”111   
This “continual self-overcoming of all [of philosophy’s] concepts” (“beständige 
Selbstüberholung aller ihrer Begriffe”) is here related to the play of living dialogue between 
                                                
110 This is precisely where language is most of all a force from behind:  when, by failing to acknowledge 
the work of history or our hermeneutic situation, we pretend to speak and think “objectively” – in truth 
here, history will have its say. 
 
111 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” Language and Linguisticality, 43. 
 
56 
 
 
 
conversation partners.112  We have seen already in the first two sections of this chapter how a 
particular concept carries within it a whole historical-linguistic tradition – a plurality of voices 
seeking to express an understanding of its “conceptuality” (Begrifflichkeit) or “matter” (Sache).   
So far from being the willful fashioning of a technical term that is univocally fixed in its 
meaning, philosophical concepts are always undergoing their own reformation through the 
ongoing dialogue of human thinking; a dialogue, that is to say, in which the “Sache” or 
phenomenon under discussion itself undergoes its own continual linguistic reformation.  One 
who reads Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics with an understanding of “eudaimonia” as 
“happiness” will (we hope) have their understanding of “happiness” changed, deepened, and 
challenged throughout the course of engaging that text.  But that means that, at the end of the 
reading, one should (or could) go back through the text again and re-read with a new 
understanding of the Sache that one takes to be under discussion, and with which one is 
philosophically engaging – and again and again.  Likewise, one who reads Aristotle’s text at the 
age of 18 and again at the age of 35 and again at 80 will, on account of their own experience with 
“happiness,” also engage with the Ethics differently each time as the Sache that forms the basis 
of the “conversation” between reader and text is continually transformed, and, we hope against 
hope, progressively deepened.  Just as new experience involves the continual deepening and 
breakup of the short-sightedness of our past experience, philosophical thinking involves the 
continual breakup of the rigidity of supposedly chemically pure concepts (die Starrheit der 
chemisch-reinen Begriffe) – i.e., concepts whose meaning falsely appears to be already fixed, 
                                                
112 Thus Gadamer here provides an example of how a metaphorical statement can offer a path for 
philosophical thinking and clarification at the level of the concept (here, e.g., the concept of “thinking” as 
a “conversation”). 
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unalterable, and uncontaminated by the overtones, metaphorical uses, or varied applications of 
the word within our experience of the world.113  And again, within such an ongoing dialogue 
philosophy encounters its proper “touchstone” for the evaluation and reformation of its 
understanding of the matter at issue, or, as we say, the heart of the matter.114 
Now how do things stand where the matter of “tracing” a concept “back” to motivating 
phenomena, or where, as Gadamer says, “the original experience of the world” that motivated 
the formation of a concept is concerned?  Gadamer, who is implicitly criticizing Heidegger here, 
does indeed acknowledge a limited appropriateness of such an undertaking – it is always correct, 
for example, through “philological-historical work,” to seek out a deeper, more adequate 
understanding of the language of the text and the world that it gives voice to.115  However, two 
points need to be emphasized here.   
First, it indeed is surely amazing how a text – and sometimes with the aid of historical-
philological work – can alert us to another way of experiencing the world, and so deepening our 
philosophical engagement or “dialogue” with it.  But just this fact means that one never seeks out 
the “original experience” of a motivating phenomenon in isolation from one’s own 
                                                
113 Gadamer, “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie,” 249.  Gadamer continues on to liken philosophical 
thinking to music:  “Musik ist erst jenes Gebilde, in dem Obertöne mit allem, was sie an neuen 
Klangwirkungen und Aussagefähigkeit der Töne zu erzeugen vermögen, mitspielen.  So its es auch im 
philosophischen Denken.  Die Obertöne der Wörter, die wir gebrauchen, lassen uns die Unendlichkeit der 
Denkaufgabe, die Philosophie für uns ist, präsent halten, und das allein erlaubt, sie – in aller Begrenzung 
– zu erfüllen.” 
114 “Im wirklichen Sprechen oder im Gesprach, sonst nirgends, hat Philosophie ihren wahren, ihren nur 
ihr eigenen Prfustein.” Gadamer, “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie,” 250. 
 
115 Gadamer, “Toward a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” Language and Linguisticality, 41.  
This can occur not only through “philological-historical work” but also through the occasional shock or 
surprise when re-reading a text, we suddenly realize that we did not appreciate the text’s foreignness or 
difference from our own world and opinions and experiences. 
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understanding and experience of that phenomenon.  Listening or remaining open to the 
foreignness of the text is already a form of dialogical engagement about a subject matter, just as 
philosophy does not simply critique the language of a given text (Sprachkritik), but also seeks 
out and discovers new words for communicating with the other (Sprachfindung).  Gadamer, who 
I quote at length, is explicit here: 
Where communication seems impossible because one “speaks different languages,” 
hermeneutics is still not at an end.  Precisely here the hermeneutical task is posed in full 
seriousness, namely finding a common language.  Even the common language is never a 
fixed given.  It resides in the play of language between speakers, who must enter into the 
game of language so that communication can begin, even where various viewpoints stand 
irreconcilably over against each other.  The possibility of communication between 
rational beings can never be denied.  Even the relativism which seems to reside in the 
multiplicity of languages is no barrier for reason, whose “word” [or logos] all have in 
common, as already Heraclitus was aware.116 
For Gadamer, language is fundamentally a form of “participation,” a way of being “with-one-
another” in communality, and so our dialogue with a given text is not something that can only 
begin “after” we have grasped the correct way of understanding the Sache to be discussed.117  
Instead, we are always already working out our grasp of the subject matter precisely within an 
ongoing dialogue itself. 
  Second, this then means that at the very least, we must say that we are always only “on 
the way” to a better (I do not say “final”) understanding and dialogue with the text, because our 
understanding of the “conceptuality” or “heart” of a concept is always a provisional, somewhat 
                                                
116 Gadamer, “Reflections on My Philosophical Journey,” The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 29.  I 
will take up Gadamer’s own paraphrase of Heraclitus (B2), which he quotes elsewhere as well, in a later 
chapter.  And I will discuss Fragment B2 in its own right in Chapter Two – whether he knows it or not, 
Gadamer is here quoting the first occurrence of “phronēsis,” which was perhaps the coinage of 
Heraclitus. 
 
117 Cf. Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” Language and Linguisticality, 46. 
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idiosyncratic and distorted, and highly limited one.  A “fully true” interpretation of Plato’s 
Republic would require that one engage with that text on the basis of a “fully true” understanding 
of, among other things, justice.  But “justice,” for our human understanding, is not a static 
concept with ideal “properties” that could be enumerated once and for all if only one was smart 
or creative enough.  Justice, like all concepts, is a tradition in which we participate and which is 
still unfolding.  Justice is on the move.   
The “original experience” we are seeking, in this respect then, has nothing to do with the 
“originality” of the historical context of a particular text, even if working towards such an 
understanding, as we said above, also has its limited place.  Rather, we are always seeking out 
the “origin” as the archē, telos or “source” of “justice” in all its reality.  It is by continually 
seeking out that source or wellspring that our philosophical dialogue with Plato’s Republic will 
be continually deepened and “corrected.”  “Ad fontes!” provides direction, but we are mistaken if 
we seek the heart of a concept in some past historical context – it does not direct us “back” but 
rather (also) points us toward the openness of the future, and so humbles our self-understanding 
by reminding us that reaching that “end” is not for us – our own individual end is not the “end” 
of “justice.”  There are hermeneutical consequences here.   
In reading Plato’s Republic in the 21st century, we are not only drawn into the particular 
historical tradition surrounding the reception of that text.  We are also drawing the Republic into 
the 21st century by allowing it to speak into and transform our understanding of our own world, 
and converse with us about the questions and problems that haunt us today – e.g., our own 
concern for justice and its lack.  The “common language” that makes this possible is not the 
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abstraction of common principles of the concept of justice that both partners could agree upon. 
Rather, as Gadamer writes,  
It is certainly not always the case that a formal definition first makes the use of a concept 
common.  Still less is a final justification required from which everything can be proven.  
The basis is rather a firm looking towards what is truly common, to which one belongs 
and to which we attempt to adhere.  There can be no doubt here that such a looking 
forward always lies beyond the actually expressed.  It is something like the idea, and 
especially the idea of the Good, that Plato’s Socrates’ untiringly sought, without being 
able to doubt it…Plato knew quite well why he called the step over the provable 
“dialectic” and entrusted it to the art of conversation.118 
It is enough to conclude this chapter to say, as we said at the end of section one above, that for 
Gadamer the “application” or “fusion” of different languages or horizons of experience of the 
world must be done “correctly” (richtig) and under the “vigilance” (Wachheit) of an historically 
effected consciousness:  “In the performance of understanding, a real fusion of horizons occurs – 
which means that as the historical horizon is projected, there simultaneously occurs its 
Aufhebung.  We designate the controlled performance of such a fusion as the vigilance 
(Wachheit) of an historically effected consciousness.”119  The “performance” (Vollzug) of the 
hermeneutic dialogue should be done well, responsibly, correctly, appropriately, with tact, etc.  
Here the question inevitably arises, how are we to engage in this hermeneutic dialogue in a 
correct (orthotes) or right or appropriate or true way?  We fundamentally misunderstand the 
nature of interpretation if we think “correct” here simply means correctly following a procedure 
or methodology.  Instead, the “correct” action in an ethical-practical situation requires the same 
sort of “vigilance” and tact as the “correct” action in a hermeneutic situation.  With this, we 
                                                
118 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” Language and Linguisticality, 46-47. 
 
119 Boldface and translation mine. Gadamer, GW 1, 312.   
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finally link back up with the central theme of this dissertation as a whole – for Gadamer’s answer 
to this issue lies within his retrieval of Aristotle’s concept of phronēsis.   
But what is this concept of phronēsis?  In this chapter we have come to recognize the 
nature of conceptuality as a dynamic tradition in which we who speak take up the word as the 
responsibility for accomplishing a task.  What follows is my attempt to clarify the historical 
development of phronēsis in as much detail, complexity, polysemy, and nuance as I can by 
caring for the phrēn/phronein word family from Homer to Aristotle, and that ultimately in order 
to show how Aristotle was able to penetrate to the heart of, and so determine, “phronēsis” as an 
explicit philosophical concept.  In this way we will see that Aristotle is at once a retriever, 
reformer, and founder of the tradition of phronēsis as the wisdom of living in words and deeds.  
Only after this – rather lengthy – historical mediation and engagement with the Greek origins 
will we come back to Gadamer and his own retrieval of phronēsis as an answer to the question 
surrounding the praxis and ethics of hermeneutics.   
First, then, another re-beginning: the origin, archē, or wellspring of phronēsis is an 
affective one, lying in the very middle of our heart, lungs, or chest, i.e., our center – in that 
Homeric organ called the “phrēn.”  That is where, in the face of our life “situation” (moral, 
practical, hermeneutic or otherwise), we feel the first trembling of worry, understanding, anxiety, 
confusion, excitement, surprise, and indeed, even our stumbling thinking that eventually “presses 
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forward” into our words and deeds, and so takes its place within “the conversation that we 
are.”120  
                                                
120 Both Heidegger and Gadamer have referred to Hölderlin’s poem, “Friedensfeier” (“Seit ein Gespräch 
wir sind…”), but I came to a version of this phrase by way of Chapter One of Adriaan Peperzak’s 
Thinking about Thinking. What Kind of Conversation is Philosophy? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHRONĒSIS – PART ONE: 
THE PREHISTORY OF PHRONĒSIS 
 
“Even when etymologies are right, they are not proofs but rather achievements preparatory to 
conceptual analysis, and only in such analysis do they obtain a firm foundation.”  
- Gadamer, Truth and Method, 108 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter One, I outlined the essential features of a Gadamerian-hermeneutic understanding of 
concepts and concept formation.  By showing how, for the discipline of hermeneutics, concepts 
develop through their essential relationship to (1) history, (2) experience, and (3) dialogue, I 
analyzed the nature of concepts as living, dynamic traditions, in which thinkers are participants: 
in short, a concept is a kind of tradition.  Throughout that chapter, I also showed how this 
hermeneutic understanding of concepts provides some guidelines for a Gadamerian “method” or 
“way” of engaging in philosophical inquiry - the writer of Truth and Method, it turns out, has a 
way of doing philosophy.   
Towards the end of the previous chapter it was hinted that something like “phronēsis” 
plays an essential role in hermeneutics, although it remains for later chapters to explicitly discuss 
what this means, why this is the case, and what the implications are for the over-arching question 
of this dissertation - namely, in what sense is interpretation an ethical action?  What is needed in 
these next two chapters (Chapter Two and Chapter Three), is to enact, concretely, this 
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Gadamerian way of doing philosophical inquiry in relation to the concept of phronēsis.  If 
“phronēsis,” for Gadamer, is going to play an essential - indeed the key - role in the process of 
interpretation and understanding, it is imperative that we first gain a solid understanding of just 
what “the concept of phronēsis” means.  Furthermore, in harmony with the work done in the 
previous chapter, it is also imperative to grasp the concept of phronēsis in just such a way that 
does not overlook (1) the historical development of that originally ancient Greek concept, (2) the 
particular experiences of phenomena that have been involved in the formation of that concept, 
and (3) the intellectual dialogues or conversations in which that concept continually underwent a 
process of re-formation.  By reconstructing the history of phronēsis from Homer to Aristotle, it 
will become clear how “phronēsis” is not pure and simply an Aristotelian concept, but rather 
names a tradition in which Aristotle’s thinking participates, but which does not silence the other 
voices that have passed down that concept to him in their own ways. 
Before beginning, it should be noted that these next two, “historical,” chapters of the 
dissertation are not merely in service of, or preparatory to the later chapters (Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five) on Gadamer’s work.  It is also possible to read the next two chapters “for their 
own sake” or as “stand alone” contributions to the history of Greek thought.  In this way, in 
particular, I aim to bring to light two historical facets of phronēsis that are sorely under-
discussed.  First, the goal of this chapter is specifically to show how “phronēsis” developed out 
of the phren-phronein word family as it was employed in poetry (Homer), medicine 
(Hippocrates), and pre-Socratic thinking (Heraclitus).  Second, in the next chapter I aim to show 
how Aristotle’s own analyses of phronēsis are born out of a particular intellectual conversation 
(or better, “Auseinandersetzung”) between philosophy (Plato) and rhetoric (Isocrates).  These 
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two historical goals taken together support my discussion of Gadamer in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five, since they will result in (1) a well-grounded understanding of the concept of 
phronesis, as well as (2) a concrete example of what it means to say that a concept is an evolving 
tradition.   
Introduction to the specific historical task 
Scholarship 
In claiming to provide some vital cultural background to Aristotle’s own work on the nature of 
phronēsis, comprehensiveness is not and cannot be the goal. My hope in fact is simply to begin a 
discussion which is long overdue, and for which there is much work still to be done.  It can be 
quite surprising to discover that even now, after so much spilled ink, there are still areas of Greek 
culture and philosophy that we are relatively in the dark about.  Nevertheless, that seems to me to 
be the case when it comes to the cultural background of the concept of phronēsis.  Of course, this 
is only partly the case.  Beginning from the most recent renaissance in classical studies over the 
last 150 years, there has been plenty of work done on various aspects that are of clear relevance 
to the concept of phronēsis.1  Nevertheless, we still lack a systematic overview of these pieces, 
as well as a sustained consideration of their significance for our reading of Aristotle.2  A whole 
world of problems lie behind even the seemingly straightforward question such as whether or not 
“prudence” (from the Latin Prudentia) is still today an adequate translation of “phronēsis,” and, 
                                                
1 For example, tracing the understanding of the noun “phrēn” from Homer to Euripides, for which see 
Shirley Darcus Sullivan, Euripides’ Use of Psychological Terminology. 
 
2 And by extension, for how we view Aristotle’s later philosophical translation into Latin. 
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if not, what would be.3 To really understand how to answer that question we would need to 
foreground the Greek cultural context and grasp the relevant connotations and motifs of the 
word, and then consider the extent to which our language has similar resources of varying 
degrees of similarity – for starters.  Every translation is always an act of highlighting some 
aspects over others, but until we have a better sense for the musicality of the word, we will have 
only mere precedent to guide us in both our linguistic translations as well as our conceptual 
understanding of the role of phronēsis in its various Greek contexts.4  
 Now it is of course true that there are several works that concern the nuances of phrēn 
and phronēo in various Greek cultural contexts, but these are generally piecemeal in nature and 
do not consider the import of this for Aristotle.  Our understanding of Aristotle therefore 
generally lacks the kind of synoptic character that would be necessary for a real contextualized 
re-reading of his work on phronēsis.5   Recently, however, some exciting attempts have been 
                                                
3 For example, Irwin’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics defends the translation of “prudence” for 
“phronēsis” almost exclusively on the basis of the authority of historical precedent – a defense which 
lacks any mention of the relevant hermeneutical complexities necessarily involved in every act of 
translation.  Philosophically, I find this to be an inadequate solution insofar as the task is to understand 
Aristotle in our own language – as though we had any other option.  I will return to this hermeneutical 
issue in the next chapter. 
 
4 To be clear, mere precedent is not necessarily a bad thing.  The purpose of these two chapters of the 
dissertation however is hermeneutic – i.e., to revive the Aristotelian concept by attempting to seek out the 
broader context in which it developed and functioned for Aristotle. 
 
5 An interesting exception to this, on which I have relied somewhat for checking my own interpretations, 
is Pierre Aubenque’s La prudence chez Aristote. Though somewhat old now, the work really ought to be 
translated into English. 
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made to reconsider Aristotelian phronēsis in light of the Greek tragedies.6  But this can only be 
viewed as a beginning; and in any case, the impulse to reconsider Greek philosophy in light of 
Greek tragedy takes its contemporary departure from Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, for whom 
Euripides was already ‘too close’ to Socrates.7 An exaggerated tension between enlightened 
philosophical reason and a quasi-tragic “amor fati” serves its purpose undoubtedly, but it 
remains an exaggeration nonetheless until further cultural spheres are included into the 
conversation about Aristotle, and we should not be forced to situate our understanding of 
phronēsis along that axis merely.  But what other axes are there? What other situations, and what 
other contexts?  It should be noted that my aim is not to determine an objectively correct 
description of ‘the’ proper context for interpreting Aristotle.  Consonant with the hermeneutical 
clarity and humility that is required in every encounter with a text, it is enough to point out that 
both the salient historical-contextual features as well as a subsequent re-reading of Aristotle will 
be fundamentally oriented by the kinds of questions that we ourselves are interested in asking.  
This is the case even if our questions and interests remain hidden from our explicit self-
awareness, and perhaps even especially when this is so. 
 
                                                
6 The result of which has already pushed our understanding of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in some 
relatively new and interesting directions by contemporary philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum or Paul 
Ricoeur. 
 
7 It is interesting to see how Nietzsche’s uneasiness with Euripides (along with Freud’s fascination with 
Sophocles) exerts a kind of hidden authoritativeness even today in contemporary scholarship on Aristotle, 
for whom Euripides was the “most tragic” of tragedians (Poetics), and who he directly quotes in his 
discussion of phronēsis in the Ethics.   
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Methodological Considerations 
In this chapter I have tried to provide a few suggestive points of cultural contact, and to 
begin drawing out what seem to be important motifs on whose basis we might gain some new 
insight into Aristotle’s conceptualization of phronēsis.  I have left the tragedies out of this 
chapter, since some work on this has already been done.  Further, out of sheer necessity, I have 
unfortunately had to set Plato in his own right aside for now, despite the fact that Plato uses 
“phronēsis” more than any other classical Greek prose writer.8  Surprisingly, this Platonic 
context is also the most important gap in our appreciation of Aristotle’s context.  Perhaps owing 
to Plato’s creative and basically free use language in general, there is no systematic study of his 
particular use of phronēsis or the phrēn/phronēo vocabulary generally.  However, until we give 
serious thought to what Plato is trying to express philosophically with such language, our reading 
of Plato on this topic still risks being overly determined by Aristotle’s own critiques of him; 
critiques which appear to be reflected in his own – somewhat idiosyncratic – refinement of 
ordinary language into the language of philosophical concepts.9  Happily, in any case, 
philosophical investigation does not have to wait on philological completion – indeed, it cannot.  
                                                
8 Or anybody else for that matter. Perhaps there was something of this behind Gadamer’s comment that 
phronēsis “is really a Platonic concept.” Cf. Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy.  However, mere word 
frequency obviously cannot be equated with philosophical investigation.  For that, Aristotle’s analyses are 
still the standard. 
 
9 My hypothesis, which I can only gesture at in this chapter, is that in fact Aristotle is returning the 
language of phronēsis back to its “ordinary” roots, but while still essentially preserving what he has 
inherited from Plato and Socrates regarding the significance of logos for human action, and thereby 
refusing to allow the concept of phronēsis to completely recede into rhetorical-political superficiality, 
which it can seem to have in, e.g., Isocrates.  In other words, we might read Aristotle as striking a 
philosophical third way “between Plato and Isocrates.” 
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In the next chapter I will, however, provide a brief sketch of Aristotle’s contemporary situation 
vis-à-vis the concept of phronēsis, which, hermeneutically, places Aristotle in between (or as a 
third way from) the use of phronēsis in (1) Plato and (2) Isocrates.   
Pressing on, I have instead put my energies elsewhere in this chapter: Homer, 
Hippocrates, and Heraclitus.  Homer was surely the most important for grasping the basic poetry 
of the phrēn/phronēo word-family in general.  The Hippocratic Corpus was necessary to research 
because, although its specific influence on Aristotle’s concept of phronēsis is only slight, the 
medical context as such is one of the most significant impulses behind Aristotle’s thinking 
generally – son of a doctor that he was.  Further, together with Homer, the Hippocratic writings 
form two ends of a semantic spectrum, and thereby help to orient the reader within the wide 
range of meanings of the phrēn/phronēo word-family employed by Greek intellectuals of later 
centuries.   
To aid the reader I have constructed, below, a two-axis diagram of the linguistic situation.  
At the one (Homeric) end, we have a very wide, poetic use of the word-family (i.e., a wide scope 
of application), which, as will be discussed in detail below, generates a host of ambiguities and 
overlapping references.  At the other (Hippocratic) end, we have a far more technical, use of the 
word-family (i.e., narrow scope of application), and particularly with respect to “phrenes,” which 
is generally used exclusively to refer to the diaphragm as a physical organ.  To supplement this 
horizontal axis, I have also included a vertical axis ranging from uses that tend to highlight or 
emphasize “psychological” aspects to those that highlight more “physiological” aspects. My 
hope here is to give the reader a quick snapshot of how several authors generally tend to make 
use of the word-family.  A few issues must be kept in mind here.  First, for any particular use of, 
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e.g., “phronēsis,” by a particular author, that use may or may not be adequately placed within the 
relevant area mapped out here – good writers often surprise us.   The diagram therefore is 
probabilistic in nature.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that the diagram has a basic validity insofar 
as we keep in mind its purpose – namely, to provide the reader with an initial orientation and 
introduction into the dynamic varieties of “phronēsis.”  Like all introductions however, there is 
some element of superficiality and hermeneutic injustice at work, the supplementation, 
correction, and general complication of which is the purpose the bulk of the chapter.  For 
example, the diagram does not at all make clear the surprising commonalities between 
Heraclitus’ understanding of phronēsis and some of the Hippocratic literature.  Further, the 
diagram may dispose the reader to assuming – incorrectly – that the vertical axis is intended to 
imply some form of a philosophical dualism between mind and body.  Instead, I am merely 
concerned with emphasis by given author, and in fact none of the author’s discussed give any 
indication that phronēsis is an immaterial activity – even when it is extended to non-human 
beings (as in Heraclitus or Plato).   
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Figure 1. A Taxonomy of Phronein.  
 It should be noted that, insofar as Homer and Hippocrates form two end of the horizontal axis, 
Heraclitus will complicate things.  On the one hand, Heraclitean “phronēsis” is not classifiable as 
either a straightforwardly technical or poetic use.  At the same time, as we will see below, 
Heraclitus’ apparent coinage of phronēsis also breaks new conceptual ground in the 
phrēn/phronēo word-family.  Further, as a consequence of this, not only does Heraclitus provide 
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us with the earliest mention of “phronēsis” (along with “gnothi sauton”), but his dense, difficult 
thinking also helped to generate the basic themes and problems regarding phronēsis that would 
be explored later by Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle (as I tried to indicate in the diagram).10  
Further, the extreme hermeneutic difficulty of reading Heraclitus’ fragments proves useful for 
breaking up and re-tilling the intellectual soil of what is often today taken to be the basic sense of 
phronēsis – i.e., an epistemological term referring more or less to the activity of good 
deliberation.  Heraclitus’ fragments are not easily interpretable if this is the meaning of phronēsis 
that we expect to find, and so the dense aphoristic style forces us to be open to other possibilities.  
Deliberation is not the hallmark of “phronēsis” in Heraclitus (or many other authors for that 
matter). 
In what follows, I will offer a brief overview of each of the three “authors” insofar as 
they make use of the phrēn/phronēo word-family, and “phronēsis” in particular.11  I will proceed 
in chronological order, and confine scholarly debate and references to the footnotes.  I will also 
try to restrict any lengthy discussion of Aristotle in relation to a particular passage or author, 
preferring instead to save such discussion for the next chapter.  My hope overall is not to lose 
sight of the enlivening and interesting themes and connotations that give body to the language, 
even as it is slowly raised to the level of conceptualization and self-conscious investigation.  It is 
                                                
10 I do not mean to suggest either that Heraclitus or any of the later writers did any of this explicitly, self-
consciously, or intentionally.  Rather, I am suggesting that hermeneutically it is helpful to understand the 
development of the subject matter of “phronēsis” this way.  With respect to what any of these individuals 
intended psychologically, I am in fact skeptical of the actual relevance.  
 
11 The lexeme “phronēsis” does not exist in Homer, and not prior to Heraclitus. 
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rather difficult to gain a feel for the nuance of an otherwise dead word, and while no undertaking 
in this respect can ever be said to be completed or “successful,” we can at least rest assured that 
our reading of Aristotle will be changed and deepened as a result, and so too, thereby, our 
understanding of what is essentially at issue in that (re-)reading.  With that said, I begin with 
Homer. 
HOMER 
The etymology of the phrēn/phron- word group is rather obscure.  Several possibilities have 
been suggested over the decades in an effort to derive phrēn from one or more Indo-European 
words such as “surround” (*bhren), “enclose” (phrasso), “shudder,” “quiver” (bhur-), “care,” 
“worry” (ghren), “cause to understand,” “to explain” (phrazo), as well as words relating to 
various parts of the body.12   A variety of etymological dictionaries also link phrēn/phronēo to 
phrazo (i.e., to indicate [to oneself or another], phrase, declare, perceive, contrive), as well as to 
osphrainomai (i.e., to smell or catch the scent of…), though this latter use is not even found in 
Homer.13 
 Homer’s use of phrēn/phron- language in general is abundant.14  There are 379 
occurrences of phrēn, and 14 occurrences of the synonymous prapides.15  The vast use of phrēn 
                                                
12 Cf., Sullivan, Shirley Darcus, Psychological Activity in Homer. A Study of Phren, 21. 
 
13 C.f., Prellwitz, Walther, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der griechischen Sprach, 494-495, and also 
Chantraine, Pierre, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, 1227-1228. 
 
14 Attending to Homeric language is of course no simple task.  There are plenty of interpretive questions 
that themselves would need to be admitted if a full study was being undertaken, which, per the 
introduction, it is not.  For example, the relationship of ordinary 8th century B.C. language use to the 
grammatical-structural as well as poetic and religious demands of Epic Poetry written in dactylic 
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in Homer is in the plural phrenes, a feature that generally persisted, at least until the tragic poets, 
who tended to prefer the singular phrēn.  In Homer, the singular phrēn occurs only 57 times, 21 
of which are the formulaic expression “kata phrena kai kata thumon”.16  Similar to the English 
“lung – lungs,” phrenes seems to refer to some sort of unity although the word is plural.  
Grammatically, in the Iliad and the Odyssey, phrenes is almost exclusively used in the accusative 
and dative cases with no instance of the genitive and only a handful in the nominative.17  Thus, 
the word is closely linked to a wide variety of verbs and prepositions: the phrenes are something 
“to,” “in,” “from,” “toward,” “against,” and “with” which something takes place.18 
 In order to untangle the complexity of the Homeric phrenes, I will make an analytical 
distinction between the “corporeal” and the “cognitive” features of the word, and treat each in its 
turn.  However, as will hopefully be apparent by the end, this distinction must finally itself be 
                                                                                                                                                       
hexameter. All that I am concerned with here is to give the reader a basic sense for how the 
phrēn/phronēo word-family is used in Homer.   
 
15 Pelliccia, Hayden, Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar, 15. 
 
16 Sullivan, Shirley Darcus, Psychological Activity in Homer: A Study of Phren,177, and 200, n.2. 
 
17 Jahn, Thomas, Zum Wortfeld ,Seele-Geist’ in der Sprache Homers, 309-314. 
 
18 The dynamic nature of the phrenes in an individual character has helped to contribute to the now-
standard debate about the Homeric “self”.  That is to say, given the porosity of a particular character’s 
agency by not only the gods’ intentions and actions, but also the character’s own “organs” such as the 
phrenes – organs in which so much surprise and tumult takes place – to what extent can that character be 
properly called a “self” as opposed to a mere focal point of chaos?  On this issue I find Hayden Pelliccia’s 
comment about a “normal operating self” to be sufficient: Pelliccia, Hayden, Mind, Body, and Speech in 
Homer and Pindar, 260.   For an alternative take, however, see Bruno Snell’s The Discovery of the Mind, 
and for a nice overview of the basic positions, see Chapter One of Darcus Sullivan’s Psychological 
Activity in Homer: A Study of Phren. 
 
75 
 
 
 
canceled in service of a higher, albeit more ambiguous, unity.  It seems to me that the Homeric 
use of phrenes is itself an ambiguous one, not open to strict demarcation and conceptualization 
or univocal translation.  Nevertheless, beginning with this distinction helps to make this situation 
clearer. 
At the end of this section, it will be clear that two central aspects (affectivity and 
speaking) of the Homeric phrēn/phronēo word family, together with a primary connotation of 
“breathing” and the general practical-ethical context for the word’s application, provide us with 
the most basic grasp of the relevant words and ideas (although admittedly covering a great wide 
range of senses).   Moreover, the Homeric context also provides us with an initial sense for the 
hermeneutic context in which later philosophical thinking about “phronēsis” would take place 
(e.g., that of Aristotle’s).  This is not to say that nothing changes, or is lost in the intervening 
time before Aristotle analyzes the concept of phronēsis.  On the contrary, as we will see in the 
subsequent section, the Hippocratic medical understanding of the “phrenes” is dramatically 
different from Homer.  As a general hermeneutic rule, however, that which persists unchanged, 
or holds steady, usually slips by us unnoticed, whereas what clearly changes seems to shine more 
brightly, and fascinates our contemplative life.  It seems to me that the basic overtones and 
connotations of ordinary words, even when raised to the supposed height of a concept, are 
necessary to seek out and listen to as we try to hear what a corpus like Aristotle’s may still have 
to say to us today. 
Phrēn 
As one of the infamous so-called Homeric “organs,” the corporeal dimension of the 
phrēn can be translated by “diaphragm,” “heart,” “midriff,” “lung,” and “chest”.  This leads us to 
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the first great theme of the language: A defining motif of the word family is found in respiration, 
breath, breathing, and air.  Throughout, even up to Aristotle’s day, it will be paramount that we 
do not forget this basic connotation.  While some scholars have preferred, perhaps 
anachronistically, the translation “diaphragm” in light of the more determinate use found in the 
Hippocratic texts, Richard B. Onians has offered “lungs” as a superior alternative for (at least the 
corporeal side of) the phrenes.19  Translating phrenes in Homer as “lungs,” according to Onians: 
(1) does justice to the near exclusive use of the plural form, (2) makes better sense of many 
perplexing textual passages, and (3) draws out the close connection between breathing, speaking, 
emotion, and thinking.20  Philip N. Lockhart has followed Onians by attempting to uncover a 
respirational sense of the verb phronein by rendering it as “to breathe” or “to exercise the lungs,” 
and thereby offer a stark contrast to the supposedly overly cognitive and intellectualistic 
understanding of the activity of phronein.21 
 Yet, in epic poetry, phrenes is used in too wide a sense to be understood merely as the 
“diaphragm” or “lung.”  Moreover, it is methodologically dubious to confront Homer’s use of 
                                                
19 The “anachronism” would involve reading 5th century medical writings back into 8th century Epic 
poetry. 
 
20 C.f., Onians, Richard B., The Origins of European Thought. 
 
21 Lockhart, Phillip N., “phronein in Homer,” 99.  Lockhart admits, and I would argue, that his attempt 
lacks a general persuasiveness insofar as there are only a small handful of instances where it would even 
seem plausible to render the verb with a more “physical” sense.  Nevertheless, this should not obscure the 
issue.  Phronein takes place “in” the phrenes.  That is enough to establish the connection with respiration 
and corporeality generally.  In any case, Lockhart’s attempt stands alone in the literature, so far as I can 
tell. 
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language with the expectation of terminological precision.22  Whether phrenes was a term that 
once had a more precise meaning, which had become more amorphous in Homer’s time, or 
whether it is simply an element of Homeric-poetic writing that gives the term its richness of 
overtones and wideness of application, we cannot say.  What, from our perspective, might be 
perceived as inconsistency, ambiguity, or obscurity, is perhaps simply the life of “natural 
language as distinct from specifically coined jargon”.23  To get a clearer picture of how wide the 
word “phrenes” can be used, therefore, we need to merge the cognitive and corporeal aspects 
that have been kept apart up until now.   
Ambiguities in the phrenes 
There are two features of the phrenes which cannot simply be classed as an overtly 
corporeal feature on the one hand, or more cognitive and intellectual feature on the other.  The 
first, already introduced above, concerns the fundamental motif of “respiration.”  The in-
spiration that allows a Homeric character to speak with “winged words,” and to deliberate and 
act with courage or menos often takes place “in” or via the phrenes. The phrenes are where a 
                                                
22 While I am somewhat sympathetic with Onians’ “lungs”, I find Ireland and Steel’s hermeneutical 
hesitancy to be both more persuasive and more precise:  “Homer was first and foremost a poet engaged in 
the oral transmission of material that was largely traditional.  The vocabulary he used, itself the result of 
decades and even centuries of change and development…For this reason we should perhaps be wary of 
applying too narrow an interpretation upon a word that appears to display a range of meaning as wide as 
that of phrenes…At all events it cannot be that we require from the poet an exactitude in dealing with a 
word that has at once physiological and psychological overtones…”  See also their comment about 
Onians: “[His] arguments suffer from overstatement, from a desire to interpret literally many cases better 
left to be understood in a figurative sense.” Ireland and Steel, “Phrenes as anatomical Organ in the Works 
of Homer,” 194-195. 
23 Which I hope is reminiscent and consonant with the discussion of these issues in the previous chapter.  
Ireland and Steel, “Phrenes as anatomical Organ in the Works of Homer,” 193.    
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character “breathes” what has been given via the god who inspires, breathes, or puts something, 
e.g., courage or an idea, into him or her.24  Jeffrey Barnouw has tried to offer some intuitive 
plausibility to the connection between respiration and practical intelligence by noting that, 
phenomenologically, “it is the tense diaphragm and the pounding heart, and in the lungs when 
breathing becomes labored, that we can feel ourselves thinking about what greatly concerns 
us.”25   
A second ambiguous feature26 concerns the relationship (be it a harmonious or 
oppositional relationship) of “outward” physical appearance or action, to “inner” disposition or 
character, as when the disguised Odysseus, having been treated so poorly by the suitor Altinoos, 
retorts that it is a pity that Altinoos has no phrenes to match his beauty.27  One’s phrenes can be 
“firm” or “fitting” (Penelope), or “wretched” and “dark” (Agamemnon).28  Relatedly, the archaic 
                                                
24 Onians, Richard B., The Origins of European Thought, 52.  For an example, see Odyssey I.89 where 
Athena intends to do precisely this in-spiration of Telemachos so that he will leave Ithaca in search of his 
father. 
 
25 Barnouw, Jeffrey, Odysseus, Hero of Practical Intelligence, 102.  Although Barnouw does not develop 
this insight in any systematic way, it is precisely this connection to lived experience that needs to be 
uncovered and described in order to grasp at least something of the affective and traditional connotations 
of “phronēsis” in Aristotle’s work. I will return to this motif below. 
 
26 That is to say, a feature which cannot easily be classed as merely physical or cognitive because the 
sense of the word’s use covers an overlapping array of dimensions, as I will discuss below.  
 
27 Od. 17.454.  Or as when Hector rebukes Paris: “Will not the Achaeans mock us and say that we have 
sent one to champion us who is beautiful to see but who has neither strength nor courage in his phresin?” 
Il. 3. 44-45. 
 
28 Pearson, Lionel, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece, 54. 
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view29 that a liquid (i.e., wine) is taken directly into the lungs also helps to articulate an 
ambiguous use of phren.  Wine can be meliphron, sweet or pleasing to the phrenes.  Should we 
say here that the wine is pleasing to the “lungs” (or to whatever other corporeal site one attaches 
to the phrenes), or that it is pleasing to the “mind”?  Perhaps it is best to declare the opposition 
itself as simply out of place?  In any case, we need to highlight the tight relationship between 
what is passively taken into or received from “the outside” by the phrenes (breath, words, wine), 
and what then actively comes back out of the phrenes (breath, words/deeds/emotions).30  This 
situation is nicely depicted in Altinoos’ rebuke of Odysseus’ brazen speech for which the wine is 
blamed: “Wretched beggar you have no phrenes…the honeyed wine has wounded you as it does 
others who gulp it down beyond measure.”31   
We can turn now from the more ambiguous features to the more explicitly psychical, or 
cognitive, side of the phrēn.32  Like the Homeric noos, the phrenes exhibit a broad array of what 
could be loosely referred to as “cognitive” or “psychical” activities including the following: 
deliberation, worry, thought, feeling, consideration, etc.  Each of these activities generally 
includes shades of ethical, emotional, and practical-volitional meanings, which is not to suggest 
                                                
29 C.f., Onians, Richard B., The Origins of European Thought, 32-36. 
 
30 E.g., Sarpedon’s words “bite” Hector in his phrenes.  Il. V. 493; and Pindar writes the line, “Terrified, 
the old man’s phrēn cried out, ‘My son!’”. For Pindar, see Pelliccia, 6. 
 
31 Od. XXI. 285-295.  Altinoos goes on to list a series of events in which someone committed some error 
as a result of impairing their phrenes with wine. 
 
32 This is not to suggest that the cognitive dimension is somehow incorporeal in Homer.  Rather, the issue 
here is simply a matter emphasis.  After all, cognitive activities (phronein) take place “in” the phrenes. 
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that such categories are themselves distinct in Homer.33  Insofar as a more explicitly 
“intellectual” activity is being emphasized (as opposed to the “emotions” of the phrenes), the 
Homeric phrenes includes at least four prominent capacities: (1) ability to recognize salient 
practical features of a situation, (2) ability to make plans about future situations and decisions for 
action, (3) receptivity to the words and deeds of other persons, gods, or animals, and (4) a 
tendency towards being either wise or foolish.34  Whether or not one finds the more intellectual 
aspect to be the most prominent feature of the phrenes, this feature itself cannot be understood in 
abstraction from, especially, the emotional and ethical aspects.  To be periphron or aphron (wise 
or foolish) cannot be reduced to a matter of mere success or failure of deliberation or an 
unemotional calculus.  The context and characters involved in the use of such language must 
guide the reader’s sense of the shades of meaning.   
Further, the activities of the phrenes associated with the verb phronein are always tightly 
bound up with ethical and practical concerns – a feature that, alongside the “respiratory” motif, 
generally persists throughout antiquity.  We find an exemplary ethical-practical moment in, e.g., 
Theognis: “This city is pregnant, Cyrnus; I feel it may breed a man who will put a check on our 
kakes hubris [base hubris].  Our citizens have saophrones [sound phrenes] still, but the leaders 
                                                
33 Shirley Darcus Sullivan is quite helpful in outlining the features of each of these (non-)categories, e.g., 
by showing that the range of emotions typically supported by the phrenes include joy, courage, pain, 
grief, anger, rage, fear, care, worry, love, hate, etc.  For citations, consult the expansive appendix to her 
Psychological Activity in Homer. A Study of Phren. 
 
34 This is not an exhaustive list, but presents the great bulk of intellectual activities of the phrenes.  For a 
full discussion, c.f., Chapter Seven of Sullivan’s Psychological Activity in Homer. A Study of Phren. 
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are ready to fall into the depths of baseness…”35  Lionel Pearson, in his excellent work, Popular 
Ethics in Ancient Greece, summarizes the situation nicely: “The term phrenes, it must be 
admitted, is used with a certain vagueness in Homer, in much the same way as terms like ‘heart’, 
‘mind’ and ‘feelings’ in modern English; it is not used to denote intelligence as opposed to 
feelings, and the corresponding verb, phronein, can mean ‘feel’ as well as ‘think’.”36 
Breathing under pressure: emotion, language, and respiration in the phrenes 
Before transitioning to the next moment of this chapter’s intellectual history of 
phronēsis, I want to elaborate the claim advanced at the beginning of this section that the 
connection to “respiration” establishes a key background for the whole phrēn/phronēo word 
family.  There are two relevant points to be made here.  The first concerns the link between 
respiration, action, and emotion.37 An exemplary situation for Homer in which these three 
phenomena occur is that of battle.  One can be “dai-phron” or “peri-phron” in war.  To have a 
mind for (perhaps we should say, “to have the lungs for”) battle and to know how to handle 
oneself with true cleverness and wisdom throughout the tumult and complexity of a whole war 
(as a general would need), or in a particular battle (as a soldier would need) requires that one’s 
breathing remains “measured” so as to “keep one’s head on straight” and not be a-phron 
(foolish, headless), but also that one receive a little luck (tyche) from the gods in the form of 
                                                
35 Theognis, 39-42.  C.f., Theognis, “The Elegiac Poems of Theognis,” Elegy & Iambus (trl. J.M. 
Edmonds), vol. 1, 235. 
 
36 Pearson, Lionel, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece, 54. 
 
37 The second, discussed below, concerns the link between respiration, action, and speaking. 
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inspiration (menos).38  The one who is daiphron must still not be foolish qua “heartless,” or 
disposed toward foolhardy fits of rage, but must know how and when to be exephron, that is, to 
“hold back” or “stay” one’s war-like phrenes.  In the Odyssey, of course, such language has a 
wider application than literal fighting.  The pounding heart, anxious breathing, and the way the 
stomach seems to turn over are phenomena that occur in any situation that displays its own 
social, ethical, and existential complexity.39  To be aphron is not simply a failure of cognition.  
Rather, it is to give oneself over, or, better, to be delivered over to an uncontrolled heart and 
mind, e.g., to the hyperventilation displayed in the sheer terror of a helpless fighter in battle who 
acts foolishly,40 or to the hubris, arrogance, and presumptiveness of a base heart.  The phrenes 
can be either good (euphron) or bad (aphron), and the steady vigilance over one’s emotions that 
is required is seemingly built into the language itself.41     
 A second issue to be clarified is that between breathing, action, and language or 
speaking (logos).  The phrenes often seem to “speak” to their owner in a sense close to the 
language of conscience and impulse – that is to say, their “language” is one toward or away from 
                                                
38 For a good discussion on this etymological background, see Bruno Snell’s “phrenes – phronēsis,” 34-
64. 
 
39 Here is another point that must be carried over into our eventual retrieval of the later 4th century 
philosophical and political understanding of phronēsis. 
 
40 C.f., Snell, Bruno, “phrenes – phronēsis,” 50. 
 
41 T.B. Webster echoes this: “The beating of the heart is obviously affected by emotion; so is the pace of 
breathing, and this is visible in the diaphragm which appears as a dark shadow at moments of great 
exertion and excitement”. Webster, T.B., “Language and thought in early Greece,” 31. 
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action.42  Hayden Pelliccia is worth quoting here: although the phrenes “cannot tell us anything 
specific, nor give an account of their ‘knowledge’ because they lack logos,” nevertheless their 
lack in verbal precision and intellectual clarity also exhibits “powerful ethical authority, in the 
sense that they give powerful testimony to a persons’ ethos: being impulsive, they are assumed to 
be honest and sincere”.43  It seems to me that we find here the basic force behind the occasional 
German translation of phronēsis as “Gewissen” (conscience).  Do not the heart, guts, stomach, 
and lungs “know” or “have a feel for” what is (apparently) desired and what must (apparently) be 
done (or not done) long before being raised to the level of public speech or, further, to the clarity 
of the philosophical concept – that is to say, in the (self)conscious use of language?     
 Further, the phrenes are a necessary but insufficient condition for the activities of 
speaking and listening insofar as they help to set the tone or context in which logos transpires.  
This point remains close to the affective dimension of the phrenes, but what should be noted here 
is that the condition of a particular character’s phrēn will act as a kind of initial, affective, 
interpreter (hermeneus) of the logos of another person or god.  Words often stir, strike, hurt, 
gladden, or otherwise affect the phrēn of Odysseus.44  The “spirit” in which we receive or “take 
in” words or thoughts from another is at least as important as the explicit content of what was 
                                                
42 C.f., Hayden Pelliccia: “The organs are the source of what we might call impulses: they can impel a 
person to a certain action, perhaps an action different from what the person otherwise thinks desirable”.  
Pelliccia, Hayden, Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar, 39. 
 
43 Pelliccia, Hayden, Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar, 260-265. 
 
44 Od. VII.218ff; VIII.448; XIII.362; XV.486; XVII.238; XVIII.327, 331, 391, 345; XXIV.382. 
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articulated.45  To “put” another’s logos in one’s heart (or, passively, to have them “put” there by 
another, e.g., by Athena), as Penelope occasionally does,46 is to suggest a deeper sort of care, 
pondering, or deliberating over what has been said – a kind of deliberation or care that begins 
long before and often long after any step-wise calculation of a determinate response.   
HIPPOCRATES 
I turn next to the Hippocratic Corpus in order to highlight some distinctive changes from the 
Homeric usage as well as to make clear that even in the drastically different contexts that 
separate 8th century Epic Poetry from 5th century medical research, the underlying motifs 
discussed above still retain a hold on the meaning of the language.   I will discuss the manner in 
which the Hippocratic literature (1) departs from, and (2) remains consonant with a traditional 
(i.e., Homeric) understanding by looking at the noun phrēn and the verb phronēo each in turn.  It 
should be noted once again that my concern is not with a particular medical author’s work per se.  
I will ignore consideration of the purpose, authorship, and date of, as well as theoretical conflicts 
between the individual medical treatises.  My interest is confined to noting the basic features of 
how the word-family is being used in general.  That said, when I do narrow my focus, below, on 
an individual work, I will then, of course, spend more care on the historical-exegetical 
                                                
45 Here lies another hermeneutic lesson, insofar as we are always already “spiritually” or “emotionally” 
oriented in our receptiveness to the word of another.  Affective neutrality would here simply be the 
clinically diagnosable condition of a “flat-affect” – which is even still a kind of orientation of course, 
albeit an unfortunate one. 
 
46 For a paradigmatic example, c.f., Od. XIX.236. 
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complexities specific to the passage(s) in question.47  The point to be stressed is that the analysis 
of Hippocrates given here vis-à-vis Homer should not be construed as an historical or 
chronological thesis, but simply a philological one.  That is to say, I am not making any claims 
about the historical development of the meaning of the language.  Placing “Hippocrates” after 
“Homer” (dubious proper names which must themselves be understood in a quite loose sense) is 
meant only to highlight the extent to which they each employ the phrēn/phronēo vocabulary in 
rather different ways.   
Phrenes in the Hippocratic Corpus: Connections to Homer 
In their use of “phrenes,” the Hippocratic48  writers maintain a connection to the 
Homeric usage in at least three ways.  First, though perhaps least interestingly, the medical 
treatises persist in using the plural “phrenes” by a wide margin.  Second, although it is correct 
that the Hippocratic texts generally use “phrenes” to refer to the diaphragm in a merely material 
fashion (i.e., stripped of any cognitive dimension), the fact that the writers feel the need to 
distance their technical, medical use of the term from such ordinary or poetic uses shows that 
there still persists a link between the cognitive and corporeal dimension of the phrenes in the 5th 
and 4th centuries.  The second issue also persists in Aristotle, though the use of “phrenes” in 
                                                
47 For now, those suggestions will be confined to the footnotes. 
 
48 I will sometimes slip between “Hippocrates” and “the Hippocratic writers” in order to indicate the loose 
sense in which the proper name “Hippocrates” can be attributed to the medical corpus whose name it 
underwrites.  
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written texts drastically declines in frequency by the late 4th/3rd centuries – an event which is 
perhaps a direct consequence of the influence of the medicalization of the noun.49  
The third and final way in which the Hippocratic writers remain close to the ordinary 
use of “phrenes” also concerns their use of “phronēo” (discussed below), and is much more 
interesting than the two features previously mentioned, and is worth lingering over.  Of concern 
is the still foundational, and to that extent basically unquestioned, relationship between 
phrēn/phronēo and its “respirational” motif; that is to say, a link with breath, breathing, and air 
on the one hand, and the diaphragm (phrenes) and cognitive capacities (phronein) on the other.  
While the link between the phrenes and the activity of phronein was medically severed over 
time, their respective links to the context of respiration remained utterly steadfast.  The link 
between the phrenes and respiration in the medical writings, for example, is obvious: the 
function of the “diaphragm” just is a respirational one.  Even today there is still a shadow of this, 
e.g., in our use of the “phrenic nerve” to refer to the nerve regulating the respiratory motor 
functioning of the diaphragm.50 I will return to the respirational theme below.  
Phrenes in the Hippocratic Corpus: Medical Innovations 
                                                
49 I say “written texts” to avoid the claim that the written texts we have access to accurately portray the 
scene of day-to-day language use.  I will discuss the in-frequent uses of “phrenes” in Plato and Aristotle 
later.  For now, it should be noted that, despite the massive vocabulary of both philosophers there are less 
than 20 instances of some form of “phrēn” in their entire combined works.  Compared to the statistics for 
Homer given above, the basic situation is clear enough:  By the 3rd century, the great Homeric ‘organ’ had 
been surgically removed by the doctor’s more technical, naturalistic language. 
 
50 Other contemporary words built from the phren- prefix include frenzy, frenetic, or frantic, as well as 
medical terms like phrenismus (encephalitis), phrenomania (delirium), and my personal favorite, 
phrenomophobia (fear of thinking). 
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The major point of departure from the ordinary or Homeric use of phrenes can easily be 
seen in light of the Hippocratic discussion of (1) the classical disease called “phrenitis,” as well 
as (2) the classical question about the “seat of the mind”.  In the hands of ancient medicine, the 
phrēn ultimately loses its Homeric-Poetic mystique, and instead is refitted into a more technical, 
medical terminology.51 
Together with mania, epilepsy, and melancholia, phrenitis (discussed below) rounds out 
the four primary psychosomatic diseases of classical medicine, which are often closely related in 
their symptoms and treatment.  Phrenitis, which in modern medicine was split into the diagnoses 
of meningitis and encephalitis, is described by the ancient writers with such disparate symptoms 
as insomnia, seizures, chills, and side pain.52 The constant features of phrenitis in all cases, 
which generally tends to be lethal in the Hippocratic case studies, are fever and some form of 
psychological impairment, generally referred to as paraphronesis, ekphrones, paranoian, and 
mania.53  The etiology of phrenitis is also obscure.  While the inflammation of the phrenes 
would seem to be the most intuitive, the translation of “phrenitis” into modern medicine comes 
by way of meningitis and encephalitis, which refer to inflammation in the brain.  Further, some 
                                                
51 A study of the influence of Greek medicine on Greek tragedy would, I think, yield a different 
conclusion overall.  The poets – similar to our use of “heart” – have always been comfortable with a 
language that does not fit in the doctor’s analyses.  The hermeneutic priority of a work’s subject matter 
here is rather obvious. 
 
52 Which refer to inflammation in the brain.  As we will see, in the Hippocratic writers a split is 
introduced between the phrēn (diaphragm) on the one hand, and the healthy or ill activity of phronein on 
the other, which may or may not take place “in” the phrenes as it did in Homer.  
 
53 Epidemics VII recounts a story in which the town butcher in Acanthus developed a phrenitis-related 
hunchback. 
 
88 
 
 
 
Hippocratic texts attribute phrenitis to bile settling in the bloodstream, which should already alert 
us to the fact that these writers were quite willing to separate the phrēn qua material organ, from 
the activity of phronein, and arrive at varying conclusions as to the precise location of that 
activity.54  In any event, the treatment for phrenitis is entirely physical – patients are to keep 
warm, abstain from wine, take hot baths, eat and drink various doctor-prescribed concoctions, 
etc.  Volker Langholf’s helpful work succinctly summarizes the role of “phrenes” here: 
In the Hippocratic Collection it [i.e., phrenes] has practically lost its Homeric 
meaning of a function (‘intelligence’, ‘mind’, ‘soul’ etc.), and is most often used as an 
anatomical name equivalent to diaphragm, and occasionally for other membranes…it 
always means an organ, never a function; it is never used metaphorically.55     
To be ‘phrenitic’ has little to do with having poor phrenes in the Homeric sense.  When Penelope 
chastises Telemachos for allowing a guest (the disguised Odysseus) to be treated so poorly, 
telling him that his phrenes are no longer good and firm (empedoi), she does not send for a 
doctor, but rather, by her actions, demonstrates what it means to be thoughtful and considerate 
(epiphron).56 Even the abstention from wine, which Altinoos recommends to the disguised 
Odysseus, is obviously stated on an ethical-practical plane rather than a medical one in which the 
ostensibly same advice is given by the Hippocratic doctor.57  Nevertheless, as suggested above, it 
is this old poetic connection between the corporeality of the phrenes and some cognitive, 
                                                
54 Discussed below under the heading of the question of the “seat” of the mind. 
 
55 Langholf, Volker, Medical Theories in Hippocrates: Early Texts and the ‘Epidemics’, 40- 44. 
 
56 Homer, Odyssey, XVIII.210-220. 
 
57 Though perhaps not an entirely different plane! 
 
89 
 
 
 
affective, ethical, and practical dimension that the Hippocratic writers feel the need to explicitly 
confront. To put the issue somewhat differently, we can ask how the Hippocratic corpus 
generally wedges a difference in between what was previously considered to be two sides of the 
same coin: that is, the corporeality of the phrenes, and the psychical activities taking place “in” 
them.  One way the difference is discussed comes by way of the classic question concerning the 
seat of the mind. Since the symptoms of phrenitis, as with other diseases such as epilepsy (the 
so-called “sacred” disease), tend to be dominated by a mixture of physical and psychical 
disturbances often employing a range of terms associated with our phrēn/phronēo word-family, 
it stands to (one line of) reason that the phrenes are the seat of mind.  After all, where else but 
the phrenes would be the place to look to for an account of ek-phrones (“out of one’s mind,” 
delirium, madness)?  Along with the blood and the brain, the phrenes are often presumed to be 
an initially reasonable candidate for the noble office of the mind.  However, e.g., in the infamous 
De Morbo Sacro, the writer is quite clear about the abyssal difference58 between the organ 
“phrenes” on the one hand, and the activities (and their malfunction) related to the verb phronēo.  
Not only is such a distinction clear here, but the writer is equally clear about the brain being the 
seat of the mind: 
In these ways I hold that the brain is the most powerful organ of the human 
body…The diaphragm [phrenes] has a name [onoma] due merely to chance [tyche] 
and custom [nomo], not to reality [eonti] and nature [phusei], and I do not know 
                                                
58 It should be noted that we are not drawing a distinction between “the mind” and “the body” here.  The 
separation of the phrenes from psychical activities, which they “contain” in Homer, is specifically a 
question of corporeal location in Hippocrates and not a distinction between materiality body and 
immaterial mind.   
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what power [dunamin] the diaphragm [phrenes] has for thought and intelligence 
[noein kai phronein]…59 
The author of the text allows himself to speculate about the phrenes, but even then the matter is 
clear: 
It can only be said that, if a man be unexpectedly over-joyed or grieved, the 
diaphragm jumps and causes him to start.  This is due, however, to its being thin, 
and having a wider extent than any other organ; it has no cavity where it can receive 
any accident, good or bad…it feels nothing before the other parts do, but is idly 
named as though it were the cause of perception; just like the parts by the heart 
called ‘ears’ [i.e., the auricles], though they contribute nothing to hearing.60  
Although the phrenes, along with the heart, “are best endowed with aisthesis” (sensation, 
feeling, perception), “neither [the phrenes nor the heart], however, has any share of 
phronēsis, but it is the brain which is the cause [aitios] of the things I have mentioned.”61 
Aside from the arguments in favor of the brain, Aristotle himself would later make the same 
claim about the etymology of phrēn and its (non-)relationship to phronein.62 Historically, the 
phrenes would never again regain the prominence and dignity displayed in Homer, even if 
the Homeric use persisted in the occasional poetic use. 
Phronein in the Hippocratic Coprus 
                                                
59 Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease, 20. 
 
60 Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease, 20.15-30ff. 
 
61 Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease, 20. 
 
62 Parts of Animals, III.10 672b25-673a10. 
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Given the change that the phrenes have undergone in the Hippocratic corpus, we need 
now ask how the verb phronēo is understood, and if it is at all different from its basis in the 
language of poetry.  Because the medical authors have severed the Homeric link between the 
phrēn as an organ and the activity of the verb phronein, we have to treat their understanding of 
both separately.  Thus while the differences from Homer vis-à-vis an understanding of the phrēn 
was clarified above, a more complex picture results when consider the Hippocratic 
understanding of the activity of phronein.  As with the first section, I will here discuss two 
respects in which phronēo language is used (1) differently from, and (2) in consonance with 
Homer.  Both respects are, thankfully, distilled in two particular passages in the Hippocratic 
corpus – the text from De Morbo Sacro, quoted above, and a particular chapter from On 
Breaths.63  
 What connects the Hippocratic use of the activity of phronein together with its poetic 
use in Homer is not simply that it is understood to be some kind of cognitive, intellectual 
(broadly construed) activity, but rather that it maintains close ties to the “respiratory” motif that I 
have suggested forms the primary background for all phrēn/phronēo language.  In fact, and 
nearly paradoxically, precisely because of the way in which the medical writers understood 
phronein differently than Homer (i.e., as doctors and quasi-natural scientists), they are actually 
led to emphasize and make explicit the connection between phronein and respiration, air, and 
pneuma.  In other words, in departing from one Homeric feature (i.e., the link between the phrēn 
                                                
63 Cf., also Hüffmeier, Friedrich “Phronēsis in den Schriften des Corpus Hippocraticum,” 51-84. 
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and phronēo), the Hippocratic corpus solidifies another.  What then are these differences and 
similarities? 
On the one hand, the nature of 5th/4th c. medical prose writing together with the sorts of 
questions which motivate the Hippocratic writers results in a different sense of phronein than is 
found in Homer.  This is not merely due to the fact that clear distinctions, e.g., between aisthesis 
and phronēsis are sometimes prevalent in Hippocrates, whereas the same cannot be said of 
Homer.  The Hippocratic Corpus is so varied and disharmonious that one always feels the danger 
of drawing conclusions by omitting some alternative piece of evidence.  The real mark of 
difference in the uses of phronein, however, is more general.  There is a clear difference in the 
style and tone with which the medical writers approach any discussion of phronein.  That is to 
say, the Hippocratic texts are concerned specifically with the physical nature of human 
intelligence.  Whereas the Homeric presentation of phronein is clearly more dynamic and covers 
broad array of meanings, the Hippocratic usage is (somewhat) more precise, and more precisely 
focused on a particular aspect – i.e., the relationship between the activity of phronein and the 
corporeal constitution of human beings as healthy or sick.64 
To summarize: phronein in Hippocrates designates the healthy, normal, sound use of 
one’s cognitive faculties, including intelligence and thinking (broadly construed), as well as 
“perception” in the robust sense in which we might say in English “she’s a very perceptive 
                                                
64 I acknowledge that I am overstating the issue somewhat here however.  Just as with Homer, to be 
“healthy” was still understood by way of a variety of religious practices and a sound grasp of an 
individual’s place in the immediate environment and the cosmos generally vis-à-vis that of the gods.   
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person” or “he knows how to read a situation”.65 Phronein in Hippocrates can be contrasted with 
paraphronesis, and being aphron, either in the more technical, medical sense of “delirious” (as 
in the case of the disease phrenitis), or in a sense reminiscent of a Homeric character who, 
amazed at the audacity of another’s words or deeds, exclaims that he must be “out of his mind.”  
Examples of the preoccupation, as is only right for a doctor, with the ways in which a normal and 
healthy phronēsis can be sustained or can deteriorate is apparent in the Hippocratic text, On 
Breaths.  Phronēsis there is said to undergo a change (an alloiōsis) in a number of ways, such as 
the onset of disease (i.e., epilepsy), or in more everyday ways, such as in sleep and dreaming, 
and drunkenness.  The writer is concerned to note that there are a variety of corporeal events, 
activities, and changes which produce significant consequences for what is otherwise referred to 
as a sound, healthy mind.66 The connection between our bodily constitution and the healthy use 
of our cognitive faculties comes by way of what the writer refers to as “habits” (ethismata): 
“Learnings and recognitions are matters of habit. So whenever we depart from our accustomed 
habit our intelligence (phronēsis) perishes”.67 The “habits” here should be understood on the 
basis of Hippocratic dietetics, which includes not only what and how one eats, but also what and 
how one should engage in physical exercise, business, parties, etc. – in short, one’s whole day-
                                                
65 I therefore consider myself to be in basic agreement with Pierre Aubenque’s La prudence chez Aristote, 
and Friedrich Hüffmeier’s “Phronēsis in den Schriften des Corpus Hippocraticum.” 
 
66 In this case, through some obstruction or alteration in the makeup or flow of the blood. 
 
67 Ta gar mathemata kai ta anagnorismata ethismata estin; hotan oun ek tou eiothotos etheos 
metasteomen, apollutai hemin he phronesis   
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to-day and year-to-year “style” or “disposition”.  Dramatic or subtle changes and excesses vis-à-
vis one’s “character” will affect one’s phronēsis, perhaps for the better but often for the worse.68   
 Drawing the discussion of Hippocrates to a close, I want to discuss, as with Homer, the 
relationship between phronein and breathing.69  The relationship between wind, or air, and 
disease in the Hippocratic corpus would be a theme too large to tackle on its own here.70 Suffice 
it to say that the link is clear, e.g., throughout De Morbo Sacro: changes in wind patterns and 
climate (kairos) play a key role in both managing and explaining the onset of a particular 
patient’s ailment. The importance of air, climate, and proper respiration for phronēsis becomes 
clear by the end of the work, which I quote at length in light of its relevance:  
....when it [i.e., the brain] is healthy, it is an interpreter [hermeneus] to us of the 
phenomena caused by the air, as it is the air that gives it phronēsis…in fact the 
whole body participates in phronēsis in proportion to its participation in air…As 
therefore [the brain] is the first of the bodily organs to perceive [aisthanetai] the 
intelligence [phronēsis] coming from the air [ēeros], so too if any violent change 
                                                
68 Although I will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter, we should take note that Aristotle, 
through his ethos–ēthos (habit-character) word-play, is evoking the world of popular medicine, but 
thereby raising it to the higher, ethical-practical level of virtue.  Aristotle’s implicit point is fundamental: 
(bodily) health is not enough to satiate the most primordial desire of human phusis.  As that which saves 
(sōzein) phronēsis, moreover, the virtue of sophrosune is equally raised up by Aristotle onto a higher 
philosophical plane.  But is not Aristotle in this sense simply remaining a faithful follower of the 
Socratic-Platonic transformation of language and thinking?  Whatever criticisms Aristotle has of the 
“Socratic exaggeration” of virtue/knowledge in EN BK VI, we should not lose sight of the more 
fundamental agreement on the basis of which his thinking moves. 
 
69 As stated above, the connection between breathing and the phrenes (diaphragm) in Hippocrates is clear.  
The function of the diaphragm just is a respirational one. 
 
70 Even if we restricted our focus to the texts considered here, De Morbo Sacro and On Breaths. 
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has occurred in the air owing to the seasons [horeon], the brain also becomes 
different from what it was.71   
I am unaware of any Homeric use of phronein, which would rival what, to modern ears, must 
sound strange in speaking of “intelligence” or “sense” as residing in or coming from the air.  In 
any event, this role of air has consequences not just for patients, but for the etiology of diseases 
as well as the doctor’s ability to prescribe treatment.  According to the writer of De Morbo, the 
so-called “sacred disease” is incorrectly and unhelpfully named, owing to a misattribution of the 
“divinity,” which properly belongs to the “elements”:  
Therefore I assert that the diseases too that attack [the brain] are the most acute, 
most serious, most fatal, and the hardest for the inexperienced to judge of. This 
disease called sacred [i.e., epilepsy] comes from the same causes as others, from the 
things that come to and go from the body, from cold, sun, and from the changing 
restlessness of winds.  These things are divine.  So that there is no need to put the 
disease in a special class and consider it more divine than the others; they are all 
divine and all human.  Each has a nature and power of its own; none is hopeless or 
incapable of treatment. 72 
Understanding and respecting the “restlessness of winds” and its role in providing, sustaining, 
and destroying human phronēsis is the heavy task that falls to the doctor: 
So the physician must know how, by distinguishing the seasons for individual things, 
he may assign to one thing nutriment and growth, and to another diminution and 
harm…Whoever knows how to cause in men, by regimen [i.e., dietetics], moist or 
dry, hot or cold, can cure this disease also, if he distinguish the seasons for useful 
treatment, without having recourse to purifications and magic.73 
                                                
71 Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease, XIX. 
 
72 Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease, XX-XXI. 
73 Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease, XXI. 
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To conclude, despite the fact that the phrēn has been severed from its earlier link to 
phronein, the theme of respiration closely follows on heels of any use of both phrēn and 
phronein. Homer and Hippocrates – and here I mean ancient Greek culture generally – presume 
an intimate link between the outside air or environment, and its involvement with “inner” human 
cognitive activity.  In fact, Homer’s poetry itself was never as explicit as Hippocrates on this 
point:  phronēsis is “of the air” (tes phronēsis tou eeros), and “the whole body participates in 
phronēsis in proportion to its participation in air”.74  But what can it mean to say that phronēsis 
involves such an elemental dimension – i.e., that phronēsis is in some meaningful way bound up 
with the air?  The brain, for its part, is the hermeneus of “the phenomena caused by the air” 
insofar as it distributes to the rest of the body its proper share of “phronetic air,” thereby causing 
(parexei) intelligence and movement of the limbs (ten phronesin kai ten kinesin toisi melesi).75 
Here, the whole body breathes phronēsis to the extent that its contact with the “outside” air is 
sound and unobstructed.   
There is a good reason why phronein and phronēsis could never really come to be 
thought of as incorporeal, if indeed even nous has that meaning in Plato or Aristotle.  Phronēsis 
names not only the healthy, sound manifestation of human psychology, but also articulates an 
intimate connection with one’s surrounding world, and the climate which forms and reforms 
one’s cognitive capacities in this-here-and-now environment, even despite (or together with) all 
                                                
74 Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease, XIX.7-10. 
 
75 Hippocrates, On the Sacred Disease, X.20-24. 
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of the contingency in the “restlessness of the winds”.76  Be it in Homer or Hippocrates, phronein 
is a deeply human, climate and environment specific, activity.  If noein (e.g., in Aristotle and 
Plato) could potentially raise the human up to something divine, phronēsis requires the gods 
“come down” to our contingent, human situation, and in-spire or breathe something divine 
(courage, wisdom) into us.  This intimacy between “inside” intelligence and “outside” 
environment clearly presses hard against any modern subject-object, inside-outside, or mind-
body presupposition.  In a way, the tension will only become greater with Heraclitus. 
HERACLITUS 
Reorientation: The Emergence of “Phronēsis” 
In the following section I narrow the focus down to “phronēsis” as such.  At this point, 
the above two sections have given us a robust picture of how to understand in general the 
phrēn/phronēo word-family across two very different rhetorical contexts (Homer and 
Hippocrates).  With Heraclitus, however, we begin to move from the plane of historical-
etymological interest to the plane of philosophical thought.  As when Socrates in the Philebus 
can no longer hold the door shut and must relent, allowing all the varieties of knowledge and 
pleasure to come rushing in to join the discussion about the second best life, so, too, Heractlitus’ 
fragments force philosophical thinking to begin in earnest.  Heraclitus not only introduces 
“phronēsis” into Greek, but further, through the movement of his cryptic thought, he also sets the 
                                                
76 This could be further developed along archaic religious lines by investigating the need for a divine 
“interpreter” (hermeneus) of the meaning of subtle shifts in the “winds” or “tides” for those going off into 
battle or preparing for a birth. 
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basic hermeneutic stage for many later authors’ thinking about the meaning of phronēsis 
(especially Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates).   
Returning to the diagram which I introduced at the beginning of this chapter (provided 
again just below), the point to be noted here is that Heraclitus establishes the meaning of 
phronēsis in a decidedly “psychological” (as opposed to merely “physiological”) sense.  In 
general, later thinkers followed him in this.77  Moreover, Heraclitus’ use of the word, although I 
will argue below that it has a somewhat precise sense (i.e., as a form of self-knowledge 
concerning one’s place in the cosmos), nevertheless is not to be taken as a ‘technical’ concept, on 
account of the linguistic density of his fragments and the obscurity of the thinking taking place 
within them.  As far as the “scope” of application (the horizontal axis in the diagram), I situate 
Heraclitus in the middle of that axis in order to indicate some of my interpretive reservations 
regarding just how precise Heraclitus understood the word.   The diagram is also intended to 
indicate the way in which thinkers, after Heraclitus, pulled “phronēsis” in rather different 
directions in terms of the scope of application (now wide, now narrow).  Explicating that 
situation, however, will be left for the start of the next chapter.  In general, what I am aiming to 
do in the rest of this chapter is to give an account of one under-developed but important context 
for understanding and retrieving Aristotle’s philosophical analyses of phronēsis – namely, the 
introduction of the concept into philosophical thinking by Heraclitus.78  
                                                
77 To reiterate a caveat however.  The diagram is merely probabilistic, and does not purport to do full 
justice to any thinker’s actual use of the language.  I am of course open to suggestions for revision and 
clarification.  Nevertheless, the basic situation seems correct enough to be useful for orientation. 
 
78 Heraclitus admittedly is only one context among many for understanding the concept of phronēsis in 
Aristotle, standing alongside Plato and Isocrates who are even closer to Aristotle’s writings.  
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Figure 2. A Taxonomy of Phronein. 
 
 
Interpreting the “phronetic fragments” of Heraclitus 
The topic of “phronēsis79 in Heraclitus” is terribly underexplored.80 Given that 
Heraclitus has provided us with the first mention of “phronēsis” (perhaps his coinage), it is 
                                                                                                                                                       
Nevertheless, I hope this section will demonstrate why Heraclitus remains invaluable for re-reading any 
of these later authors. 
 
79 Although there is no one English word that correctly translates phronēsis across all contexts, 
“understanding,” “wisdom,” and perhaps also “thinking” are adequate beginnings for its use in Heraclitus. 
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surprising that the theme has not received more attention.  The specific aim of what follows is 
two-fold.  First, and most generally, I will make the case that there exists a “phronetic language” 
in Heraclitus, which should be taken seriously as an important topic for further exploration in its 
own right.81 Second, over the course of a close reading of several of the most relevant fragments, 
I provide a provisional description of what Heraclitus takes “phronēsis” to be.   
A Private Understanding? 
The first use of the abstract action noun “phronēsis” occurs in the following fragment: 
Although the word is common, the many live as though they have private understanding 
[phronēsin].82 
The fragment, which was preserved for us in a passage from Sextus Empiricus, is 
particularly rich in its complex construction and conceptual density.  Unlike many other 
                                                                                                                                                       
80 That is not to say that it is entirely unexplored.  The point is simply that “phronēsis” in Heraclitus is 
generally subordinated to some other, or more general line, of investigation.  For some who do, albeit 
briefly, discuss the topic, see Kirk’s commentary on fragments B2 (according to Diels’ numbering) in 
Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments; Werner Jaeger’s “Heraclitus” in his The Theology of Early Greek 
Philosophers; and Gadamer’s “Heraclitus Studies” in The Beginning of Knowledge.  See also the 2008 
dissertation by Mathew P. Meyer, “Heraclitus on Meaning and Knowledge Limitation.” 
 
81 I am not very happy with these expressions, and welcome alternatives.  In any case, by “phronetic 
language” and “phronetic fragments” I mean the word-family derivable from the basic noun phrēn, the 
verb phroneo, and especially phronēsis, which transforms the verb into an action noun.  I include the 
following in my list of “phronetic” fragments: B2, B17, B112, B113, B116 (for phronein and phronēsis), 
and B104 (for “phrēn”).  For “euphronē,” a beautiful poetic epithet used by Heraclitus to refer to 
“night,” see also B26, B57, B67, and B99.  Throughout the section, I will always cite the Greek in a 
footnote whenever I first introduce a particular fragment.   
 
82 τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν (B2).  Kahn: “Although the 
account is shared, most men live as though their thinking were a private possession.” The verb phronein 
and its root noun phrēn were already in use in Homer, though their meaning had also developed 
somewhat dramatically by the time of Heraclitus.  See n. 12 below for his gloss on the fragment.  
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fragments, B2 contains a cluster of key Heraclitean words – i.e., logos, xunos, oi polloi, and 
idios.83  My aim is to show that phronēsis needs to be added to that list as well.  Before we can 
answer the question about the meaning of phronēsis in Heraclitus, we need to take a close look at 
B2.  As is so common with the Ionic wordsmith, his language buzzes with the electricity of 
dialectical play as each fragment demands that we slow down and linger with it.   
 Just what is going on in B2?  It is often noted that the “common logos” appears 
juxtaposed to the “private phronēsis” of the many.  But what is the nature of this juxtaposition?  
It is imperative here that we pay close attention to the ‘contrary to fact’ tonality suggested not 
only by the “hōs” (“as if”), as well as the “although…” in the opening clause, but also by the 
syntactic separation of “phronēsis” from its adjective “idian” (“private”) by way of the 
intervening participle “exontes” (“having”). By constructing the fragment in this way, Heraclitus 
has underlined the paradoxical unreality involved in the way most of us (oi polloi) live our 
lives.84  Human life is all too often lived in an irrealis modality.  At the conceptual level, the 
essential opposition concerns the common and the private (ξυνοῦ vs. ἰδίαν), and not at all simply 
                                                
83 Note the several parallelisms with the beginning of B1 – the famous Logos-Proem. The full first 
sentence of B1 runs, τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι 
καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον·.  Kahn’s translation: “Although this account holds forever, men ever fail to 
comprehend, both before hearing it and once they have heard.”  For example, (1) both B1 and B2 take the 
bare form, “although X, yet Y,” (2) the opening clause of B1 (τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ ἐόντος) is repeated 
nearly identically in B2 (τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος), and (3) each sentence concludes with a statement about the 
rather miserable condition of how most humans live vis-à-vis the logos.  This syntactical closeness has 
led some to think that B2 must have come just after B1, but it seems to me that this confuses conceptual 
closeness with closeness in order.  
 
84 See Vlastsos, 132-135, for someone who also notes the sense of the “unreality” of the phronēsis in play 
at B2. 
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the logos and phronēsis as such.85  To make this structure more apparent in English it might be 
better to translate B2: “although the word is common, the many live as if they privately had 
phronēsis [understanding].” A more precise question would therefore ask about the extent to 
which phronēsis can participate in what is “common,” as opposed to the solipsistic, myopic, and 
private world of the sleeper, which Heraclitus equates with the irrealis.  In fact, the introduction 
of the “private phronēsis” by the “as if” (hōs) should already alert us that Heraclitus is forcing 
the word into a context that is foreign to his real understanding of it.  Real phronēsis – what that 
is, we have yet to say – is not to be identified with the private life of the many (oi polloi). Before 
we can respond to this question, however, we need to shed some light on the nature of the 
“common” and the “private” here. 
 We are given a clue about the meaning of “private” in fragment B89, which states that, 
“the world of the waking is one and shared, but the sleeping turn aside each into his idion 
[private] world.”86 The one and shared cosmos (hena kai koinon kosmon), that is to say, the 
world of the waking, is opposed to the sleepers who “turn aside” (apostrephesthai) into a private 
(idion) world.  We have here the image of a sleeper who, having been partially awoken for just a 
moment (perhaps by a gadfly), shifts positions and “turns over” onto his other side in bed, and 
                                                
85 Kirk, 61ff, is explicit about this: “It is important not to be misled by the contrast between xunou and 
idian into thinking that an equally exact contrast exists between logou and phronesis…[There] is 
sufficient connection between logos and phronesis to ensure that the opposition between their significant 
epithets is not lost.”  I am in agreement with Kirk’s point, but not his reasoning, as I will discuss below.  
 
86 ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσµον εἶναι τῶν δὲ κοιµωµένων ἕκαστον εἰς 
ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι.  Though it is not to be classed as a “phronetic fragment,” it useful insofar as it 
clarifies the idian of B2.  Note again the logical form, “although X, yet Y” in play here. 
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comfortably drifts back down into the irreal-world of sleep.  All too often, humans might be 
better described not as “rational animal” but rather simply as “very tired.”  Aristotle draws a 
perfectly correct conclusion from this, though it is not generally given much philosophical 
emphasis – unlike the gods, our participation in theoria is hemmed in by the fact that we get 
tired, and are ultimately destined for sleep.87  Of interest to Heraclitus, however, is the sudden 
and absolute opposition between the common world of the one who is awake, and the private 
world of the sleeper.  We are familiar with the way that a friend who falls asleep during a late 
night conversation suddenly no longer seems to be in the same world with us.  On account of 
this, readers of Plato’s Symposium are forever frustrated with Aristodemus who fell asleep, 
thereby separating us from the world of Socrates’ logos concerning tragedy and comedy.  
At the other end, with respect to the language of the “common,” Heraclitus invites us to 
pull apart an ambiguity present in the word.  In one way, it is appropriate to identify the many 
(hoi polloi) with what is common.  However, Heraclitus says that what is common (xunou) is 
precisely what the many commonly forget or miss in their lives.  It may indeed be common to 
live as though one could privately have an understanding concerning what is good and 
worthwhile, but the truthfulness and vitality of one’s “own” wisdom is often enough unmasked 
in the light of day – that is, in the shared, common space of the word of dialogue.  In other words, 
it is common, all-too-common for us to retreat into the privacy of our own opinions and pseudo-
understanding (idian phronēsin), missing out on what it means to take our place in the shared, 
public world, structured as it is by the truly “common” logos.  The common logos of B2 cannot 
be a private possession because it is not something one can be said “to have” at all.  Neither does 
                                                
87 Aristotle, EN X.7. 
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the logos require private (idian) initiation into a secret knowledge.  Rather, the logos pervades all 
and is shared by all things unendingly (aei) – it is common to all things: “although the word is 
common, the many live as if they have understanding [phronēsis] privately” (B2). 
A Puzzle about B113 
What then does Heraclitus take to be the nature of an authentic, real phronēsis?  This sort 
of question is just what forms part of the gap in the scholarly literature.  By not raising the topic 
of phronēsis to the level of explicit engagement in Heraclitus’ fragments, there is a tendency 
either to not see the question itself,88 or to interpret it on the basis of rather anachronistic 
categories.89 Both G.S. Kirk and Charles Kahn, at least, see that there must be some kind of 
connection between phronēsis and logos insofar as fragment B2 makes us wonder whether there 
really even is such a thing as a “private phronēsis” at all.  However, they are in disagreement 
about the nature of that connection.90 Their disagreement is ultimately determined by the 
interpretation of another “phronetic fragment” (B113), which states, “understanding is common 
                                                
88 Vlastos, 132, is clear about the nature of the juxtaposition in B2 (i.e., between “common logos” and 
“private phronēsis”), but he fails to engage the question of what would be a positive account of phronēsis 
in Heraclitus. 
 
89 As Dorter, 42-43, does insofar as he might seem to push Heraclitus into a quasi-cosmopolitan and 
humanist direction.  We should not forget that, from the perspective of his contemporaries, it would have 
been Heraclitus himself who seemed to be living in his own private world – “turning aside” from the 
public by forsaking a powerful political career in 6th century Ephesus.  
 
90 Sextus Empiricus’ gloss seems unhelpful to me: B2 “is nothing other than an explanation of the way in 
which the universe is ruled.  Therefore insofar as we share in awareness of this, we speak the truth, but 
insofar as we remain independent of it, we lie.” Boldface mine. See Kirk, 57-64.  The question I am 
raising here is rather Aristotelian in a way: just what is meant by “share in” or “participate in”?  Sextus 
Empiricus does not clarify, though he seems to suggest that phronēsis is something that allows us to 
“share in” awareness about the nature of the universe (i.e., the logos). 
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to all.”91 As Dorter notes, the fragment has been interpreted in a wide variety of ways, none of 
which stand conclusively.92 For Kirk and Kahn, the matter largely rests on how we read the 
(xunon esti) pasi here.   
Should we take Heraclitus to be implying only “all” human beings?  If so then we are led, 
as Kirk is, to claim that phronēsis names a human activity which, in its true (i.e., not “private”) 
form, grasps its proper object (i.e., the common logos).93 Thus the connection between phronēsis 
and logos “is a connection of relation rather than of kind.”94 More specifically, phronēsis in 
Heraclitus would be an epistemological activity of those humans who have found the proper 
object to grasp in their thinking.   
Alternatively, perhaps the “pasi” of B113 signifies that understanding (phronein) belongs 
to all things (the whole cosmos) in common, thereby pushing the fragment toward a quasi-
panpsychism, which is how Kahn takes it.  In this case the relationship between phronēsis and 
                                                
91 ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν.   
 
92 Dorter: Fragment B113 “has been interpreted in widely different ways: from Kirk’s dismissal of it as a 
paraphrase of B2...to Kahn’s interpretation of it as panpsychism, to Schindler’s proposal to take it as 
meaning ‘I cannot think by myself alone’.” See Dorter, 43n.16.  
 
93 Thus Kirk, 61-62ff: “The opposite of idia phronesis would not be xunh phronesis, which is nonsense 
(in spite of fr. 113d), but phronesis tou xunou, which would include the xunos logos.”  This is close to 
begging the question.  Why “nonsense” unless Kirk has already determined that phronēsis has no place 
beyond human cognition?  But where has he shown this?  On the contrary, there was even Ionic precedent 
for understanding phronēsis in a more ‘elemental’ way – that is to say, for phronēsis to be “in the air” and 
so “in” human beings only inasmuch as the air is breathed (See, Hippocrates On the Sacred Disease. 
20ff).  Kirk helps himself by abandoning B113 as spurious.  It seems to me that Vlastos has been 
persuasive in rescuing B113 in its own right as genuine.  See Vlastos, 135ff. 
 
94 Kirk, 61-62. See note 7, and note 15 for my thoughts about this suggestion. 
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logos would indeed be close to synonymous.  In fact, this is how the early church father 
Hippolytus apparently interpreted things, and the German philologist Karl Reinhardt, following 
him.  The “fire” (or “thunderbolt”) is able to steer (i.e., order, distinguish, re-connect, etc.) all 
things (B64),95 because it is phronimon.96 Karl Reinhardt has worked back from here in arguing 
that “phronēsis” (Vernunft) was in fact already in Heraclitus (!) a synonym for logos and fire – 
as the “Vernunftfeuer.”97 It is true that Heraclitus nowhere explicitly equates phronēsis with 
either fire or logos.  But on the other hand, when was Heraclitus ever explicit? 
  Having raised the issue about “real phronēsis” with the help of B113 and its puzzle, we 
can shed more light on the matter by looking to other phronetic fragments.  It seems to me that 
by failing to treat “phronēsis” explicitly as a proper topic of investigation, both Kirk and Kahn 
are forced into placing too much weight on the reading of “pasi” in B113.  But both B113 and, 
especially, B2 begin to come into their own when they are placed in hermeneutic proximity with 
their phronetic cousins, such as B17.98  
Phronēsis as Understanding One’s Place in the Cosmos 
B17 runs as follows: “Most do not think [phroneousi] things in the way they encounter 
them, nor do they recognize what they experience, but believe their own opinions.”  Part of what 
                                                
95 τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός. 
 
96 Hippolytus, Refutatio IX.10.7, and also Karl Reinhardt’s Parmenides (cited below).  
 
97 See Karl Reinhardt’s Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, 161-162ff. 
 
98 οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκοίσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ µαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ 
δοκέουσι.  
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makes this fragment so notable is that here “phronēsis” is contrasted to what it seemed (at least 
at first glance) to have been precisely identified with in B2.  In B2 the many were said to live as 
if they had their own private understanding, and we were left in the dark about what non-idian 
phronesin might look like.  But here in B17, phronein is itself contrasted with the thinking of the 
many that is blind to anything other than their own opinions.  Further, B17 provides real insight 
into what it would be to move out of the lonely, secluded world of private thinking.  To let one’s 
understanding be guided and disciplined by experience (i.e., how phenomena show up to or are 
encountered by us) is the positive task that Heraclitus gives us.  Elsewhere, Heraclitus seems to 
describe this as learning the language of things (B107).99  Mere sensation is not enough for real 
understanding (phronēsis) or experience.  What good are eyes and ears if they do not understand 
the language that phenomena speak:  “Not knowing how to listen, neither can they speak” 
(B19).100  The most rigorous listening is the prerequisite for phronēsis.  For what we understand 
and what we testify to is, at its best, the common word of the world – that is, the logos (should 
we also say the phronēsis?) that is common to all. 
Continuing in this way, it seems significant to me that we have embedded within B17 
faint allusions to the old “pathei mathos” and “gnothi seauton” dictums.  Anchored by 
“ginōskousin,” Heraclitus is able to echo both dictums at once.101  Through this, we are given an 
                                                
99 κακοὶ µάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλµοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων.  Kahn: “Eyes and ears are 
poor witnesses for men if their souls do not understand the language.” 
 
100 ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάµενοι οὐδ' εἰπεῖν. 
 
101 See the “γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς” in B116, discussed below, for an even clearer reference.   
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interpretation that combines the two: to recognize experience as that which one must accept and 
undergo in order to “wise up” up to one’s place in the cosmos.  Explicit praise of phronēsis 
occurs in B112, where the activity of phronein is said to be the greatest virtue, and is identified 
as true wisdom – here taken to be the ability to speak and act (legein kai poiein) in tune with the 
truth, and to perceive in accord with nature (physis).102 Phronēsis has become a form of self-
knowledge. 
 Echoing this, phronēsis as self-knowledge is evidenced also in fragment B116, which, 
not coincidentally, contains the first mention of “gnothi seauton”: “it belongs to all men to know 
themselves and to think well.”103 Here we have a clear instance of “pasi” being restricted to 
humanity.104  Therefore, even if we must bracket the question of the scope in which phronēsis is 
“common to all” at B113, we still have won some genuine insights about how Heraclitus views 
its manifestation in human life.  Phronēsis, at least insofar as human beings have a share in it, is 
for Heraclitus a form of self-knowledge, where the particular “self” that is at issue can only truly 
                                                
102 [σω]φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ µεγίστη καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας. Kahn: 
“Thinking well is the greatest excellence and wisdom: to act and speak what is true, perceiving things 
according to their nature.” In some versions, the Heraclitean cognate of phronein – sophronein – is 
preferred here, though for my purposes either one are is adequate.   
 
103 ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι µέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ [σω]φρονεῖν.  As Kahn and others (e.g., Wilkens, 
Diels, North, perhaps also Vlastos) have noted, here is another place where phronein and sophronein are 
found in different manuscripts, but which are in any case cognate. For “gnothi seauton” in Heraclitus, cf., 
Eliza Wilkens, 12.   
 
104 But I do not see that this resolves the Kirk-Kahn disagreement one way or another.  Kirk might cite 
this as precedent for taking pasi in a restricted sense when used with phronein, whereas Kahn might point 
out that Heraclitus has taken pains here to do exactly what he did not do before – namely, restrict the 
usage.  Both are reasonable – and that is partly what makes the interpretation of phronēsis in Heraclitus a 
genuine hermeneutical task.  
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be understood in light of its particular situation vis-à-vis the whole cosmos.  Phronēsis names a 
particular attunement to the structure of the whole, and is manifested in one’s living (actions, 
passions, words, etc.).105   
Returning to fragment B2 one last time, things begin to fall into place when we recognize 
that “phronēsis” has this specific sense of self-knowledge: “Although the word is common, the 
many live as though they privately have self-knowledge,” or “…as though their self-knowledge 
were a private possession.” 
Though perhaps an inadequate translation, putting things in this way at least highlights 
the unreality of idian phronesin, and gives us a somewhat clearer sense of what Heraclitus 
understands by the word.  To understand oneself or one’s place is to recognize the link between 
one’s own orientation, and the context or environment in which one is oriented.  It is natural – 
for us – to carve up the public and the private, the interiority of the individual and the exteriority 
of the world.  Yet that kind of distinction is just what Heraclitus cannot abide.  Human beings are 
not set apart from the world either in body or in mind.  Therefore, neither is our understanding of 
ourselves, or the good life, disconnected from the common logos that structures all.  Self(-
knowledge) and world(-knowledge) are intimately entwined with one another for Heraclitus – so 
close in fact that the distinction between the two keeps breaking down. 
                                                
105 Heraclitus does not specify what that life looks like, nor does he restrict phronēsis to a cognitive act 
per se, since it is primarily one’s living that exemplifies phronēsis and not the thoughts that one might 
have in one’s head. We can be sure at least that it is something rather different from merely the Periclean 
skill of political deliberation (euboulia), which impressed Aristotle and Isocrates so much. 
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 To bring this discussion to a close, with is introduction of the concept of “phronēsis,” 
Heraclitus has handed us a question about the relationship between the individual and the world 
– i.e., the concrete ground of the dialectical movement between the particular (i.e., the 
individual) and the universal (i.e., the universe or cosmos).106  No doubt there is still a great deal 
to explore in the phronetic fragments by emphasizing some fragments over others, or by placing 
them in varying hermeneutic orders.  But the matter of self-knowledge that has emerged here is 
vital, and persisted throughout later discussions on the nature of phronēsis, e.g., in Plato and 
Aristotle.  
Conclusions and Transition: Phronēsis as an Historical Tradition 
The purposes of this chapter were (1) to show in general how the concept of “phronēsis” in fact 
names an historical tradition, and (2) to show specifically how “phronēsis” developed on the 
basis of the phren-phronein word family as it was employed in poetry (Homer), medicine 
(Hippocrates), and pre-Socratic thinking (Heraclitus).   In order to accomplish this task I had to 
undertake a rather lengthy investigation into that long-developing, dynamic, cultural heritage.  In 
part, this was because there are currently hardly any secondary works which attempt to 
synthesize the various (or at least many of the) pre-Aristotelian uses of “phronēsis.”  Because of 
this, I tried to investigate and bring to light a few of the most relevant contexts, and, especially in 
the case of Heraclitus, and to a lesser extent Hippocrates, to propose an interpretation of the 
understanding of phronēsis that is at work there.  By choosing to focus on Homer, Hippocrates, 
and Heraclitus, we are now able to see the outlines of the historical situation in which later 
                                                
106 Note the similarity to the dialectical movement of Aristotle’s own thinking about phronēsis in EN VI.  
I will say more about this below. 
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5th/4th c. thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates, would begin to develop their own 
understanding of the matter.   
  By now it should at least be apparent that Aristotle in no way created the concept of 
phronēsis ex nihilo, as it were.  As a participant in a tradition, and in light of the particular 
situation in which he puts forward his own understanding of phronēsis, we need to view 
Aristotle’s approach to phronēsis as one of the first great hermeneutic retrievals and revivals.  In 
general, the concept of phronēsis belongs to a tradition which concerns a nexus of themes and 
questions that are expressed through the language of the phrēn/phroneo word-family.  That is to 
say, questions concerning one’s place in the world, and how one’s living fits into it, whether we 
construe this 
1. (with Homer) as being primarily about a particular concrete situation of speaking and 
acting, with an eye towards success of rather concrete, localized goals (a la Odysseus and 
Penelope); or 
2. (with Hippocrates) as a more general question about the healthy, sound, and fit 
(physiological) constitution of the human person; or finally 
3. (with Heraclitus) as a great “cosmic” question about the human participation, 
throughout the whole of one’s living (legein kai prattein), in the logos that binds all 
things.    
Going forward, it will be important to keep in mind that, as a general working definition, 
phronēsis is a form of self-knowledge. To a rather large extent, the different ways of 
understanding the concept are variations on that theme.  Moreover, we will have to keep in mind 
that the self-knowledge characterized by phronēsis is manifested between oneself and the world. 
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This also is the case whether we understand that “world” in an elemental and material way 
(Hippocrates), in a cosmic, universal way (Heraclitus), or in a localized, practical way (Homer).   
 However, before turning explicitly to Aristotle’s own use of phronēsis in light of his 
participation in this tradition, I want to conclude by returning to the motif of breathing, which I 
highlighted throughout this chapter.  The basic connection between breathing, air, and the 
manifestation of one’s cognitive and emotional faculties, persisted in various ways throughout 
Western history - for example, in the Renaissance poem Orlando Furioso, in which Orlando 
recovers his “wits” by inhaling them from the jar in which they were stored after he lost them.  
This does not necessarily imply a direct connection to the Greek context, but rather the 
respiratory theme that was expressed in Greek through the language of phrēn/phroneo might 
simply highlight a particular field of common human experience.  Even today, expressions like 
“breathing under pressure” and “breathing it all in,” or when one says that an idea or love is “in 
the air,” all evoke an experience that has apparently been common to many people across many 
different times and places.  The activity of breathing marks the passage between “inside” 
(thinking, feeling, deliberating) and “outside” (environment, situation, context), and indeed 
renders false a strict separation of these two terms.  Moreover, the connection between the two is 
terribly complex and does not permit a strictly abstract (decontextualized) analysis.  For 
example, one can actively think about a situation in which one has to act, but one’s thinking can 
also be passively influenced by the given situation.  Moreover, it can be something ethically 
good or bad when, for example, (1) one speaks or acts without any real understanding of the 
nature of the environment or context, or, alternatively, (2) when one’s words or actions seem to 
be wholly determined by the situation, and thus, “out of one’s control.”  The ethical question, 
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i.e., the connection of phronesis to ethics, remains terribly difficult and complex, and requires a 
sustained, rigorous analysis - that is to say, in its Greek context it required the intellectual 
engagement with phronesis by Plato and Isocrates, and, ultimately, Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics.  In the next chapter we will see just how Aristotle’s analyses of phronesis, for all their 
depth, breadth, and rigor, remain indebted to his philosophical and literary forebears, and further, 
we will see how knowing this allows us to articulate the faint outlines of the trajectory of the 
concept-tradition of phronesis after Aristotle.107
                                                
107 For example, how the conception of phronesis in rhetoric did not simply die out after Aristotle’s 
philosophical sublation or “aufhebung” of Isocratean thinking.  Isocratean phronesis persisted in Cicero, 
who seemed not to distinguish between “rhetorical” and “philosophical” phronesis.  Untangling this, and 
other historical issues surrounding the concept of phronesis requires, or so I am trying to show, a 
hermeneutic sensitivity that is alive to the role of history, experience, and dialogue in the re-formation of 
concepts, which I discussed in Chapter One. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHRONĒSIS – PART TWO: A 
TRADITION IN DIALOGUE: ARISTOTLE’S PHRONĒSIS BETWEEN PLATO AND 
ISOCRATES 	
ἡ δ᾿ ἑρµηνεία ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ 
- Aristotle, De Anima1 
 
Introduction 
Gadamer’s revolutionization of the discipline of hermeneutics worked on the basis of his 
understanding and retrieval of the concept of phronēsis - and specifically on the basis of his 
understanding and retrieval of Book Six of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  In order to engage 
in a critical dialogue with Gadamer’s work (Chapter Four, Chapter Five, and the Conclusion), 
then, we need first to gain an understanding of phronēsis.  As I showed in Chapter One of this 
dissertation, gaining a hermeneutical understanding of a philosophical concept requires coming 
to awareness of that concept as a kind of living tradition, which has been shaped and reformed by 
its relation to (1) history, (2) experience, and (3) dialogue.  Whether or not cosmologically, we 
                                                
1 “Hermēneia is for the sake of well-being” (DA II, 420b21).  The Greek word hermēneia, by the 5th/4th 
century, had a tangled web of connotations, not all of which can be captured merely by way of 
“interpretation,” “expression,” “explanation,” “mediation,” or “translation.”  Within the context of the De 
Anima passage cited, “expression” is perhaps the best translation, but only if it is taken to mean the 
expression of thoughts, through vocalized words, spoken to another.  Hermeneia, “expression,” here 
should not be confused with that 18th century German romantic, aesthetic concept of “self-expression,” 
still alive today, whereby one attempts to “express” one’s inner, subjective life-feeling (Lebensgefühl) 
through art, music, dance, etc.  The emphasis of “hermēneia” throughout the classical and medieval 
periods was always on communication with others – that is to say, on dialogue.  For Gadamer’s history of 
the concept of “Ausdruck,” see Appendix VI in Truth and Method, 503-506. 
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must affirm hermeneutically - ex nihilo nihil fit.  The previous chapter began the process of 
gaining this hermeneutical understanding of phronēsis by showing the early significance of 
Homer, Hippocrates, and Heraclitus in that tradition.  What remains now is to complete the 
account of the early history of phronēsis from Homer to Aristotle, by showing how Aristotle’s 
own work in Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics can be understood as the first great 
culmination - i.e., both summit and retrieval - of the tradition of phronēsis.  Whoever retrieves 
phronēsis in Aristotle, retrieves also Plato, Isocrates, and so many others.  Said differently, to 
learn from Aristotle about practical wisdom, is likewise to learn from those participants in the 
tradition who have handed “phronēsis” down to him.   
In order to make the above claims clear in the case of Aristotle specifically, the goal of 
this chapter is to show how Aristotle’s own analyses of phronēsis are born out of a particular 
intellectual scene - with particular questions and concerns - involving philosophy (Plato) and 
rhetoric (Isocrates).  Aristotle’s conceptualization of phronēsis in Book Six of his Nicomachean 
Ethics is appropriately interpreted not as mere conceptual analysis or as the fixing of a technical 
term for naming a certain ontological distinction, but rather first and foremost as the search for 
his own response to a question (or set of questions) that had been handed down, in particular, 
from Plato and Isocrates.  In other words, an interpretive, hermeneutic, story is required given 
the disparate uses of “phronēsis” that are employed throughout Aristotle’s various works - e.g., 
his use of the word in his biological works, or its function in the Protrepticus or the Metaphysics, 
wherein it is nearly synonymous with what is called “sophia” in the Nicomachean Ethics.  In this 
chapter, I am claiming that the way to tell this story with respect to the Ethics is through the 
specific intellectual dialogical context involving Isocrates and Plato.  Aristotle’s understanding 
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of phronēsis is bound up not only with the philosophy of Plato, but also the political rhetoric of 
Isocrates; and the profundity of Aristotle’s analysis of the concept in his Nicomachean Ethics 
works on the basis of his critical engagement with those earlier thinkers. 
At the end of this chapter it will become clear that, on the one hand, it was right for later 
thinkers - e.g., Cicero, Aquinas - to associate the matter of phronēsis fundamentally with 
Aristotle and his Nicomachean Ethics.  However, by tying Aristotle’s understanding of phronēsis 
back to its roots in the soil of wider, ordinary language and intellectual-cultural life, it is possible 
to cultivate a deeper awareness of how Aristotle’s epoch-making work not only does not break 
with, but in fact depends upon an engagement with, other thinkers of phronēsis.  In this way it is 
possible to break apart the all-too fixed ground of an understanding of phronēsis that occurs 
when our engagement with it is more concerned to fashion a technical term, and less a matter of 
ourselves participating in the ongoing dialogue concerning the actual subject matter of practical 
wisdom and/or self-understanding - for example, by considering the role of phronēsis in 
speaking.  In particular, this chapter aims to recover a sense for just why Isocratean rhetoric 
made such a lasting impression not only on Aristotle’s understanding of phronēsis, but also on 
later thinkers such as Cicero or Machiavelli.  By approaching phronēsis as a concept-tradition in 
which Aristotle participates, but is not the only participant, it will be possible to gain awareness 
for the sense in which phronēsis is required in our speaking to one another - in short, to gain 
awareness for the sense in which our use of language is a concrete ethical-practical concern.  
Gadamer’s work may have rendered the connection between interpretation (of language) and 
ethics philosophically explicit, but there are traces of an awareness of that connection already 
117 
 
 
 
residing in the ancient Greek development of the concept of phronēsis.  Gadamer’s turn to 
“phronēsis” was more insightful than seems to have realized.  
Overview of the Chapter 
In order to show how that Aristotle’s understanding of phronēsis can be understood as emerging 
out of a particular intellectual-cultural situation, this chapter moves from a general cultural scope 
(Part One) to a more precise textual one (Part Two).  In Part One of the chapter I make the case 
that the concept of phronēsis of the 5th/4th century BC was intimately bound to (political) 
rhetoric, and to speaking more generally (eu legein).   To do this, I (1) give an account of the 
cultural and intellectual situation in which Aristotle’s concern with phronēsis took place, and (2) 
indicate some of the hermeneutic and methodological issues that are involved in taking this 
context seriously for reading and interpreting Aristotle.  In part two, I provide a close re-reading 
and interpretation of Aristotle’s conceptualization of phronēsis in Book Six of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. 
Part One:  What is the Conversation in which Aristotle is Participating? 
In this first part (Part One) of the chapter, I make the case that the concept of phronēsis of the 
5th/4th century BC was intimately bound to (political) rhetoric, and to a concern with speaking 
more generally (eu legein).   To do this, I (1) give an account of the cultural and intellectual 
situation in which Aristotle’s concern with phronēsis took place, and (2) indicate some of the 
hermeneutic and methodological issues that are involved in taking this context seriously for 
reading and interpreting Aristotle.  In particular, in this first section, I clarify my own approach 
to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by briefly articulating my understanding of the nature of 
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Aristotle’s writings as they have been handed down to us, and of the manner in which his 
conceptualization of phronēsis exists in relation to ordinary language.   
 
 
Reading and Participation in Dialogue: A Note on Reading Aristotle’s Ethical Works 
One potential problem that should be confronted upfront concerns the rejoinder to any 
attempt to read Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis in strong connection to ordinary language and 
cultural context:  namely, Aristotle’s description of phronēsis is unique precisely inasmuch as he 
raises the language of phronēsis to the level of a concept; one, moreover, which exists precisely 
in abstraction from its ordinary and contextualized employment. Here we confront a fundamental 
interpretive question, which concerns what sort of hermeneutical presuppositions will guide our 
reading of Aristotle’s practical works.  
While it may at first seem as though this rejoinder takes seriously Aristotle’s penchant for 
conceptualization, in fact it fails as an appropriate hermeneutical presupposition not only by 
misunderstanding the nature of conceptuality,2 but also (1) failing to appreciate the nature of 
Aristotelian writing, concerning which we have much to (re)learn from early commentators,3 and 
                                                
2 This philosophical-hermeneutical issue has been discussed in Chapter One, in which I present and 
defend a Gadamerian account of the relationship between philosophical concepts, ordinary language, and 
historical tradition.   
 
3 Here I am taking my cue from the interesting and important research done by Jaap Mansefld in his 
Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled before the Study of an Author or a Text.  In particular, see pp. 10-
43.  As an example, Mansfeld notes that a fixed series of questions were said, as early as Proclus, and 
some of which were adapted from Origin, to be required to ask before, or in conjunction with, the reading 
of a work of Aristotle or Plato.  Among the eight or so questions are, for example: (1) What is the skopos 
or aim or goal of the work?  (2) what is the reading position of the work in the place of Aristotle’s works 
(i.e., at what point, and after reading what other works, should the present work be read)? (3) What is the 
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(2) failing to appreciate the unique historical position in which Aristotle is one of the first 
thinkers to fashion a robust conceptual vocabulary.  I will unfold each of these two points in 
turn.  
 With respect to Aristotelian writing (point “1”), Aristotle’s precise use of language is 
always dependent on and motivated by the questions being pursued within the context of a 
particular work.  The fact that in his ethical works Aristotle gives “phronēsis” a conceptually 
thick, rather precise, meaning, does not therefore oblige him to use the word in the same way 
elsewhere.4  We see this clearly in his use of “phronēsis” in the De Anima, the Protrepticus, and 
his biological works - e.g., when he assigns “phronēsis” to bees, discusses its physiological 
relationship to the phrenes, or makes it appear to resemble what he calls sophia in EN VI.5  The 
context and nature of the philosophical conversation has priority over the meaning of words.  
                                                                                                                                                       
utility of the work (utilitas)? (4) What qualities are required of the exegete or teacher? (5) What qualities 
are required of the students or readers?   
 
4 To think that Aristotle’s “real” understanding of phronēsis can be determined in this way provides some 
of the interpretive framework underlying late 19th and early 20th century attempts to trace the “historical 
development” of Aristotle - e.g., along the lines of supposedly early “Platonic” uses of “phronēsis” 
juxtaposed to later “Aristotelian” uses.  For example, see Werner Jaeger’s monograph on Aristotle.  For 
an early critique of this approach, see Gadamer’s 1928 essay “Der aristotelische ‘Protreptikos’ und die 
entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der aristotelischen Ethik.”  Gadamer continued his critique of 
this, and similar, hermeneutic approaches, later in his life by emphasizing the nature of Aristotle’s writing 
as “school notes” and the concomitant danger of placing too much hermeneutical weight on particular 
turns of phrase as evidence of a “development” or as a more or less “Platonic” period.  See the last two 
chapters of his Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy. 
 
5 In fact, as we will see below, Aristotle does not stick to his “terms” even within Book Six itself – 
wherein he first supposedly “defines” them! 
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More precisely, the meaning of a particular word or phrase, and the context or scope of a work, 
are interdependent.6   
Concerning Aristotle’s historical position as a thinker (point “2”), recognizing that 
Aristotle does occasionally craft precise, conceptual terms, must be held together with the fact 
that rather often his conceptualization of a word is historically unique.  This means that his 
crafting of a concept must take its departure from ordinary language, since it cannot depend on a 
pre-established body of discipline specific, specialized jargon.  It is just this fact that creates the 
interesting hermeneutic cases where Aristotle attributes a particular philosophical view 
concerning, for example, the nature of perception, to authors whom we should be surprised to 
learn had any “views” at all (e.g., Homer).7  Aristotle’s development of conceptual language thus 
by necessity takes place on the basis of a dialogue with the ordinary, lived language of the 
tradition(s) in which he is situated.8  His “endoxic method” is not just an attempt to pay homage 
                                                
6 Thus, just as we must be careful when we make claims about Plato in general by citing evidence from 
across various dialogues, we need similar caution lest we read Aristotle’s works altogether as comprising 
a grand system that employs a fixed terminology throughout.  The philosophical and hermeneutical 
position that I am taking here of course comes from Gadamer - as was discussed in Chapter Two – and I 
am attempting to show the fruitfulness of this position concretely. 
 
7 For a good example of this, see Aristotle, De Anima III.3.  A whole world of hermeneutical issues 
surfaces the minute we ask whether Aristotle was “wrong” to interpret Homer in the way that he did.  The 
ancient practice of reading a traditional text as if it spoke directly to a writer’s present needs and context 
was quite common, not only in philosophy and medicine, but in legal disputes as well.  Thus Homer’s 
epic poetry could be cited to substantiate a 4th century legal decision.  Gadamer calls this the relevance 
(Aktualität) or application (Anwendung) of a living text, as opposed to the (naive) treatment of a text as a 
mere relic – i.e., a dead artifact which no longer “speaks” or “applies” to us.  I discuss the concept of 
hermeneutic “application,” and why Gadamer thinks it necessitates phronēsis, in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five. 
 
8 See my discussion of the role of “dialogue” for the formation of concepts in Chapter One. 
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to and retrieve traditional views, but is also a searching about for suitable expressions or phrases 
that can light the path of thinking.   
To push the matter somewhat further, Aristotle himself in fact claims that the main virtue 
of style (lexis) is clarity (saphēs), and, especially in prose, one ought to generally take one’s cue 
from ordinary language (ek tēs eiōthuias dialektou).9  For Plato and Aristotle, speaking and 
writing, as the medium of all philosophical inquiry, serve the goal of communication with 
another person.10  In this respect, Aristotle models in an exemplary way what Gadamer 
philosophically articulates:  there is always a two-way, back-and-forth, relationship between 
philosophical concepts and their life in ordinary language; that is to say, a mutual re-interpreting 
and filling out of the meaning of a word.11  Thus, ancient commentators and readers, who from 
early on (e.g., already with Galen) wondered at Aristotle’s “terse and dark” style, admirably 
applied what we sometimes today call the “hermeneutical principle of charity” by explicitly 
asking “why has the philosopher cultivated obscurity”?12  Rather than assume some logical or 
rhetorical fault on the part of Aristotle, they instead worked from the noble hermeneutical 
presumption that such density and obscurity itself served some purpose which, in its turn, was 
for the sake of an ultimate clarity.  Perhaps the response already given by Theophrastus, as a 
                                                
9 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III.2 1404b1ff. 
 
10 See note 1 at the beginning of this chapter on the word “hermēneia.” 
 
11 Gadamer actually refers to such “filling out” as an “increase in being” (Zuwachs an Sein) both in Truth 
and Method, 145 and 156, as well as in The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 165. 
 
12 Cf., Mansfeld, Prolegomena, 25ff.  We do not typically associate the “obscurity” and “terse” style of 
Aristotle with that of Heraclitus, whom Aristotle did not seem so fond of.  But perhaps, from the 
perspective of our reception of their texts, the styles of the two are not so different after all.  
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supplement to Aristotle’s comments on the importance of clarity in one’s “style” (lexis), still 
stands: “...one ought not to elaborate everything in detail, but leave some things to the reader, for 
when he notices what you have left out, he does not remain a mere reader, but becomes a 
participant.”13 
With Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in particular, there is more than one way in which 
the reader is invited by the text to become a participant.  It is commonly noted that Aristotle’s 
surviving works generally take the form of “lecture notes” or quasi-treatises which were used for 
generating and leading something like a classroom discussion.  The writing itself, unlike the 
poetic beauty of the Platonic dialogue is almost a kind of stenography - shorthand notes that only 
find their full expression and concrete vitality in the lived dialogue amongst the participants 
(e.g., those attending Aristotle’s lecture).  Aristotle’s style in the Ethics poses questions to us just 
as a teacher offers questions, or sketches out lines of thought to students for a living discussion 
together.14  The language of the text itself is thereby oriented in the same direction that it invites 
the reader to follow - that is, towards a dialogue.15 
This is not the only manner in which the Nicomachean Ethics calls the reader to 
participation, however.  There is also the issue that arises in light of the peculiarity of the subject 
matter itself (“ethics”), and the purported aim (skopos) of the book – that is, not to have mere 
                                                
13 Cf., Mansfeld, Prolegomena, 26. 
 
14 Cf., Gadamer’s “Nachwort” in his very late (1998!) German translation and short commentary, 
Nikomachische Ethik VI.    
 
15 Which perhaps is quite different from the orientation and invitation of either a sacred text, or the great 
systems of modern philosophers. 
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knowledge of what is good, but much more so to become good (EN X.9).16  That aim also 
supports the exploration of the traditional question about the teachability of “phronēsis” and 
virtue, whose complexity Aristotle also inherits from Isocrates and Plato which leads him 
(Aristotle)  consistently and urgently to restate the requirement that those who come to his 
lectures on ethics already be disposed in such a way that they can benefit from them (EN X.9).  
To the extent that we do not read Aristotle’s book as a mere historical artifact, but as something 
which says something to someone, perhaps those requirements still hold today for those of us 
who come to the text as students hoping to learn from Aristotle.17  Keeping the above issues in 
mind as we interpret the Ethics will also allow me to emphasize the protreptic character of the 
work.  In a number of respects, the Nicomachean Ethics is Aristotle’s true “protrepticus.”18 
Nicomachean Ethics VI: Written Thoughts for a Conversation (with Plato and Isocrates) 
                                                
16 Aristotle prefigures this at EN.II.4 (1105b12ff.) where he writes that the many (hoi polloi) “instead of 
doing virtuous acts, take flight into logoi, and fancy that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will 
make them good men.  In so doing they act like sick persons who listen carefully to what the doctor says, 
but entirely neglect to carry out his orders.  That sort of philosophy will no more lead to a healthy state of 
soul than will the mode of treatment produce health of body.” This is a rich passage to begin with, but 
becomes all the more complicated when we catch the repetition of the famous phrase from Plato’s Phaedo 
in which Socrates says that he abandoned cosmology, physiology, et al., and “took flight into logos.”  Is 
this a veiled critique of Academic dialectic?  
 
17 Note the similarity between Aristotle’s statement about what is required of the student of ethical 
philosophy, and question 5 of the early commentators: i.e., “what qualities are required of the students or 
readers?”   
 
18 Cf. D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson’s “Protreptic Aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 383-409.  Gabriel Richardson 
Lear has also offered the following claim about Book Six in particular: “I believe the structure of NE VI 
is protreptic, leading the audience raised in fine moral habits to an appreciation of theoretical wisdom...to 
appreciate that in some sense theoretical wisdom is a standard for practical wisdom.” (See Lear, 94).  
There are many other protreptic “moments” in the Aristotle’s lecture on ethics, e.g., in the course of his 
clarification of the nature of philia and of “self-love” (which I will note below), and in his description of 
the life of contemplation at EN X.7-8.  
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Having clarified some of the precise hermeneutical presuppositions that will guide our 
reading of the Nicomachean Ethics in Part Two of this chapter, we can now outline the historical 
conversation in which Aristotle’s robust conceptual analysis of phronēsis is participating.19  
Aristotle’s discussion of phronēsis in Book Six of his Nicomachean Ethics occurs within the 
context of a particular cultural conversation about the good life, about the extent to which one 
can “learn how” to live such a life, and about the extent to which there can be “wisdom” 
saturating one’s concrete living – that is, one’s speaking and acting, along with one’s affections, 
decisions, and thinking.  As is so common with Plato and Aristotle, the conversation partners – 
friend and foe – comprise those so-called “sophists” who, throughout the preceding century, 
effected a radical transformation of the educational and cultural formation of citizens – i.e., of 
their paideia and of how best to “use their scholē” to shape a way of living or bios.20 
 In particular, Aristotle’s contributions to the concept of phronēsis participate in a 
conversation inherited from the Platonic dialogues and the rhetorical works of Isocrates.21 In 
saying this, I aim to echo the claim of Tarik Wareh that we need to reject  
The assumption that the essential ideas of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics can be fully 
understood without reference to the system of rhetorical education which we can know 
through Isocrates’ surviving works...Aristotle and Isocrates both express a theory of how 
an actor (the virtuous man for Aristotle, the politically active orator for Isocrates), 
                                                
19 This section is thus another concrete example of the role of “history” and “dialogue” in relation to 
concept formation that was discussed in Chapter One. 
 
20 On the emergence and impact of the sophists in the 6th and 5th centuries, see Werner Jaeger’s 3 volume 
work Paideia. Oxford University Press (1986), and in particular his chapter titled, “The Sophists” in 
Volume 1, and “Isocrates” in Volume 3. 
 
21 For recent attempts to show the importance of this context for an understanding of Aristotle’s concept 
of phronēsis, see especially, Wareh, Tarik. The Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates and the 
Philosophers, and Isocrates and Civic Education. 
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through rigorous training or habituation [ethizein, for both thinkers], achieves a state of 
readiness to act ‘just the right way’ in a crucial moment’s unscripted performance.22 
Among the important issues involved are the following: (1) the role of general ethical norms, 
rules or principles, on the one hand, and particular, even singular, concrete situations with all 
their complexity, on the other (and thereby the “applicability” of general principles); (2) the 
importance (or unimportance) of philosophical contemplation about the nature of goodness, 
justice, and beauty (as well as being – physis, ousia) for wise living; and (3) the possibility (or 
impossibility) of teaching wisdom (phronēsis).  Regardless of the particular paths taken by Plato, 
Aristotle or Isocrates to respond to these issues, the concept of wisdom (phronēsis) was always 
inextricable from its social-political and ethical manifestation in personal and interpersonal 
relationships within a particular community.  Even if Plato (and Aristotle, at least in the 
Protrepticus) raises phronēsis to the heights of cosmological and metaphysical wisdom, that is 
not evidence that Plato (or Aristotle) ever denied or lost sight of the ethico-political significance 
of phronēsis.  On the contrary, if anything, it is evidence of just how all-encompassing was 
Plato’s (and Aristotle’s) orientation towards the Good.23 
 Unfortunately, attention to this context, and its significance for Aristotle’s conception 
of phronēsis has been scant.  Tarik Wareh’s 2012 book Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates 
and the Philosophers, together with David Johnson’s 2002 dissertation entitled “The Discovery 
                                                
22 Tarik Wareh, Theory and Practice of Life, 6. 
 
23 Cf., Gadamer’s Plato Dialectical Ethics, in which he argues for an ethical orientation inherent within 
Plato’s concept of “dialectic,” through the use of which one can become phronimos (e.g., in the Philebus).  
Or was phronēsis already required for the appropriate (good, not sophistic) use of dialectic in the first 
place? 
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of Practical Reason: Plato, Aristotle and the Development of a Notion of Deliberation” form 
major pieces of recent philosophical scholarship.24   Both works offer extremely detailed and 
interesting proposals for how to conceive of the philosophical polemics between Plato and 
Isocrates – the two principal educators of Athenian citizens and rivals for the name of 
“philosopher” – and, further, of Aristotle’s place between and in the wake of them both.  Before 
turning to a close reading of Nicomachean Ethics VI, then, I will first quickly sketch both Wareh 
and Johnson’s approach to this cultural context.  While I may disagree with them on particular 
points, I am in basic agreement with their sense that an historically sensitive discussion of 
phronēsis in Aristotle can only occur when we appreciate his involvement in a conversation that 
includes both Plato and Isocrates. 
Tarik Wareh is explicit in arguing for the three philosophers’ “participation in a shared 
framework of protreptic and inquiry,” and that this participatory engagement explains the fact 
that Isocrates’ vocabulary includes words like phronēsis, ideai, and philosophia: “...if we 
consider there to have been an open conversation [between Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle], the 
result is not that we will confuse or identify Isocratean and Aristotelian accounts of 
deliberation...Rather, the result is a more complete picture of a complex space and arena within 
which Isocrates and Aristotle were among those intervening to contest and refine such notions 
[as phronēsis or philosophia].”25 This shared space of philosophical conversation is indeed a 
                                                
24 Neither work, however, is concerned with the overall historical tradition of phrēn/phroneo, or the initial 
emergence of “phronēsis” in the fragments of Heraclitus.   
 
25 Tarik Wareh, Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates and the Philosophers, 7.  Wareh is contrasting his 
view (which I agree with), with the assumption that the “sophist” Isocrates merely attempted to co-opt 
such key Platonic-Aristotelian terms for his own dubious ends. 
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complex one, since the use and meaning of words like phronēsis or philosophia - and so the 
understanding of what those terms disclose about the world - do not function as fixed 
terminological units, but rather as living words that are constantly being spoken and (re)formed 
within the intellectual conversations of the 5th/4th century (and on!).  For example, while Plato 
and Aristotle may reserve for their own schools the designation of “philosophy,” and refer to 
Isocrates as a “sophist,” Isocrates does just the opposite.  Thus, his treatise “Against the 
Sophists” takes Plato as one of its targets, and his “Antidosis” - written in the style of an 
apologia - is the defense of his “philosophia”!   
Furthermore, we cannot even presume a straightforwardly polemical separation between 
the three thinkers.  We can see, for example, just how difficult Aristotle has made reading Plato 
when we acknowledge the fact that his critiques are often already found within the dialogues 
themselves.26 Introducing Isocrates as a third “partner” in the philosophical conversation adds 
another layer of complexity.  This is because, even if they use different words, or give varying 
meanings to the same words, both Plato and Aristotle share much in common with Isocrates.  For 
example, the significance of the kairos (right time, moment) as a philosophical concept seems to 
have first been articulated by Isocrates, acknowledged by Plato (by way of its non-philosophical 
roots in medicine), and explicitly appropriated by Aristotle in his ethical works.  Aristotle’s use 
                                                                                                                                                       
   
26  I mean that once we see, e.g., that in the Philebus the orientation is toward the humanly practicable 
good, then we need to re-question Aristotle’s own criticisms of Plato’s conception of the Good as being 
ethically and practically irrelevant.  On the complexity of Aristotle’s critique of Plato, cf., Gadamer’s The 
Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy.  The complexity of how to read Aristotle’s critiques 
of Plato can also be seen, for example, by reconsidering the purpose of those critiques in light of the fact 
that they are often also found already in Plato – e.g., the “Third Man” argument. 
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of kairos in the context of his Nicomachean Ethics should be associated less with its medical 
roots (i.e., the doctor must know when to apply which treatments by looking to the “weather”), 
and much more so with Isocrates, who developed a rather extensive account of the ways in 
which a politician or public speaker must be well-attuned to the situation into which they are 
speaking.27 Furthermore, all three thinkers are in agreement with respect to their defense of a 
“flexible logos against any technē (art) that claims to offer written prescriptions adequate to the 
demands of action.”28   
Of course, this does not preclude Isocrates from charging exorbitant fees for his 
“teaching” (which he says is not and cannot be identified with any kind of epistēmē) which seeks 
to provide some paideia or care or help (ōphelein) for the soul.  That Platonic epistēmē, 
according to Isocrates’ understanding of it, could not really provide any such help, precisely 
forms his reasons for classing the Academics as “sophists” and “eristics” - thinkers who pursue 
seemingly lofty, grandiose thoughts, but which are of no real use (chrēsimon) or help to anyone’s 
                                                
27 Which is not to say that the medical and rhetorical contexts have nothing in common.  Plato, in the 
Phaedrus, refers to the honorable skill of doctors when attempting to “bridge” rhetoric and philosophy.  
For Isocrates’ account of the concept of kairos see his “Against the Sophists.”  The complexity of how the 
three thinkers relate returns however, since in the latter treatise, Isocrates’ argument for the importance of 
sensitivity to the “moment” or “situation” is contrasted with those who practice sophistry and/or eristic - 
i.e., according to Isocrates, Plato (among others). 
 
28 Tarik Wareh, Theory and Practice, 8.  Wareh later nuances his claims about Isocrates vis-a-vis technē, 
since Isocrates does not hold any real praxis/poiesis distinction as Aristotle does.  To put the matter 
bluntly, Isocrates is not always clear whether his “paideia” which leads to (teaches?) phronēsis is for 
purely “instrumental” purposes (traditionally, glory, fame, honor – that is, timē) or something higher, as it 
surely is in Plato and Aristotle.  Cf. Wareh, 20.  Note how Aristotle systematically, and “protreptically” 
redefines the meaning of timē for his audience throughout EN. X.7-9. 
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life.29  Contrariwise, Aristotle defends Platonic philosophia and phronēsis in his Protrepticus 
against these charges of Isocrates.  Saving the details for the close reading of Aristotle’s EN VI 
which follows below, we can already begin to appreciate why Aristotle would have felt it 
necessary there (EN VI) to “untangle” the overlapping meanings of various terms, as he did 
when he tried to clarify the nature of phronēsis, distinguishing it from epistēmē and technē, as 
well as from doxa, which Isocrates took to lie at the basis of his “paideia.”30  Aristotle’s 
conceptual analyses can therefore be read as his attempt to help clarify the “terms” of an ongoing 
conversation.  How often do we, when looking back on philosophical polemics that took place in 
an earlier time period, or between two colleagues, find the contestants saying very similar things 
although they used very different vocabularies - and so “talk past” one another?  Aristotle is in a 
similar position with respect to Plato and Isocrates, and their respective vocabularies.  However, 
and this truly complicates matters, Aristotle does clarify terms or fashion fixed meanings in order 
to disinterestedly judge the winner of a rhetorical contestant.  Rather, he is a philosopher - and 
that means that he himself is also always thinking about the truth of what is beings said, and 
thereby the extent to which a given word, phrase, or general “logos” discloses what is true. 
In contrast to Wareh’s “complex” view (of the relationship between Plato, Isocrates, and 
Aristotle) described above, the work of David Johnson offers a more straightforward (though for 
that also less nuanced) account of the relationship of the three thinkers, and, furthermore, does so 
                                                
29 We should never forget that phronēma (thought, spirit, resolution) could also carry the connotation of 
arrogance and high-mindedness, especially in the tragic context. 
 
30 As Wareh notes, after Plato, what could be more un-philosophical than substituting epistēmē with 
doxa?  However, we have to appreciate just what Isocrates meant by the term “doxa” (and epistēmē).  For 
more on this, see Takis Poulakos, “Isocrates’ Civic Education and the Question of Doxa,” 44-68. 
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precisely vis-a-vis the development of the concept of practical reason in particular.  According to 
Johnson, Aristotle develops his account of practical reason by responding to problems posed to 
Plato via Isocrates, and so for Johnson, Aristotle(‘s account of practical reason) synthesizes and 
transcends both thinkers and their respective theories.31  More specifically, Johnson proposes the 
following schema:  
Plato conceives of wisdom as knowledge (epistēmē) of general principles that are worth 
knowing for their own sake and for the sake of their role in guiding deliberation and 
action.  In so doing, he encounters difficulties justifying the claim that wisdom ensures 
excellent deliberation.  As Isocrates rightly argues, excellent deliberation primarily 
requires perceptiveness and case-specific judgment concerning particulars - capacities 
which cannot be acquired through or replaced by knowledge of general principles.32  
Put baldly, for Johnson, Plato supplies attention to the “generals” and Isocrates supplies attention 
to the “particulars.”  On Johnson’s reading, Aristotle (1) affirms our “capacities for perception 
and case-specific judgment about particular circumstances” (with Isocrates), and also (2) affirms 
the need for “true hypolēpsis (“rational supposition”) of ends, which forms a non-deductive basis 
for determining the general ends that serve as the starting-points of means-end deliberative 
reasoning.”33   
                                                
31 Cf. the “Introduction” to Johnson’s dissertation. 
 
32 Johnson, iv.  Johnson could have also mentioned the importance, for Isocrates, of “habit” and 
“experience.” 
 
33 Johnson, iv.  Johnson maintains that Plato holds that the “general ends” concerning action can be 
rationally deduced.  Although I cannot engage with him on this point, Johnson and I here part ways.  Here 
I find Tarik Wareh’s nuanced scholarship more helpful, since Wareh is sensitive to the variety of views 
that Plato’s seems to put forward in various dialogues.  It is symptomatic that Johnson does not engage 
substantially with the Philebus, which, more than any other dialogue, should be read together with 
Aristotle’s Ethics.   
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 The heart of Johnson’s engagement with Aristotle and Isocrates concerns his attempt to 
show the pivotal place of Aristotle’s Protrepticus insofar as it articulates a defense of Platonic 
philosophy against the illegitimate criticisms levied by Isocrates.  This criticism charged the 
Platonic contemplation with being a merely “eristic” dialectic and of no practical “use” 
(chrēsimon) or help (ōphelein) to the souls of those who engaged in Plato’s gymnastic 
dialectics.34  Thereby, Isocrates was able to contest the notion that there even is such a thing as 
knowledge (epistēmē) concerning ethico-political-deliberative matters.35 By contrast, Isocrates 
defends his philosophia, in his apologia, the “Antidosis,” by characterizing it in the following 
terms: 
For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science (epistēmē) by the possession of 
which we can know (eidenai) positively what we should do or what we should say, in the 
next resort I hold that man to be wise (sophos) who is able by means of his beliefs (tais 
doxais) to arrive generally (hos epi to polu) at the best course (to beltiston), and I hold 
that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will 
most quickly gain that kind of insight (phronēsis).36 
There are whole worlds of questions contained in Isocrates’ use of all of the highlighted terms 
here.  As we will see below, Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis in Book Six of his Nicomachean 
Ethics simultaneously retrieves or appropriates much of Isocrates’ thoughts about the 
                                                
34 Note that Isocrates here charges Plato exactly with what Plato accuses the “sophists” of doing! 
 
35 Cf. Johnson’s discussion of Aristotle’s reply on p.102ff.  Aristotle’s basic response is to argue that (1) 
there is such knowledge (epistēmē) – a reply which is striking given that Aristotle, though for different 
reasons, denies such “epistēmē” in Book Six of the EN – and furthermore that (2) Isocrates is “completely 
ignorant” of the distance separating what is good (ta agatha) for its own sake, from what is necessary (ta 
anagkaia). 
 
36 Antidosis 271; quoted in Johnson, 118.  Note the use of the phrase “for the most part” or “generally” – a 
phrase which Aristotle employs to great effect in his practical philosophy.  
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“methodology” of his paideia while also creating a wide gap between the ends to which Isocrates 
sets his sights in contrast to Aristotle’s profoundly wider or deeper horizon.37   
The line of questioning that we must hold fast to throughout what follows concerns 
precisely those themes that were first raised by Heraclitus when he first set down the word 
“phronēsis” for others to contemplate:  namely, a question of just how wide one’s scope must be 
in order to properly contemplate and/or respond to even the most practical, exigent questions of 
human living, let alone those more “metaphysical” questions about the nature of human beings 
and their place in the whole cosmos.  For Isocrates, the horizon or scope of what is relevant for 
the phronimos to take into consideration in order to deliberate well and live virtuously has a 
clear, finite political end.  Whatever form of contemplation lifts one out of the pressing, practical 
questions of inter-personal – especially political – action, or fundamentally calls into question 
those prevailing doxai on which “virtuous” action is based, constitutes, for Isocrates, at best a 
propaedeutic on the same level of gymnastics or training in mathematics, and at worst a harmful 
seduction to inaction, quietism (apragmosunē), and to corruption.38 Although some distance 
from the immediate present is required in order to deliberate at all, so this line of thinking goes, 
too much distance leaves one in the rarefied air of useless speculation.39 
                                                
37 For the language of “retrieval” or hermeneutic “application” (sometimes referred to as hermeneutic 
“appropriation”), see the next chapter of this dissertation. 
 
38 In this way Isocrates – who made a fortune with his “paideia” – attempted to defend himself against the 
charge of “corrupting the youth” in his quasi-apologia.  His “Antidosis” court case failed, and he was 
forced to pay the cost associated with equipping a trireme.   
 
39 The popularity of this position, it seems to me, persists throughout a variety of cultural spheres, and 
continues today as an anti-intellectualism and suspicion of academic “inactivity.”  The Latin translation of 
the “bios politikos” as the “vita activa” preserves the connection between “action” and “politics” 
perfectly.   
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By contrast, for Heraclitus as for Plato the horizon of the phronimos is far wider.  This is 
not because their appetite for knowledge is so much greater than Isocrates.  Neither Plato nor 
Heraclitus aim for an all-encompassing, systematic knowledge in the way that the later modern 
philosophers did.  Rather, for Plato as for the Aristotle of the Protrepticus, the question of 
philosophia – as the question of how to live – could only be truly asked and answered when one 
has begun to grasp the telos of “nature” (physis) as a whole – a telos in which one’s life is asked 
to participate.  Such radical “cosmic” lines of thought serve to effect a veritable revolution in the 
prevailing doxai about any number of traditional concepts, not the least of which are the 
traditional views about ethico-political aretai and concomitant timē (honor).  Even if Isocrates’ 
scope extended later in his life beyond Athens and became pan-hellenic, for all of that he still 
failed to see the practical importance of a pan-cosmic sense for reality.  To put things another 
way, whereas Isocrates was concerned with a growing class of politically apragmones (quiet, 
inactive) citizens, Plato, Heraclitus, and other philosophers were concerned with the already 
large class of those who were philopragmones (meddlesome, busybodies).40  In light of their 
differing assessments of the social-political situation, the importance of phronēsis in Plato and 
Isocrates are at odds. 
 But what about Aristotle?  The question of where, on this issue of scope or horizon, 
Aristotle’s concept of phronēsis in his Nicomachean Ethics fits in provides our basic orienting 
hermeneutic question for the following re-reading of NE Book Six.  Tracing the development of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
40 See Plato Republic, 549c; and Isocrates Antidosis 227.  For a detailed treatment of the specific political 
meaning of these terms, see L.B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian. 
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the concept of phronēsis from Homer to Hippocrates and Heraclitus, and, further, seeing how 
some of the basic themes and questions (such as the question of “scope” or “horizon” of 
phronēsis) were discussed by Plato and Isocrates, has allowed us to discover a somewhat novel, 
though historically well-grounded, approach to Aristotle’s work on phronēsis.  In other words, 
having set the historical stage, and by tracing some of the most important historical themes and 
questions, we can now ask in earnest: how does Aristotle participate in, retrieve, and give new, 
foundational and lasting energy to the tradition of phronēsis and to “practical philosophy” in 
general?  Just what is the distinctly Aristotelian understanding of phronēsis?  
Part Two:  Variations on a Theme:  A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Analysis of Phronēsis 
in Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics 
Who is Phronimos?  From Pericles to Socrates, and From “Phronēsis kata meros” to “Phronēsis 
kata holōs” 
It is quite right for Aristotle to begin focusing his explicit attention on an abstract action 
noun like “phronēsis” (and we will follow him in this) by looking at those individuals in whom 
such a virtue lives, namely, the “phronimoi” (the practically wise persons, or the persons with 
understanding for living the good life).41  It is right to begin this way since the “definition” must 
ultimately bet tested against the extent to which it reveals a human possibility – that is to say, we 
are looking for the humanly practicable good or the good life for humans.  Thus, Aristotle here 
says that we can come to a definition of “phronēsis” by considering or looking (theōrēsantes) 
                                                
41 Aristotle does the same thing in the Metaphysics (I.2 982a1ff) by setting his sights on the adjective 
“sophos” in order to understand the substance of “sophia.” 
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toward those we call (legomen) “phronimos.”42  On the one hand, this introduces the familiar 
“endoxic” procedure, and Aristotle will indeed mingle prefigurations of his considered views 
with culturally wider, common thoughts and opinions, some of which he may or may not fully 
endorse in the end.  On the other hand, as we will see, the appeal to ordinary language and 
opinion also comprises Aristotle’s general attempt to return the concept of phronēsis to its 
traditional soil, in contrast to the metaphysical heights it had attained in Heraclitus and Plato, 
who sometimes poetically stretched the meaning of words to the point of “obscurity.”  In this 
respect, tying phronēsis back to its living, ordinary use is not just characteristic of an “endoxic 
method” but rather reveals something of Aristotle’s philosophical distance from the 
Academicians, such as Xenocrates, concerning the nature of phronēsis as such.  Rather than 
following the Academy in drawing a distinction between theoretical and practical “phronēsis” 
as Xenocrates had done, Aristotle, at least in the Nicomachean Ethics, lets the everyday use of 
language guide the movement of his thinking, and so “phronēsis” in Aristotle is here tied to its 
concretely human, practical manifestation, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, has been in 
the foreground ever since Homer.43  In this way, Aristotle’s re-orienting of phronēsis towards 
ordinary language brings him closer to Isocrates; if Isocrates, for his part, goes on to allow 
                                                
42 EN. VI.5 1140a24. 
43 This is not always the case, as Aristotle’s use of “phronēsis” in the Metaphysics, De Anima, and, as we 
saw, in the “Protrepticus,” is often closer in tone to its typical use in Plato.  In some respects, Aristotle’s 
use of phronēsis in EN. VI is an outlier with respect to the rest of his corpus.  For the reference to 
Xenocrates, see Burnet’s comment on p. 261 in The Ethics of Aristotle. Ayer Co Pub (1976).  In that 
comment as well, Burnet also claims that “in Plato the word phronēsis is exactly equivalent to sophia…”  
This is an unhelpful comment because it is not clear that Plato himself uses “sophia” in a consistent 
manner (and why should a dramatist?).  Moreover - as I have already tried to indicate above – Plato’s use 
of phronēsis in the Philebus comes extremely close to its function in Aristotle’s Ethics, which is why 
some have raised the possibility that the Philebus is already a response to Aristotle, or an Aristotelian-
minded student raising questions in the Academy.     
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common opinion and common ways of speaking to dictate his thinking too strongly (according to 
Plato and Aristotle), that is no objection to Aristotle’s methodological appropriation of (some of) 
this tendency.44 In his Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, Gadamer is 
basically right to summarize the matter in the following terms: 
Aristotle remains true to the actual language usage of phronēsis in his ethics, as in fact he 
does generally.  It is not the case, as Natorp believed, that Aristotle restricted a 
ceremonious artificial word of Plato’s to the ethical realm.  Quite the reverse: Plato in 
fact widened the customary usage, whose proximity to practice must have always been 
sensed, to include dialectical knowing, and he did so in order to ceremoniously exalt 
dialectic.  In other words, he took what was called practical reasonableness and expanded 
it to include the theoretical disposition of the dialectician. 
Conversely, if on occasion Aristotle himself follows Plato’s widened language 
usage, one should not overburden this circumstance by basing hypotheses about 
Aristotle’s “development” on it, as Jaeger, Walzer, and others once tried to do.  In truth, 
it demonstrates only that Aristotle continues to live in the same world of language as 
Plato’s.  Nor does it in any way mean that in such cases Aristotle forgot the proper sense 
of phronēsis - whose meaning he himself analyzed - or that he was consciously 
“Platonizing.”45   
In introducing the topic of phronēsis, Aristotle follows the familiar rhetorical practice of 
marking out an exemplary person (a ”paradeigma”) as worthy of emulation, and an example or 
model to be “imitated” or “followed” in one’s own singular life and way.46  Aristotle further 
                                                
44 Though we will see below that, in the end, Aristotle is in far more agreement with Plato than with 
Isocrates, even though he appropriates much of Isocrates’ thinking, and uses terms somewhat differently 
in the EN than Plato does in his dramas. 
 
45 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 37-38ff.  In a later 
chapter, we will have to return to Gadamer explicitly and ask in what sense he could have offered the 
following statement, in a late interview with Riccardo Dottori, in which he claims, provocatively, that 
phronēsis “is really a Platonic concept.” Cf. Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 22. 
 
46 For several examples in Isocrates, see Carlo Natali, The Wisdom of Aristotle. 195, n.63.  Aristotle, as 
with most things, appropriates this procedure for his own ends, which is clear enough, for example, when 
we learn in EN X.7-9 that “eudaimonia” must really be understood on the basis of its truly “paradigmatic” 
instance –i.e., not just the activity of contemplation per se, but the activity as it is performed by “God.”  
Isocratean “paradigms” are, by contrast, human, all-too-human. 
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follows the orators in naming Pericles as phronimos along with the commonly acknowledged 
qualities of the phronimos, chief of which is the practical concern for what is good for oneself 
and for other human beings.47  Now Pericles, whose name was synonymous with the height of 
Athenian democracy and geo-political might, was renowned for his rhetorical ability just as 
much as his political acumen – or better, the two were inextricable.  The name of Pericles 
provides Aristotle with a good indication of what phronēsis means precisely because Pericles 
displayed the ability to tactfully or skillfully speak to and persuade a particular audience about 
his political deliberations concerning what actions the community should or should not take in a 
particular situation.  Both the carrying out of the decision, and the ability to communicate and 
persuade the community that this particular course should be undertaken, are concrete forms of 
praxis.  It is important that we do not lose sight of the way in which discourse (legein), at least 
for the 5th/4th century Greek intellectuals, comprises the distinctly human activity, be it primarily 
with another person, or in that “dialogue of the soul with itself.”48  Aristotle’s mention of 
Pericles is intriguing, and unfolding this discussion ultimately leads us back to the problem, 
introduced above, of how wide the “scope” or “horizon” of the understanding of the phronimos 
must be.   
In his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Burnet states that the name of Pericles as 
phronimos is related to Aristotle’s mention of Thales and Anaxagoras in chapter seven as two 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
47 1140b8ff. The language of concern for what is good for oneself and for others runs throughout EN. 
VI.5. 
 
48 I remain skeptical about the extent to which we could make the same claim about the Homeric or 
Spartan warrior, or the countryside farmer.   
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sophoi.49  However, Burnet’s framing of things in this way obscures the issue.  Aristotle is not 
straightforwardly comparing “Pericles” as phronimos to “Thales and Anaxagoras” as sophoi.  
The question of who are to be the true paradeigmata - a question we must answer ever anew - is 
bound up with what I have been calling the question of the scope or horizon of what the true 
phronimos will consider as relevant for deliberating about right action, and for living the good 
life. 
For example, just prior to the mention of Thales and Anaxagoras as potential sopohoi, 
Aristotle initially named the famous sculptors Pheidias (commissioned by Pericles to work on 
the most sublime parts of the Parthenon, and the creator of the “Statue of Zeus at Olympia” 
which was one of the seven wonders of the ancient world) and Polycleitus (who invented the 
model of the style of statue depicting a young male nude, which he called “kanōn”).  These 
extraordinary talents were said to possess “sophia” (in a sense which in fact is closer to 
Aristotle’s definition of technē given in EN VI.4).50  Now Aristotle allows that they are indeed 
artistically wise, but proceeds toward a deeper sense of philosophic wisdom by broadening the 
scope of the nature of such sophia.  Some people, he says, are wise not in particular areas of 
knowledge or about some part or aspect (meros), but rather are wise about the whole (holōs), and 
to the extent that one is “wholly” wise, then that kind of sophia is the most exact or precise 
(akribestatē) form of knowledge (epistēmē) – e.g., in contrast to the partial form of wisdom 
                                                
49 For “Pericles” as phronimos, see 1140b8ff, and for “Thales and Anaxagoras” as sophoi, see 1141b1-8.  
See Burnet’s comment on 1140b8. 
 
50 1141a10ff. 
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revealed in the sculpting wisdom of Pheidias.51  The true sophos will have a “head” (kephalēn) 
on his or her knowledge about that which is the most exalted (timiōtatōn) - that is to say, there 
will be a governing or consummated unity of meaning living among all the parts that help to 
comprise that whole, and which take their proper places and find their proper limitations and 
delimitations in light of that unifying “head.”52  
Likewise, within the context of considering who is to be called phronimos, Aristotle also 
raises the issue of “scope” in his initial indication of what phronēsis is:  
Now it is held to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate well about what is 
good and advantageous for himself, not in some one part (meros), for instance what is 
good for his health or strength, but what is concerned with the good life as a whole (to eu 
zēn holōs).  A sign of this is that we also speak of people as practically wise in a certain 
area (peri ti) when they calculate well towards some worthwhile (spoudaion) end, which 
is not [attainable by] an art.  In this way, the one who deliberates about the whole (holōs) 
will be practically wise (phronimos).53 
This is a rich passage, and I will comment on it more below.  For now, however, I merely want 
to note that much will hang on how one understands the meaning of “to eu zēn holōs” - the good 
life as a whole.  This is not merely an “exegetical” or narrowly hermeneutic issue with respect to 
Aristotle, but indeed is a question that invites us to participate in that ongoing conversation that 
lies at the heart of the philosophical tradition of phronēsis.  Burnet’s gloss, which leads the 
reader to see Aristotle comparing Pericles as phronimos to Thales and Anaxagoras as sophoi is 
                                                
51 This discussion occurs at EN VI.7 1141a9-23. 
 
52 For this odd use of kephalē see Plato’s Gorg. 505d, and Phileb. 66d, as well as Aristotle’s Rhet. 
1415b8f.  Aristotle uses this kind of language at 1141a20 just after the discussion of Pheidias and 
Polycleitus, and again at 1141b1-5 just prior to the naming of Thales and Anaxagoras.   
53 1140a25-28. Translation modified from H. Rackham, Nicomachean Ethics. Loeb Classical Library.  It 
is important for what follows to note that the “ti” here stands in place for the “meros” given earlier.  We 
will see below that Aristotle later begins to shift his language from meros and holōs to tis and haplōs.  
This shift in language gives us a clue for how to interpret the meaning of “to eu zēn holōs.” 
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misleading because it precisely misses the question that underlies the discussion - that is, the 
question of how wide a horizon or scope one’s wisdom must be in order to live the good life, or, 
to put it another way the question of what “to eu zēn holōs” means.  In contrast to Burnet, I 
propose the following extended analogy is in play: (practical) wisdom in part : (practical) 
wisdom as a whole :: Pheidias and Polycleitus : Thales, Anaxagoras (and Pericles?). 
The question is whether Aristotle thinks that Pericles models phronēsis only in part or in 
general; that is, whether, like the wisdom of Pheidias and Polycleitus, Periclean understanding 
has a restricted or partial scope.  By presuming that Aristotle is simply comparing Pericles with 
Anaxagoras and Thales, Burnet has, in a way, skewed the interpretive game.   
But if not Pericles, then who?  The title I gave to this section just above was intended to 
alert the reader, however, to my own view on the matter.  It may be that Socrates, for Aristotle, is 
not necessarily a sophos in Aristotle’s more refined, technical sense; and that rather, for 
Aristotle, Socrates is in fact the true phronimos.54 Or, to put the matter more precisely, Aristotle 
will accept both Pericles and Socrates as phronimoi, but remains ambiguous with respect to 
whether he thinks that a narrowly politico-rhetorical phronēsis is really concerned with the good 
life as a whole.  Just as Thucydides’ portrayal of Pericles in the “funeral oration” is an exemplary 
moment for the meaning of phronēsis, so too Plato’s portrayal of Socrates in the Apology - his 
own kind of funeral oration - also exemplifies what it means to speak, deliberate, and act well in 
                                                
54 This also accords with Aristotle’s general impression of Socrates as someone who pursued ethical 
wisdom first and foremost. See the comments on Socrates in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I.6, 987a29-35. 
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a particular social-political context and with an eye towards the truly good life for oneself and for 
the community.55  
The problem, as we will see below, ultimately hinges on the meaning of “to eu zēn 
holōs,” which must be understood as an equivalent expression for Aristotle’s eudaimonic 
vocabulary.  That is to say, the meaning of eupraxia, and eu zēn must be co-determined together 
with the meaning of eudaimonia, towards which a particular human’s deliberative thoughts, 
actions, and desires bend.  For Isocrates, of course, Pericles is the exemplary phronimos tout 
court, whereas the philosophers (whom he calls the “sophists”) muddy the practical waters by 
subjecting the ‘obvious,’ ‘doxastic’ meaning of (1) the virtues, (2) human happiness, and (3) 
worthwhile practical goals not only to a radical re-questioning, but also by connecting such 
inquiry to the “unhelpful” and “useless” speculation about nature (physis), being (ousia), and the 
heavens.56 According to Isocrates, pursuing the political (i.e., economic, military, and social) 
well-being of Athens - or, later in his life, a Pan-Hellenic well-being in the face of Alexander - 
was the rhetorico-political task of the phronimos, full stop.  Aristotle quotes – and we should not 
be afraid to hear some Socratic irony or ambiguity in the passage – the common opinion that 
“this is why people say that men like Anaxagoras and Thales ‘may be wise but are not prudent’, 
when they see them display ignorance of their own interests; and while admitting them to 
possess a knowledge that is rare, marvelous, difficult, and even superhuman, they yet declare this 
                                                
55 Recall that in Plato’s Apology, Socrates positions himself as a “politician” qua gadfly, seeking to be a 
true help to Athens.  I see no reason to treat this as merely ironic. 
 
56 In this way, Isocrates’ frustration with Plato and Aristotle is not unlike the charge that Socrates busied 
himself with things above the sky and below the earth, made the weaker argument the stronger, etc. 
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knowledge to be useless (axrēsta), because these sages do not seek to know things that are good 
for human beings.”57  Note how far this Isocratean opinion is from Heraclitus inasmuch as 
Heraclitus ridicules the provinciality of the lives and wisdom of the many, who fail to discern 
what it means to take up one’s place within the cosmos – precisely as a matter of phronēsis!58   
Keeping all of this in mind now sheds new light on Aristotle’s naming of Pericles:  “That 
is why we think Pericles and people of that sort to be practically wise (phronimous) - because 
they have (dunatai) theoretical knowledge (theōrein) of what is good for themselves and for 
human beings (ta hautois agatha kai ta tois anthrōpois), and we think household managers and 
politicians (oikonomikous kai politikous) are like that.”59  The question of what is “good for 
                                                
57 EN. VI.7 1141b2-8.  This language of “uselessness” is typically Isocratean and is precisely the view 
against which Aristotle argues in the Protrepticus. Thus, I am suggesting that one way to interpret 
Aristotle’s quotation of this common opinion is as a bit of irony – as if pursuing an understanding of what 
is the highest or divine and most wondrous, was not a good way for finite, humans to live.  Is that not the 
conclusion of Book Ten of the Nicomachean Ethics, or the conclusion of Book Six wherein sophia 
regains superiority over phronēsis – despite the fact that phronēsis is required in order to pursue sophia?  
The same could be said when Aristotle mentions the old story of Thales supposedly “falling” into a well - 
as if he would not have climbed down into it on purpose.  We should not forget how important wells were 
for such astronomers in the mapping of star movements, etc.! 
 
58 “Although the logos is common to all, the many live as if they privately had understanding.” (B2) See 
the previous chapter for my full explication of this, and other, fragments of Heraclitus.  In a way, 
Isocrates’ Pan-Hellenic goals are, in the end, not “cosmopolitan” enough. 
 
59 1140b7-11.   Trl. C.D.C. Reeve, Aristotle on Practical Wisdom, 56. Reeve’s translation of theōrein 
here, though intriguing, is too strong.  We should not presume that Aristotle is working with his technical 
definition of theoria until, and only in the context of, the last half of Book Ten.  That said, Reeve’s 
translation is helpful for alerting us to this use of theōrein, as something worth commenting on, and it is 
unfortunate that Burnet, Joachim, and Greenwood avoid it.  In his translation of EN VI, Gadamer 
interestingly translates this line as “Deshalb meinen wir, Perikles und seinesgleichen seien vernünftig, 
weil sie einen richtigen Blick für das haben, was für sie und andere gut ist, und schreiben wir diese 
Tugend der Vernünftigkeit den Ökonomen und Politikern zu.” (Boldface mine).  “Einen richtigen Blick,” 
and its motif of sight, is a thoughtful translation not just for the ordinary use of theōrein, but for phronēsis 
especially.  We might also be reminded of the colloquial English expression used in baseball, where a 
batter must “have a good eye” in judging whether a particular pitch will be a good pitch to swing at or to 
let pass.  See Gadamer, Nikomachische Ethik VI, 35. 
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oneself” and “for human beings” can only be answered with reference to the meaning of the 
“first principle” or “starting point” of practical philosophy and ethical life in general – namely, 
the question of the meaning of eudaimonia as to eu zēn holōs.  Is the practical wisdom of 
Pericles “kata meros” or “kata holōs”? 
Rather surprisingly, at this point Burnet offers a gloss on “household managers and 
politicians,” saying simply “these are instances of phonimoi kata meros.”60 This seems to beg the 
question, for it might suggest that Aristotle does not endorse Pericles (the exemplary politician) 
as a real phronimos.61  At any rate Burnet also seems to presuppose that we have at this point in 
Book Six (yet still only half way through the first chapter in which phronēsis is introduced), 
been given Aristotle’s considered view concerning “phronimoi kata holōs.”  We have not.  
Rather, what is occurring at EN VI.5 is, among other things, Aristotle’s initial approach towards 
a more robust, dialectical treatment of the question concerning “partial vs. whole” phronēsis, or 
the “scope” or “horizon” of what is relevant for phronēsis.  That full discussion, which I will 
discuss below, only begins at the end of chapter seven (1141b9) and continues halfway through 
chapter nine (1142a12) – which may account for why some manuscript versions begin chapter 8 
just at 1141b9, i.e., to signal that a new discussion has begun.62  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
60 Burnet, Ethics of Aristotle, 263.  
 
61 Which, at any rate, would make Aristotle’s esteem of Pericles less “anti-Platonic” – as several other 
scholars see it insofar as it runs counter to the skeptical thrust of Socrates’ descriptions of Pericles in 
Plato’s Meno, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Alcibiades.  On this “anti-Platonic” reading of the naming of 
Pericles, see Carlo Natali, The Wisdom of Aristotle, 195, n. 63.  
 
62 Such as the version Gadamer follows in his translation of NE VI.  I find this grouping of chapters to be 
more helpful, although I will follow the conventions of most English translations when referring to the 
various chapters.   
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L.H.G. Greenwood, in opposition to Burnet, remarks that “Professor Burnet strangely 
holds that the oikonomikoi and politikoi are instances of the phronimoi kata meros.  Surely not.  
To eu zēn holōs, the great final telos, is the end that the oikonomikoi and politikoi, as such, have 
in view - their end is not any particular telos such as health or victory.”63  However, Greenwood, 
by not lingering with the question of the “holōs,” proceeds too quickly in assimilating nearly all 
manifestations of phronēsis to a phronēsis kata holōs.  He claims that, with respect to the 
politician, the household manager, and the individual as such, “all have as their end to eu zēn 
holōs, whether for a country or a family or an individual.”64  But then the question must arise for 
Greenwood, which it does not, what would be a phronēsis kata meros?  In any case, we require 
some robust explanation – which I hope to provide below – for how to more concretely 
understand a phronēsis kata meros and holōs on the basis of 1141b9-1142a12.  Both Greenwood 
and Burnet seem to be working with an implicit understanding of the meaning of these terms, but 
they offer no real explication.  Finally, in C.D.C Reeve’s 2013 translation and commentary on 
Book Six, he writes that, with respect to Pericles, “it is soon obvious, indeed, that whatever 
Pericles did possess it was no more than a nascent form of Aristotelian practical wisdom.  For he 
can hardly be supposed to have possessed the understanding of what happiness is that practical 
wisdom and full virtue of character imply.”65  Reeve does not make use of the kata meros and 
kata holōs framework in his text, but he, as with the other commentators, is at least clear that the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
63 L.H.G. Greenwood, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics Book Six, 185. 
 
64 Greenwood, 185.  Italics mine. 
 
65 C.D.C. Reeve, 158-159. 
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question of Pericles’ being phronimos hangs on “the understanding of what happiness is” which 
involves the interpenetration of phronēsis and the character virtues.  Nevertheless, the 
description of Periclean phronēsis as “nascent” is vague, and we can give more sense to the text 
once we have a clear grasp of the question that Aristotle is participating in - namely, the question 
of the scope of the wisdom of the phronimos, along with the contrary answers that seem to be 
advocated by Isocrates, on the one hand, and Plato, on the other.    
By way of one further example of how Aristotle’s thinking makes the transition from part 
to whole, it may be worth quickly noting his use of the term “good deliberation” (euboulia), a 
term which must be heard in its social-political register.  Aristotle’s introductory definition of 
phronēsis, which I quoted above, concludes with the statement that “the one who deliberates 
(bouleutikos) about the whole is phronimos.”66  In this way we are already prepared for what 
Aristotle will say about euboulia at EN VI.9, which concludes with the following: 
Moreover, it is possible to deliberate well, either unconditionally (haplōs) or to further a 
specific end (pros ti telos).  Unconditionally good deliberation correctly furthers the 
unconditional end (to telos to haplōs), the specific sort, some specific end.  If, then, it is 
characteristic of practically wise people (tōn phronimōn) to have deliberated well, good 
deliberation (euboulia) will be the sort of correctness (orthotēs) that is in accord with 
what is advantageous (sumpheron) in furthering the end about which (hou) practical 
wisdom (phronēsis) is true supposition (alēthēs hupolēpsis).67 
                                                
66 1140a31.  
 
67 1142b28-34. Trl. C.D.C. Reeve (72).  The relative pronoun “hou” is ambiguous and has given birth to 
much debate regarding the nature of practical reasoning; debate, which hangs on the issue of whether the 
hou refers to “means” or (also) to the “end(s)” of human action.  The textual problem is bound up with the 
interpretive question of whether Aristotle thinks that phronēsis deliberates about “means” (to the end) 
only, or also deliberates about the “end” itself.  Although I will not argue for it here, my position is 
similar to Daniel C. Russell’s, who points out that, at the very least, phronēsis must deliberate about ends 
insofar as it seeks to make the general, indeterminate end (e.g., “helping a friend,” “living well”) more 
determinate by considering both the “means” (e.g., “shall I do X or Y?”) as well as what the end means or 
looks like concretely in this particular case.  See Daniel C. Russell’s “Phronesis and the Virtues” in the 
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By moving from the language of “meros…holōs” (part, whole) to the related, though more 
subtle, “tis…haplōs” (conditioned, unconditioned), Aristotle shows how “to eu zēn holōs” is an 
expression which raises the question of the meaning of eudaimonia: the “true supposition” of 
eudaimonia, as “the unconditional end” (to telos to haplōs), or “the highest end” (to telos to 
ariston), for and at which all human beings essentially long and aim, helps to guide our 
deliberations about what is truly, finally, “advantageous” for our particular lives – both in the 
short and long term. 
By using the language of “haplōs” - i.e., what is simple, unconditioned, unqualified - 
Aristotle helps us to understand his use of “holōs.”  The good life “as a whole” could, after all, 
have any number of meanings, and it may be that Aristotle endorses several of them.  
Temporally, “to eu zēn holōs” could mean that the whole of one’s lifetime (bios) should be 
performed in the ergon of human living - “for one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one 
fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not make a man blessed and 
happy.”68  Spatially, for lack of a better term, it could mean that all the various “areas” or “parts” 
that make up the whole of one’s life (e.g., family, friends, job, social-political context, etc.) 
should be good or lived through in a good way, since “the term self-sufficient, however, we 
                                                                                                                                                       
Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 205-219.  As an aside, it is worth noting 
that Aristotle’s text is ambiguous in exactly the same way as Heraclitus’ proem, which Aristotle 
complains about in the rhetoric:  “Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy 
to utter, which is the same thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a number of connecting particles, 
or when the punctuation is hard, as in the writings of Heraclitus. For it is hard, since it is uncertain to 
which word another belongs, whether to that which follows or that which precedes; for instance, at the 
beginning of his composition he says: “Of this logos which exists always [aei] men are ignorant,” where 
it is uncertain whether “always” should go with “which exists” or with “are ignorant.”” (Rhet. III, 
1407b11-19). 
 
68 EN. I.7 1098a18f. 
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employ with reference not to oneself alone, living a life of isolation, but also to one’s parents and 
children and wife, and one’s friends and fellow citizens in general, since man is by nature a 
social being.”69  
However, the sense of “simple” or “whole” that is being underlined in Book Six in 
relation to the “intellectual virtue” of phronēsis in particular is somewhat different than either the 
“temporal” or “spatial” senses.  To deliberate about the good life as a whole or the good life pure 
and simple, as the English phrase goes, requires that one’s heart and mind (Homer would have 
just said one’s phrenes) are wholly oriented toward the ethical task of living a good human life as 
this particular human being.  In another epoch, Kierkegaard would pick up on this theme in his 
essay “Purity of the Heart is to Will One Thing.”70  Thus Aristotle concludes Book Six with a 
reconsideration of the nature of both phronēsis and the ethical virtues in order to make clear that 
only when there is a mutual suffusion amongst these two “parts” of a virtuous soul can a person 
be said to be good.71  That is to say, the truly good person is good “simply” and in no way 
                                                
69 EN. I.7. 1097b7-11.  I chose this quotation, as well as the one just above, precisely because Aristotle 
explicitly outlines eudaimonia as consisting, among other things, in “self-sufficiency” and a certain sense 
of the “function” or ergon of human life.  Carlo Natali also identifies this passage as relevant for gaining 
an understanding of phronēsis and the good life “as a whole.”  Cf. Carlo Natali, The Wisdom of Aristotle, 
150-154. 
 
70 Gadamer’s turn to the Greeks can be partially understood in this way.  While Gadamer is deeply 
influenced by Kierkegaard’s call to “purity of heart” – or by Heidegger’s discussion of “authenticity” – he 
distances himself from the individualism that seems to run alongside 19th and 20th century 
“existentialism.”  Aristotle, and the classics in general, represent for Gadamer a better understanding of 
the human person as engaged in and constituted by “dialogue.”  In this way, Gadamer came to identify the 
locus of concrete human responsibility less with Heidegger’s “Being-towards-death” but much more so 
with Aristotle’s discussion of “friendship.”  For a similar understanding of Gadamer’s biographical 
relationship to the Greeks, see P. Christopher Smith’s comments in his translation of Gadamer’s The Idea 
of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 173 n.5. 
71 This discussion occurs at EN. VI.13, and is exemplified in Aristotle’s intriguing distinction there 
between virtue being determined “kata ton orthon logon” and “meta tou orthou logou.” 
148 
 
 
 
“divided” against him or herself such as in Aristotle’s terrifying description of the self-
understanding of the person who is vicious: “...such persons are at variance with themselves, 
desiring one thing and wishing another...such men do not enter into their own joys and sorrows, 
as there is civil war in their souls; one part of their nature, owing to depravity, is pained by the 
abstinence from certain indulgences while another part is pleased by it; one part pulls them one 
way and another the other, as if tearing them apart.”72  On the other hand, a perfect unity of soul 
is not a human possibility, since a human soul, unlike the soul of a divine being, is not simple but 
rather “complex,” as Aristotle shows through his analysis of the various “parts” of the one 
human soul.73 
I will explore the issue of the “holōs” further in the next section.  It is enough for now to 
conclude by restating that what lies behind the particular questions which Aristotle, writing and 
thinking in the wake of Plato and Isocrates, is wrestling with from the very start of his analysis of 
phronēsis at EN. VI.5 - questions in which we must also participate - are dealt with only in light 
of the foundational question of the Nicomachean Ethics:  what is eudaimonia for finite human 
beings?  As the “first principle” or the fundamental archē of all deliberation and practical 
wisdom, our practical lives always presuppose some grasp or “supposition” of the meaning of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
72 The full description occurs at EN. IX.4 1166b1-30. We should note the protreptic tone of the passage, 
which thus concludes with Aristotle drawing the practical consequence for his listeners:  “If then such a 
state of mind is utterly miserable, we should do our utmost to shun wickedness and try to be virtuous. 
That is the way both to be friends with ourselves and to win the friendship of others.” 
 
73 Gadamer important conclusions from this for the question of the “two lives”: “Aristotle knows just as 
well as Plato that for human beings precisely this possibility of the theoretical life is limited and 
conditional.  Human beings cannot devote themselves persistently and uninterruptedly to thought’s pure 
seeing for precisely the reason that their nature is composite.” Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in 
Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 176-177. 
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happiness – both “in outline” and as it concretely appears in particular situations.  The task of 
“practical philosophy” is to clarify this target and aid a “true supposition,” which, however, can 
only really be grasped to the extent that the whole of one’s character (i.e., one’s emotions, 
habits, desires, etc.) is well-educated and well-molded enough to “see” what sort of life (bios) is 
truly good as good.74  Aristotle agrees with Isocrates’ emphasis on the importance of practice, 
habit, and the formation of character as a general corrective to the exaggerated “intellectualism” 
of Socrates and Plato who seem to equate possession of virtue with the knowledge (epistēmē) of 
it.  However, as I have been suggesting in this section, Aristotle, by taking the name of Pericles 
as an all-too-obvious candidate for being phronimos – indeed the exemplary candidate for 
Isocrates – is able to push the discussion of the meaning of happiness to a higher or deeper 
register.  Yet although Aristotle will give, as we will see below, a deeper meaning to phronēsis 
than Isocrates would affirm – indeed one that is ultimately much closer to Plato than to Isocrates 
– that does not mean that Aristotle goes so far as to equate the sophos and the phronimos, as 
Plato seemed to have done even though for Aristotle the bios theōrētikōs also includes the 
achievement of true phronēsis.75  Put bluntly, Aristotle’s understanding of the phronimos sits 
ambiguously in between Isocrates on the one hand, and Plato on the other.76   
                                                
74 Note the strong connection between the character and the intellectual virtues, which Aristotle finally 
draws towards the conclusion of Book Six (1144a28ff): “the highest good [to telos kai to ariston] only 
appears to the good person; vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views (diapseudesthai) 
about the first principles of conduct (tas praktikas archas).  Hence it is clear that we cannot be phronimon 
without being agathon.”  Although I cannot explore this here, there is a tantalizing hermeneutic question 
lying beneath Aristotle’s comments here, and in other places:  what sort of character stands behind the 
Nicomachean Ethics? 
 
75 Here I follow Carlo Natali’s position according to which the contemplative life is “a weighted 
equilibrium of components that have different degrees of importance and dignity.”  It is not altogether 
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Cosmos, Community, Individual: The Moral Scope of Phronēsis and its Relationship to Sophia 
After Aristotle’s introductory comments concerning phronēsis, some of whose most basic 
questions we outlined above, there is a brief interlude (1140b31-1141b8) before he explicitly 
returns to consider the nature of phronēsis more deeply.  It would be incorrect to interpret this 
interlude as the mere methodological completion of a task outlined at the start of chapter three; 
the famous treatment of the five ways in which the rational ‘part’ of the soul accomplishes truth 
through affirmation and denial: epistēmē (chapter 3), tēxnē (chapter 4), phronēsis (chapter 5), 
nous (chapter 6), and sophia (chapter 7).77 Aristotle proceeds to analyze each of these five ways 
in just the order given above, and, given this, one could perhaps read what follows after the 
initial discussion of phronēsis in chapter five as simply the completion of the analysis of “the 
five ways” before proceeding to a more thorough investigation of phronēsis in chapter 8.  One 
might even suggest that chapters 6 and 7 “interrupt” the discussion of phronēsis, and conjecture 
that they might perhaps be better placed before chapter 5.  
Treating chapters six and seven in this way would, however, terribly obscure the 
approach to the questions regarding phronēsis that are at issue.  H.H. Joachim instead rightly 
suggests that the analysis of the five ways, and what follows thereafter, should be interpreted on 
                                                                                                                                                       
clear, however, whether Natali would, in the end, want to call his position an inclusivist one (as opposed 
to the exclusive or dominant view).  For more on his own view, see 111-114, and 165-183. 
 
76 Thus my historical claim about Aristotle’s conception of phronēsis vis-a-vis Plato and Isocrates is also 
meant to be consonant with Aristotle’s general methodological orientation toward preserving or “saving” 
what is (limitedly or qualifiedly) true in the thoughts and writings of earlier intellectuals, poets, and 
generally well experienced persons. 
 
77 EN. VI.3 1139b15f.  In fact Aristotle uses the verb alētheuei to describe the soul’s activity - the soul 
can be said “to truth” in five ways. 
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the basis of a more or less unified attempt to clarify the relationship between phronēsis and 
sophia: “the object of the passage - the main object of the book [i.e., Book Six] - is summarized 
in the recapitulation: ‘We have now stated what phronēsis is and what sophia is: with what each 
is concerned: and that each is an excellence (aretē) of a distinct part of the sou.’”78  Yet Joachim 
does not quite see the socio-historical context that supplies the question which comes to be at 
issue for Aristotle in light of Isocrates and Plato’s debates about the nature of (practical) wisdom 
- i.e., the question of the scope of the wisdom of phronēsis.79  Already throughout the discussion 
of sophia in chapter 7 there are indications of the more robust consideration of the scope of 
phronēsis that will follow in chapter 8. 
Chapter 7 in fact carries this procedure forward by further delimiting the scope or horizon 
of sophia and phronēsis on the basis of their proper “objects.”  I have already somewhat 
discussed Aristotle’s naming of Thales and Anaxagoras as sophoi in relation to the naming of 
Pericles as phronimos.  However, there is another way to read the naming of various sophoi 
which becomes instructive for this task.  Aristotle writes of sophia that it is concerned with the 
most exalted (timiōtatōn) objects; knowledge (epistēmē) about which, moreover, would be rare 
(peritta), amazing (thaumasta), difficult (xalepa), and daimonic (daimonia).80  By contrast, 
Aristotle writes in the middle of this chapter that the objects of human phronēsis are human 
                                                
78 H.H. Joachim, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. A Commentary, 189.  The quote from Aristotle occurs at 
1143b14-17.  Joachim does not say it explicitly, but his statement that I have quoted is a perfect example 
of the old hermeneutic task of identifying the scopus of a particular textual passage.  Following Gadamer, 
I am aiming simply to go one step further by rephrasing this scopus in terms of a question that must be 
answered.  It is generally hermeneutically instructive to attempt to ask “what is the question to which X is 
the response.” 
 
79 We will see below that Joachim does show some awareness here, but does not explicitly confront it. 
80 See especially 1141b3-8, and 1141a20. 
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beings and what is good for human beings - indeed even what is “the best” (aristos) practicable 
good for human beings.81  I say “human phronēsis” because Aristotle, aside from mirroring the 
language of the Philebus about what is the human good, also ascribes phronēsis - in the 
Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere - to other animals, such as bees or any animals “which 
display a capacity (dunamin) for forethought (pronoētikēn) as regards their own lives (peri ton 
autōn bion).”82 With respect to the relationship of phronēsis to sophia, there are three profoundly 
interconnected issues that arise in light of these just quoted passages.   
First, for Aristotle, the “objects” of wisdom (qua sophia) are, quite simply, better than the 
objects of wisdom (qua phronēsis): “For it is absurd to think that....phronēsis is the most serious 
(spoudaiotatēn) [way of accomplishing truth] since man is not the best thing in the cosmos (mē 
to ariston tōn en tō kosmō anthrōpos estin).”83  C.D.C. Reeve renders the sentence as “For it 
                                                
81 See 1141b13.  In fact, Aristotle here defines the good deliberator pure and simple (haplōs) as the one 
who practically pursues what is the best for human beings to pursue.  Thus when Aristotle uses the 
example of “light meat” to illustrate the so-called “practical syllogism,” which models the activity of 
deliberation, we should not at all think that “light meat” is literally meant to be taken as a paradigmatic 
example of the sort of questions and activities that a phronimos will be concerned with.  As when 
Socrates discusses shipbuilders or shoemakers, so too with Aristotle, the heart of the matter lies 
elsewhere.  Given that this passage follows on the heels of a statement about what is “the best” in the 
cosmos as such, it seems to me that we have here another hint at what will, in the end, count as true 
phronēsis for Aristotle: a life that is morally well-guided toward the end of contemplation (i.e., the 
divine).  By orienting the nature of deliberation and of practical wisdom toward a robust questioning of 
what truly is “best,” Aristotle refuses to undertake anything less than a radical investigation into the 
nature of traditional answers; answers, moreover, which Isocrates still affirms too quickly.   Burnet, 269, 
notes that the use of haplōs here is to be understood in contrast to “kata meros.” 
 
82 EN. VI.7 1141a28-30.  The immediate context of which (1141a20-30) also in part concerns the issue of 
the phronimos. 
 
83 1141a21-22.  The language here is compressed somewhat.  Where I write “way of accomplishing truth” 
Rackham writes “kind of knowledge.”  Since “knowledge” is a good translation of epistēmē, which is 
only one of the five ways of accomplishing truth, I would rather not use “knowledge” here to avoid 
implying that phronēsis is a kind of epistēmē, since that is exactly what Plato seems to do, and what 
Isocrates (and Aristotle) will distance themselves from. 
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would be a strange thing to think - if anyone does - that political science or practical wisdom is 
best - unless the best thing in the universe is a human being.”84 Although he does not show 
awareness of it in his commentary, Reeve’s translation is useful for identifying a place in the text 
where it is helpful to remember that this is precisely Isocrates’ position (viz. that [political] 
phronēsis is best and that [philosophical] sophia is “useless” since it does not “benefit” human 
beings). Gabriel Richardson Lear, however, makes it a point to draw out the anti-Isocratean 
impulse that is in play insofar as Aristotle identifies the objects of sophia differently than 
Isocrates, who “claimed that the deeds of heroes and great men were the proper object of 
philosophia on account of their great superiority.”85  In this respect the entire trajectory of Book 
Six, and indeed ultimately of the Ethics as a whole, shows how fundamentally juxtaposed 
Aristotle and Isocrates are.  Whereas Aristotle claims, as we will see below, that phronēsis finds 
its ultimate meaning in service to sophia, Isocrates claims just the opposite.86   
Second, the objects of sophia concern “the best” entities in the cosmos as such.  
However, the peculiarity of the object of phronēsis - i.e., what is good “for oneself” - requires 
that it be differentiated depending on the “oneself” that is at issue (e.g., a human vs. a fish vs. a 
bee).  Thus Aristotle writes: “It is also clear that sophia cannot be the same thing as politikē; for 
if we are to call knowledge of our own interests sophia, there will be a number of different kinds 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
84 C.D.C Reeve, 62.   
 
85 Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 112.   
 
86 As we saw above insofar as Isocrates claims that the mental “gymnastics” of Academic and Platonic 
“sophistry” may find their redemption by being good preparation for politics and for the kinds of political 
discussions that were pursued in Isocrates’ school. 
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of sophiai, one for each species: but there cannot be a single such wisdom dealing with the good 
of all living things, any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things.”87  Whereas 
the objects of sophia would ostensibly be the same for all insofar as they are simply the best 
things in the cosmos (notwithstanding the fact that lower animals cannot engage in philosophia 
proper), the object of phronēsis, as the “well-fare” of oneself, will be different for each species.88 
Gabriel Lear has helpfully noted one further import of this passage, by drawing attention to the 
way in which Aristotle is already here prefiguring the later claim that sophia is “superior” to 
phronēsis:  phronēsis, unlike sophia, “does not distinguish human beings from animals.”89 
Third, in differentiating sophia from phronēsis in this way, Aristotle continues the 
tradition of thinking of phronēsis as the wisdom of “self-understanding,” which was explicitly 
begun with Heraclitus’ coining of the term. We have also seen how this tradition occurred 
implicitly already in Homer (e.g., as the practical awareness of what action one must undertake), 
or in Hippocrates (e.g., as the self-understanding of one’s physical limitations and what dietary 
balancing acts one must perform to remain healthy).  Further, by identifying phronēsis as “self-
understanding” (specifically as the understanding of what is best for ourselves) we can also see 
how, for Aristotle, it may possibly be, in the end, that Socrates and not Pericles is the true 
                                                
87 1141a29-32 (trl. Rackham).  
 
88 Note that here at least the “good” for humans is a species-good and not a “private” good, despite the 
fact that it is up to the individual to concretize that good.  In fact, it would be more precise to say that 
Aristotle is seeking the good for humans not as the member of a “species” per se, but rather as a politēs 
(citizen).  We will see below how this later specification plays an important role in further distinguishing 
phronēsis from sophia for Aristotle. 
 
89 Gabriel Richardson Lear, 114.  However, Lear is careful to point out that this may not apply to 
Aristotle’s full account of phronēsis, which “perfects a distinctively human function...and what it enables 
us to do is not something of which beasts are capable.” (116)   
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paradigm for a wisdom about “the good life as a whole.”90  In the pursuit of “self-
understanding,” as the ethical undertaking (despite Aristotle’s reservations for calling this a form 
of “knowledge”), Socrates remains the true exemplar.    
Sophia is a wisdom that is, so to speak, unidirectional and wholly “out-going” - it reaches 
up and out towards the best, most divine and wonderful beings in the cosmos.  Phronēsis, by 
contrast, is a unique kind of re-flected wisdom, a doubling back upon oneself in practical (self-
)understanding. It is not therefore a wisdom about humans as the “second best” objects in the 
universe - for it is not an “objective” wisdom at all.91  According to Aristotle, even if human 
beings are “better” than all other animals, that is irrelevant as a definition of phronēsis, since the 
unique aspect of phronēsis in Aristotle’s discussion of it here is that, structurally, it is a 
movement of a kind of re-flection (just as the conscientia of later epochs echoes, however 
faintly, the traditional demand to “know thyself!”).92  Aristotle’s own rhetoric exemplifies this 
here:  it is true phronēsis on Aristotle’s own part to see and accept that the phronēsis of a mortal, 
limited human creature is only one small part of the whole cosmos: at least in this moment in the 
                                                
90  This is a complicated claim.  The complexity lies in the fact that Socrates also clearly exemplifies not 
the vita activa, but the vita contemplativa of EN. X.8 (where the description of the philosopher mirrors 
that given in Plato’s Theaetetus).  Thus we also need an account of how phronēsis will be found in the life 
of the latter. 
 
91 It is therefore incorrect to juxtapose sophia and phronēsis as a competition between “first place” and 
“second place” per se.  The point I am emphasizing here is the extent to which we truly have two different 
kinds of wisdom - whose “strengths and weaknesses” are therefore different.  This is entirely consonant 
therefore with the fact that each of these “intellectual virtues” is the excellence of one “part” of the 
“rational soul” – now the “scientific,” now the “calculative” sides. 
 
92 Interestingly, Gadamer notes that even the “lower” animals can be said to participate in the divine for 
Aristotle 
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text, there is no difference between the conceptual analysis of phronēsis, and the wisdom 
(phronēsis) of that analysis. 
Having thus provided an initial differentiation of the objects of phronēsis and sophia in 
the beginning of chapter seven, Aristotle turns at the end of the chapter to a further clarification 
of the scope of phronēsis in particular (1141b23-1142a12), although even this further 
clarification will, in the end, simply return us to the question of its relationship to sophia.93  The 
movement of Aristotle’s thinking about phronēsis in this particular passage oscillates between 
two common views about the scope of phronēsis, according to which the virtue of practical 
wisdom properly has either a political or an individual scope of concern.  Throughout this 
passage, Aristotle is careful to note how these common views have impacted the use of the 
language of phronēsis (and other associated words) by ultimately distorting its real (ethical) 
meaning. It is entirely appropriate for Aristotle to move from a differentiation of two kinds of 
wisdom (phronēsis and sophia), to the more specific clarification of phronēsis in the way that he 
does.  For, if phronēsis is to be a form of “self-understanding” (as opposed to a “cosmic 
understanding”), it is then only natural to ask what the scope of this “self” will be - viz., will the 
true phronimos be concerned (1) with his or herself exclusively, or (2) with the socio-political 
                                                
93 Hermeneutically, the scopus that I am identifying here concurs with the comment of Joachim just 
quoted above.  The relationship of phronēsis to technē and the distinction of praxis from poiēsis, which 
has occupied the attention of so many contemporary scholars and retrievals of the “relevance” of Aristotle 
(which includes the retrievals of Gadamer and Heidegger), is in truth for Aristotle a rather minor issue, 
which is why he simply refers the listener to his “exoteric” dialogues for the arguments about those 
distinctions.  The heart of the matter for Aristotle is, in the end, the question of what sort of wisdom 
philosophia longs for, and how that longing can be ethically and concretely lived out by particular, finite 
human persons.  Ever the aristocrat, there is never any real worry that the expertise of a tradesman could 
be superior to either phronēsis or sophia. 
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community as such, or with some third possibility.94 While the common views that underlie 
these two extremes are able to pick out some true aspect of practical understanding (phronēsis 
kata meros), they need to be contextualized within a larger scope or whole, both so that they are 
properly understood in their (partial) truth, and so that the meaning of phronēsis kata holōs can 
come into sharper focus. 
The particular lines (1141B23-34) of this passage are, as Carlo Natali writes, “rather 
complex, and badly organized.”95  Because he has worked hard to untangle the meaning of the 
passage, I quote Natali’s translation in full:  
Politics [A]and phronēsis [B] are the same habitual state (hexis), but they differ with 
regard to their being (to...einai).  As for that [A] which regards the city, the one [A.1] 
which is architectonic is legislative wisdom (phronēsis), while the other [A.2], which 
deals with individual cases, has the name common to both, politics.  This latter is both 
practical and deliberative; in fact, a decree (psēphisma) is practical in the [it is] an 
ultimatum.  For this reason it is said that only these latter govern the city, as they are the 
only ones who act, like manual labourers.  And it is also thought that [B] phronēsis is 
mainly that which regards oneself and the individual; and this has the common name, 
‘wisdom’ (phronēsis); as for the others, one is [A.3] ‘economics’, another [A.1] 
‘legislation’, another [A.2] ‘politics’, and, with regard to the last of these, one [A.2.1] is 
‘deliberative’ and the other [A.2.2] is ‘judicial’.96 
                                                
94 A hermeneutical note:  The end of chapter seven concludes with a brief discussion of how phronēsis 
must be concerned with “particulars,” and, after the dialectical investigation that I am discussing here, 
Aristotle seems to return to a discussion of the importance of “particulars” for phronēsis at the end of 
chapter eight.  A hermeneutical discussion of how the dialectical interlude relates to the discussion of 
“particulars” is sorely needed, though I cannot deal with that issue here.  Suffice it to say, it will not do to 
avoid the question by suggesting that the dialectical interlude should be “moved” somewhere else.  The 
specific interpretive task, it seems to me, must concern the question of how the last line of chapter seven, 
and its use of “arxitektonikē” connects to the use of “arxitektonikē” at the very beginning of chapter eight 
(let alone the hunt for an “architectonic science” discussed in Book One!). 
 
95 Natali, 23. 
 
96 1141B23-34. See Natali, 22-23. 
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Without going into detail about the nature of Athenian politics,97 a careful consideration of this 
shows one way in which Aristotle attempts to clarify the nature of phronēsis.  With the 
proliferation of terms for various aspects of socio-political life mentioned in the above passage, 
there is a temptation to unduly restrict the meaning of phronēsis merely to the scope of one 
political province or another - or indeed simply to oneself as a single being (auton kai hena).  In 
truth, phronēsis is a “common name” (to koinon onoma), which properly applies to all the 
various socio-political spheres of concern.  Indeed the scope of phronēsis will be coextensive 
with the whole “scope” of ethics.  To pursue the real meaning of phronēsis, Aristotle must guard 
against the fragmentation of socio-political life into discrete domains, which threaten to 
appropriate a word like phronēsis merely for one sphere or another.  In the face of this, Aristotle 
defines phronēsis as a concern for “the good life as a whole,” and although such a definition can 
only be specified in a general outline, it is enough for taking a philosophical step forward in the 
difficult hunt for what, in the end, is “good for oneself” or “the best” for human persons – or at 
least those who are lucky enough to consider what form of life (bios) their leisure (scholē) should 
take. 
 Aristotle raises the possible view that phronēsis concerns what is good for oneself qua 
only this one, single individual by lending it some authoritative credibility through a reference to 
some lines in Euripides’ lost Philoctetes (1141b34-1142a5).  This leads us to the second key 
theme - i.e., how Aristotle situates his conception of phronēsis within the social context of an 
opposition between the life of (political) action exemplified in men like Pericles, on the one 
                                                
97 For clear discussion of this passage, see Natali, 23, as well as Burnet’s commentary. 
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hand, and on the other, the life of (political) quietism exemplified by rural farmers, young 
intellectuals, and wealthy but politically disaffected oligarchs.98  In the Euripidean tragedy that 
Aristotle quotes, Odysseus contrasts the anxious, busybody (polupragmones) nature of 
politicians and “men of action” (prassontas), with “phronēsis” and “minding one’s own 
business.”99 In this way, Euripides gives voice not only to the individualism of his generation, 
but also to the apragmosynē (love of a quiet life, freedom from politics) that was becoming an 
established “way of life” (bios) in the face of the wartime horrors and political disasters that 
defined Athens in the late 5th century BCE.100   
Obviously Isocrates could never have given any credence to such a view.  His whole 
wealthy business of “education” depended precisely on teaching aspiring young men how to 
become “men of action” in the political life of Athens and to avoid what is “useless” or to be 
tempted to become an apragmones. A “life of action” - and here we mean a Periclean-like 
engagement with the political activities of Athens - just is the content of Isocratean phronēsis.  
For Euripides to contrast “phronēsis” with involvement in the socio-political well-being of the 
community would be, at best, an outrageous misunderstanding for Isocrates.  And so it was also 
                                                
98 For a whole historical overview of this issue, see the rich, rewarding work of L.B. Carter, The Quiet 
Athenian.  Unfortunately, Carter stops his study short with Plato and only briefly suggests some 
conclusions for Aristotle’s practical philosophy. 
 
99 1142a1-6. The phrase “minding one’s own business” appears to have been coined by Plato, who also 
contrasted “philopragmosunē” with “apragmosunē” (i.e., minding one’s own business) – a contrast 
which Aristotle appropriates to suit his own needs, as I discuss below.  See also Burnet’s comments on 
the passage at 272.   
100 This dovetails nicely with the whole debate about where true paideia is learned and practiced - in the 
city or in the countryside?  We should keep in mind that “culture” is a concept which, so to speak, grew 
out of the noble practice of agriculture and husbandry, and for which Xenophon would still vocally 
advocate.  
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for Pericles himself (as portrayed by Thucydides): “We alone regard the man who takes no part 
in politics not as minding his own business (apragmōn), but as useless (axreios).”101  In fact, this 
is one important respect in which not only Isocrates and Aristotle, but Plato as well are all in 
agreement, if not for the same reasons or motivations.  To restrict the scope of “wisdom” to just 
oneself is both philosophically naive and ethically disastrous.  Thus, Aristotle is also quick to 
note the individualistic exaggeration at work in views such as the one suggested in Euripides’ 
lost play.  Aristotle comments:  “Yet certainly a man cannot pursue his own well-being (to autou 
eu) either without oikonomias or without politeias.  Further, how one should conduct one’s 
affairs is not clear and should be considered.”102 If human beings can be appropriately 
understood, at least in part, as “political animals,” then a robustly human wisdom about what is 
good for human well-being (i.e., phronēsis) must include the active participation in the well-
being of the whole community in which the single individual finds his or her place as an 
individual.  The “scope” or “horizon” of the wisdom of the phronimos must include more than 
simply the concern for one’s “own good” qua the individualistic abstraction from the whole 
concrete socio-political and historical community that surrounds one’s singular life.  From the 
city of ethics, there is no quiet countryside to escape from moral responsibility.   
However, whereas Isocrates would identify “politics” precisely with “phronēsis,” 
Aristotle undertakes his reflection on the scope of phronēsis (i.e., whether it is a concern for the 
                                                
101 Thucydides, The Pelopennesian War, II.40.2. 
 
102 1142a9-11.  Carlo Natali, 196, n.73, interestingly notes that “In pol. this is spelled out, in the sense that 
one should pursue one’s own economic interests not with a view to increasing one’s oikos as much as 
possible, but in order to provide oneself with the leisure to take part in the political and philosophical life 
(7, 1255b35-37).” 
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single individual merely, or includes the wider community), at the start of chapter eight, by 
stating that “phronēsis is indeed the same hexis as politikē, though their essence (to einai) is 
different.”103 This is another extremely important passage which has not quite received the 
attention it needs.  Greenwood translates the passage as “political wisdom and practical wisdom 
are in practice the same quality, though the words do not really mean the same thing.”104  
Rackham and Burnet both remark that, for Aristotle, “politikē” is not identical to “phronēsis,” 
but rather a “special application” of it.105  The language of “special application” suggests 
therefore that politikē is only phronēsis “in part” and not “as a whole”; and indeed this is how 
Burnet seems to take it: “...politikē is a special application of phronēsis generally.  There is also 
phronēsis concerned with the family (oikonomia) and the individual.”106  Neither Burnet nor 
Rackham, however, seem to show awareness of the problem or question that supports Aristotle’s 
move here - namely, the question we have been pursuing concerning the meaning of phronēsis 
“as a whole” or “simply.”  Throughout Book Six, Aristotle is indeed “defining” the meaning 
(i.e., delimiting the horizon or scope) of phronēsis as a concept,107 but he does not do so in the 
straightforward manner of a dictionary.  Rather, his analysis of the concept of phronēsis occurs 
                                                
103 EN. VI.8 1141b23f.  On the use of “to einai” in this passage see Irwin’s commentary (245, 229), 
Burnet (270), and Natali (196 n.66).   
 
104 L.H.G. Greenwood, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 107.  
 
105 See Rackham, 346 n.c, and also Burnet, 270. 
106 Burnet, 270.  Greenwood’s commentary does not really touch on this issue except to say that “All 
phronēsis is to some extent praktikē and bouleutikē….” Greenwood, 190-191. 
 
107 The conceptual relationship between the Greek word “horizein” and the language of part and whole 
make it perfectly natural that Aristotle, in seeking to “define” the essence of phronēsis, would proceed by 
considering what makes up a “partial” vs. a “whole” or “simple” phronēsis. 
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on the basis of a dialectical movement of thinking whose orientation ultimately concerns a (or 
the) typical “Socratic question”: that is, what is the good for humans and what is good to do in 
this particular situation?108  H.H. Joachim’s commentary on this passage indicates a grasp of this 
issue.  Precisely because Joachim has explicitly laid down a hermeneutic scopus for Book Six 
(viz., to work out the relationship between phronēsis and sophia as two “kinds” of wisdom), he 
is able to see that Aristotle’s interest here is not merely to discuss a “special application” of a 
“general” phronēsis.  Rather, Aristotle is pursuing an answer to the question of the scope of 
phronēsis, and thereby taking his place in between (both with and against) Isocrates and Plato - 
as chief representatives of two “extreme” views about the nature of phronēsis and its relationship 
to politics, to theoretical wisdom (sophia), and to the good life in concreto.   On the one hand, 
Aristotle sees that phronēsis is not a wisdom which encompasses some realms of human 
practical life and excludes others, as if some “parts” did not require (practical) wisdom or “self-
understanding.”  Human desire reaches out for eudaimonia - the good life as a whole - and desire 
will not concede that the good life can be lived in public while one’s home life is a tragedy, or 
when one’s finances and health are good, but one’s friendships are a disaster.  The practical 
wisdom or self-understanding required to live a humanly good life as a whole (or “through and 
through” as the English phrase goes) demands that the “grasp” (both by the intellect and by one’s 
                                                
108  See the recent book by Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, and especially the 
introduction “The Socratic Question of the Ethics.”   
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desiring character) of what is “the best” for human persons must infuse the whole of one’s 
living.109   
Therefore, when Aristotle remarks in Book Five that justice “as a whole” (holē 
dikaiosunē) coincides with virtue “as a whole” (holē aretē), this does not mean that the virtue of 
phronēsis is only about politics any more than justice is only about politics.110  This becomes all 
the more clear once the language of “dikaiosunē” is made subservient (not only at the end of 
Book Five, but also in Books Six and Eight) to ethical concepts like “epieikeia” (equity, 
reasonableness), “sungnōmē” (forgiveness), and “philia” (friendship) - concepts which must 
pervade the whole of human living as with phronēsis in order for the good life to be concretely 
realized.  The Isocratean conception of phronēsis is at best a phronēsis kata meros, and Pericles 
qua politician is at best a phronimos “in part.”  Contrariwise, we already find some preparation 
for the meaning of Aristotelian phronēsis in the Plato’s Apology, wherein Socrates gives his 
justification for not being “politically active,” strictly speaking.  In contrast to the “life of action” 
which Isocrates, or those like him, encourage young men to take part in (and who charge a hefty 
fee for their “education”), Socrates, who cites his poverty as a witness, instead models a peculiar 
combination of political action and inaction.  Socrates indeed is a “busybody” (“polupragmonō” 
                                                
109 It is in this sense that I agree with Greenwood that the politician, the household manager, and the 
individual as such, “all have as their end to eu zēn holōs, whether for a country or a family or an 
individual.” See Greenwood, 185. 
 
110 See Joachim, 214.  Joachim wants to emphasize how important politkē is, but since he does not see 
that there is an extreme here as well (i.e., that of Isocrates), he somewhat overstates the case when he says 
that “phronēsis in its highest realization coincides with politikē.”  Yet what follows after this, insofar as 
Joachim articulates Aristotle’s difference from Plato, is terrific and well said.  Perhaps Joachim is still 
right, however, once we recognize that the Ethics leads into the Politics - for Aristotle, true politikē is not 
merely (Isocratean, or traditional) politikē either. 
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at Apol. 31C) who never stops exhorting others toward true virtue and toward a truly good life.  
But he is a busybody “in private” (idia, 31c) – Socrates does not meddle in the context of the 
assemblies or the state as such.  Moreover, he proceeds in this way for precisely ethical reasons:  
“A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life even for a little while, must be 
a private citizen (idiōteuein), not a public man (dēmosieuein)” (32A).  For those who, like Plato 
and Aristotle, advocate for a human life of philosophia in contrast to the life of politics, Socrates’ 
wisdom (phronēsis) remains exemplary.  
For Aristotle, the true scope of phronēsis, like the meaning of eudaimonia, is much 
bigger than the political power plays of Athens, and instead covers the whole of human praxis.  
Moreover Aristotle’s consistent orientation of eudaimonia towards activity (“...an activity of the 
soul in accord with virtue…”) is opposed both towards those who would identify eudaimonia 
with a state of inactive,111 unperturbed tranquility (ataraxia), and those who think that 
eudaimonia is the flowering of Athenian domination.112  The former do not see that human life is 
meant for action, while the latter myopically misunderstand the true goal of human action as 
such.  Or to put it another way, whereas the former do not see that an “energeia” is better or 
more fulfilling than a bare state or “hexis,” the later do not see how the “use” (chrēsis) of a hexis 
by way of its concrete actualization can be good “for its own sake,” and not because it is “useful” 
for some other end such as political power, wealth, or honor (timē).   Thus, in the later chapters 
of Book Six (what I would title “The Varieties of Phronēsis” at 1143a25-1143b17) Aristotle 
                                                
111 This a disagreement that Aristotle has with his contemporary Academicians and the proto-Stoics.  See 
Natali’s Chapter Four, 119ff. 
 
112 On this class of individuals, see L.B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian. 
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affirms with some slight reservations that a whole range of words refer to various aspects of the 
same phenomenon - that is to say, to the same persons who are paradigmatically (practically) 
wise.  One catches a glimpse of what true phronēsis is when we are moved to say that a person 
shows “understanding” (sunēsin), “forgiveness” and “considerateness” (sungnōmēn, gnōmēn), 
“insight” (noun), and “wisdom” (phronēsin) in their living.113  Still further, at least part of the 
definition of all of these terms will be the same insofar as (1) they all ultimately have the same 
scope of concern or are about the same things (i.e., the whole of human living), and (2) they all 
concretize the meaning of “equity” or “reasonableness” (epieikeia) by “having a good eye” 
(“horōsin orthōs”) or correctly judging what is reasonable (“...kritikē tou epieikous orthē”) - 
abilities (dunameis) which are “learned” or “gained” through experience (empeiria).114  In this 
way, Aristotle appropriates typically Isocratean concepts such as the priority of experience both 
for becoming a good judge and for having insight into human living, but he alters their 
philosophical foundations by subjecting everything to a sustained inquiry into the meaning of the 
human good (along with nearly every other traditional Athenian ethical term), and, further, by 
extending their scope well above and beyond mere politics or the well-being of Athens per se.  
                                                
113 EN. VI.11. 1143a25-1143b17.  Daniel C. Russell, takes the same interpretive approach here by calling 
these terms “a whole family of skills” of phronēsis.  See his “Phronesis and the Virtues” in the Cambridge 
Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 206. 
 
114 See 1143a23-28, and1143a6-14.  Aristotle is clear enough that the mere passage of time or merely  
getting older is not sufficient for their acquisition.  The philosophical consequence is this:  According to 
Aristotle, we do not “learn” from experience by nature.  Or, to put it another way, in the end, we do not 
truly undergo experiences by nature (phusis).  Something else must be required for us to really “learn 
from,” “be disciplined by,” or “undergo” an experience.  Aristotle does not tell us what this is exactly, 
but, if I can speculate, it seems to me that the answer must lie in the formation of character and desire and 
not necessarily in any kind of self-conscious reflection.  We need only consider those persons who 
constantly “analyze” their experiences, but yet who never seem to “learn” from them. 
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As Carlo Natali has said, “from the fact that happiness [for Aristotle] is mainly composed of fine 
and noble actions, it is wrong to draw the conclusion – typical of Athenian culture of the time – 
that the best thing to do is to try to obtain as much power as possible in order to perform many 
fine deeds.”115  If traditional, aristocratic aretē and its related timē requires the level of power, 
wealth, and passion that is exemplified by someone like Pericles, then, according to Aristotle, so 
much the worse for (that understanding of) virtue.116 
 Yet, at the same time, if Aristotle distinguishes himself from Isocratean phronēsis, does 
this entail that Aristotelian phronēsis is to be aligned with its Platonic (or Academic) conception, 
which seems to equate phronēsis with sophia?  Joachim is insightful and succinct here as well:   
The good for the agent, Aristotle insists, depends upon his position and function in the 
community, i.e., the common good of the polis as a member of which the agent can find 
full scope for expressing his human self...But Aristotle stops here, for the present at any 
rate.  He does not, like Plato, maintain that the statesman’s insight into the good for man 
involves philosophical knowledge of the scheme of things as a whole, and of man’s place 
                                                
115 Carlo Natali, The Wisdom of Aristotle (trl. Gerald Parks). (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), 167.  Natali 
interprets Aristotle’s “theoretical life” by drawing the consequences of the view just quoted above.  For 
Natali, and I here I agree with him that “the best life…consists of contemplating, and at the same time 
practicing the virtues of character that are compatible with the primacy of contemplation and necessarily 
connected with it, not as a means to end, but as part of the harmonious realization of the philosopher’s 
personality” (171).  This “compatibility” is discussed in more detail especially on page 175.  
 
116 I say “passion” here to note that the emotions of the philosopher will also be somewhat different than 
those of the great politician, just as the emotional life of the “life of action” and the “life of 
contemplation” will be somewhat different.  The “strive for greatness” that must orient the political life 
can be contrasted with its more humbled version in the “wonder” of the philosophical life.  This mirrors 
Aristotle’s comments in Book Ten concerning the different level of “external goods” required to manifest 
Periclean-like virtue vs. to engage in contemplation together with friends.  See also the Politics (1334a1-
36) where Aristotle identifies certain virtues (e.g., sōphrosunē) as especially important for those who wish 
to “spend their leisure” engaged in philosophia, since the danger of arrogance (hubris) becomes greater in 
periods of peaceful leisure.  We can articulate a proverb here:  Nobody counts their life divine in wartime, 
but those who lead a quiet life may be filled with arrogant thoughts (phronēmata).  At the same time, the 
Spartan sōphronsunē was identified with a slowness to act and hēsychia as a way of avoiding the hubris 
resulting from success in war and politics. See Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, I.84.2  
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in that scheme...For sophia has for its subject-matter the nature of things as a whole, and 
is not restricted to the understanding of a particular class of things.117   
Aristotle appears to concede something to Isocrates’ charge of the political-practical 
“uselessness” of philosophical inquiry.  By partitioning the universe into the changeable and the 
unchangeable, and ascribing a kind of wisdom proper to each (i.e., phronēsis and sophia 
respectively), Aristotle may appear to leave behind his “Platonic” position in the Protrepticus.118  
The Aristotle of the Nicomachean Ethics seems to affirm an unbridgeable practical gap between 
knowledge about, as Joachim says, man’s place in “the scheme of things as a whole,” on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, the (self-)understanding about one’s place within the political 
community and the practical pursuit of eudaimonia.  In other words, “first philosophy” and 
“ethics” seem to find their philosophical separation as two distinct realms of inquiry, and this 
separation may – in part – have to do with the Isocratean insight into the “uselessness” of 
metaphysical inquiry for meeting the exigencies of practical life.119   
On the other hand, when Aristotle stops short of identifying phronēsis with sophia at the 
end of the Book Six, it is ultimately in order to remind his student/reader about the dignity, 
which sophia maintains over phronēsis.  From an Isocratean perspective this is an altogether 
strange intellectual move – viz. to concede that phronēsis is not (Platonic) sophia, but to 
maintain that, ultimately, it is the pursuit of sophia that makes possible the fullest eudaimonic 
                                                
117 H.H. Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics. A Commentary, 214.  Note Joachim’s use of “scope” and 
“part/whole” language.   
   
118 In which, namely, Aristotle specifically seems to equate phronēsis with sophia and argue for the 
practical-ethical important of both.  See my discussion of the work in Part One of the chapter of this 
dissertation.   
 
119 For more on this issues, see Claudia Barrachi’s Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy. 
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life of human persons.  Thus, any Isocratean-concession that Aristotle makes is at the same 
coupled with a Platonic-reaffirmation of “(philo-)sophia.”  By reaffirming the dignity of sophia, 
Aristotle in fact redoubles his ‘protreptic’ efforts here at the end of Book Six - this time in the 
form of a philosophical treatise carrying the weight of sustained argumentation and inquiry, 
rather than through the common rhetorical genre of a “protrepticus.”   
In any event, we have now seen how Aristotle positions himself “between” Isocrates and 
Plato.  However, in order to understand the details of this “in between” position, we need now to 
consider more closely Aristotle’s inquiry into the specific relationship between phronēsis and 
sophia, which covers the end of Book Six (chapters 12 and 13). 
 
The Aporematic Conclusion to Book Six 
The two concluding chapters of Book Six rather abruptly introduce a series of aporiai to 
which Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis culminates.  C.D.C. Reeve, whom I follow in 
distinguishing three such puzzles, notes that “in whatever terms puzzles about the virtues of 
thought are raised, a discussion of them is the methodologically appropriate sequel to working 
out their definitions.  For definitions of the virtues are starting-points for ethics and as such are 
appropriately defended dialectically or aporematically…”120  This is consistent with Aristotle’s 
general approach to “definitions” which find their real function only insofar as they make a 
subsequent discussion possible and philosophically precise, but which are generally not carried 
                                                
120 C.D.C. Reeve, Aristotle on Practical Wisdom, 241.  Where Reeve says “definitions” I would remind 
the reader that for Aristotle this has meant, at least for phronēsis here, a wrestling with its scope - i.e., 
what sorts of issues are relevant to phronēsis and what are irrelevant. 
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over across contexts. Even within the same chapter previously “defined” words can be used in 
more or less “technical” senses.121   Hermeneutically, the last chapters of Book Six are in fact the 
real beginning of a philosophical discussion that only finds its full treatment in Book Ten and its 
discussion of the extent to which both the “political” and/or the “theoretical” life is the best, 
happiest use of one’s leisure.122  The three aporiai raised at the end of Book Six, then, consist in 
a question of  
(1) what use (chrēsimon)  sophia is for becoming eudaimon; 
(2) what use (chrēsimon) phronēsis is for becoming eudaimon; and  
(3) whether phronēsis or sophia is the more “authoritative” (kuriōtera).123   
These puzzles or knots, however, are not extrinsic to the analysis of the concept of phronēsis, but 
rather, as Reeve says just before their introduction, “although Aristotle seems to put a full stop to 
                                                
121 As the use of “poiein” in Book Six attests (e.g., at 1144a1-5 where sophia “produces” happiness).  
Although I cannot deal with it here, it seems to me that bearing this in mind would offer real interpretive 
aid for understanding the discussion of the “two lives” in Book Ten.  My hypothesis is this: Aristotle does 
not always use “phronēsis” in Book Ten in the rather technical or full bodied meaning that he gives it in 
Book Six.  In fact, as we have seen, even in Book Six he plays with its wider, ordinary meanings and does 
not maintain a “consistent” usage.  The point I take it is that Aristotle does not “define” a word once and 
for all, but rather is constantly working to highlight or make apparent various aspects or sides to the 
concept - a task which may require leaning on a colloquial sense rather than a previously stated 
conclusion about the concept. 
 
122 I highlight the context of “leisure” since, in the Politics, Aristotle denies that beasts or slaves in fact 
have a “bios,” “participate in happiness,” or take involvement in the polis.  We could also add, for 
Aristotle, children (and women?) to this list.  The opportunity to “have a share” in something divine (be it 
theōria or moral virtue) is a restricted one indeed for Aristotle.  On the other hand, as Gadamer notes the 
tradition of assigning particular animals to a god (e.g., Zeus’s eagle or Apollo’s dolphin) was apparently 
still in Aristotle’s mind (at EE 1217a24).  To be “named after” a god is, in a sense, to participate 
(metexein) in the divine.  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 
175n7. 
 
123 The first two are introduced at 1143b18-33, and the third is stated at 1143b33-36.  Because the first 
two are so similar, I will occasionally discuss them together. 
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his accounts of practical wisdom and understanding at [the end of chapter 11], VI 12-13 adds 
substantially to them.”124 In fact (and many commentators have not emphasized this enough) EN 
VI.13 in particular not only “adds substantially” to the meaning of phronēsis and its relationship 
to sophia, but also to the meaning of the character virtues as well, as we will see below. 
Introducing the Three Puzzles.  
Before dealing with the puzzles insofar as they are relevant for understanding the 
meaning of phronēsis, we should note that, once again, the characters of Socrates and Isocrates 
are lurking in the background; and keeping this philosophical context in focus will guide us in 
interpreting the rest of Book Six.  While Socrates (or “Socratic ethics”) is in fact explicitly a 
concern for Aristotle here, Isocrates is, as usual, only identifiable through the mention of key bits 
of Isocratean terminology or argumentation.125  In this case the aporiai about the use (chrēsimon) 
of phronēsis and sophia should remind us of the same charge against which Aristotle sought to 
offer a defense in the Protrepticus.  That Aristotle, here at the end of Book Six, wonders what 
the “use” of both phronēsis and sophia could be, shows in fact how close this puzzle is to the one 
raised by Isocrates and dealt with in the Protrepticus.  For if, as Jaeger was so keen to show, 
Aristotle used “phronēsis” in the Protrepticus in a “Platonic” way - i.e., almost synonymous with 
sophia - then one might suppose that perhaps, by way of the separation of phronēsis and sophia 
in the Ethics, the charge of “uselessness” would only apply now to sophia and not to 
                                                
124 C.D.C. Reeve, Aristotle on Practical Wisdom, 239. 
 
125 An earlier example of this occurs in EN VI.9-11 where Aristotle appropriates Isocrates’ conception of 
the kairos, and the importance of empeiria for phronēsis, eubouleia, and related concepts. 
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phronēsis.126  That Aristotle raises the puzzle about both, however, stands as a testament to how 
far Aristotle’s conception of phronēsis itself is from Isocrates’ own conception, and how little 
Aristotle is willing to concede to Isocrates about the nature of either concept.127 
 The first puzzle then, is laid out as follows.  With respect to the usefulness of sophia 
for becoming happy, Aristotle presents the problem in the following way:  “One might puzzle, 
however, about what use (chrēsimoi) they are [i.e., both phronēsis and sophia].  For surely 
sophia will not consider (theōrei) any of the things from which a human being will come to be 
eudaimōn (since it is not concerned with anything’s becoming)” (1143b18ff).128  As I discussed 
above, the scope of phronēsis and sophia was delimited in the course of the first eight chapters 
by distinguishing (1) their proper objects, and (2) the structure of their movement.  Whereas 
sophia is concerned with the cosmos as a whole, and, more precisely, the best, most wonderful, 
divine, and eternal things in the cosmos.  Phronēsis by contrast is concerned with the humanly 
good life as a whole, and, more precisely, with the concretization of the good life in the 
particular, mortal, mutable, socio-political (and private) realms of human living.  To the extent 
                                                
126 I refer to Jaeger not as drawing this later inference, but rather as proposing the view that the 
Protrepticus is an “early” or “Platonic” work of Aristotle’s.  It was in fact Aristotle’s use of phronēsis in 
the Protrepticus that formed the backbone of Jaeger’s “developmental” thesis; a thesis against which a 
young Gadamer argued against vigorously in his article from 1927.  Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Der 
aristotelische ‘Protreptikos’ und die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der aristotelischen Ethik.” 
 
127 In any case this is especially clear when Aristotle places sophia “over” phronēsis, thereby adopting the 
exact contrary to Isocrates’ position.  
 
128 It may be that in the question “what use are they” (peri autōn ti chrēsimoi eisin), the “autōn” refers to 
all the intellectual virtues in general, and not just phronēsis and sophia.  However, since the specific 
answers to the aporiai laid out involve Aristotle only thinking about the relationship between phronēsis 
and sophia, I will have to set aside the possibly more inclusive reading of “autōn.”  It would, however, be 
interesting to consider to what extent Aristotle considered it possible that, for example, technē or euboulia 
were potentially “useless.” 
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that one is concerned with eudaimonia, eu prattein, and the eu zēn of oneself as a member of a 
community, then one will not be a lover of sophia, but rather a “philophronimos.” 
 However, this leads immediately to the second side of the aporia - concerning the 
“uselessness” of phronēsis for becoming happy (1143b21-33).  This puzzle admits that phronēsis 
is concerned with the whole realm of things (i.e., the moral virtues) which, following the first 
five books of the Ethics, are identified with true happiness.  However, virtuous actions are just 
what the good person, that is to say the person whose whole character has been well-habituated, 
does already; and so Aristotle continues: 
Knowing (eidenai) about [the moral virtues] does not make us any more capable of doing 
them; just as is the case with the knowledge of what is healthy and vigorous - using these 
words to mean not productive of health and vigour but resulting from them: we are not 
rendered any more capable of healthy and vigorous action by knowing the science of 
medicine or of physical training.129 
That is the one side of this puzzle.  It appears that phronsēis is useless for being happy since the 
“state” of being happy results from the possession and (especially the) actualization of a virtuous 
character, and not from any knowledge or intellectual concern with such virtues or aspects of 
                                                
129 1143a24-28. This distinction between pursuing knowledge about virtue and actually becoming 
virtuous is an echo of Book Two of the Ethics, where Aristotle, also making use of the analogy to 
medicine, says that the many (hoi polloi) “instead of doing virtuous acts, take flight into logos, and fancy 
that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will make them good men.  In so doing they act like sick 
persons who listen carefully to what the doctor says, but entirely neglect to carry out his orders.  That sort 
of philosophy will no more lead to a healthy state of soul than will the mode of treatment produce health 
of body” (EN. II.4, 1105b12-18).  This is a rich passage, but becomes all the more complicated when we 
catch sight of the repetition of the famous phrase from Plato’s Phaedo in which Socrates says that he 
abandoned cosmology, physiology, et al., and “took flight into logos.”  The phrase at Phaedo 99e is “...eis 
tous logous kataphugonta.”  Aristotle’s version of it here is “epi ton logon katapheugontes.” For comment 
on this link, see Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, 6ff. 
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human living.130  Moreover, and here is the other side of the puzzle, even admitting that it is the 
disposition of one’s character that “produces” or issues forth in virtuous activity (i.e., the activity 
of eudaimonia) and relegating phronēsis merely to the task of becoming virtuous will not suffice.  
Phronēsis is also “useless” in this way since not only does this admit that (1) phronēsis is of no 
use to those who are already virtuous, but (2) even for those of us who are not “we may just as 
well listen to others who possess phronēsis...We may be content to do as we do in regard to our 
health; we want to be healthy, yet we do not learn (manthanomen) medicine.”131   
 At the end of the introduction of the first two aporiai, we seem to be left with the 
startling conclusion that neither sophia nor phronēsis are necessary either for becoming or for 
performing human happiness.  Book Six, in this respect, should be a superfluity for Aristotle’s 
practical philosophy.  Of course, we know already that Aristotle accepts none of these positions; 
but how does he untie these knots?     
                                                
130 One can feel the sophistry involved already by noting identification of phronēsis with a stock of 
knowledge just like the technē which the expert medical doctor will have.  Hasn’t Aristotle just got done 
clarifying the difference between the two?  For the import of emphasizing “activity” here, see Natali’s 
comments on Aristotle’s differences from Academic and neo-Stoic conceptions of happiness as a state of 
inactive, unworried bliss (ataraxia):  Carlo Natali, The Wisdom of Aristotle, 119ff. 
 
131 1143b28-33. Note again the tension in play in the analogy.  By identifying phronēsis with a body of 
knowledge such as the doctor would possess we are falsely led into the error of thinking (1) that there are 
such persons as “moral experts,” and (2) that we may shirk the moral responsibility of choosing a course 
of action for ourselves by simply doing what the “expert” tells us to do.  Phronēsis is not a body of 
knowledge that could be transmitted or taught to another person any more than a parent could 
“reproduce” their moral conscience in the moral conscience of their sons and daughters.  The “gap” 
between the teacher and the taught in the realm of ethics is not just due to the freedom of the latter, nor 
merely the result of changing times and circumstances, but rather to the imperative nature of ethics as 
such (“...here there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life!” - Rilke).  Thus Aristotle 
says that with respect to phronēsis “there is no forgetting” (lēthē). 
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Somewhat surprisingly, at this point Aristotle abruptly introduces a third aporia before 
turning to a robust re-investigation of the whole realm of the key concepts of his Ethics in order 
to respond to the various puzzles.  This third aporia (1143b33-36) concerns the question of 
which kind of wisdom should reign “supreme” or has more “authority” in human life - sophia or 
phronēsis.  (A strange place to offer this puzzle given that we have just been led into the worry 
that neither concept is useful for happiness at all!)  While it would be thought strange for 
anything to be more sovereign (kuriōtera) than sophia, phronēsis is precisely a kind of wisdom 
which rules (archei) and commands (epitattei), and these just are the activities of one who is 
“kurios.”  Thus we must wonder: With respect to human living or the task of becoming human 
and of performing the function of our humanity in an “eudaimonic” way, what kind of wisdom 
should capture the longing of our hearts and minds as most worthy of attaining?  Phronēsis?  Or 
sophia?  We now turn to the solutions of these puzzles. 
The Architecture of Happiness:  Phronēsis as “Medicine” and Sophia as “Health”   
There are two places in Book Six where Aristotle indicates a response to the puzzle 
about the “uselessness” of sophia in particular (1144a1-6, and 1145a7-12).  However, these are 
really only brief hints (by way of an analogy) which are unfolded more fully in the discussion of 
theōria and the so-called “two lives” (the vita activa and the vita contemplativa) in Book Ten.  
Thus, what follows at the end of Book Six, as what follows in the rest of this dissertation chapter, 
can only be a provisional sketch of Aristotle’s full response.132 
                                                
132 With respect to contemporary scholarship there is much that could be said here - particularly about the 
recent trend to be “disappointed” with Aristotle’s “intellectualism,” “rationalism,” or ultimate decision to 
place, as we will see, sophia “over” phronēsis.  I cannot discuss this literature here.  However, I would 
simply like to note that this has been a contentious issue as far back as Alfarabi, who tried to interpret 
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 Aristotle’s first response, rather quickly stated, adopts more or less the same approach 
that was found in the Protrepticus.  Against those who constantly ask “what use is it?” Aristotle 
asserts that sophia and phronēsis are desirable in themselves since they are virtues (of the 
intellect) and virtues are choiceworthy, necessary, or desirable in themselves (“...kath’ hautas 
anagkaion…”).133  In particular, they are each virtues of different “parts” of a healthy, unified 
rational soul – namely, the “scientific” and the “calculative” parts, or, in other words, the part 
concerned with the truth of the divine (cosmos), and the part concerned with the truth of human 
action and what is possible for humans to change.  Aristotle’s second response picks up on this 
claim that sophia is a virtue, and then infers the reasonable conclusion that indeed there is a way 
in which sophia is the cause of happiness.  Since sophia, together with phronēsis, is one of the 
“highest” virtues, this means (1) that “sophia is a part (meros) of virtue as a whole (holēs 
aretēs),”134 and (2) that through its actualization (energein) it makes (poiei) a person happy.135 
                                                                                                                                                       
Aristotle in such a way so as to “reverse” the superiority and give pride of place to phronēsis - inviting 
much criticism from other neo-Aristotelian commentators.  Philosophy has traditionally “quarrelled” not 
just with poetry, but politics as well.  But here we also must not forget the political tragedies associated 
with Socrates (Alcibiades), Plato (Dionysius), and Aristotle (Alexander).  In the face of the execution of 
Socrates and the tense times of Syracuse in the late 5th or Athens in the 4th century BCE, who could 
seriously affirm the superiority of the “political life,” whose concerns are dominated by “politics” and 
“war” (EN X.7), over the life of philosophical contemplation and meditation?   
 
133 1144a1.  This is a perfect example for Aristotle’s basically free, ordinary use of language.  He is here 
making the exact same point which was made against Isocrates in the Protrepticus, but using different 
words.  In the Protrepticus Aristotle lamented those who, while constantly asking for the “use” of a thing, 
do not see the difference between what is good “in itself” and what is necessary for something else 
(Aristotle says “anagkaia” there!).   
 
134 This has clear implications for the meaning of the “theoretical life” of the philosopher, as I will 
mention below. 
 
135 1144a5f.  The use of “poiei” here, following on the heels of the infamous distinction between praxis 
and poieisis is another example of Aristotle’s inconsistent use of supposedly technical terms. 
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Two points need to be emphasized here.  First, by restating that sophia is “a part of virtue as a 
whole” we should not be confused, as Greenwood is, into thinking sophia is a “means” to 
happiness.  Joachim is right to say that the “parts” of virtue here (i.e., phronēsis and sophia) are 
“not parts of eudaimonia in this mechanical sense.”136  Rather, Joachim continues, “the good life 
is an organized or systematic whole, and sophia and phronēsis produce and constitute it in a vital 
sense.”137  However, “vital sense” is vague.   The point is simply that phronēsis and sophia are 
co-constitutive “parts” of the good life, though, of course, that does not mean, as Natali is careful 
to note, “that they are parts in the same way as the others, or that they are on the same plane and 
have identical roles.”138  
Indeed, we saw above that the chief distinction between phronēsis and sophia is not only 
that the latter is concerned with “the unchanging” and the former “the changing” - or better, as 
both Gadamer and Gabriel Richardson Lear phrase it, the “unchanging” vs. that which is of 
concern for an agent insofar as he or she is capable of effecting a change through his or her 
actions.139  Since we have carefully traced the tradition of phronēsis from Homer up through 
Heraclitus and on, we have been in a good position to easily grasp a structural difference 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
136 H.H. Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics. A Commentary, 217.  Reeve, in his commentary, 
unfortunately does not comment on the expression “a part of virtue as a whole.” 
 
137 H.H. Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics. A Commentary, 217.  
 
138 Carlo Natali, The Wisdom of Aristotle, 152. 
 
139 See Gadamer’s essay “The Socratic Question and Aristotle” (trl. Carlo DaVia), 95-102.  See also 
Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 96-97.  It seems to me then that within the 
distinction between the “unchanging” aspects of reality and “that which could be otherwise” there is a 
hint of the old “gnothi seauton!” dictum in play, for to know what one can and cannot change just is one 
of the hallmarks self-knowledge.  See Eliza Wilkins, “Know Thyself” in Greek and Latin Literature.   
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between sophia and phronēsis:  whereas sophia is a wisdom that looks up and out towards the 
divine cosmos, phronēsis is a humbled wisdom of self-understanding, which Socrates pursued by 
“caring for his soul.”140  The demand coming from Delphi - “know thyself!” - is the true 
“architectonic” wisdom which “gives commands” (epitattei) for living one’s finite human life 
well.141 In this sense, the “best politician” is neither the Periclean general nor the Socratic gadfly, 
but, specifically, the oracular imperative.142  
Aristotle’s second response to the first aporia employs an analogy - characteristically 
drawn from the realm of technē - and hints at the fuller analyses that comes in Book Ten.143  
Aristotle says that “sophia produces (poiousi) happiness, not in the sense in which medicine 
(iatrikē) produces health (hugieian), but in the sense in which healthiness (hugieia) is the cause 
of health” (1144a3-5).  The reliance on the (somewhat insufficient) analogy with medicine and 
health in fact runs throughout the last chapter of Book Six, reminding the reader that Book Six is 
                                                
140 By “self-understanding” here I do not mean “merely concerned with oneself” but rather the self-
understanding that is required for right action not only in one’s private, personal affairs, but also in one’s 
socio-political dealings with others, and so on. 
 
141 Aristotle identifies phronēsis as an architectonic wisdom at the very end of chapter seven and the 
beginning of chapter eight.  For the use of “epitattei” with respect to phronēsis see 1143a9, 1143b36, and 
1145a9.  The latter two references occur also in the differentiation of phronēsis from sophia. 
 
142 Burnet is also careful to note, as he calls it, “the imperative character of phronēsis.”  This sense of 
phronēsis is what allowed for its later (medieval) association with conscientia, which itself still contains, 
though somewhat hidden in the language, the demand to “know thyself.”  John Burnet, Ethics of Aristotle, 
282. 
 
143 Here the analogy again concerns the medical art.  Earlier, when discussing the so-called “practical 
syllogism,” Aristotle also had recourse to the medical art in the form of dietary and nutritional advice by 
beginning with the general principle that “light meat is healthy.”  Even in Aristotle’s choice of examples 
we can see how phronēsis, by being associated with behaviors such as eating, cannot attain the divine 
status of sophia in Aristotle’s eyes.  See also Ronna Burger’s interpretation of this passage in Aristotle’s 
Dialogue with Socrates, 121. 
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concerned to discuss the healthy soul as opposed to the (moral) sicknesses that will be discussed 
in Book Seven.144  Joachim explains the cryptic claim that sophia “produces” happiness insofar 
as healthiness produces health by relying on Aristotle’s 4-fold theory of causation:  “Sophia is 
the formal cause of happiness, though not its efficient cause.  It is the state - or, rather, the 
continuous activity - whose manifestations are the supremest human felicity.  Health is the cause 
of man’s being healthy as the hexis enuparchousa (inner state) from which acts of health 
proceed.”145   
The wisdom of the whole, that is, the cosmic whole and the most wonderful aspects of 
that whole,146 i.e., sophia, is the end simpliciter (to telos to haplōs) on which we must set our 
sights - as on a target - and for the sake of which we must tighten or loosen, increase or decrease, 
push or pull on the whole of our practical lives.    
Now if sophia has become the formal cause of happiness (which certainly provides a 
stark rebuttal to the charge the sophia is “useless” for becoming happy!) then what of phronēsis?  
                                                
144 Both Ronna Burger and Gadamer (in the concluding essay of his translation of Book Six) pick up on 
the significance of phronēsis as a kind medical art or purification for the soul.  There is, of course, much 
in common with the Platonic Socrates in this analogy, and, although I cannot explore this hypothesis here, 
it may provide a further way in which Aristotle distances himself from the political rhetor Isocrates, 
despite all of the ways that Aristotle has appropriated Isocratean concepts.  See Chapter Four of Ronna 
Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, as well as the concluding essay of Gadamer’s translation and 
commentary of Nikomachische Ethik VI.  
 
145 H.H. Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics. A Commentary, 217.  Burnet also relies on the theory of 
causation to explain the analogy.  John Burnet, Ethics of Aristotle, 283.  Ronna Burger explores the 
implications that follow from the apparent claim that it is the possession of sophia, which makes a human 
happy (as opposed to mere philo-sophia).  Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, 123-130. 
 
146 I agree with Ronna Burger that neither here, nor in the Metaphysics (982a8-14), is Aristotle altogether 
clear about any significant differences between the most comprehensive knowledge vs. the most precise 
knowledge. See Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, 259n12. 
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How does Aristotle counter the claim of “uselessness” with respect to phronēsis?  Before we 
develop Aristotle’s - quite robust - answer to this particular puzzle, it will be helpful to begin by 
quickly seeing how he, at the very end of Book Six, responds to the last puzzle - that is, the 
puzzle concerning the supremacy of sophia over phronēsis: 
Nevertheless it is not really the case the phronēsis is in authority (kuria) over sophia, or 
over the higher part (beltionos moriou) [of the intellect], any more than medical science 
is in authority over health.  Medical science does not control (xrētai) health, but studies 
(hora) how to bring it [health] about (genētai); hence it issues orders (epitattei) for the 
sake of (heneka) health, but not to health.  And again, one might as well say that politics 
rules (archein) over the gods, because it gives orders (epitattei) about everything in the 
polis (panta ta en tē polei). ( 1145a7-12)147 
On the one hand, this passage seems to increase, or make stark, the contrast between sophia and 
phronēsis inasmuch as Aristotle reminds the reader of the absolute gulf that separates (1) the 
political regulations concerning the constructions of temples and the human worship of the gods, 
from (2) the gods themselves.  Likewise, just as there is a difference between the human 
relationship to the gods, and the gods themselves, so too there is a difference between medical 
science and health.  Both the human worship of the gods and the art of medicine comprise 
practical, human activities, which pursue, or are “for the sake of” the gods or health.  Following 
the analogy through, when it comes to the concepts of phronēsis and sophia, the former 
comprises the practical, human wisdom, which pursues or is “for the sake of” the latter.  Exactly 
what is meant by the use of “for the sake of” (hou heneka, 1145a9) language here, however, is 
                                                
147 Italics mine.  Translation adapted from Rackham.  The unstated premise of the last line is that the 
construction of temples and the appropriate worship of the gods were all relegated by “politics.”  It is hard 
to overstate what a tight bond religion and politics had for the Greeks.  It would be interesting to know if 
Aristotle is being sarcastic here, or if there really was some contemporary who held this, or a similar, 
position.  With respect to medicine, for example, we know how important it was for Plato and Aristotle to 
articulate clearly why the medical art was insufficient for true health, or why being a “slave” to the doctor 
and the imperatives of his regimen was inappropriate for a “free” person. 
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not immediately obvious.148  Thankfully the language of the Eudemian Ethics offers us at least 
one possible interpretation: “God (theos) is not a ruler issuing commands (epitaktikōs archōn), 
but is the end for the sake of which (hou heneka) practical wisdom (phronēsis) gives commands 
(epitattei)…” (1249b13ff).149  Here we see an ultimately religious, or divine orientation even of 
the practical wisdom of phronēsis: the pious person, just like the phronimos, precisely 
understands that their limited, human living or their pious actions are, somehow, “for the sake 
of” something higher and divine.150   Further, the pious person and the phronimos have this 
(practical) wisdom or self-understanding for the same reason, since both have undergone the 
purification that comes by way of an ethically well-oriented heart and mind (or shall we just say 
one’s phrēn?).  Phronēsis is “for the sake of” something divine, and not, pace Isocrates, kleos 
(fame), doxa (reputation), or timē (honor).  It is practical wisdom, which understands that the 
scope of human life does not, cannot, and must not equate itself with the whole of things.151  In a 
                                                
148 Gabriel Richardson Lear has worked out a view according to which “practical wisdom is theoretical 
wisdom in practice” - that is to say, phronēsis “approximates” sophia.  See Gabriel Richardson Lear, 
Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 108, as well as Chapter Five of that work. 
 
149 I have chosen to raise this quasi-religious dimensions, since it seems to me that the possibility that 
phronesis, in Aristotle, still held some kind of religious connotation, is under-explored in the scholarly 
literature.  For the relation of EE to the EN and the authenticity of the former, see Lawrence Jost, “The 
Eudemian Ethics and its Controversial Relationship to the Nicomachean Ethics,” The Cambridge 
Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 410-427.  On the philosophical appropriateness of 
utilizing both the EE and the EN in working out Aristotle’s views on phronēsis, see Chapter Five in 
Gadamer’s Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy. 
 
150 To hope that, through piety, one could become a god, just is impiety.  Likewise, to hope that one 
could, through living a good human life, live like the gods, just is to be practically unwise or “a-phrōn.”  
Or perhaps Aristotle would prefer to simply say deinos (“terrible”). 
 
151 To make the mistake of viewing the whole entirely in terms of one’s own species is lambasted in the 
comedic “ornithogony” of Aristophanes Birds. See also Statesman 263d, which may be an allusion to 
Aristophanes’ comedy. 
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similar vein, in Book Ten of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle urges his reader, in contrast to 
the pseudo-wisdom of Euripides and Pindar, “not to obey those who advise that a human should 
think of human things (anthrōpina phronein) and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we 
ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that a man may to live in accordance 
with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power (dunamei) and honor 
(timiotēti) it far surpasses everything else.”152 
“We must also reexamine virtue once more”: The “necessity” of phronēsis  
We now turn to consider Aristotle’s solution to the second aporia, which concerned the 
“useless” character of phronēsis for eudaimonia.  In this way we are also drawing to a close this 
chapter of the dissertation, and summarizing some final key elements involved in Aristotle’s full 
understanding of the meaning of phronēsis.   
Aristotle gives us two answers to the question about the “usefulness” of phronēsis, the 
first of which takes a similar approach to the one used in identifying the “use” of sophia for 
eudaimonia – that is, sophia is a component part of virtue as a whole, whose exercise just is 
happiness, since “happiness” is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.  Likewise, with 
respect to phronēsis, Aristotle says that phronēsis, together with ēthikē aretē (moral virtue), 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
152 EN X.7 1177b30ff.  Aristotle here is clearly speaking to a specific audience who traditionally would be 
motivated by the typically Homeric pursuit of a hero’s life and the honors associated with it.  In light of 
the meaning of “honor” and political power in 4th century Athens, Aristotle is here turning the whole 
hero-worship apparatus on its head, by associating it not with the “political” life, but rather with the 
philosophical one.  L.B. Carter thus argues that “the bios theōretikos (Contemplative Life) was a fourth-
century rationalization – an interpretation in philosophic terms – of the political and social phenomenon 
of apragmosunē.”  See L.B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian, 131ff. 
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completes or performs the function (ergon) of human beings.153  Together with sophia, phronēsis 
forms the second basic excellence (what Gadamer sometimes calls Bestheit or “bestness”) of the 
rational “part” of the soul.  In the opening chapters of Book Six Aristotle analytically split the 
rational “part” of the soul into two sub-”parts” - i.e., the “scientific” (epistēmonikon) and the 
“calculative” (logistikon) aspects. 154  Whereas sophia is the virtue of the “scientific” aspect, 
phronēsis is the virtue of the “calculative.”  This analytical separation of what is ontologically 
whole, unified, and healthy, therefore entails that only when “both parts” of “virtue as a whole” 
(holēs aretēs, 1144a1-6) are actualized in a human life can we properly speak of eudaimonia.  
Now we already know from Aristotle’s solution to the third puzzle – concerning the superiority 
of sophia over phronēsis – that the actualization of these two rational “parts” of the soul are not 
on the same operative level. Rather, a hierarchy or “weighted equilibrium” is in play according 
to which the actualization of the virtue of the “calculative” part (i.e., phronēsis) will be oriented 
toward the ultimate actualization of the virtue of the “scientific” part (i.e., [philo-]sophia), at 
least insofar as this is possible for finite human beings embedded in varying socio-political 
contexts.155  Thus by the end of Book Six it is clear that eudaimonia, or virtue as a whole, 
depends on the actualization of every relevant “part” of the soul - i.e., the scientific (via the 
                                                
153 EN. VI.12, 1144a5-9. 
 
154 To say it more straightforwardly:  It is clear that in EN VI.12, Aristotle is working with 4-fold 
analytical division to describe the “complexity” of the human soul.  The scientific and calculative “parts” 
are in fact two sides of the “rational” aspect of the soul, while the other two “parts” of the soul are desire 
and the sensing or nutritive “parts.”  Thus Aristotle can speak of the “fourth part” of the soul (“...tetartou 
moriou tēs psychēs…”) at 1144a9 in order to deny that it has any proper virtue of its own. 
 
155 Natali suggests that, depending on the political situation – e.g., wartime vs. peacetime – the theoretical 
life, strictly speaking, may or may not be a live option.  Carlo Natali, The Wisdom of Aristotle, 165-176.   
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virtue of sophia), the calculative (via the virtue of phronēsis), and the desiring (via the ēthikē 
aretē).156  “Flourishing” occurs when the entire human soul is, as the phrase goes, “firing on all 
cylinders,” or when all of its “parts” work together in a harmonious concert.   
Aristotle’s second answer to the aporia concerning the “use” of phronēsis for happiness 
is, however, much longer, and proceeds by way of a reexamination of the nature of (moral) 
virtue, and its relationship to phronēsis.  There is wide disagreement amongst scholars about how 
to read this response, which takes up the end of chapter 12 and almost the whole of chapter 13 
(11144a1-1145a6).  Whereas Gabriel Lear, for example, writes that this section “includes some 
of the most notoriously difficult claims to interpret in the entire Nicomachean Ethics,”157 Carlo 
Natali, by contrast, thinks that “Aristotle writes these chapters in good style, lucidly expressing 
himself…so that what he means comes out clearly.”158  
Although I disagree with some of Natali’s claims, his overall interpretive structure is 
quite helpful for making sense of the text, and much of what I say will be influenced by his 
interpretive schema according to which Aristotle is here performing a “double mental 
experiment.”159  The initial aporia, recall, seemed to show that, since it is moral virtue that 
makes us virtuous and happy, phronēsis is apparently neither useful for “being” virtuous nor for 
                                                
156 I say “relevant” here since at 1144a9 Aristotle excludes the “fourth” part - the nutritive part - from any 
characteristic virtue that contributes to the proper ergon of human persons. 
 
157 Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 116. 
 
158 Carlo Natali, “The Book on Wisdom,” The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
195.  Continuing, Natali thinks that the confusion occurs “mostly because modern readers do not happen 
to like what Aristotle prima facie is saying.”  
 
159 Carlo Natali, “The Book on Wisdom,” The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
196. 
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“becoming” virtuous.  Aristotle’s solution, aside from reasserting its dignity as an excellence of a 
certain “part” of the soul, is to draw phronēsis and moral virtue closer together – indeed to bind 
them together – and so the “double mental experiment” involves asking what either one would 
really be without the other (now phronēsis, now moral virtue).  Through this, Aristotle explicitly 
reunites what has hitherto been analyzed separately throughout the course of his lectures – viz., 
the intellectual and the character virtues.   
Aristotle begins by saying that just as moral virtue “makes the target correct (ton skopon 
poiei orthon), so too phronēsis makes good whatever enables us able to actually hit the target.160  
Often this last clause is read simply as “the means to the end” (ta pros touton), and, to be sure, 
Aristotle is quite concerned to show the importance of finding the correct – that is, good – means 
or path to the end, which ultimately consists in “the good life as a whole.”161  It is hard to 
underestimate the role of concrete practical-moral “success” in Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis 
and the attention given to finding the right means.  But imperative of success in moral-ethical life 
is not simply a leftover from an archaic-Homeric or aristocratic conception of aretē – i.e., in 
which (e.g., military or political) “success” marks the boundary between aretē and hubris.  
Rather, Pierre Aubenque is right to say “il n’est pas permis d’être maladroit, lorsque la fin est 
bonne” – when the end is good, it is forbidden to be clumsy.162  Similarly, Carlo Natali is right to 
                                                
160 EN VI.12, 1144a8-9. 
 
161 For more on the language of “means” here, see David Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Wisdom,” 
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 221-240. 
 
162 Quoted in Carlo Natali, “The Book on Wisdom,” The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, 199. 
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claim that Aristotelian ethics “is the opposite of the motto attributed to Melanchthon, fiat justitia, 
pereat mundus” (let there be justice, though the world perish) – a phrase which must be 
incomprehensible to an Aristotlelian ethics.163 
At the same time, the strict identification of phronēsis with the ability to find “the means 
to the end” has also obscured just what this “finding” entails.  “Practical wisdom” is not the 
name for a merely skillful, rational calculus.  It is more correct to say that phronēsis is the ability 
to concretize the abstract end or ends that are set by one’s character.164 For example, my 
character may be generally formed so as to desire to help my friend in a difficult situation.  But 
the specific end here – to be a good friend – is still abstract.  It is abstracted not just from the 
“means” (e.g., shall I do x, y, or z), but also from the consideration of what “friendship” or 
“helping my friend” actually means or looks like in this particular, concrete situation; a situation 
which may be quite different from other situations, and so the end may look quite different from 
any other concrete realization of friendship that I have seen.165   The ability to find the “right 
means” is coextensive with the ability to consider what the virtue of friendship really means 
                                                
163 Immanuel Kant also quotes this phrase approvingly in his Toward Perpetual Peace, 34. 
 
164 Here I am in agreement with Daniel C. Russell’s position in “Phronesis and the Virtue (NE vi 12-13),” 
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Natali acknowledges this but 
subsequently downplays it in order to avoid giving the impression that phronēsis actually deliberates 
about ends – a controversial view.  See Carlo Natali, “The Book on Wisdom,”The Cambridge Companion 
to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 194.  I agree that, strictly speaking, phronēsis does not deliberate 
about ends (e.g., should I live the good life, should I be courageous, or should I live a wretched life?), but 
we must also avoid the opposite danger – that is, giving the impression that phronēsis is nothing more 
than a utilitarian calculation of means. 
 
165 Strictly speaking this is already a quasi-concrete version of the true, and most abstract, end of human 
desire: to live well, eudaimonia, or “the good life as a whole.”  Thus what is ultimately at issue is to make 
that end concrete.   
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here-and-now in the concrete.  Phronēsis finds the right means by specifying or concretizing the 
end – that is, by considering what would count as meeting this end.  Put another way, the end of 
“being a good friend” is not, strictly speaking, a goal to be attained at some temporal or 
chronological endpoint.  I must “be a good friend” the whole time that I take steps to help my 
friend in the particular situation; and that requires a vigilance about how, when, in what manner, 
with what tone of voice, and so on I must engage with and speak to my friend.166  Daniel C. 
Russell sums up the matter thus, “the decision-making process, for Aristotle, would seem to 
involve these three parts: the indeterminate end from which deliberation begins [and which is set 
by moral virtue/desire], making the end determinate in the case at hand, and working out 
effective means to that determinate end.”167  Gadamer, while using a more conceptual language, 
specifies things by identifying the back-and-forth relationship between the (in)determinate 
general end, and the concrete situation: “in practical matters the general hermeneutical task, 
which figures in all instances, that is, of concretizing general knowledge, always implies 
generalizing something concrete.”168 
                                                
166 It is the same in Plato’s Euthyphro.  The question “What is piety?” is less about finding the one, true 
definition of piety, and much more so about its concretization in the particular situation.  When Socrates 
asks Euthyphro about the meaning of piety, he is also asking Euthyphro if his concrete action – taking his 
father to court – is an instantiation of piety.  It is a concrete question to point to an action or to consider a 
possible course of action and then ask “Is this pious?” “Is this friendship?”  This does nothing to 
downplay the fundamental role of character and desire.  One does not seriously ask the concrete question 
“Is this (particular action) really friendship?” if one’s desires are not already so oriented. 
 
167 Daniel Russell,“Phronesis and the Virtues,” The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, 205.  Brackets mine.  It seems to me that phronēsis is the virtue of performing all three of these 
“parts” well. 
 
168 Gadamer, Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 160.  This kind of language is typical 
of Gadamer when he wants to highlight the nature of the practical rationality of phronēsis. 
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Aristotle draws out the importance finding appropriate ways of concretizing a general end 
nicely in one half of his “double thought experiment.” Here he asks what moral virtue would be 
without phronēsis, and thereby offers a brief reexamination of the nature of moral virtue as such 
(1144b1-10).  Aristotle now says that one’s character can take two (duo) basic formations – 
“natural virtue” (aretē phusikē) and “true goodness” (kurios agatha, arēte kuria).169 The 
intention is to show that “natural virtue,” as a general inclination identifiable already in small 
children and animals to be generous or moderate or brave, is not enough for true, authentic 
virtue, and can in fact lead one to harm.170  A person who has a general tendency toward bravery 
or generosity, but does not have the ability to see how to concretize those ends in appropriate, 
good, ways, is like a cyclops who loses his sight (perhaps Odysseus pokes his eye out) and 
“meets with a heavy fall.”171 Likewise, if the “eye of the soul” is blind, the moral failing may be 
sudden and hard – just as when Hippolytus’ natural disposition toward sōphrosunē brings him to 
a tragic end.  For Aristotle, this obviously does not entail that there is anything wrong with 
                                                
169 There seems to be another analogy in play, according to which Natural Virtue : Full Virtue :: 
Cleverness : phronēsis.  However, since the first portion of the “double thought experiment” begins with 
the consideration of moral virtue without phronesis, I will leave a discussion of “cleverness” for later, 
since it is precisely moral virtue that the merely clever person lacks. 
 
170 EN VI.13, 1144b1-10.  This latter point perhaps accounts for the reason why Aristotle speaks of 
“natural virtue,” admittedly an awkward expression, and not simply of “natural disposition.”  It must 
have been obvious that “natural vice” would lead one into harm’s way.  The question is whether “natural 
virtue” is already enough for eudaimonia – thereby re-solidifying the “uselessness” of phronēsis.  
Aristotle uses the expression “natural virtue” simply to get at the question of the importance of phronēsis.  
He is not reneging on his earlier claim that we do not become virtuous by nature – hence the introduction 
of the expression “true goodness” to safeguard the philosophically robust meaning of virtue that has been 
the subject matter of the NE thus far. 
 
171 EN VI.13, 1144b8-12. I am not aware that anyone has suggested that the image of the cyclops is in 
Aristotle’s mind here. Could another alternative perhaps be Oedipus?  In any case, Aristotle is here in 
dialogue with Plato, Republic 491a-c. 
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sōphrōsunē per se, but is only to say that the general, abstract or indeterminate tendency is not 
enough to guide one safely to the good life.172   
This has consequences for the meaning of “authentic” or “authoritative” (kurios) moral 
virtue or “real goodness”: it becomes clear that it is not possible to have moral virtue without 
phronēsis.173  Only by acquiring that eye of the soul that is phronēsis (which Aristotle here 
sometimes simply calls “nous”) can “natural virtue” be transformed into true moral virtue.174  
Understanding concretely how to be a good friend in this-here-now particular situation, is like 
having one’s eyes opened.  For Aristotle, as for Plato and Socrates, it is not enough to “mean 
well” or “have a good heart”; the true ethical goal is rather to do well (eu prattein). 
With this half of the thought experiment completed, Aristotle, following the 
consequences, now feels compelled to combat the other extreme according to which moral virtue 
is, in the end, nothing but phronēsis.175  This extreme is identified with the supposed Socratic 
view which asserted that the virtues are forms of phronēsis (or logos or epistēmē).176  However, 
                                                
172   There is a close affinity here with Plato’s Philebus, which I have not seen discussed at all.  The 
problem of the unlimited (apeiron), and the role of an appropriate, sōphron “measure” that must be 
applied in order place a limit on the unlimited closely mirrors the problem of the how to – appropriately – 
make determinate what would otherwise remain indeterminate. 
 
173 EN VI.13, 1144b17.  “…he kuria ou ginetai aneu phronēseōs.” 
 
174 EN VI.13, 1144b13-18. 
 
175 Daniel C. Russell makes a careful, and helpful distinction here between the “reciprocity of virtue” and 
the “unity of virtue.”  Whereas the former holds that each virtue requires all the others, and that every 
virtue requires phronēsis (Aristotle’s position), the latter holds that all the virtues are the same thing – 
viz., a kind of phronēsis (the position Aristotle rejects).  See Daniel Russell,“Phronesis and the Virtues,” 
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 203 n.2. 
 
176 This discussion occurs as EN VI.13, 1144b18-30.  For a good discussion of Aristotle’s philosophical 
relationship to Socrates see Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates.  For Lear’s excellent 
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this view needs to be amended, according to Aristotle, despite the fact that some other 
Academicians had apparently already begun to modify the position by saying that moral virtue is 
a disposition according to or determined by (kata) phronēsis.177 Aristotle proposes a “slight 
modification” (micron metabēnai, 1144b25), to this view, which in fact preserves the truth 
implicit in both the Socratic and the modified Academic views: virtue is a hexis that is united to 
or in communion with (meta) phronēsis. 
The problem with the Socratic identification of moral virtue with knowledge is, in part, 
that it exaggerates the role that reason plays in human action while at the same time forgetting or 
downplaying the role of ethos, character, and desire.  However, the view of those who modified 
the Socratic position by saying that virtue is a disposition to act according to (kata) phronēsis is 
also insufficient.  Although they were correct to identify a relationship between moral virtue and 
phronēsis (as opposed to their equation with one another), this view mischaracterizes that 
relationship by making it seem as though it is possible to be virtuous simply by “listening to” 
right reason (orthos logos, phronēsis) or, as we say, “doing what you’re told.”  But “doing what 
you’re supposed to” is not praiseworthy, and simply “following the rules” may be sufficient for 
being a good craftsman, but it is not at all sufficient for living the good life.178   As we have 
emphasized above, to “flourish” or to be a truly (kurios) good person is for all the “parts” of 
                                                                                                                                                       
analysis of Aristotle’s solution to the second puzzle, see Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the 
Highest Good, 116-120. 
 
177 Aristotle uses the expression “kai gar nun pantes” here (1144b21) to describe the ubiquity of the 
Socratic view amongst “everybody today.”  It is an expression which, as Carlo Natali is careful to note 
(119), “is usually used to indicate the philosophers of the Academy (cf. Top. 104b25).” 
 
178 See C.D.C Reeve’s helpful commentary here. C.D.C. Reeve, Aristotle on Practical Wisdom, 257-260. 
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one’s soul to work in harmony.  As Aristotle says when discussing the nature of self-love, “the 
good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with every part of his 
nature.”179  In this way, Aristotle’s own position remains close to the Socratic position – it is, 
after all, only a “little adjustment”: Aristotle does not wish to separate the two for any reason 
other than to clarify that their real communion does not involve an equation – moral virtue and 
phronēsis, or desire and practical reason, are still two different “parts” of good human action (as 
well as two “parts” of the human soul).  That the one cannot be understood without the other is 
the purpose of the double thought experiment, the second half of which proceeds by asking what 
phronēsis itself would be without moral virtue.180   
  To ask what phronēsis would be without moral virtue is the same as to ask what 
understanding of how to find the right “means” for concretizing one’s indeterminate ends would 
be without a good orientation of one’s habits, emotions, and desires.  Just as Aristotle had 
introduced a hitherto unexamined concept (“natural virtue”) to get at the “real” (kurios) meaning 
of goodness or moral virtue, so, too, Aristotle now offers a distinction between phronēsis and 
“cleverness” (deinotēs).181  We should not overlook the connotation of deinotēs as something 
terrible or frightful.  The capacity to realize one’s goals is something praiseworthy only to the 
extent that one’s goals are praiseworthy; otherwise it is something cheap and awful (phaulos and 
                                                
179 EN IX.4, 1166A10-15. 
 
180 This discussion occurs at 1144a11-35. 
 
181 EN VI.12, 1144a23-35. 
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panourgos).182  Phronēsis without the virtues of character is in truth not phronēsis at all, but 
rather something else entirely.  Vice, for Aristotle, is not just something “bad” or something one 
shouldn’t do.  Rather, at least in this context, Aristotle wants to emphasize that vice is bad 
because it “perverts the mind and causes it hold false views about the first principles of 
conduct.”183  Vice is bad because it only make matters worse, or makes it more difficult for one 
to live the good life.  The reciprocity of the virtues of character with the virtues of the mind has 
consequences for that “eye of the soul” that governs human action: “the good only appears 
[phainetai] to the good person…Hence, it is clear that we cannot be phronimon without being 
agathon.”184  Gadamer makes the point in a similar manner:  “in the realm of practice, holding to 
a principle, for example, to a certain aretē, is not a merely logical act.  Practical reasonableness 
is displayed not only in knowing how to find the right means but also in holding to the right 
ends.  Aristotle’s demarcation of phronimos (prudent, reasonable) from deinos (clever) turns on 
this point.”185 
The consequence is the same as it was with the first part of the thought experiment: the 
communion of phronēsis with moral virtue.  In fact, Aristotle had already announced this 
conclusion at the outset of his treatment of the aporia regarding the “uselessness” of phronēsis 
                                                
182 EN VI.12, 1144a25ff. 
 
183 EN VI.12, 1144a33ff. 
 
184 EN VI.12, 1144a33ff.  I emphasize “phainetai” here since Aristotle, in just a few lines above, had 
introduced the expression “the eye of the soul”. 
 
185 Gadamer, Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 164-166. 
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for being good and for happiness.186 In practical matters, the defining aspect of human creatures 
is the capacity for what Aristotle calls prohairēsis or “choice.”187  To choose to do the virtuous 
act, and for its own sake, is the hallmark of the difference between a “really good person” and 
one who, e.g., does something just but cannot be called a “just person.”  To concretely choose 
the good here and now – that is to say, to act in a truly human and humane way – is the 
consummate achievement of the intertwinement of moral virtue with phronēsis.188  
Conclusion 
The early roots of the tradition of phronēsis both find a real philosophical beginning as well as 
culmination in Book Six of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Having studied these early roots, as 
well as Aristotle’s own analyses – both in their specific historical context in light of Plato and 
Isocrates, and through a close reading of his text – we have put ourselves in position to give our 
own answer to the question, what is phronēsis for Aristotle?  Words like “prudence,” 
“reasonableness,” “practical wisdom,” “tact,” “wisdom,” and “conscience” all have their place, 
but none of them quite capture what he is after.  If, going forward, we make use of these words 
and others like them, the conceptual content must be presupposed along with them.  For 
Aristotle, in the end, “phronēsis” means this: that the conscientious self-understanding of one 
whose whole human practical life (which is manifested in and throughout one’s emotions, 
                                                
186 EN VI.12, 1144a10-25. 
 
187  For Aristotle prohairēsis names the ability of a person to be a source (archē) of action – the human 
participation in the dignity of self-motion.  See EN. III for Aristotle’s full discussion of choice.  In any 
case it is important to not let modern, or neo-liberal conceptions of “choice” obscure the Greek 
prohairēsis. 
 
188 EN VI.12, 1144a10-25. 
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desires, character, and words and deeds) is oriented towards that which makes a human life most 
humane – the human good.189   
 In the course of these last two chapters (Chapter Two and Chapter Three) I have 
offered an account of the historical development of the concept of phronesis from Homer to 
Aristotle - albeit only a partial account (e.g., which has excluded the ancient dramatists and 
historians).  This functioned, in part, to provide a concrete example of a Gadamerian view of 
concepts and their (always a re-)formation, which I outlined in Chapter One.  Additionally, we 
are now in a good position to engage in a critical dialogue with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
contemporary retrieval of phronesis and his revolutionization of the discipline of hermeneutics.  
In this way, we are well prepared to respond to the guiding concern of this dissertation - namely, 
the relationship between ethics and the interpretation of texts.  Interpretation, we will see, is not 
only an unavoidably ethical activity, but it is in fact an activity of just the sort that requires 
phronesis if it is to be done well.  At first blush, this may seem to be a rather surprising claim, 
and unlikely to be true.  However, by martialing a robust hermeneutical appreciation for just 
what the concept-tradition of phronesis means, we will be able to understand better not only 
what Gadamer himself expressed in his writings, but also what he did not necessarily express, 
but which is entailed in a true retrieval of phronesis.  In the end, although we will have reason to 
critique some aspects of Gadamer’s retrieval, it will become clear how “phronesis” - whose 
beginnings lay in the phren of Homer - is, still, a tradition in which Gadamer himself deserves to 
                                                
189 I leave “the human good” unspecified here so as to avoid the difficult question – a topic for another 
dissertation – of the “two lives” in Book Ten.  I have offered suggestions of my view throughout this 
chapter, but I cannot take the time to deal with the matter in detail here. 
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be counted among one of its chief philosophical participants by virtue of providing us with, like 
Aristotle, another key summit-and-retrieval of that tradition.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
THE ETHICAL (RE)TURN OF HERMENEUTICS – PART ONE: THE HERMENEUTICAL 
PROBLEM OF APPLICATION 
 
“You must sharpen your ear, you must realize that when you take a word in your mouth, you 
have not taken up some arbitrary tool which can be thrown in a corner if it doesn’t do the job, but 
you are committed to a line of thought that comes from afar and reaches on beyond you.” 
- Gadamer, “To What Extent Does Language Pre-form Thought?” 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Goals and Outline 
I began this dissertation by raising a basic philosophical question motivating the work done 
throughout this dissertation: to what extent is the performance of interpretation (of texts) an 
ethical undertaking, and, following this, what are the basic outlines of a “hermeneutic 
ethics”?1  Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics not only reveals the philosophical legitimacy of 
asking this question itself, but also provides a way forward in constructing an answer - namely, 
via his claim that hermeneutics requires phronesis.  In the next two chapters (Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five, as well as the Conclusion), I argue for a strongly ethical reading of Gadamer’s 
retrieval of phronesis, and critically extend the trajectory of Gadamer’s thinking to include 
several unacknowledged, but essential consequences involved in a retrieval of phronesis for 
hermeneutics.  The goal of this present chapter, then, is to show how inquiry into a “hermeneutic 
                                                
1 See the “Introduction” to the dissertation for my initial introduction of this question. 
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ethics” (or an ethics of interpretation) follows necessarily from Gadamer’s insight into the 
unavoidability of a moment of “application” involved in any interpretation or understanding 
whatsoever.2  Interpretation (of texts) is necessarily an ethical act. 
The philosophical key - both for this dissertation, and, as I am arguing, in Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics - turns on the concept of phronēsis.  In light of this, I began this 
dissertation (Chapter One) by reconstructing a Gadamerian account of the nature of concepts and 
their intrinsic relationship to history, experience, and dialogue. I argued, in short, for an 
understanding of a concept (Begriff) as a dynamic tradition.   This set the methodological stage 
for my own retrieval of the concept of phronēsis (Chapter Two and Chapter Three), which 
sought to emphasize the nature of phronēsis as a conceptual tradition, by tracing the path of its 
historical development from Homer to Aristotle, and especially by emphasizing the continual 
reformation or refinement of the concept via 5th and 4th century Athenian intellectual dialogue 
(especially, the “dialogue” between Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle).  In this way, I was able to 
make a contribution to the historical scholarship on the concept of phronēsis, as well as to lay the 
groundwork for a critical engagement with Gadamer’s own retrieval of phronēsis.  If phronēsis 
is to be the ethical and conceptual heart of hermeneutics, it is essential that one first gains a rich 
understanding of what it means to reference “phronēsis” at all.  To take Gadamer at his word 
“phronēsis” is to invite a whole historical tradition of thinking about that concept into the 
philosophical conversation.   
                                                
2 Below I discuss in detail the complex relationship between “application,” “interpretation,” and 
“understanding.”  For now, it is enough, though insufficient, to simply define interpretation as the 
linguistic explicitation of one’s understanding (of a text). 
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By laying the hermeneutic foundation for a new or renewed “Auseinandersetzung” 
between Gadamer and the ancient thinkers of phronēsis, the rest of this dissertation will now 
explore the complexity and, ultimately, the unexplored potential as well as the critical oversights, 
involved in Gadamer’s claim that phronēsis is essential to the hermeneutic process.  Put 
differently, I am now able to hold Gadamer himself philosophically accountable to his own 
quasi-methodological comment given in the epigram to this chapter:  “You must sharpen your 
ear, you must realize that when you take a word in your mouth, you have not taken up some 
arbitrary tool which can be thrown in a corner if it doesn’t do the job, but you are committed to a 
line of thought that comes from afar and reaches on beyond you.”  The “historical” chapters of 
this dissertation (Chapter Two and Chapter Three) sought to “sharpen” my own ear for what is 
meant by the concept of phronēsis.  The rest of this dissertation now explores the consequences 
of staying “committed to a line of thought that comes from afar and reaches on beyond you” - for 
the line of thought that Gadamer himself began (or at least renewed) through his retrieval of 
phronēsis for hermeneutics does indeed come from afar, as well as reach beyond him (and us).  
How then does Gadamer argue that phronēsis is a requisite hermeneutic virtue for any act 
of interpretation?  This present chapter provides the first half of the argument by clarifying the 
nature of the hermeneutic act qua praxis, whereas the next chapter gives an account of the ethical 
nature of “hermeneutic phronēsis” in particular.  In this present chapter, I first highlight 
Gadamer’s engagement with the problem of “application” (Anwendung) – a problem, which 
Gadamer calls “the fundamental problem of hermeneutics.”3  In doing so I explicate Gadamer’s 
                                                
3 Truth and Method, 318.  If there was any doubt that one of the primary contributions that Gadamer's 
work has made to the discipline of hermeneutics was his radical retrieval of the problem of application, 
198 
 
 
 
account of the unity between “understanding,” “interpretation,” and “application”; and 
furthermore explain how each of these terms are transformed in light of Gadamer’s concept of 
“wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein” (effective historical consciousness).4  Following this, I 
then deepen my account of hermeneutic application by raising and responding to two issues, 
which Gadamer scholars have not sufficiently dealt with, but whose clarification are required in 
order to make sense not only of what “Anwendung” means for Gadamer, but also for 
understanding his retrieval of phronēsis.5 
Transition: Putting Aristotle Back to Work 
In Chapter One I showed how the transference (Übertragung) of a word or concept from one 
domain to another, according to Gadamer, opens up a primary theoretical space for the 
philosophical transformation (both clarification and modification) of that concept.  In Chapter 
Two I provided a clear concrete historical example of such “metaphorical transference” by 
showing how the phrēn-phronein word-family was variously employed across a number of 
disparate contexts (poetic, medical, pre-Socratic) – all of which contributed to the formation of 
“phronēsis.”   Then in Chapter Three I showed how the development of phronēsis into a robust 
philosophical concept was at the same time the culmination of a tradition of thinking about 
                                                                                                                                                       
one need look no further than a published seminar on hermeneutics, which Gadamer put together with 
Gottfried Boehm in 1976.  In that work, which includes selections of texts from many of the great modern 
and “postmodern” hermeneutic thinkers, only two pieces of Gadamer's writings are included: the first is 
an historical essay on the nature of philosophy in the 20th century; and the second is precisely the sections 
on "Anwendung" from Truth and Method, which I will discuss in this chapter.  See Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Seminar: Philosophische Hermeneutik, 327-332. 
 
4 This chapter presupposes what was said about this concept in detail in Chapter One. 
 
5 Those two issues are (1) the extent to which application is something that takes place inevitably and 
automatically, or, on the other hand, purposefully – or somehow both; and (2) what it could mean for 
Gadamer to claim that the text is something “universal” that must be applied to a “particular.” 
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practical-ethical life, whose historical basis is encountered in the works of Plato, Isocrates, and 
Aristotle.   
On the one hand, there is a clear gap, both historical and thematic, separating the previous 
chapter – on the development of phronēsis in Aristotle – from the present chapter concerning 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 20th century philosophical hermeneutics.  Yet this gap is not as great as 
it may appear.  For in fact, this present chapter also continues the inquiry into “phronēsis” as a 
conceptual tradition, by articulating one further (contemporary) development of that concept.  
Just as the phren-phronein word family could be applied across disparate contexts, so too 
Gadamer’s work has shown how the concept of phronēsis can be fruitfully applied to a domain 
not anticipated by Aristotle or his contemporaries – namely, the transference of the ancient 
Greek phronēsis from the concrete realms of human life and action, to the specific realm of 
hermeneutics and the interpretation of texts.  If today we speak of “hermeneutic virtues” such as 
charity, or if thinkers today articulate a conceptual link between the hermeneutic act and human 
praxis, it should not be forgotten that this link first came into language by way of metaphor (e.g., 
in the modern scientific attempts to “read the book of Nature,” or today when we say that one 
“reads a situation” or “does justice to a text”).  Nevertheless, it has not always and everywhere 
been simply obvious that there is such a link between text and action beyond being a “mere” 
metaphor.  Therefore in this chapter, I provide the philosophical and conceptual ground that 
makes it possible for Gadamer to claim that phronēsis has a role to play in hermeneutics6 – 
namely, by showing how profoundly necessary the concrete act of “application” is for any 
                                                
6 And vice versa – hermeneutics also will teach us something more about the nature of humane “practical 
wisdom.”   
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interpretation or understanding of a text.  Or, in other words, by showing the extent to which 
understanding (a text) is a form of “applied knowledge.” 
“The Fundamental Problem of Hermeneutics”: Application 
Motivating the Turn to Phronēsis 
That Gadamer’s turn to the Aristotelian concept of phronēsis formed part of the 
philosophical center of his 1960 Truth and Method was understood almost from the beginning of 
the book’s subsequent reception.  Just how to understand the philosophical role that phronēsis 
was intended to play there, however, has proved to be far from obvious.  One cannot simply 
begin with the sections explicitly dedicated to phronēsis in Truth and Method, because, 
hermeneutically, the concept of phronēsis (like every concept for Gadamer) is an answer to a 
question.7  What is needed, then, is to ask, what is the question to which “phronēsis” is the 
answer?  Beginning in this way provides us with the most appropriate interpretive starting point 
for engaging Gadamer’s (in)famous discussion of the relevance of Aristotle for hermeneutics.   
In this dissertation I am claiming that the question that Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis 
seeks to respond to concerns “the fundamental problem” of hermeneutics – namely, what he calls 
the problem of “application” (Anwendung).8  The question to which phronēsis will be the answer 
                                                
7 Methodologically, this is just what one should expect after our analysis of Gadamer’s understanding of 
conceptuality (Chapter One) - recalling that, for Gadamer, our concepts are (even if only provisional) 
dialogical answers to questions, which emerge out of experience.   
 
8 Gadamer also occasionally uses “Applikation” interchangeably with “Anwendung,” though this latter is 
much more common.  See Lawrence K. Schmidt, “Application and Praxis,” Blackwell Companion to 
Hermeneutics, 253-258.  
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can formulated in the following way:  how is the one text to be understood within the many ever-
changing hermeneutic situations that concretize and condition its being read and interpreted? 
The claim that lies behind this question – or the presupposition that makes this question 
possible – is that understanding and application are inextricable from one another: the text is 
only understood in and through its application (or “concretization”).9  This claim, however, is not 
simply an obvious or uncontroversial one, and so Gadamer spends a good portion of Chapter 
Four of Truth and Method arguing both (1) for the essential connection between understanding, 
interpretation, and application, and (2) for the legitimacy of the problem(s) that are generated 
once that connection is grasped.  After the concept of hermeneutic application is sufficiently 
clarified and shown to be “the central problem of hermeneutics,” Gadamer’s answer or response 
to that problem – i.e., phronēsis – becomes more understandable and its centrality as the 
crowning hermeneutic virtue can be recognized.   
Fusing Understanding, Interpretation, and Application into a Unity 
The concept of application – ap-plicare – necessarily implies the related concept of 
distance.  “To apply” originally meant linking two concrete entities together (docking a boat in a 
harbor), and so “making near what was once apart or separated” became the guide for the 
                                                
9 In some respects it might have been better – at least for English speakers – if Gadamer had not used the 
word “application” (Anwendung), since it is all too easy for us to presuppose that the English 
“application” means to take something prefabricated and “apply” it to some other thing or “use” it for 
some other purpose.  As the reader will see below, a better word for English speakers to begin to grasp 
what Gadamer means by Anwendung might have been “translation,” “adaptation,” “retrieval” or – in a 
quasi-Aristotelian vein – “reworking.”   
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development of the concept.10  Even when we say that a person “applies himself” to a subject 
matter such as philosophy or mathematics or baking bread, this still implies that a certain 
distance is in the process of being overcome.  Likewise the application of a general virtue or 
principle to something concrete entails that some kind of gap is overcome in the concretization - 
e.g., the separation or distance between “justice” and this here-and-now situation.  The contact 
between two entities which had previously been separated is the hallmark of any mode of 
application.  For the discipline of hermeneutics, it is the gap between the text and the reader that 
is overcome by hermeneutic application; and the nature of that application - bringing it about in 
the “right” way - involves the wisdom of hermeneutic phronēsis.11   
Emphasizing the conceptual connection between application and distance also provides 
us with the added scholarly benefit of clarifying the overall structure of Chapter Four of Truth 
and Method.  This intention and structure of this chapter is difficult to grasp, as Gadamer himself 
later noticed.  In a footnote inserted in a later edition of Truth and Method, Gadamer reflects on a 
particular shortcoming of the chapter:  
In many respects, the discussion here is much too restricted to the special situation of the 
historical human sciences and ‘being that is oriented to a text.’  Only in Part Three have I 
succeeded in broadening the issue to language and dialogue, though in fact I have had it 
                                                
10 For more on this, see Haomin Liu, “Subtilitas Applicandi as Self-Knowledge: A Critique of the 
Concept of Application in Hans-Georg Gadamer,” 128-147. 
 
11 Admittedly I am here neglecting the universal claim of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
according to which every act of understanding (not just that of a text) requires hermeneutic phronēsis.  I 
will return to this issue in the next chapter where I take up Gadamer’s claim that philosophical 
hermeneutics is a (the?) “heir” to Aristotelian practical philosophy.  Nevertheless, I have maintained the 
traditional focus of hermeneutics on texts since that focus also shapes the guiding question of my 
dissertation - i.e., to what extent is the interpretation of texts an ethical endeavor? 
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constantly in view; and consequently, only there have I grasped in a fundamental way the 
notions of distance and otherness.12 
For my part, I have tried to keep the importance of dialogue for Gadamer in mind from the beginning of 
the dissertation; which is why I began (Chapter One) with a discussion of the nature of language and 
conceptuality as participation in a dialogical tradition, rather than postponing it for the end, as Gadamer 
did in Truth and Method.  In order to clarify the structure of Chapter Four, and to show how the topic of 
“application” motivates the retrieval of phronēsis, we can visualize the chapter (below) in terms of a 
pyramid.  After several introductory sections, a very precise philosophical line of thought begins 
to unfold, which finds its apex in the retrieval of phronēsis.  For ease of visualization I offer here 
first the visual schematization, whose headings correspond to their section titles in Truth and 
Method: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 398-399. 
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Figure 3. A Structural View of TM, Chapter Four. 
 
The reader should bear in mind that each step in the pyramid is named after a (sub-)section 
heading in Chapter Four of Truth and Method, which, when all taken together, form a basic line 
of inquiry that are followed to a (i.e., Gadamer’s) conclusion.  Moreover, the reader should note 
the benefit of structuring things as a pyramid:  not only can one visualize the basic philosophical 
trajectory in this way, but, more precisely, one is able to appreciate how both sides of each level 
of the pyramid correspond to one another.  Gadamer systematically raises questions (the left side 
of the pyramid) and responds to them (the right side of the pyramid), while simultaneously 
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progressively deepening or ascending to his key philosophical insight – namely, the necessity of 
(hermeneutic) phronēsis.13   
 The experience of the (temporal and cultural) distance between the reader and text 
introduces one of the basic questions to which modern hermeneutic theorists have tried to 
respond.14  The shock of discovering how great the distance can be between reader and text can 
lead to, and has led to, a false dichotomy according to which the meaning of the text either (1) 
wholly resides in an unknowable past reading of a text, or (2) is wholly the work of a present, 
individual reading, which “creates” or “constructs” the meaning of the text.  By taking up the 
experience of distance separating reader and text, Gadamer’s hermeneutics clarifies the nature of 
that experience, which leads to a novel position according to which the experience of distance is 
itself dependent on an always-already prior act of “application” (Anwendung), which “bridges” 
the gap between reader and text.  Moreover, that act of “application,” as I will explain below, is 
made possible, in part, by the fact that the present reader is in some relevant sense conditioned 
by the very past that reader is seeking to understand. 
Gadamer begins this line of thought by noting that the distance that separates today’s 
reader from, e.g., the comedies of Aristophanes, is indeed enormous, but it is not the absolute 
separation between two discrete, atomistic entities – namely, the reading subject, on the one 
                                                
13  A comment about the left base of the pyramid:  one self-criticism that later in his life Gadamer came to 
level against Truth and Method is just that in this section he began with “temporal distance,” rather than 
the experience of “distance” more generally (including cultural, linguistic, and so on).  I have placed 
“temporal” in parentheses to mark this.  Cf. his comments in “Reflections on My Philosophical Journey,” 
The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
 
14 For more on this, see my discussion in Section One of Chapter One of this dissertation. 
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hand, and the text, on the other hand.  Instead, Gadamer introduces (in the second level of the 
pyramid) the concept of “Wirkungsgeschichte” (historical effect, and the related term, 
Rezeptionsgeschichte), in order to clarify the nature of the (temporal) distance, by showing how 
the text that is read today is, ontologically, an element of “tradition” - that is to say, it is 
something “handed on.”15  This means that the distance between reader and text is not absolute, 
but rather always only a “relative” distance, across which lies the whole span of historical-
cultural “effects” that have conditioned the meaning of the text, which itself has been received by 
and handed down to others who further transform and hand on the text to us today.  The 
(meaning of the) text itself does not die with its author, but rather continues to grow right 
alongside – that is, thanks to, or due to – its historical reception.     
However, the reception of the text is not a pristine one whereby the text remains 
unaltered or untransformed by those who hand on and receive that text throughout history.  With 
every new reception of the text there occurs a process of reinterpretation, adaptation, translation, 
and revival of the text in new and different socio-historical-cultural milieus or “hermeneutic 
situations.”16   Thus the ongoing work of tradition connects the contemporary reader to the “past” 
                                                
15 This holds even in the case where a “new” text is discovered (i.e., rediscovered), since a single text is 
not some a-historical creature existing without any relation to other texts, cultural products, historical 
events, etc.  The “discovery” of a new text is not a separate event independent of that text’s taking its 
place within the larger life of and dialogue with “Tradition.”  A text that cannot find a place in tradition is, 
quite simply, not a text – there are no private texts. 
 
16 Gadamer uses Heidegger’s term “hermeneutic situation” to encompass not only the particular 
individual reader’s own hermeneutic presuppositions, experiences, questions, and concerns, but also the 
whole general spatio-temporal situation in which a text is read (e.g., Aristotle’s works as read in ancient 
Athens, in Alexandria, in the 13th century, or in England and America in the late 20th century). 
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life of the text just as much as it provides an initial point of departure whereby the contemporary 
reader will give the text a new (i.e., relatively different) and sometimes also a “future” life.17   
With this in mind, by the time one reaches the start of Gadamer’s explicit section on 
“application” in Chapter Four of Truth and Method (the 3rd level of our pyramid diagram), it is 
easier to see why the link between “interpretation” and “understanding” must at the same time 
involve a kind of “application.”  Gadamer’s discussion of application, and his retrieval of 
phronēsis, provide a philosophical key or turning point, which ultimately leads to his technical 
concept of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein (effective historical consciousness).  Gadamer’s 
analysis of the link between application, understanding, and interpretation is used to show how it 
was precisely the blindness to the philosophical legitimacy of the problem of application itself 
that systematically hamstrung hermeneutic thinking since the 19th century by entangling it in so 
many aporias concerning the “distance” between reader and text.18  
Traditionally hermeneutics was divided into three separate ‘subtleties’: (1) subtilitas 
intelligendi (understanding), (2) subtilitas explicandi (interpretation), and (3) the subtilitas 
applicandi (application), which Gadamer claims was included by pietism (J.J. Rambach).19 
These three arts or “finesses” were viewed as discrete parts of the discipline such that, for 
                                                
17 In Chapter One of this dissertation I tried to show how Gadamer argues that our language itself is 
always already “interpretive” (so that every translation is already an interpretation), and that the concepts 
we use to explicitly interpret a text always participate in the larger life of the tradition that has (partly) 
shaped their meaning. 
18 Truth and Method, 318:  “In the early tradition of hermeneutics, which was completely invisible to the 
historical self-consciousness of post-romantic scientific epistemology, this problem had its systematic 
place.”  
 
19 For a nuanced critique of Gadamer’s claim about Rambach, cf. István M. Fehér’s “Hermeneutics and 
Philology: Understanding the Matter, Understanding the Text,” 269-285. 
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example, one only ever needed to interpret something when someone (be it oneself or another) 
did not already understand a given piece of text.   
In the 19th century, Romantic hermeneutics (Schleiermacher) was able to see the unity of 
“understanding” and “interpretation.”  According to Gadamer, Romantic hermeneutics 
acknowledged that “interpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement to understanding; 
rather, understanding is always interpretation, and hence interpretation is the explicit form of 
understanding.  In accordance with this insight, interpretive language and concepts were 
recognized as belonging to the inner structure of understanding.”20  Whoever does not want to 
“interpret” but only “understand” a text will, in the end and in a naïve way, simply make use of 
all the presuppositions residing in the concepts by means of which they understand the text at 
all.21   
However, the recognition of the unity of interpretation and understanding also resulted in 
a new orientation for the discipline of hermeneutics, for it seemed to require a new way of 
understanding what the task of the interpreter really is.  For 19th century post-Romantic 
hermeneutics, the concern became to discover a scientific method of interpretation that would 
secure the “objective” meaning of a text.  According to Gadamer, this was the near-inevitable 
result of (1) the reframing of the reader-text relationship in terms of a subject-object relation, (2) 
the successes of the modern natural scientific method, and (3) the near total exclusion of that 
                                                
20 Truth and Method, 318. 
 
21 Thus a student in my classical mythology course was eager to know “if the Greeks really believed in all 
these myths.”  Clearly, unpacking any one of these concepts (the Greeks; [really] believing; myths) would 
require a dissertation in itself.  For a good example of historical research that is also hermeneutically 
aware, cf. Paul Veyne, Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination.       
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third traditional hermeneutic element – the “finesse” of applicatio.22  The search for the right 
method of interpretation presupposed that what was being sought was an objective, universally 
true, and timeless interpretation of the text – i.e., one in which the reading subject and their 
hermeneutic presuppositions are somehow neutralized or deemed inapplicable so far as the 
meaning of the text is concerned.23  In light of this new concern, “the edifying application of 
Scripture in Christian preaching, for example, now seemed very different from the historical and 
theological understanding of it.”24  “Application” here took on the meaning of a secondary “use” 
of the text that is otherwise understood on its own.  In other words, the text could “first” be 
understood and, if one so wished, “later” be “applied” in some way.  This shift in meaning of 
“application” meant the general separation of literary and historical hermeneutics from 
theological and legal hermeneutics.  For theological (and legal) hermeneutics, according to 
Gadamer, necessarily kept in view the “tension” (Spannung) between “the fixed text” (dem 
gesetzen Text) such as the law or the gospel, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, “the sense 
arrived at by applying it at the concrete moment of interpretation [den konkreten Augenblick der 
Auslegung], either in judgment or in preaching.”25   By contrast, post-Romantic literary-historical 
hermeneutics exaggerated and misidentified the nature of the historical “distance” between 
                                                
22 Truth and Method, 318f.  It might have been better for Gadamer to speak not of the “exclusion” of 
application, but rather of the “transformation” of hermeneutic application into a scientific and 
technological sense of application. 
 
23 Cf. Gadamer’s comments on the “secondary naivety” that is involved when one “demands that in 
understanding history one must leave one’s own concepts aside and think only in the concepts of the 
epoch one is trying to understand.”  Truth and Method, 398. 
 
24 Truth and Method, 318. 
 
25 Truth and Method, 319. 
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reader and text that needs to be overcome, and so they could only view the element of 
application as something that may occur only “after” understanding was found – “edifying” 
perhaps, but incidental to a truly “wissenschaftliche” understanding.26  Historically, this also 
meant that literary hermeneutics and historical studies “cut their ties with the other hermeneutical 
disciplines [i.e., theological and legal hermeneutics] and established themselves as models of 
methodology for research in the human sciences.”27  
By rehabilitating the place of application, Truth and Method sets itself the task of 
clarifying and reorienting the whole general nature of the hermeneutic process. Gadamer argues 
that intelligere, explicare, and applicatio, in fact, together comprise a unity. This does not mean 
that one “first” understands or interprets the text and only “second” chooses to apply the text (or 
not to apply it) to some particular case.  In fact it is not really a matter of choice at all: readers 
themselves are already a particular (and singular) “case” in which the text is applied if it is 
understood at all.28  A “mere reproduction” (eine bloße Wiedergabe) of something, without any 
adaptation or alteration, is simply not possible because every reproduction or reading always 
                                                
26 Although Gadamer does not explicitly return to this matter of “edifying” reading, it should be noted 
that the influence of Kierkegaard on Gadamer was in effect already before he went to Freiburg to study 
with Heidegger.  Has Kierkegaard’s critique of an all-too-“objective” and distanced form of 
understanding, and the publication of his “up-building discourses” shaped Gadamer’s thinking about 
“Anwendung”?  Kierkegaard’s literary On Repetition also seems to prefigure the nature of retrieval or a 
repetition with a “twist” that is involved in Gadamer’s conception of tradition and application. 
 
27 Truth and Method, 319.  Gadamer continues: “The fact that philological, legal, and theological 
hermeneutics originally belonged closely together depended on recognizing application as an integral 
element of all understanding.” 
 
28 This kind of understanding therefore also includes misunderstanding.  Indeed, for Gadamer, even the 
“best” understanding is always only provisional, partial, and limited, and so must always also be a partial 
misunderstanding as well.   
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takes place in a new and different concrete hermeneutical context.  For example, a perfectly 
“historicized” performance of a Greek tragedy is impossible – even when the Greeks themselves 
began re-performing the works of Aeschylus, they did not hesitate to include stage props or 
theatre devices that had not been invented in Aeschylus’ day.  Each re-performance of, say, the 
Prometheus Bound, be it in Athens in the 4th BCE or the 21st CE, is in some sense a new 
creation, just as much as it is a revival or re-creation.  The danger of attempting to completely 
historicize a tragedy is that it threatens to deaden its effect: the audience may only come away 
with the experience of having looked at a mere museum piece, rather than having actually been 
confronted by or undergone a tragedy.29  In other words, the hermeneutic situation and the text 
are what must be “applied” to one another for understanding to occur:  “we have come to see that 
understanding always involves something like applying the text to be understood to the 
interpreter’s present situation…we consider application to be just as integral a part of the 
hermeneutic process as are understanding and interpretation.”30  In the case of the performance 
of a Greek tragedy, one can say that only by adapting, concretizing, applying, renewing, 
translating, and so on can the tragedy be understood at all – only by becoming (relatively) 
different can the tragedy or the text speak again today.  The hermeneutic situation in which a text 
is read cannot be neutralized or historicized away, but instead needs to be related to the text so 
                                                
29 The hermeneutic question is how one is able to adapt the play in such a way that it actually speaks to 
the audience – and that requires a good deal of practical wisdom, as we will see later. 
 
30 Truth and Method, 319.  For this reason Gadamer also remarks here that “this is not to return to the 
pietist tradition of the three separate ‘subtleties’.”   
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that the meaning of the text can begin to come to the fore.31  It is not for nothing that Euripides 
performed the Trojan Women in 415 BCE, only a few months after Athens had killed the men 
and enslaved the women of the island of Melos.32 
To summarize what has been discussed thus far, “hermeneutic application” (1) refers to 
the application, linking together, or concretization of the text itself “to” or “in” the hermeneutic 
situation of the reader,33 and (2) is not a separate act, independent from the process of 
understanding, but is in fact essential for understanding as such.34  In Truth and Method 
Gadamer states that the task of application takes place within the “tension” (Spannung) that 
exists between “the identity of the common object” (i.e., the text) and “the changing situation in 
which it must be understood” (e.g., by you and me here and now).35   
Two Problems with the Problem of Application 
Gadamer’s way of speaking about Anwendung is not without some confusing elements.  There 
are in fact two questions lingering in the background that must be dealt with.  First, is 
                                                
31 Truth and Method, 319. 
 
32 A terrific example of how tragedy can be made to speak by being adapted well to a context is that of the 
“Syria Trojan Women” project, in which Syrian refugee women stage productions of Euripides’ Trojan 
Women in the UK.  For more information, visit www.syriatrojanwomen.org.   
 
33 The act of application in hermeneutics “explicitly and consciously bridges the temporal distance that 
separates the interpreter from the text and overcomes the alienation of meaning that the text has 
undergone.” Truth and Method, 322. 
 
34 “What we are dealing with here is not the taking of something that was first understood in itself and 
then “applying” it subsequently to something else; rather, application is involved in the first real reaching 
of an understanding of a matter by the person who is seeking to understand it.”  Gadamer in 
Conversation, p. 47.  
 
35 Truth and Method, 320. 
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hermeneutic application something that occurs “automatically” and “implicitly” in any and every 
event of understanding, or, second, is it something that the reader “purposefully” and “skillfully” 
accomplishes (or, third, somehow both automatic and purposeful)?  Second, what does Gadamer 
mean by speaking of the text as a “universal” that must be applied to something “particular”?  
Answering these two questions will go a long way in explaining some of the details of 
hermeneutic “application,” as well as completing our approach to Gadamer’s retrieval of 
phronēsis.  
Problem One: Is Hermeneutic Application Automatic or Purposeful? 
On the one hand, Gadamer claims that application is essential to any and every act of 
understanding, such that “application is an implicit moment in all understanding; it does not at all 
conflict with the genuine obligation to have scientific rigor.  One does not accomplish 
application by taking some excerpt from the tradition and then making some doubtful 
“application” of it; rather, application takes place in order for one to understand it at all!”36  This 
means that wherever understanding occurs, application will also have taken place whether or not 
the reader is conscious of or “purposeful” about that application.  In this respect, application 
happens “automatically” inasmuch as the hermeneutic situation by necessity will play a role in 
making the text understandable.   
At the same time, however, Gadamer also claims that the “controlled performance” 
(kontrollierte Vollzug) of the fusion of horizons is the task (Aufgabe) of an “effective historical 
consciousness” (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein), which is “the central problem of 
                                                
36 Gadamer in Conversation, 47-48.  
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hermeneutics…the problem of application, which is to be found in all understanding.”37  To 
speak of a “controlled performance,” however, seems to suggest that the act of application is in 
fact a “purposeful” one, which the interpreter consciously performs.  This seems to make 
application into a very specific type of activity that is not necessarily undertaken “every time” 
one understands something.  Yet, how, then, is this compatible with the claim above that 
application is always already implicitly occurring in any and every moment of understanding 
whatsoever?   
Gadamer’s discussion of application is not incoherent – the two claims are in fact 
compatible.  To the extent that hermeneutic application is “automatic,” “universal,” and always 
already “implicit” whenever understanding occurs, one can say that for Gadamer application 
simply means that the text has to be “translated” into a language that the reader can understand.  
The force of all the hermeneutic presuppositions that reside in our language is what carries the 
day here.  For example, the beginning student who first reads about Plato’s “ideas” will more 
than likely read the word “idea” in a very un-Platonic (more Lockean, perhaps) sense, and so to 
that extent will come to a somewhat un-Platonic (or a partial, limited) understanding of Plato.  Or 
again, the translation of phronēsis today as “prudence,” which follows its Latin rendering, may 
lead the beginning student of today – for whom the English word “prudence” connotes a prude or 
an overly cautious square – to understand Aristotle’s crowning moral virtue in a rather lopsided 
way.  To apply the text in this sense, then, refers to the naïve understanding (and therewith also 
                                                
37 Truth and Method, 317-318.  This passage is in fact also a good example of where Gadamer equates the 
“fusion of horizons” with the task of application, which an “effective historical consciousness” 
undertakes. 
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misunderstanding) of the text on the basis of one’s present hermeneutic prejudices (Vorurteile).38  
Whoever reads will (mis)understand.  Because applied (mis)understanding is in a certain sense 
“automatic,” there resides a danger in not acknowledging or remembering that one’s 
understanding of a text occurs, necessarily, through the relating of the text to one’s own 
particular hermeneutic situation; a situation, which – again, necessarily – is different from the 
horizon in which the text was “first” written.  To admit that this is the case is to acknowledge the 
hermeneutical legitimacy of the problem of application.39   
To admit that one has a problem, however, already changes one’s relationship to that 
problem, and opens up new hermeneutical possibilities.  To understand that one is finite may 
mean that one begins to live differently; and the insight into one’s own hermeneutic finitude 
likewise may mean that one begins to “interpret” and “understand” (the text, the world, oneself) 
differently.  When Gadamer speaks of a “controlled performance” (kontrollierte Vollzug), or that 
hermeneutics “explicitly and consciously” (ausdrücklich und bewußt) performs a task of 
application,40 he means only that the interpreter who has become aware of the inevitability of 
application tries to perform that application in a more appropriate, better, more correct, and 
                                                
38 I do not want to overstate the “naivety” here.  As I have tried to emphasize throughout Chapter One and 
the present chapter, one’s present hermeneutic presuppositions were not created just “yesterday,” but 
instead belong to the whole ongoing life of the historical traditions that have created the situation in 
which those presuppositions are at work. 
 
39 The “problematicity” of the problem of application, in turn, consists in the fact that we want to read and 
interpret well, correctly, rightly, appropriately, truthfully, and so on.  This brings us closer to the need for 
phronēsis, but I postpone the full discuss until the next chapter. 
 
40 Cf. Truth and Method, 322: “Our thesis is that historical hermeneutics too has a task of application to 
perform, because it too serves [dient] applicable meaning, in that it explicitly and consciously bridges the 
temporal distance that separates the interpreter from the text and overcomes the alienation of meaning that 
the text has undergone.” 
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truthful manner.  In short, they aim to develop the hermeneutic excellence required for becoming 
good at the unavoidable task of application (namely, as will be seen in the next chapter, the 
excellence of hermeneutic phronēsis).  It does not mean that the task of application is something 
that one can “choose” to engage in or not to engage in, as is the case when one decides to apply a 
hammer to a nail, or a method to an object.  Rather, the hermeneutic act of application is just like 
encountering an ethical situation wherein one cannot choose to opt out of a response one way or 
another.  Likewise, one can “forget” to apply a procedure or a method in a particular case, but 
one cannot “forget” the act of hermeneutic application, just as one cannot “forget” phronēsis.  
Now this does not mean that good interpretation necessarily requires the explicit, 
“controlled performance” of application.  Or put better, the “control” here is not an avowedly 
methodological control – as if the author of Truth and Method was, in the end, attempting to 
outline a new general hermeneutic methodology like that of Schleiermacher, Emilio Betti, or 
E.D. Hirsch.  It is possible, for example, to come to learn that Plato’s “idea” means something 
quite different than what one first thought, or that Aristotle’s phronēsis is a much more 
interesting concept than the moralistic orientation of a conservative prude (I hope to have shown 
at least that much in previous chapters).  That such a change in understanding is possible at all is, 
for Gadamer, the great “miracle” (Wunder) of understanding.41  What is involved in the process 
of coming to a better understanding, however, is nothing other than the ongoing, repeated act of 
application.  One might begin with a certain (mis)understanding of what Plato meant by “idea,” 
                                                
41 Cf. Truth and Method, 163, 303, and 322 for Gadamer’s use of “das Wunder des Verstehens.”  I thus 
(think that I) disagree with the interpretation of this phrase that is given in Haoming Liu’s article, 
“Subtilitas Applicandi,” 128-147. 
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but through continuous re-reading and discussing with others who themselves have read and re-
read the text, one may suddenly become aware that the meaning of the text is different from what 
one originally presumed.  This means that some of our previous presuppositions through which 
the text was interpreted are now seen to be insufficient.  The text itself has “miraculously” said 
something to us that we ourselves were not expecting, and in spite of the fact that it can only do 
so by speaking into our own hermeneutic situation.  This means that we are capable of being 
faced by something “other” than our own immediate hermeneutic presuppositions.  One can 
become aware that the horizon within which one was interpreting the text is insufficient or 
inappropriate, and so must be altered to better fit what one now is slowly coming to understand 
in a new (hopefully better) way.  The “wonder” – i.e., the place from which Gadamer begins his 
philosophical questioning – is that understanding seems to deepen itself by becoming (more or 
less) different every time through an experience of contact with something other.42 
To give another example: it is all-too-common for today’s reader of the myths contained 
in Genesis 1 to naively interpret the text as proto- or bad-science that was the product of an 
ancient people who, nevertheless, were trying to answer the same questions as today’s scientist 
about the material creation and development of the cosmos.43  Becoming aware that the text may 
be seeking to answer different questions altogether takes time, re-reading, and engagement with 
                                                
42 Truth and Method, 320: “Understanding proves to be an event, and the task of hermeneutics, seen 
philosophically, consists in asking what kind of understanding, what kind of science it is, that is itself 
advanced by historical change.” 
 
43 Of course equally as bad are those who presume Genesis to be dealing with the material creation of the 
cosmos, but who then try to make it “compatible” with or even “better than” the best scientific 
explanations that we have today.  By contrast, for another good historical work that is hermeneutically 
aware, see John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis 1. 
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others who have spent much time thinking about that text.44  The conclusion, then, is the 
following: if application is the cause of an initial (mis-)understanding, (re-)application is also 
the cause of a better (mis-)understanding. 
Problem Two: What is the “Universality” of the Text? 
There is one last issue that must be dealt with before turning to the place of phronēsis in 
philosophical hermeneutics.  For the way in which Gadamer relates the concept of phronēsis to 
Anwendung is not as philosophically straightforward as it may first appear.  For at the very start 
of the section titled, “The Hermeneutical Relevance of Aristotle,” Gadamer curiously alters his 
terminology and re-summarizes the task of application somewhat differently from the way in 
which it had been previously introduced.  Gadamer writes:   
If the heart of the hermeneutical problem is that one and the same tradition must time and 
again be understood in a different way, the problem, logically speaking, concerns the 
relationship between the universal and the particular.  Understanding, then, is a special 
case of applying something universal to a particular situation.  This makes Aristotle’s 
ethics especially important for us.45 
                                                
44 To speak of a “firmament” that holds back the waters “above” is of course scientifically incorrect.  But 
that is not what the nomadic Hebrew farmers searching for a home were trying to assert.  Rather, with the 
sense that one is surrounded by (political and environmental) chaos on all sides, and yet standing in a 
stable, center of peace – and receiving rain to water crops (but not too much rain to cause a flood) – one 
may search for a language to assert a spirit of gratitude.  With that change in perspective from the 
approach of a modern literalist, materialist reading of Genesis the task of “application” begins again 
anew: can we still understand what Genesis 1, now, seems to be saying to us?  At the same time, when 
can we say that we have “finally” come to understand just what it is that that text is trying to 
communicate such that re-reading is no longer required?   
 
45 Truth and Method, 322.  It is worth quoting the German here in full: “Wenn das hermeneutische 
Problem seine eigentliche Spitze darin hat, daß die Überlieferung als dieselbe dennoch je anders 
verstanden werden muß, so handelt es sich darin – logisch gesehen – um das Verhältnis des Allgemeinen 
und des Besonderen.  Verstehen ist dann ein Sonderfall der Anwendung von etwas Allgemeinem auf eine 
konkrete und besondere Situation.  Damit gewinnt die aristotelische Ethik für uns eine besondere 
Bedeutung,“  Gadamer, GW I, 317.  Is Gadamer’s last use of „besondere“ signaling that his retrieval of 
phronēsis will also be a concrete and “particular” example of the concept of Anwendung?  In a letter to 
219 
 
 
 
Previously I have said that the task of application consisted in the application of the text to the 
hermeneutical situation.  In the quote above, however, Gadamer does not once mention texts or 
hermeneutic situations per se, but instead speaks about “tradition” and about the “logical” 
relationship of the universal to the concrete particular, all the while presuming that the same 
subject matter (Sache) is still being investigated – i.e., the problem of application.  However, 
what does it really mean to say that the relation between the text and the hermeneutic situation is 
like the relationship between the universal and the particular? 
In fact the issue is even more complicated.  For Gadamer discusses the problem of 
application by employing a wide variety of terms, not all of which are obvious in their meaning 
or in how the terms all relate to one another.  In order to give the reader a sense for this, I offer 
here a short table of several of the most common, and most important, ways in which Gadamer 
speaks about the problem of hermeneutic application.  Variously, hermeneutic application is said 
to consist in: 
 The application of the   To the 
 1. Text     1. (One’s own) Hermeneutic Situation 
 2. Universal (or General)   2. Particular (or Singular) 
 3. Past     3. Present  
 4. One     4. Many 
 5. Foreign    5. Familiar 
 6. Tradition    6. Oneself; Novel 
 7. Horizon (of the text, past, etc.)  7. Horizon (of the reader, present)46 
                                                                                                                                                       
Richard Bernstein, Gadamer seems to confirm just as much.  Cf. Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism, 261-266. 
 
46 I cannot list every place in Truth and Method, let alone Gadamer’s corpus, in which he uses these 
terms.  That said, I have supplied many instances where Gadamer has used these terms throughout this 
chapter.  Cf. 298-335 of Truth and Method for the most condensed place where many of these terms are 
used interchangeably. 
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Gadamer scholars have generally paid insufficient attention to the fact that the differences in 
terminology here raise as many questions as they resolve.  What does it mean to speak of the text 
as something “universal”?  To what extent is the text identical to its “horizon” (of meaning? its 
historical horizon?)?  What does it mean to think the “past” as something “universal” (or 
general), and the “present” as something “particular” (and singular)?  And in what sense are 
these terms reversible, such that it is the particular that must also be applied to the universal, and 
the present to the past, and so on?    
There is a beehive of questions lurking behind these different ways that Gadamer 
discusses the praxis of hermeneutics.  Moreover, it is not possible to dismiss these terminological 
differences by claiming that they are all only mere analogies intended to clarify the one true 
sense of hermeneutic application – i.e., that of the text to the hermeneutic situation.  For part of 
what makes Gadamer’s Truth and Method so groundbreaking is not just that it has helped to 
clarify the nature of textual hermeneutics in the Geisteswissenschaften, but that it does so by 
clarifying the nature understanding as such, regardless of whether one is seeking to understand a 
text, a moral situation, a live conversation, a past historical event, an encounter with another 
culture, (social-)scientific data, and so on.  In other words, “philosophical hermeneutics” puts 
forward a certain universal claim about the nature of human understanding.47  This in turn means 
                                                
47 I will deal, partly, with this claim later.  See also Gadamer’s article “The Universality of the 
Hermeneutic Problem,” which also functions as a helpful summary of the main lines of Truth and 
Method.  Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem,” Philosophical Hermeneutics.  See 
also David Weberman, “Is Hermeneutics Really Universal despite the Heterogeneity of its Objects?” in 
Gadamer Verstehen, 35-56. 
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that the various ways of speaking about the task of application are not necessarily merely 
metaphorical, but instead are so many instances of the general task of application, which 
Gadamer argues is an ineliminable aspect of every act of understanding whatsoever.  
 I cannot deal with every nuance or peculiarity in Gadamer’s vocabulary so far as the 
problem of application is concerned in this dissertation.  Thankfully, however, that is not a 
requirement for describing the philosophical frame of his retrieval of phronēsis.  What is 
required, however, is to come to an understanding of what it means to speak about the text as 
something “universal” (Allgemein).  This is for two reasons: first, this way of speaking 
dominates Gadamer’s discussion about phronēsis not only in Truth and Method, but in many 
other writings as well.48  And, second, there is some reason to think that Gadamer himself 
privileged one particular way of thinking about application: Verstehen, Gadamer writes, “is a 
special case [Sonderfall] of applying something universal to a particular and concrete 
situation.”49  This seems to suggest that every act of hermeneutic application can be understood 
in a general and abstract way according to the universal-particular schema.  Given these two 
reasons, what follows is my reconstruction of what Gadamer seems to mean when he writes that 
the interpreter seeks “to understand this universal, the text.”50   
                                                
48 Cf. the use of “Allgemein” in “Praktisches Wissen,” Chapter 5 of The Idea of the Good in Platonic-
Aristotelian Philosophy, as well as Chapter 1 and 4 of Hegel’s Dialectic. Five Hermeneutical Studies.  
 
49 Truth and Method, 322. 
 
50 Truth and Method, 333:  “Der Interpret will vielmehr gar nichts anderes, als dies Allgemeine – den 
Text – verstehen....“  A full treatment would also require that one reconstructs Gadamer’s account of just 
what a text is, which is something that Truth and Method does not explicitly state.  For a later attempt to 
“define” the text, cf. Gadamer’s quasi-taxonomy of texts that he gives in his (equally quasi-)dialogue with 
Derrida in “Text and Interpretation,” Dialogue and Deconstruction, 21-51.  
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Among the (few51) scholars who have questioned what it means for Gadamer to say that 
the text is something universal, not only have their responses to that question been different – 
variously critical52 or sympathetic53 – but also their formulations of the question itself have been 
different.  Given this state of the literature, in what follows I offer my own view on the matter, 
by outlining the clear link between Gadamer’s discussion of (1) application and phronēsis in Part 
Two of Truth and Method, to (2) his discussion of humanism in Part One – wherein a substantial 
account of “universal” is explicitly given.54   
In what sense then does Gadamer understand the text to be a kind of “universal” 
(Allgemein)?  Gadamer shows some awareness that this manner of speaking might require 
clarification when he signals to the reader of Truth and Method (in a footnote) that several earlier 
sections of the book are relevant to his present retrieval of Aristotle.55  Those earlier sections 
deal with the main concepts of humanism – specifically the concepts of Bildung (education, 
                                                
51 The Gadamer Dictionary, for example, has an entry for “universality,” but its discussion is wholly 
concerned with Gadamer’s claim that all (i.e., “universally”) understanding is “hermeneutic” – i.e., there 
is no understanding that is not “interpretive” and “applicative” in essence.  Thus Gadamer can say that it 
is not just texts that require interpretation, but, in truth, the whole human of socio-cultural life (and 
beyond?).  Cf. Chris Lawn and Niall Keane, The Gadamer Dictionary, 153-154. 
 
52 For example, in Liu’s “Subtilitas Applicandi as Self-Knowledge: A Critique of the Concept of 
Appilcation in Hans-Georg Gadamer.” 
 
53 For example, cf. Paul Schuchman’s “Aristotle’s Phronēsis and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” 41-50.  
 
54 To be fair, Liu, at the very end of his article, stumbles upon the possibility of handling the issue in this 
way as well, but he does not make it thematic or pursue it in depth, choosing instead to quickly dismiss it.  
His, rather ambiguous, dismissal (142-143), however, begs the question, since he dismisses it only by 
drawing on the view he has just presented earlier; but we have to wonder whether his earlier approach 
was in fact the correct one in the first place. In general, however, I am grateful for Liu’s grasp of the 
problem, although I think his approach and conclusions are insufficient. 
 
55 Cf. footnotes 57 and 58 on p. 392. 
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culture, formation) and Sensus Communis.56  Although he is not concerned there to give a full 
explanation of how he understands the concept of a “universal” in its own right, it is nevertheless 
possible to gain some insight into the key features that are relevant for understanding what 
Gadamer means by speaking of the text as a “universal,” and thereby for completing our 
characterization of the task of hermeneutic application.    
In the course of his overview of the concept of Bildung (paideia, culture, formation, 
cultivation), which is heavily indebted to Hegel’s outline of a “theoretical” and “practical” 
Bildung as well as Hegel’s (somewhat Aristotelian) conception of a “concrete universal,” 
Gadamer writes that, “Bildung, as rising to the universal, is a task for man.”57  The expression 
“Erhebung zur Allgemeinheit” is essential for beginning to grasp the way in which Gadamer will 
later use “Allgemein.”58 Bildung is something “universal,” for Gadamer, inasmuch as it embraces 
every individual who is “formed” or “shaped” by a “culture.”59  However, unlike the technical 
formation of “material” by a prefabricated “model,” the case of human formation in culture is not 
something which occurs straightforwardly or in one direction.  One is not educated via the 
                                                
56 The pages that are most relevant to us here are, pp. 11-13, 16, 20, 30-31, 35, as well as 201-202, 316, 
349-350. 
 
57 Truth and Method, 12: “Bildung als Erhebung zur Allgemeinheit ist also eine menschliche Aufgabe.”  
Throughout these pages Gadamer regularly quotes from Hegel’s Philosophical Propaedeutic and the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 
58 Liu begins to see this (142), but does not explore it fully: “…the relevance of Bildung to the problem of 
universality [i.e., the “universality” of the text] lies in its classical definition that Bildung is “Bildung zu 
Menschen”…and Hegel’s theoretical Bildung, which is characterized by…striving to attain the universal.” 
 
59 Gadamer notes (TM, 9-10) the etymological connection between Bildung and the philosophical 
background of the idea of “formation” according to which a “Bild” – as both a Vorbild (model) and a 
Nachbild (copy) – has the capacity to shape individuals (i.e., in its “image”).  
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impress of a predetermined, “universal” (selfsame) model onto a completely passive, blank set of 
material.  In the first place, inhabiting a particular style, tradition, culture etc. is always done by 
singular individuals who, no matter how much they have in common, are not “repeatable” in the 
way that the production of metal folding chairs are.  This is (partly) because “Bildung” is not 
something that exists separately apart from all the individuals in the way that the technical mold 
is separate from the individual creations that is shapes.   Bildung is only found in the particular 
individuals who are both formed by, and who continually reform, the “culture” that embraces 
them all.  Bildung, therefore, neither culminates in identically molded individuals, nor is it an 
unchanging, pre-set mold – cultural formation is not a case of “mass production.”60   
Moreover, to be formed in a particular way is a process that takes (a long) time.  The 
educated person (Gebildete, “pepaideumenos”) is slowly “raised up” (educated, cultivated) to a 
higher, deeper, and more “universal” perspective and way of living – which here means that 
one’s initial prejudices are slowly educated via the broadening of one’s horizons.61  To be 
educated is not only to have one’s perspective shaped in a determinate way, but also to be given 
a starting point for encountering the world in ways that may challenge that very education one 
has thus far received.  To be “cultivated,” then, is to be educated into openly and honestly 
encountering, and being encountered by, the other.  For Gadamer, Bildung therefore implies a 
particular responsibility for the universal: one must eventually accept responsibility for one’s 
own, continuing, cultivation as the singular, particular, and universal(ized) human that one now 
                                                
60 To the extent that a group of people behave “exactly the same,” that is not a culture, but rather a cult. 
 
61 To be “raised up” to a wider perspective – that is not primarily “Aufhebung,” but rather the concrete 
education of a paidion (little child).  
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is.62  Cultural formation, education, goes before and beyond any academic schooling or 
institutionalized “education” precisely because of its fundamental basis in an ethical relation to 
the other, as Gadamer notes:  
It is not enough to observe more closely, to study a tradition more thoroughly, if there is 
not already a receptivity to the “otherness” [das Andere] of the work of art or of the past.  
That is what…we emphasized as the general characteristic of Bildung: keeping oneself 
open to what is other – to other, more universal points of view.63   
I will return to this ethical basis, and its connection to the retrieval of phronēsis in the next 
chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that Gadamer’s use of “Allgemein” refers to that which 
is “common” (Gemein) to individuals, and which (re-)forms and is (re-)formed by those 
individuals.  To “rise up” to a universal is said to be a task (Aufgabe) because the “universality” 
of one’s perspective is never a total universality, but always only a limited, and provisional sense 
of the “whole,” just as one is never “totally” educated or cultivated “completely.”  This is why 
Gadamer writes, in the quote just above, that openness to what is other may involve an openness 
a “more” “universal” perspective – i.e., a broadened perspective that is, always only relatively, 
truly universal.  To understand and accept responsibility for one’s continuing education, 
including the fact that one’s understanding is always a partial, limited understanding, means 
accepting that, e.g., I myself and my understanding of things are not the “whole” of the matter.  
This kind of “education,” for Gadamer, 
Embraces a sense of proportion and distance in relation to itself, and hence consists in 
rising above itself to universality…This universality is not a case of a particular being 
                                                
62 Cf. also Gadamer’s late lecture “Education is Self-education,” 529-538. 
 
63 Truth and Method, 16.  And again (16), “to distance oneself from oneself and from one’s private 
purposes means to look at these in the way that others see them.”  
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determined by a universal; nothing is proved conclusively…Thus the cultivated 
consciousness has in fact more the character of a sense [rather than an inflexible 
yardstick]…it is a universal and common sense.64 
Coming back now to the text – as the codification of a fellow human’s words – we can say that, 
for Gadamer, to claim that the text is something “universal” is to say that it is something 
common, which embraces every reader.  That is to say, it is a “task” for the reader to “rise up” to, 
to take responsibility for, and to be receptive to, and to do so in just the same way, and with the 
same responsibility, that is required when one encounters any other element of human “culture.”  
For the words of a text are not primarily scratch marks on a page, which the mind ideally 
“constitutes” into something meaningful, but rather first and foremost they are the words of 
another person handed down by other persons to you and I, the readers, who cannot avoid 
responding to that which embraces us both.65  
This way of using the word “universal” – as the ever-widening horizon – is carried over 
throughout Truth and Method, and can be easily seen in two long quotations that bookend 
Gadamer’s account of the problem of application and his retrieval of phronēsis.  First, just before 
turning to his specific discussion of Anwendung, Gadamer connects that language of universality 
to his account of historical texts: 
                                                
64 Truth and Method, 16.  The English translation of this last sentence is informative here.  The German 
simply states “Es ist ein allgemeiner Sinn.”  Weinsheimer and Marshall have chosen to translate 
„allgemeiner“ as „universal and common,“ which I think is correct inasmuch as it guides the reader to the 
way in which Gadamer seems to generally be using „allgemein” in this context as that which is “held in 
common.” 
 
65 This resonates with Gadamer’s general view of the text as an element of “Tradition” (Überlieferung), 
and, further, with the view put forward in Chapter One of this dissertation where the concept was 
analyzed as a kind of linguistic tradition. 
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Understanding tradition undoubtedly requires an historical horizon, then.  But it is not the 
case that we acquire this horizon by transposing ourselves into an historical situation.  
Rather, we must always already have a horizon in order to be able to transpose ourselves 
into a situation…Transposing ourselves [Sichversetzen] consists neither in the empathy of 
one individual for another nor in subordinating another person to our own standards; 
rather, it always involves rising to a higher universality [die Erhebung zu einer höheren 
Allgemeinheit], that overcomes not only our own particularity, but also that of the 
other…To acquire a horizon [Horizont gewinnen] means that one learns to look beyond 
what is close at hand [das Nahe und Allzunahe] – not in order to look away from it, but to 
see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion.66 
And again, at the conclusion of his retrieval of phronēsis, Gadamer draws attention to the 
difference between his use of universal (as a task for one to approach) versus the sense of a 
universal as something fixed, and wholly pre-determined, which can be “applied” (i.e., “used”) 
for some other, external purpose: 
The interpreter dealing with a tradition tries to apply it to himself.  But this does not 
mean that the traditionary text [der überlieferte Text] is given for him as something 
universal, that he first understands it per se, and then afterward uses it for particular 
applications.  Rather, the interpreter seeks no more than to understand this universal, the 
text – i.e., to understand what the tradition says, what constitutes the text’s meaning and 
significance.  In order to understand that, he must not try to disregard himself and his 
particular hermeneutic situation.  He must relate the text to this situation if he wants to 
understand at all.67 
The text then – its meaning and significance – is “universal” for human persons insofar as 
(1) it is an ongoing task that requires the particular interpreter to “rise up” to it over time, (2) is 
held in common by a multitude of readers across centuries and contexts, and (3) is only 
encountered amongst the particular, situated, finite readers who try to understand the text here 
                                                
66 Truth and Method, 315-316. 
 
67 Truth and Method, 333. I have boldfaced places where Gadamer uses “Überlieferung” and “Text” 
interchangeably and without warning. 
 
228 
 
 
 
and now.68  Put slightly differently, “Allgemein,” for Gadamer, means that the (meaning of the) 
text69 is something “common,” “genera,” and “whole.”  It is (1) “common” or “public” (all-
gemein, koinon) because, put baldly, there simply is no such thing as a private language for 
Gadamer.70  Language, as discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation, is that which 
communicates and mediates understanding, and the text – as a lingual, communicating 
phenomenon – is therefore held in common by an in-principle infinite (i.e., never ending) array 
of speakers and readers.  The text is also (2) “general” in the sense that it is something abstract, 
which only gains its determinate meaning and significance within the very concrete, even 
singular, context of particular interpreters via the hermeneutic act of “application.”  Anwendung 
is not a technical procedure in which one determinate entity is used for another specific purpose.  
Rather, the Gadamer has shown that the text, “before” it is applied (but when is that?), is not 
something determinate at all, but rather is something general or “universal.”  Hermeneutic 
application does not mean that we “use” what we “already understand” for something else.  
Instead, the goal is nothing other than to understand the text here-and-now.  Hermeneutic 
application thus refers to the concretization of something general and abstract in something 
                                                
68  This last point has bearing on one further way in which one could respond to the question of what it 
means to say that the text is a “universal” – namely, by relating it to the question about the existence of 
universals.  That is to ask, to what extent is the universality of the text, for Gadamer, something real, 
ideal, or nominal? 
 
69 Cf. Truth and Method, 333: “The interpreter seeks…to understand this universal, the text – i.e., to 
understand what it says [sagt], what constitutes the text’s meaning and significance [Sinn und 
Bedeutung].” 
 
70 Cf. also P. Christopher Smith, in an introductory footnote to his translation of The Idea of the Good, 
says much the same thing about Gadamer’s use of “Allgemein.”  Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of 
the Good in Platonic Aristotelian Philosophy, xxvi. 
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concrete and determinate.  Doing so is what yields the dialogue in which the text can be 
understood, misunderstood, and understood better and better through continually concretizing the 
general (text) in this here-and-now situation (myself).   
Finally, the text is also (3) a “whole” or a “unity” (Einheit, katholou) in the sense 
corresponding to the (in)famous hermeneutic circle according to which understanding is always 
shuffling back and forth between, on the one hand, a (projected) understanding of one part of the 
text in light of the whole, and on the other hand, a (projected) understanding of the whole of the 
text in light of all its parts.  Working out the unity or a sense for the whole is also a task to be 
undertaken; for, as Gadamer says, quoting Heidegger, the task is “to come into the circle in the 
right way – that is, neither by anachronistically updating [the text] nor by distorting it to fit one’s 
own preconceptions.”71    
It is in these senses named above that Gadamer writes that “understanding is a special 
case of applying something universal [the text] to a particular situation [myself]” – what at first 
sounds like a straightforward sentence, in the end takes on a robust philosophical sense once one 
outlines the nature of hermeneutic application. 72 
 
Transition to Phronēsis: (Self-)Understanding on the Way to (Self-)Understanding 
Throughout this chapter, I have emphasized above all that Anwendung, for Gadamer, means the 
application of the text to the hermeneutic situation of the reader.  Together with this goes the 
                                                
71 Truth and Method, 601. 
 
72 Truth and Method, 322. 
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claim that whoever seeks to understand (a text) cannot help but “put themselves into” the 
meaning that is understood, since one cannot even begin to read the language of a text without 
one’s own conceptual and interpretive “prejudices” (Vor-urteile) playing a role in making the 
language of that text intelligible at all: the text is linked together, coiled up, folded into (plicare 
and ap-plicare) the unique hermeneutic situation of every particular reader.73  The concept of 
application – even if Gadamer has admitted that the word itself can be misleading74 – has thus 
played an important philosophical role in breaking out of the all-too-common presupposition that 
the reader-text relationship can be appropriately understood on the basis of a subject-object 
relation, where those two terms could be separated by an objectifying hermeneutic method.  
This, still common, presupposition works by naively presuming that, via the mastery of a 
particular methodology (or just by “being careful”), one could separate out the “subjective” 
elements in one’s understanding of a text from the “objective” meaning of the text itself.  For 
Gadamer, instead, the reader and the text “belong” (gehören) to one another.  The reader and text 
are always connected by both the subject matter under discussion (Sache), and also by the 
historical tradition (Überlieferung) that “effects” (activates) not only (1) the meaning (Sinn und 
Bedeutung) of the text as it is differently encountered throughout different times and places, but 
also (2) the “consciousness” (Bewußtsein) of the multitude of different readers who engage the 
                                                
73 “In all understanding an application occurs, such that the person who I understanding is himself or 
herself right there in the understood meaning.  He or she belongs to the subject-matter that he or she is 
understanding.” Gadamer in Conversation, 47. 
 
74 “Now I am willing to admit that the concept of Applikation…is artificial and misleading.  But I 
certainly had not anticipated that one could think that, according to it, understanding should be applied to 
something else.  No, I mean that it is to be applied to oneself.” Gadamer in Conversation, 37-38. 
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text.75  Because “application” involves the linking together of text and oneself as reader, the 
understanding that emerges is thus also a kind of “self-understanding” (Sich-selbst-Verstehen): 
“the hermeneutic process involves not only the moments of understanding and interpretation but 
also the moment of application; that is to say, understanding oneself is a part of this process.”76  I 
will return in detail to this matter of “self-understanding” in the next chapter of this dissertation, 
since it is in Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis where this kind of hermeneutic self-understanding 
is more fully explained. 
 There is one further link between the earlier sections of Truth and Method concerned 
with Bildung and the retrieval of phronēsis, which I would like to alert the reader to by way of 
previewing some of what will follow in the next chapter of this dissertation, and in the 
conclusion.   
It may come as no surprise to find that Gadamer was already hinting at the concept of 
application in those earlier sections, since to take responsibility for the “universality” of Bildung 
is to attempt to continually “apply” or “concretize” that universal within the warp and woof of 
human living.77  Renaissance humanism provided a variety of answers to this matter through the 
concepts of tact,78 sensus communis,79 judgment,80  and taste.81  In short, the behavior (in word 
                                                
75 For more on the concept of “belongingness” in Truth and Method, and on the nature of the Sache in 
relation to experience, see Chapter One of this dissertation and the section titled “Experience.” 
 
76 Gadamer in Conversation, 37. And further below (48): “Everyone who understands something 
understands himself or herself in it.  The researcher, too.  Then and today are mediated in the researcher’s 
work – the historical heritage with which he or she is dealing is mediated through his or her own present 
time.” 
 
77 Truth and Method, 14. 
 
78 Truth and Method, 14. 
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and deed) of the “educated person” involved being governed by a capacity for “reasonableness” 
or “sensibleness” (Vernünftigkeit).82  These concepts one and all are truthfully so many ways in 
which the tradition of practical philosophy, whose roots lay in the ancient Greek concept of 
“phronēsis,” was continually revived and “applied” throughout changing historical epochs and 
climates.  What is needed, is a thorough historical investigation into the links between 
Aristotelian practical philosophy, Isocratean rhetoric, their quasi-synthesis in Cicero, and the 
rediscovery and transformation of Cicero – and the traditions that he bears witness to – in the 
Italian Renaissance.  Although I will not take the time to show this with each humanistic concept 
just named, in the next chapter and in the conclusion I will try to highlight a few ways in which 
Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis was simultaneously a retrieval of the concepts of the 
humanistic tradition with which he begins Truth and Method – whether or not Gadamer realized 
just how much resonance there is between those concepts and the phronēsis of Aristotle.  It was 
precisely the long historical preparation of previous chapters that has made it possible to gain 
these insights – for example, by exhuming the old Homeric organ, the “phrēn,” it is possible to 
bring into focus one further consequence of post-Romantic hermeneutics, and its fascination with 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
79 Truth and Method, 18-28. 
 
80 Truth and Method, 18-32. 
 
81 Truth and Method, 32-39. 
 
82 “Vernünftigkeit” – which is used throughout the sections on Bildung in Truth and Method – is one of 
Gadamer’s favored translations of Aristotle’s “phronēsis” along with “praktisches Wissen.”  Cf. 
Gadamer’s translation and commentary of Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics: Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Nikomachische Ethik VI.  As an appendix to this dissertation, I have translated the concluding essay of 
that work, which, written when Gadamer was 98 years old, offers one of the last sustained reflections on 
Aristotelian “phronēsis.” 
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methods and the neutralizing of the “subjectivity” of the interpreter: it was the hermeneutical 
separation of the “head” and the “heart” that made it impossible to appreciate the sense in which 
the 18th century theologian, Friedrich Oetinger claimed that “understanding” a text (e.g., the 
proverbs of Solomon) must take place in the “heart” above all else.  Just as the “winged words” 
of Athena were shot to the center of Odysseus, or as the words of “Homer” have been flying to 
the hearts of readers across millennia, so too Oetinger was able to see the hermeneutical 
relevance of the heart: “More profound than all knowledge of hermeneutical rules is the 
application to oneself: ‘above all apply the rules to yourself and then you will have the key to 
understanding Solomon’s proverbs’.”83   
To this point I have sufficiently outlined the framework within which a hermeneutic 
phronēsis will find its place: the practical task that faces everyone who seeks to understand a 
text, then, is how to concretize the same text in an ever new and different context, and in an ever 
new and different way.  Or, to put the matter in other terms, the problem is how to translate the 
meaning of the text into a language that is understandable today, or, as Gadamer sometimes says, 
how to “dialogue” with the text well.   
                                                
83 Truth and Method, 28.  Gadamer here quotes Oetinger’s 1753 Inquisitio in sensum communem et 
rationem.  On this quotation Gadamer remarks (footnote 47) that “just at this point Oetinger remembers 
Aristotle’s skepticism about having too youthful listeners present during the discussion of moral 
philosophy.  Even this is a sign of how much he is aware of the problem of application.”  What Gadamer 
does not appear to recognize however, is that the problem of “youthfulness” is matter not only of the 
“head” but all the more so of the “heart” – it is a problem of affectivity and emotional well-being that 
obscures one’s sensitivity to the truth of what is being said, just as much as an intellectual 
misunderstanding.  What Gadamer also does not see is that the worry about the “youthfulness” of 
readers/listeners also goes back to Origen and other ancient commentators on the Songs of Solomon.  See 
my discussion of the ancient commentators’ “isagogica” in Chapter Three of this dissertation.  Cf. also 
Gadamer’s article “Oetinger als Philosoph,” 89-100.  I will return to these issues at the conclusion of the 
dissertation. 
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To say that the text is something universal that must be applied to, or concretized in, a 
particular (hermeneutic situation) tells us not only something about what texts are, but also helps 
us to see why the retrieval of phronēsis becomes so necessary.  For if the understanding of a text 
is always already a form of applied knowledge in which a “universal” is concretized in a 
“particular,” then in order to understand exactly how such understanding can be done “well,” 
“correctly,” “excellently,” “rightly,” and so on, a philosophical account of that kind of “applied 
knowledge” will be necessary.84  Put this way, the turn to Book Six of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, wherein several forms of “knowledge in action” are discussed – i.e., not only phronēsis 
but also technē – is a perfectly intelligible philosophical move for Gadamer to make. 
 In what follows I offer an account of the place of phronēsis in Truth and Method and in 
“philosophical hermeneutics” in general, by emphasizing several key features of Gadamer’s 
retrieval, some of which have thus far been underappreciated or even unnoticed, but which we 
are now in a better position to grasp after having outlined the broad historical development of the 
phrēn/phronein word family.
                                                
84 Gadamer does not mean that every understanding of a text is good or correct – that would be to lapse 
into a naïve relativism.  This calls into question whether or not Gadamer thinks that every reader always 
already displays a kind of hermeneutic phronēsis, or whether that hermeneutic virtue is – as with its 
Aristotelian origin – only performed by a limited group of excellent persons.  I will say more about this in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE ETHICAL (RE)TURN OF HERMENEUTICS – PART TWO: GADAMER’S 
RETRIEVAL OF PHRONĒSIS		
“Sources [Quellen] need not become muddied by being used.  There is always fresh water 
pouring out of a source, and it is the same with the true sources of the human spirit that we find 
in tradition.  Studying them is so rewarding precisely because they always have something more 
to yield than has yet been taken from them.”  - Gadamer, Truth and Method 
 
Introduction 
Understanding, then, is something that one does – it is applied knowledge.  Gadamer’s recovery 
of the central problem of “Anwendung” (application, concretization), which I analyzed in the 
previous chapter, has provided us with the philosophical basis for articulating, in this chapter, an 
understanding of hermeneutics as an ethical matter.  If the understanding of a text is always 
already a form of applied knowledge in which a universal is concretized in a particular, then in 
order to understand exactly how such understanding can be done “well,” “correctly,” 
“excellently,” “rightly,” and so on, a philosophical account of that kind of “applied knowledge” 
becomes necessary.  In this chapter, I turn explicitly to Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis in order 
to outline and critically deepen my ethical interpretation of Gadamer’s hermeneutics.  In doing 
so, I once again emphasize the sense of phronēsis as a form of ethical self-understanding - a key, 
but underemphasized sense of phronēsis, which I also began to highlight in the historical 
chapters on the Greek development of the concept.  Building on that work, this chapter shows 
how understanding (Verstehen), in the end, requires persons who can interpret with (self-
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)understanding (Selbst-verständnis) in order to come to an understanding with others 
(Sichverständigen) within a hermeneutic community. 
It is easy for scholars to insufficiently emphasize, or even neglect the extent to which 
hermeneutic phronēsis is an inherently ethical virtue, and not merely a descriptive concept.  In 
ameliorating this issue, I also highlight one of the key differences that separate Gadamer’s 
retrieval from that of Heidegger’s understanding of phronēsis, since the shadow of Heidegger’s 
interpretation has continually loomed large over scholars’ interpretations of Gadamer’s 
work.  By contrast, I argue that even if it was Heidegger who provided Gadamer with the initial 
spark of interest in renewing the relevance of phronēsis for contemporary philosophy, this does 
not mean that Gadamer ever understood phronēsis in a primarily “Heideggerian” manner – 
namely, as an existential structure of Dasein.1  Showing how Gadamer explicitly distances his 
understanding of phronēsis from Heidegger’s, while still remaining indebted to him, will help us 
to appreciate the general sense in which hermeneutic phronēsis is, for Gadamer, an ethical 
virtue.    
In arguing for a strongly ethical sense of Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis, there are a 
series of questions that must be answered.  Each of the following questions structure the main 
sections of this chapter, and will be responded to in turn: (1) what was it that made phronēsis in 
particular so necessary for hermeneutics, as opposed to that other form of “knowledge in action” 
that Aristotle called “technē”?  (2) If hermeneutics is a part of our ethical life, is the opposite 
                                                
1 For a wide survey of the general trend of renewing the contemporary relevance of Aristotelian politics 
and ethics throughout Germany, England, and America in the 20th century, cf. Thomas Gutschker’s 
Aristotelische Diskurse. Aristoteles in der politischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts. 
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also the case; that is to say, is our ethical life – including our reflections on our ethical life – 
inherently hermeneutic?2  (3) When Gadamer claimed that “philosophical hermeneutics” was an 
“heir” to Aristotelian practical philosophy this clearly signaled that Gadamer’s hermeneutics was 
different from the 18th and 19th century conception of the art of interpretation.3  Did this claim 
also signal a new development in the conceptual tradition of phronēsis?     
In the course of responding to these questions, I also broaden my focus beyond the text of 
Truth and Method.  Specifically, I show how Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” in general 
can be understood as a form of “practical philosophy” – a rather striking claim of Gadamer’s, 
which has not been sufficiently clarified.  I argue that the late 20th century development of 
Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” ought to be understood as an important further 
historical development in the long conceptual-tradition of phronēsis, whose Greek development 
this dissertation articulated in previous chapters.  In this way, I draw to a close the line of 
thinking begun in Chapter One, where I argued for a Gadamerian sense of a “concept” (Begriff) 
as a kind of living tradition, which I then concretized (or “applied”) in chapters Two and Three, 
wherein I traced the basic Greek historical development of the tradition of phronēsis from Homer 
to Aristotle.  By the conclusion of this present chapter, it will be clear how this conceptual 
tradition has continued to live via Gadamer’s hermeneutic retrieval.  Gadamer’s words, which I 
quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, can be applied to his own work on phronēsis to describe 
the view of phronēsis as a tradition that I have articulated throughout this dissertation: “Sources 
                                                
2 For a full treatment of this question, cf. P. Christopher Smith, Hermeneutics and Human Finitude: 
Toward a Theory of Ethical Understanding. 
 
3 Cf. Gadamer “Hermeneutics and Social Science,” 316. 
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[Quellen] need not become muddied by being used.”  The concept of phronēsis is ultimately a 
wellspring or source, from which ever new thinkers in ever new contexts can draw.  Although its 
historical origins lay in ancient Greece and Rome, the philosophical life-course of phronēsis has 
been sustained and reinterpreted by an array of thinkers from antiquity and the middle ages to the 
Renaissance, and again from its relative hiddenness in modernity to its relative recovery in the 
20th century through the works of Heidegger, Arendt, MacIntyre, Nussbaum, and many 
others.  Above all, however, it was through Gadamer’s consistent, 80 yearlong engagement with 
the virtue of phronēsis that renewed a contemporary appreciation of the universal need for a 
sensitive, humane, practical wisdom.  That Gadamer was able in the end to appreciate just how 
all-encompassing the virtue of phronēsis was for his philosophy is seen clearly when, for 
example, at the age of 100, he remarked, “you could quite easily object that my whole 
philosophy is nothing but phronēsis – but, of course, it is nothing but phronēsis, and this 
continues to be the case.”4 
Main Lines of Gadamer’s Retrieval of Phronēsis in Truth and Method 
In the following sections I lay out the main lines of Gadamer’s explicit retrieval of phronēsis as 
it is found in Chapter Four of Truth and Method, under the heading “The Hermeneutic Relevance 
of Aristotle”.5  Specifically, four key features of (Gadamerian) phronēsis can be used to 
                                                
4 Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 36. 
 
5 Gadamer, Truth and Method, II.4.2.B. There is some variation amongst scholars on how best to discuss 
these sections of Gadamer’s magnum opus.  For several other good, different ways of handling the topic 
of phronēsis in Truth and Method, see the following works: Enrico Berti, “Gadamer and the Reception of 
Aristotle’s Intellectual Virtues”; Friederike Rese, “Phronesis als Modell der Hermeneutik.  Die 
hermeneutische Aktrualitat des Aristoteles”; Joseph Dunne, “Aristotle after Gadamer: an analysis of the 
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contribute to a positive philosophical account of the ethical character of hermeneutics: (1) 
knowing-how, (2) phronēsis vs. technē, (3) self-understanding, and (4) discipline vs. method in 
the humanities. 
Connecting Phronēsis to Application: Knowing-How (to Apply)? 
The common distinction between “knowing that” (e.g., knowing a fact or piece of 
information) and “knowing how” (e.g., knowing how to be a friend) cannot be maintained once 
the basic hermeneutical insight into the practical character of understanding is recognized.  At 
least in the case of texts, all “knowing” is, in the end, made possible by a fundamental praxis.6 
What then is this type of hermeneutic knowing, which only is what it is via praxis, and, 
moreover, which necessarily always appears (relatively) different given the (relative) difference 
of every situation?  To ask the question another way, what sort of knowing is hermeneutic?  Who 
“knows how” to apply or concretize the text?  These questions lie behind Gadamer’s retrieval of 
phronēsis in Truth and Method:  
If the heart of the hermeneutic problem is that one and the same tradition must time and 
again be understood in a different way, the problem, logically speaking, concerns the 
relationship between the universal and the particular.  Understanding, then, is a special 
case of applying something universal to a particular situation.  This makes Aristotelian 
ethics especially important for us.7  
                                                                                                                                                       
distinction between the concepts of phronēsis and technē”; Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 
187-192; and James Risser, Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other, 101-110. 
 
 
6 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Knowing How” partly tries to distinguish knowing 
“how” and “that” on the basis of the Greek terms epistēmē and technē.  It is revealing that no mention of 
phronēsis is made, and that the main concern is whether “knowing how” could be reduced to “knowing 
that,” when hermeneutically, if anything, the opposite is the case (i.e., “knowing that” is a kind of 
“knowing how”). 
 
7 Truth and Method, 322. 
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Gadamer recognizes that this turn to Aristotle will not necessarily be an obvious one for the 
reader insofar as “it is true that Aristotle is not concerned with the hermeneutical problem and 
certainly not with its historical dimension, but with the right estimation of the role that reason 
has to play in ethical action [sittliches Handeln].”8  However, Aristotle’s concern, expressed in 
this way, nevertheless does get to the core of the problem that Gadamer has shown confronts 
hermeneutics as well: for the “knowledge” that is achieved in the hermeneutic process is not 
separate from the actions, the agent, or the situations in which that knowledge occurs.  Gadamer 
expresses this by noting that “what interests us here is precisely that he [i.e., Aristotle] is 
concerned with reason [Vernunft] and with [a kind of] knowledge [Wissen], not detached from a 
being that is becoming [einem gewordenen Sein], but determined by it and determinative of it.”9  
For Gadamer, Aristotle too found need to describe a form of knowledge that is inexorably linked 
to the concrete actions of agents in unique circumstances. 
In Chapter Three I showed how, for Aristotle, knowing how to act well, and knowing 
what (a) virtue is, is not something separable from its praxis.  I learn, for example, how to be a 
friend by acting in “friendly” ways over time - and this deepens or changes my understanding of 
what “friendship” means, and of how to be “a friend” in the future.  The knowledge is both 
(partly) constitutive of its praxis, as well as (partly) constituted by its praxis.10  This knowing is 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
8 Truth and Method, 322. 
 
9 Truth and Method, 322. 
 
10 I say “partly” here since philosophical reflection about praxis (e.g., by reading the Nicomachean 
Ethics) also “partly” re-shapes, albeit indirectly, our praxis – namely, by clarifying the nature of our aims.  
The matter is different with philosophical hermeneutics.  For reflection about one’s hermeneutic praxis in 
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necessarily of a dynamic and changing sort, since the one who is acting, and the situations in 
which one “shows” what one knows, are likewise dynamic and changing.  One does not first 
become an ethical agent, and only then act.  Rather, the human agent is, as Gadamer says, “a 
being that is [is still] becoming.”11  Given this determining role of praxis (admittedly which for 
Aristotle is itself informed by “habit,” desire, and ethos), it would be an exaggeration to simply 
equate virtue with a discrete body of knowledge, as Aristotle claims Socrates did.  The one who 
displays true virtue is not altogether without knowledge, but the knowledge is a form that is tied 
to praxis and to desire, and so Aristotle calls it not epistēmē, but phronēsis, humane wisdom – a 
word whose relation to human desire and affectivity had been clear since Homer. 
The knowledge involved in the matter of hermeneutics is the same.  It would be an 
exaggeration to reduce “knowing how” to interpret (e.g., a text) to some discrete body of abstract 
knowledge (e.g., of hermeneutic methods, or of historical or cultural knowledge about the text).  
Rather, such ‘abstract’ knowledge is in fact both (1) constitutive of my interpretive praxis, as 
well as (2) constituted by my interpretive praxis.  The interpreter, Gadamer claims, is not 
altogether without some form of knowledge, but it will be a kind of phronēsis, and not the 
scientific (wissenschaftliche) mode of epistēmē.  What Gadamer says about Aristotelian moral 
knowledge holds equally true for hermeneutic understanding: “moral knowledge, as Aristotle 
                                                                                                                                                       
order to clarify its nature (e.g., by reading Truth and Method) is still fully a hermeneutic praxis.  
Gadamer’s Truth and Method is simultaneously a theoretical description of, as well as concrete example 
of, hermeneutic praxis.  In other words, does Gadamer actually practice what he preaches? For another 
response to this question, see David Vessey, “Gadamer’s Interpretive Practice” (online): 
http://www.davevessey.com/Gadamer_interpretive_Practice.pdf.  
 
11 It is with this in mind that we could re-engage the classic quasi-paradoxical statement of Aristotle: “for 
things that we must learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them.”  NE II.1. 
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describes it, is clearly not objective knowledge [gegenständliches Wissen] – i.e., the knower is 
not standing over against a situation that he merely observes; he is immediately confronted with 
what he sees [or reads].  It is something that he has to do.  Obviously this is not what we mean by 
knowing in the realm of science.”12 
At this point, Gadamer raises an important issue, however.  For to show that hermeneutic 
knowing cannot be understood as a kind of science, does not immediately entail that it is a form 
of practical wisdom.  For there is also the mode of technical know-how called technē, which is 
also an applied knowledge tied to a human agent who must “do” something in a concrete 
situation.  Arguing positively for a hermeneutic phronēsis, then, also requires disentangling 
phronēsis from technē.   
Why Phronēsis and not Technē?13 
Recognizing the task of application entails that hermeneutic knowledge cannot be 
understood or modeled on the basis of an objective methodology in pursuit of scientific 
knowledge or “episteme.” Rejecting that mode of knowing, however, leads to the more nuanced 
question of whether hermeneutic understanding is closer to technē or to phronēsis.14  For 
Aristotle’s concept of technē also refers to a capacity for concretizing or applying something 
                                                
12 Truth and Method, 324. 
 
13 For the following subsection, I have relied on Friederike Rese, “Phronēsis als Modell der Hermeneutik. 
Die hermeneutische Aktualität des Aristoteles (GW 1, 312-329),” 127-149.  
 
14 Thus the section of Truth and Method titled “The hermeneutic relevance of Aristotle” relies on 
Aristotle’s account of the different types of knowledge in Book Six of his Nicomachean Ethics.  It would 
be a mistake, however, to think that Gadamer is simply trying to force “hermeneutic knowledge” into one 
of Aristotle’s types.  The point is rather that, by trying to characterize the true nature of hermeneutic 
knowledge, Gadamer is led to search for other words than “wissenschaftlich” and “objektiv.” 
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general within a particular situation where some action must be taken (e.g., concretizing “house” 
through its actual production).  This also means that technē requires that agents not abstract their 
knowledge of the general (the universal, “house”) from the situation in which they are trying to 
produce something (including also the status of the possibly recalcitrant materials).  In the 
preceding chapter, I discussed the nature of this hermeneutic process as one in which something 
general (e.g., a text) must be concretized in (or “applied to”) something singular (e.g., my given 
hermeneutic situation in which I am reading) in order for my understanding to occur.  However, 
if this were the full extent of Gadamer’s account of the hermeneutic process, then we might 
wonder why he does not turn to “technē” instead of “phronēsis” in order to show how 
hermeneutic knowledge is not “distinct from ‘pure’ knowledge detached from any particular 
kind of being.”15  Could we not simply describe the hermeneutic process in terms of the technical 
production of an interpretation – is not “producing” an interpretation exactly what the interpreter 
does?  In what sense is it correct to say that the hermeneutic task (Aufgabe) is more an ethical 
praxis than a technical poiēsis?   
 It should be noted at the outset that Gadamer does not utterly reject the possibility that 
“technē” could serve as a (limited) conceptual model or exemplar for hermeneutics.16  However, 
Gadamer’s argument proceeds by way of highlighting the differences between the concepts of 
                                                
15 Truth and Method, 324, italics in text.  The point is that both technē and phronēsis share a common 
differentiation from epistēmē insofar as both are forms of “knowledge in action” and not abstract forms of 
knowing. 
 
16 For example, “hermeneutical consciousness is involved neither with technical nor with moral 
knowledge, but these two types of knowledge still include the same task of application that we have 
recognized as the central problem of hermeneutics.”  Truth and Method, 325f.  Or again, “there is, no 
doubt, a real analogy between the fully developed moral consciousness and the capacity to make 
something – i.e., a technē – but they are certainly not the same.” Truth and Method, 326.   
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technē and phronēsis (poiēsis and praxis) in order to argue for the centrality of phronēsis for the 
hermeneutic task.17  The main differences that Gadamer emphasizes between technē and 
phronēsis concern (1) the relationship between one’s prior knowledge and the present situation 
of action, (2) the relationship between means and end, and (3) the relationship to experience, 
oneself, and self-understanding.  I will first focus on the first two features, saving the third for a 
more thorough discussing in the next section below. 
Prior Knowledge vs. Present Action 
Both technē and phronēsis involve the application of prior knowledge to some present 
task.  In the case of technē, the craftsman undertakes his or her productive activity by making use 
of a prior knowledge in the form of a set of techniques or skills, and a blueprint or 
methodological plan of implementation.  In the case of phronēsis, however, the prior knowledge 
involves an array of customs, habits, education, and experience, as well as general guidelines and 
exemplary images.  Although both technē and phronēsis are modes of knowing that are oriented 
toward action, the prior knowledge that helps to determine the agent’s action are of very different 
types: although it is true that the craftsman may have to modify the prior knowledge, for 
example, by changing part of a blueprint or a plan for building a guitar in this particular 
situation, the alteration comes in the face of recalcitrant material, limiting material conditions, 
                                                
17 Joseph Dunne, in an excellent article, has seen this as well: “Technē and phronēsis are akin in that they 
both have as their field the variable ‘what can be otherwise’…and, moreover, both are concerned not 
simply with knowledge but rather with a knowledge that can inform practical activity.  Despite, or rather 
because of this closeness, however, it is precisely by spelling out, a good deal more explicitly than 
Aristotle himself, the full implications of its distinctness from technē that Gadamer elucidates the nature 
of phronēsis.”  Cf. Joseph Dunne, “Aristotle after Gadamer: an analysis of the distinction between the 
concepts of phronēsis and technē,” 106.  
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broken tools, and so on.  The prior completely determines the craftsman’s actions except insofar 
as some unexpected problem is encountered in the present situation.  This is why craft-labor can 
be delivered over to machines for the mass production of the same product (e.g., mass produced 
guitars or chairs), and why the human component often amounts merely to checking to make 
sure there is not a defect in one of the multitudinous creations.    However, in the case of 
phronēsis, the prior knowledge cannot be “completely determining” of the agent’s action, 
regardless of whether or not there are “recalcitrant materials” or unexpected, limiting conditions.  
For example, although I bring some prior knowledge of “friendship” to every new situation of 
action in which I must be a friend to someone, I cannot let that prior knowledge completely 
determine what I consider to be the required behavior.  Each new present situation in which I 
must act as a friend to someone may involve me learning something entirely new about what 
“friendship” is, and so thus substantially revise, or even negate, what I thought I already knew.  
Put differently, no machine-like behavior can take over the moral task that confronts each 
singular human person, just as there can be no “mass production” of friendship or eudaimonia.  
This is precisely because the type of prior knowledge that is at issue – custom, education, habit, 
and so on – must itself constantly be reformed (sometimes dramatically so) in light of the present 
moral situation.  To let one’s prior knowledge wholly, dogmatically dictate how one will act in 
the present is an ethical failure, not a success, since it necessarily forecloses on the possibility 
that ethical growth, via recognition that one has been wrong, could occur.  If one always already 
knows exactly what to do in every moral situation, one can never be wrong – but what human in 
fact has such knowledge?  The prior knowledge involved in moral action is at its best when it is 
housed within a spirit of humility and openness to the new. 
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 These issues are the same in the case of hermeneutics.  Gadamer more than most has 
emphasized the important role of “prior knowledge” in the task of interpretation of texts (e.g., 
Vor-urteile, pre-judgements): the hermeneutic agent – i.e., the one who faces the practical task of 
interpretation – already “knows” much that will inform her or his hermeneutic behavior, for, as I 
argued in Chapter One of this dissertation, no one reads a text without always already 
participating in a particular historical and linguistic tradition, which pre-forms their interpretative 
orientation.  Whoever begins to read already participates in a conversation that was started long 
ago, and will continue long after one has “understood.”  Furthermore, the source(s) of the prior 
knowledge involved in hermeneutics is of the same type as it was in the case of moral behavior – 
i.e., tradition, education, custom, habit, exemplars, experience, and so on.18  Although the 
hermeneutic agent may possess some skills or techniques – perhaps even a full blown 
hermeneutic methodology such as Emilio Betti outlined in his confrontation with Gadamer – 
these skills or techniques can never be wholly determinative for one’s reading a particular text.  
Instead, the prior knowledge of the hermeneut must – and really will be – constantly reformed 
and changed in light of the present situation, just as prior knowledge about “friendship” will be 
reformed in light of present moral situations.19  There is no way to mass produce the “same” 
interpretation of a text, just as one cannot mass produce the same right behavior, for the agents 
                                                
18 Is what Aristotle calls “ethos” what Gadamer calls “tradition”?  I will take up this question in the 
conclusion of the dissertation where I explore the place of hermeneutic character virtues.  What is the 
equivalent in hermeneutics of “ēthos”?  How does one “lengthen the vowel” of tradition? 
 
19 Here I refer the reader back to my discussion of Bildung in the previous chapter for an example.  The 
prior knowledge that we receive by way of “cultural formation” or “education” certainly plays a role in 
our hermeneutic life just as much as in our moral one, and in both cases we are responsible for the 
continual re-formation of that prior cultural formation in order to be good hermeneuts and moral actors. 
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involved will be different, the hermeneutic situations will be different, and the unfolding of time 
and history will change the meaning of our interpretive concepts. 
 In the realm of craft production, one first “learns” how to do something, or first 
“knows” what one wishes to construct, and only then (i.e., later in time) “applies” one’s 
knowledge in a particular situation.  “Knowledge” here is like a readymade tool that can be used 
or not used for some other, predetermined purpose.  As I discussed in the preceding chapter, one 
does not first understand a text, and then, later, “apply” that knowledge to a hermeneutic 
situation.  For understanding the text itself requires that it be concretized in a particular 
hermeneutic situation.  This is why some readers (e.g., of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit) have 
the frustrating feeling that they would be able to make sense of a part of the text if they could 
only first already understand the text as a whole.  One does not first learn how to interpret, and 
only then, later, choose to use or not use that skill.  Just as one cannot choose to “opt out” of 
moral life, or refuse to “make use” of one’s practical knowledge, so too one cannot help but to 
interpret, to understand.  Understanding, like moral action, will occur (for good or ill) whether 
we want it to or not – which is manifestly not the case for any technē.  There is no “forgetting” to 
interpret, just as we cannot “forget” to act. 
Means vs. Ends 
The second difference that Gadamer highlights between technē and phronēsis, and their 
respective relevance to hermeneutics, concerns the relationship between means and end.  
Although both technē and phronēsis are practically oriented toward some end for which they 
must make use of correct means, there are nevertheless key differences in how each mode of 
knowing approaches the relation between means and end.  First, as is the case in the “prior 
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knowledge” of technē, so too its end is a determinate end: if one wishes to build a guitar, that is 
already a highly specific object, which immediately determines much of what must be done in 
order achieve that end.  The craftsman has not only a highly detailed blueprint or procedure for 
producing some object (perhaps modifying it in light of available materials), but also a highly 
specific set of skills for manufacturing the object. The means to the end may have to be modified 
in light of some unexpected problem, but in general the means, and certainly not the end, 
undergo no process of reformation when the process of production goes smoothly. 
 In the case of the wisdom of practical life or, we will see below, in the case of 
hermeneutic understanding, the relationship of means to end is drastically different than it is in 
the case of technē.  The end involved in the case of phronēsis, as I discussed in Chapter Three, is 
of a general, indeterminate kind – i.e., “the good life as a whole” (to eu zēn to holōs), or “acting 
well” (eupraxia), or “happiness” (eudaimonia).  Aristotle himself occasionally reminds his 
reader how indeterminate these ends in fact are, and how profoundly they require “specification 
through living” if they are to be realized.  “Acting rightly” is not something that can be specified 
or concretized outside of a particular situation.  This indeterminacy (or generality) entails also 
that “the means” (or mediating actions) to achieving the end cannot be pre-determined outside of 
the context of action as well.  Deliberating anew in each situation about the means is required in 
order to concretize, in my own life, the ultimate end of living well as a whole.  Gadamer has this 
issue in view when he writes, “the relation between means and ends here [i.e., in phronēsis] is 
not such that one can know the right means in advance, and that is because the right end is not a 
mere object of knowledge either.  There can be no anterior certainty concerning what the good 
life is directed toward as a whole.  Hence Aristotle’s definitions of phronēsis have a marked 
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uncertainty (Schwanken) about them, in that this knowledge is sometimes related more to the 
end, and sometimes more to the means to the end.” 
 For hermeneutics, too, the relationship of means and end is the same as it is for 
phronēsis.  The hermeneut is oriented toward the end of “right understanding” but that end 
remains indeterminate and abstract independent of the specific, concrete situation in which a 
particular text is interpreted.  Likewise, the “means” that are involved in interpretation do not 
rise to the level of a methodological procedure that one simply needs to follow in order to 
achieve the end of understanding the meaning of the text.  Hermeneutics, the art of interpretation, 
is no “art” (Kunstlehre) after all.20  Each new encounter with a text – even, or especially, when it 
is a text one has read often – requires deliberating once again about what the text says here-and-
now.  Knowledge of hermeneutic means – e.g., hermeneutic rules, guidelines, and strategies – is 
no guarantor for right understanding.  What is always required is the virtue of sensitivity and 
good judgment for knowing how to handle such strategies or guidelines, and for knowing when 
they are a hindrance to interpreting the text.  Put differently, whereas the aim of techne is the 
production of an end external to the doer and the doing (i.e., the doing, poiēsis, is itself a 
“means” to the end product), the aims of moral action and the understanding of a text are not 
anything set apart from acting well or interpreting well.   
 The issues discussed in this section have brought us closer to a full appreciation of why 
Gadamer turns to phronēsis for explaining the heart of hermeneutic wisdom.  However, in order 
                                                
20 Here I echo James Risser – note his use of moral language: “Hermeneutics is not a Kunstlehre, a 
doctrine for a technique, but a practice requiring moral wisdom, engagement, and practical application in 
relation to oneself.”  James Risser, Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other, 110. 
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to complete the analysis, we need to turn explicitly to the matter of the relationship of 
hermeneutic knowledge (and moral knowledge) to oneself – myself as interpreter or moral agent.  
For the aim of moral action and hermeneutic understanding have essential ties to myself as 
(moral or interpreting) agent – I myself want to become someone who lives well or who 
interprets well.  We will see below how this leads to the sense of phronēsis as a kind of self-
understanding.21  In previous chapters I have hinted at this aspect, but only when we understand 
how hermeneutics – like phronēsis – is always a kind of self-understanding can we appreciate 
the full depth of Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis in Truth and Method. 
Self-Understanding and Experience: Phronēsis as Mindfulness 
One of the more important insights recovered in my earlier chapters on the historical 
development of phronēsis, concerns the relationship of phronēsis to the ancient dictum, “Know 
Thyself,” and to self-understanding more generally.22  As conscientious self-understanding – 
mindfulness – phronēsis is a mode of wisdom that is (1) inextricably tied to particular, singular 
ethical sites of action and deliberation, as well as (2) inextricably tied to some form of awareness 
(of oneself) as an ethical agent who must (herself or himself) take action.  Deliberating about 
what I myself should do about this-here-and-now, singular situation, requires that I keep in view 
the nature of the situation and the other persons or issues involved just as much as myself.23  
                                                
21 Cf. also the insightful article by Jerome Veith, “Concerned with Oneself as One Person: Self-
Knowledge in Phronēsis,” 17-27. 
 
22 In particular, I refer the reader back to the section on Heraclitus in Chapter Two (beginning on page 
37), and to the discussion of Aristotle throughout the second half of Chapter Three.  
 
23 I take it that this does not necessarily require that I – self-consciously – think about myself, though 
sometimes that may be required.  What is required, however, is a working sense of oneself. 
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Translating “phronēsis” as “mindfulness” helps to capture these aspects.  The word “mindful,” 
although it can be used to refer to a kind of meditation, still maintains its practical, ethical 
orientation, which can be heard in English when, for example, parents tell their children to “be 
mindful of me” or “be mindful of where you are.”  This means that I am in some way aware of 
(1) my own tendencies, character, predilections, and so on, as well as (2) the ethically relevant 
features of the situation I find myself in.  In any case, however I respond to the situation (the 
words I speak, the actions I undertake) will reveal something of how I understand myself and 
who I myself am, ethically: my own actions affect myself just as much as they affect others.24  
The wisdom – i.e., the mindfulness, the phronēsis – that therefore inheres in your or my own 
“responding well” to ethical situations contains a relationship to ourselves that is unlike any 
other type of knowing – it is an “allo genos gnōseōs.”25   
 In order to further explain why it is phronēsis and not technē that provides the real key 
to the hermeneutic performance (Vollzug), Gadamer leans heavily on this sense of self-
understanding.  Once again, this requires that Gadamer articulate some difference between the 
self-understanding of phronēsis, and that of technē: for there is indeed a kind of self-
understanding involved in technē.  “A person who knows how to make (herzustellen) 
something,” Gadamer writes, “knows something good, and he knows it ‘for himself’ (für sich), 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
24 Without this insight, Socrates would not have been able to argue that unjust actions harm the doer just 
as much, or even more than, the one who has received injustice. 
 
25 In speaking about self-understanding in relation to phronēsis in Truth and Method, Gadamer cites the 
following passages from Aristotle in a footnote: NE VI.8 1141b33, 1142a30; EE VIII.2 1246b36.  See 
also Gadamer’s article “Praktisches Wissen” in volume 5 of his Gesammelte Werke. 
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so that, where there is the possibility of doing so, he is really able to make it.”26 A person who 
knows how to bake bread or build a guitar also has a kind of knowing that has come rest in their 
soul, as it were – he or she is him- or herself a bread baker, or a guitar maker.  However, there 
are important differences between the self-understanding involved in phronēsis, and that 
involved in technē.  The differences emerge clearly when we look at how phronēsis and technē 
relate to experience and teaching. 
 Gadamer writes that “it is pointless to distinguish here [i.e., in the case of phronēsis] 
between knowledge (Wissen) and experience (Erfahrung), as can be done in the case of 
technē.”27  Gadamer’s ensuing discussion here helps us to understand why Aristotle says that 
virtue (whether phronēsis or character virtue) cannot be taught like a body of knowledge, but can 
only be cultivated over time through experience (empeiria).28  The self-understanding that is 
involved in technē, by contrast, means that the craftsman is capable of passing on that knowledge 
to others, despite the fact that there too experience is required: one can go to school to learn 
woodworking, but that training will be modified and concretized only through its application or 
use in experience.  In the case of our ethical lives, however, there is no formal training that could 
be applied later – one is always already learning from, and applying experience.  This is why 
Aristotle tells his students that his course in ethics is incapable of making them good and happy, 
but rather provides philosophical reflections about what they are (or should be) already doing – 
                                                
26 Truth and Method, 327. 
27 Truth and Method, 332. 
 
28 It is quite curious that in the scale of intelligences which Aristotle lays out at the beginning of his 
Metaphysics (viz., which moves from memory and sense perception, to experience, to art, to science, and 
finally to sophia), phronēsis is nowhere mentioned.     
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even at its most exhortative, it is “practical philosophy” that is taught in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
and not phronēsis as such.29   
 How then does this distinction between the self-understanding of phronēsis and that of 
technē relate to hermeneutics?  At the end of the previous chapter, I noted how the task of 
hermeneutic application entails that the interpreter display some form of self-understanding, 
since in order for the text to be understood at all, it must be “applied” to oneself and one’s own 
hermeneutic situation.30 Or, said conversely, I must “apply myself” and my situation to the text 
in order to enact an interpretive dialogue with the text. This concretized “belongingness” 
(gehörigkeit) or “bond” that underlies the reader-text relationship entails that hermeneutic 
understanding involves also a kind of self-understanding.  The hermeneutic dialogue that 
characterizes all understanding is, Gadamer writes, like Aristotle’s elaboration of phronēsis itself 
as a kind of understanding (synēsis, Verständnis) and deliberation (euboulia, “Beratschlagung 
mit sich selber”).31  In the case of synēsis, where one must listen sympathetically in order “to be 
understanding” (whether or not one is going to give explicit advice), one must display the ability 
to put oneself in the other’s shoes – which requires that one keeps oneself in view as well, in 
order to take stock of the relevant differences between oneself and the other. How often, by 
contrast, does it happen that the advice we give to another person actually applies more to 
                                                
29 I will return to this distinction below for where I discuss the relationship between “(hermeneutic) 
phronēsis” and “philosophical hermeneutics” in order to explain why Gadamer claims that philosophical 
hermeneutics is an heir to “practical philosophy.” 
 
30 See especially Chapter Four, 33ff. 
 
31 Truth and Method, 332ff. 
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ourselves than to the other?  It requires a great deal of self-understanding, and a disciplined 
capacity for listening, in order to be a person truly capable of being understanding for another.32   
This kind of understanding at work in phronēsis (qua synēsis) is exactly what is required 
in the performance of the hermeneutic task assigned to every interpreter: “once again we 
discover that the person who is understanding does not know and judge as one who stands apart 
and unaffected but rather he thinks along with (mitdenkt) the other from the perspective of a 
specific bond of belonging, which binds him to the other (die ihn mit dem anderen verbindet), as 
if he too were affected [by what affects the other]."33  Even the academic distance of the scholar, 
or the academic exchanges between scholars, rests on a prior bond of belongingness in which the 
voice of the text can be heard and responded to with practically wise insight (gnome, Einsicht) 
and sympathetic understanding (syngnōmē, Nachsicht).34   
In order to explain more clearly exactly how phronēsis lies at the center of the 
hermeneutic act of interpretation, and, furthermore, how keeping the concept of phronēsis in 
view allows us to understand Gadamer’s own philosophical hermeneutics better, the next section 
raises, and offers a solution to, a small interpretive issue within Truth and Method.  The very last 
lines of Truth and Method have often struck readers as puzzling, but bringing the concept of 
                                                
32 I will say more about this discipline of listening in the next section below.   
 
33 Truth and Method, 332-333.  Translation modified. 
 
34 This does not mean “agreement” per se.  Displaying practical wisdom in my interpretation of texts also 
“involves recognizing that I myself must accept some things that are against me, even though no else 
forces me to do so.”  Truth and Method, 369.  Cf. also Gadamer’s claims about the “normative” 
dimension of secondary works of scholarship at Truth and Method, 161-163. 
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phronēsis to bear on these a clearly ethical line of thought emerges:  displaying phronēsis in 
one’s hermeneutic praxis is the discipline that outstrips every method. 
Discipline and Method: A Note on the Last Lines of Truth and Method 
The last sentence of Truth and Method states, “What the tool of method does not achieve 
must – and really can – be achieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring, a discipline that 
guarantees truth.”35  There is much to be puzzled by in this claim, but here I want to show how it 
can be understood in light of Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis, as well as, conversely, how the 
notion of a “discipline of questioning and inquiring” helps us to better understand the relevance 
of phronēsis for the humanities (or the “Geisteswissenschaften”). 
The title “Truth and Method” has proved to be a curiosity to scholars over the years since 
its publication in 1960.36  Some have viewed the title in oppositional terms – truth “vs” (or 
“against”) method – while others have viewed it more as a kind of didactic exaggeration meant 
to remind the reader that truth is a much bigger event than what methodologies can uncover.37  
                                                
35 Truth and Method, 506. 
 
36 “Truth and Method” was in fact Gadamer’s 3rd choice for a title.  The current subtitle “foundations of a 
philosophical hermeneutics” was in fact the original title Gadamer proposed to Siebeck.  It was rejected 
for fear that it was too long and cumbersome, and that the book wouldn’t sell well.  The second 
suggestion, “Geschehen und Verstehen” (Event and Understanding), was too similar to the recently 
published (also by Siebeck) “Glauben und Verstehen” (Faith and Understanding).  Gadamer finally 
settled on the title “Wahrheit und Methode” (Truth and Method), apparently somewhat in homage to 
Goethe’s “Dichtung und Wahrheit” (Poetry and Truth).  After all that the book still did not sell well at all 
during its first few years.  By 1965 the book sold only 29 copies.  At the end of 1966 1,264 copies were 
sold.  Habermas may have Gadamer to thank for helping him in his early academic career, but Gadamer 
also has Habermas’ engagement with Truth and Method to thank for its increase in popularity at the end 
of the 60’s.  Cf. Jean Grondin, Gadamer. A Biography, 459 n. 8.  For Grondin’s account of the selection 
of a title, see 281-282. 
 
37 Concerning the title, I echo what James Risser writes in the introduction to his Hermeneutics and the 
Voice of the Other, 5.  
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Perhaps we could also suggest another alternative title for the book, which brings into sharper 
focus the ethical dimension of Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis as the crowning virtue of 
hermeneutics: “Discipline and Method.”  Gadamer’s specific rejection of the scientific method as 
an illegitimate model for the Geisteswissenschaften to follow does not entail that Gadamer’s 
approach to hermeneutics is altogether undisciplined.  Not only truth, but also “discipline” 
encompasses more than what method permits.  Methodologically dominating an object that one 
observes in order to know it, is only one way of approaching phenomena.   
 Listening – and therefore also responding appropriately – is not a “method” one uses or 
“applies” to objects in order to test them.  Rather, listening and responding are ethical disciplines 
that must be cultivated if one is to learn how to perform them well, and which entail self-
transformation and self-understanding.  One must become a “good listener” or conversation 
partner in order to understand the meaning of another’s words.  Put differently, one must become 
a “disciplined” person, capable of being appropriately responsive to what is being said (whether 
said by a text or another person).38  By contrast, the person whose attention is prone to wander 
whenever another is speaking (or when the meaning of a text is not immediately clear) shows 
themselves to be an undisciplined listener.  Their subsequent responses, then, are prone to being 
inadequate inasmuch as they do not truly (cor-)respond to the heart of what the other (or the text) 
is saying.  Knowing how to listen well, and how to respond well, requires not only that one is 
attentive to the other (or to the text) – to what they are (or the text is) saying, and to the context 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
38 In Chapter Three I emphasized the influence of Isocrates’ rhetorical “phronēsis” on Aristotle, and tried 
to highlight that “practical wisdom,” for the ancient Greek and Romans was just as much a matter of 
listening and speaking well as it was of acting well – that is to say, it concerned both logos and ergon. 
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in which they are (or the text is) speaking – but also that one is attentive to oneself and one’s 
own tendencies and proclivities that partially condition one’s own receptiveness and 
responsiveness to the words of the other.  The discipline of listening is not separable from the 
Delphic command to “know thyself” in the sense of “sō-phrosunē.”  In hermeneutics too there 
are disciplines that “save” or “preserve” phronēsis, so that one is able “to be always listening 
[listening better; listening more]” (immer hörender zu werden).39 
Bringing this sense of “discipline” qua responsible receptivity and responsiveness into 
the Geisteswissenschaften reveals a further ethical element of Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis.  
One does not master a body of work called “philosophy,” “history,” “French literature,” “law,” 
“theology,” etc.  Rather, they are first and foremost disciplines that one “applies oneself” to.  The 
expert here is not the one who knows everything, or who knows more than all the others, but 
rather the one who has become a master by having been mastered by or disciplined by the 
discipline itself.  In short, the master of a discipline is the one who is sufficiently capable of 
listening to and responding to what is said in the texts and dialogues of that discipline.  The 
“discipline” requires self-transformation and self-understanding so that one can take 
responsibility for the future of a particular academic discipline – that is, its future 
transformations and critique.   
It is no accident that certain disciplines are called the “humanities,” those “moral 
sciences,” as John Stuart Mill called them.  They can be so-called because we humans who 
would study them are ourselves, in part, at stake in them.  For Gadamer this means that in 
                                                
39 Gadamer, “Text und Interpretation,” 164. 
 
258 
 
 
 
understanding the text “the knower’s own being comes into play.”40  Consequently, as Gadamer 
writes, 
The human sciences stand closer to moral knowledge than to […] “theoretical” 
knowledge.  They are “moral sciences.”  Their object is man and what he knows of 
himself.  But he knows himself as an acting being, and this kind of knowledge of himself 
does not seek to establish what is.  An active being, rather, is concerned with what is not 
always the same but can also be different.  In it he can discover the point at which he has 
to act.  The purpose of his knowledge is to govern his action.41 
Returning now to the last lines of Truth and Method, it is possible to offer a plausible 
interpretation based on the preceding discussion of phronēsis and discipline: “what the tool of 
method does not achieve must – and really can – be achieved by a discipline of questioning and 
inquiring, a discipline that guarantees truth.”42  Without discussing the way in which Gadamer is 
using “guarantee” here, it is worth keeping in mind his juxtaposition of discipline and method, as 
I have done here, and paying careful attention to the ethical tone in which Gadamer refers to 
“discipline” as the name for some importance features of hermeneutic phronēsis, such as the 
capacity for a rigorous listening and corresponding response to what is said.  We find 
confirmation for this reading of the last lines form a letter to Richard J. Bernstein, wherein 
Gadamer himself was explicit in a comment about this last sentence: “here I mean discipline in 
the moral sense of the word.”43  Gadamer’s is relentless in his careful attention to the 
involvement of the reader in the text that they are interpreting, and so also to the ethical 
                                                
40 Truth and Method, 506.  This was discussed in Chapter One and again in the previous chapter on 
application. 
 
41 Truth and Method, 325. 
 
42 Truth and Method, 506. 
 
43 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 263. 
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responsibilities that follow from this –i.e., in the form of cultivating a wise, disciplined 
hermeneutic ability; or, in other words, phronēsis.   
Phronēsis as Hermeneutic Virtue: Gadamer after Heidegger, Ethics before Ontology 
In order to emphasize that Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis was an intensely ethical one, it will 
be worth clarifying how Gadamer’s work differs from (the early) Heidegger’s work in this 
regard.44  Gadamer’s inquiry into the hermeneutical relevance of phronēsis maintained the 
essential connection of phronēsis to ethics, as I have been arguing in the last two chapters.  This 
connection, however, runs counter to the tendency of Heidegger’s early lecture courses in which 
Gadamer participated as a student, and from which Gadamer drew great inspiration.  As I will 
discuss further below, Heidegger’s early lectures on Aristotle tended to systematically strip any 
determinate ethical sense from Aristotle’s practical philosophy.45  And yet, those courses were 
not without significant impact on Gadamer’s thinking – as evidenced, for example, by the 
influence of Heidegger’s early lectures on Aristotle on Gadamer’s phenomenological-
hermeneutical understanding of “basic concepts” (Grundbegriffe), “conceptuality” 
(Begrifflichkeit), and of the philosophical importance of a “history of concepts” 
                                                
44 For what follows, see the following secondary sources: P. Christopher Smith, “Phronesis, the 
Individual, and the Community.  Divergent Appropriations of Aristotle’s Ethical Discernment in 
Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” Gadamer verstehen/Understanding, 169-185; Francisco 
Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath Good and Evil? Heidegger’s Purification of Aristotle’s Ethics,” 127-156; 
Franco Volpi, “Being and Time: A “Translation” of the Nicomachean Ethics?” 195-211; Walter Lammi, 
“Hans-Georg Gadamer’s “Correction” of Heidegger,” 487-507. 
 
45 For the locus classicus of Heidegger’s “ontological” interpretation of phronēsis, see the first half of 
volume 19 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, translated into English as Plato’s Sophist.  See also Francisco 
Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath Good and Evil? Heidegger’s Purification of Aristotle’s Ethics.”  
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(Begriffsgeschichte).46  Gadamer himself has explicitly acknowledged the profound impact that 
Heidegger’s earliest interpretations of Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics had on his own 
philosophical development:  “the course of my own thinking was actually established after my 
first encounter with Heidegger.  Naturally, I was bowled over at first…I was twenty-two years 
old.”47  One particular aspect of Heidegger’s thought, which “set the course” of Gadamer’s own 
thinking involves Heidegger’s early interrelated concepts of Faktizität and Verstehen (facticity 
and understanding), which he developed in terms of a “Hermeneutik der Faktizität” 
(hermeneutics of facticity) in his 1923 Freiburg course – one of Gadamer’s first as Heidegger’s 
student.48  In that course we see some of the earliest indications of the philosophical tradition 
now called “hermeneutic phenomenology” (or “phenomenological hermeneutics”), a phrase used 
to characterize the style of thinking of the early Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, for 
example.49  The commitment to working out an understanding of phenomena by remaining close 
to concrete experience, and by recognizing the interpretative nature of that understanding in light 
of our participation in linguistic and historical traditions is a task the outlines of which Gadamer 
                                                
46 As I discussed in the first and second sections of Chapter One of this dissertation. 
 
47 Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 22.  The places where Gadamer articulates the impact that his early 
encounter with Heidegger had on the development of his own thinking are too numerous to list.   
 
48 That, very interesting, course has been published as volume 63 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, and 
translated into English as Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity. 
 
49 It is worth noting the extent to which I aim to follow in that tradition, under the direction of Adriaan 
Peperzak.  Cf., for example, Eros and Eris: Contributions to a Hermeneutical Phenomenology.  Liber 
Amicorum for Adriaan Peperzak. 
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encountered in Heidegger’s courses in the 1920’s, and in Heidegger’s early manuscript 
“Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Indications of the Hermeneutic Situation.”50 
In what way then did Gadamer’s understanding of phronēsis, from the very beginning, 
remain importantly different from Heidegger’s?  In other words, how is it that specifically with 
respect to the concept of phronēsis, Gadamer was able to reflect back and say of his early 
encounter with Heidegger, “I was trying to come to philosophy along different paths [i.e., 
different from Heidegger], specifically, along the path of practical knowledge…[T]he decisive 
step was already taken in that, from that point on, even if I had wanted to follow Heidegger, I 
could no longer have accommodated him…Heidegger wasn’t really interested in practical 
knowledge or phronēsis at all.”51  What was the “decisive step” alluded to here? 
What differentiates Gadamer’s understanding of the concept of phronēsis – and the 
hermeneutics that he develops on the basis of that concept – is his abiding concern for the ethical 
orientation toward the other, thou, you (Du).  Recognizing the hermeneutic centrality of the 
conversation between you (Du) and me – “the conversation that we are” – was the “decisive 
step,” which meant that Gadamer could “no longer accommodate” Heidegger’s thinking “even if 
I [Gadamer] had wanted to.”  In order understand how this works, philosophically, however, we 
need to clarify how Gadamer came to identify an affinity between the Aristotelian concept of 
                                                
50  Martin Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen 
Situation),” 236-254.  On this manuscript Gadamer later comments, “after having read it again, I see I 
could actually have established quite clearly that Heidegger wasn’t really interested in practical 
knowledge or phronēsis at all…But rather, being…If you look at it closely, he isn’t really all that 
preoccupied with Aristotle.”  Hans-Georg Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 20-21. 
 
51 Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 20. 
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phronēsis and the Platonic concept of dialogue.  For what does phronēsis have to do with 
conversation, with speaking?   
In light of the historical work done in Chapter Two and Three of this dissertation, we are 
in a unique position to understand this question and to affirm that, indeed, from the very 
beginning of its inception in ancient Greece, phronēsis has always had close ties to the realm of 
speaking (logos), and not only of deed (ergon).  In those earlier chapters, I showed how 
Aristotle’s thinking about phronēsis itself developed within a Platonic-Isocratean context in 
which “reasonableness,” “tact,” “(practical) wisdom” was understood to be required above all in 
our speaking to one another.52  Whether or not Gadamer fully understood the ancient Greek roots 
of this tradition of phronēsis and its links to the context of language and speaking, his work has 
clearly tapped into this stream. 
I am not aware of any place where Gadamer acknowledges the development of the 
concept of phronēsis in the way I tried to outline in Chapter Three.  Nevertheless, he was able to 
sense an important connection in phronēsis to Plato’s concept of dialogue.53  In contrast to 
Heidegger’s attempt to turn “phronēsis” into a merely ontological structure of Dasein or into the 
“practical decision” that every individual, solitary philosopher must face in responding to the 
“Seinsfrage,” Gadamer keeps in view the ethical relation of the phronimos to the particular 
                                                
52 In the case of Plato it was the Socratic context of philosophical dialogue, and in the case of Isocrates it 
was the rhetorical context of politics.  These two contexts overlap in Aristotle’s practical philosophy, 
wherein phronēsis is found in both word and deed, logos and ergon.   
 
53 I say “dialogue” here instead of “dialectic,” since the latter term obscures the ethical point that 
Gadamer will make about the hermeneutic relationship between persons who are speaking to one another.  
For Gadamer’s full argument about how Platonic dialectic is at the same time a dialogical ethics, see his 
Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, as well his Idea of the Good in Aristotelian Philosophy. 
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community, ethos, and tradition in which she or he must act in relation to others.54  For Gadamer, 
Heidegger’s interpretation of phronēsis suffers to the degree to which it is overly individualistic 
– symptomatic perhaps of many interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics.55  For example, it is 
difficult, but essential, to keep in view the relationship of euboulia (deliberation) to the primarily 
social and rhetorical context of the boulē: it is true wisdom (phronēsis) to know when and how to 
“take council for oneself” (bouleuesthai), in which, as P. Christopher Smith notes, this middle 
voice does not primarily mean “by” myself all alone, but rather “for” my own sake – in other 
words, by speaking with others who can deliberate with me.56  Relatedly, the interpersonal 
connection of phronēsis to language – e.g., in its various forms of euboulia, synēsis, syngnomē – 
highlights another important difference between Gadamer and Heidegger.  For Heidegger, the 
semantic sedimentations of tradition that are found in language are precisely what must be 
“overcome” or “deconstructed” or “de-structured” on the way to the formation of a “new” 
language built, for example, on the “radical neologisms” invented by the solitary thinker.  For 
Gadamer, however, language is first and foremost conversation (Gespräch) between dialogue 
partners, which entails that language is always already related to historical traditions which hand 
                                                
54 We see this contrast between Gadamer and Heidegger clearly in that, where Heidegger constantly 
interprets and relates Aristotle’s ethical concepts to his Metaphysics and Physics, Gadamer councils 
readers to never forget to relate Aristotle’s ethics to his Politics and Rhetoric.  See for example, the first 
half of Heidegger’s Plato’s Sophist, and footnote 64 in Gadamer’s Truth and Method, 392. 
 
55 I take this point from P. Christopher Smith, “Phronesis, the Individual, and the Community.  Divergent 
Appropriations of Aristotle’s Ethical Discernment in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” 
Gadamer verstehen/Understanding Gadamer, 169-185. 
 
56 Smith also highlights the predominance of the first person plural “we” in Book Six of the Nicomachean 
Ethics.  Cf. P. Christopher Smith, “Phronesis, the Individual, and the Community.  Divergent 
Appropriations of Aristotle’s Ethical Discernment in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” 
Gadamer verstehen/Understanding Gadamer, 180. 
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down and co-determine the meanings of our words.  “Deconstructing” or constructing a “new” 
language remains, at best, an exaggeration of the proper task of reformation of, and 
responsibility for, those traditions in which we find ourselves together.57  Not only our behavior, 
but also the whole linguistic element of human thinking and speaking, is done in the context of 
our “being with one another” (Miteinander) – a term, which, for Gadamer, is importantly 
different from the Heideggerian insight that the individual thinker stands next to others (Mitsein): 
“Mit-sein is, in truth, a very weak idea of the other, more a “letting the other be” than an 
authentic “being-interested-in-him.”58   The culmination of phronēsis in the moment of decision, 
the “prohaireton” or “kairos,” is indeed the action of this here-and-now singular individual, but 
that does not mean that the phronimos acts with an individualistic attitude of “for all I care” (von 
mir aus): the interpersonal and conversational world is found even in the singularity of my own 
actions.59     
Gadamer notes that even Heidegger’s surprising translation of phronēsis as “Gewissen” 
(conscience) is stripped of any real ethical sense inasmuch as it has no real relation to the other: 
“for Heidegger, the conscience is undoubtedly not the other, but is, rather, the puzzle of this 
“coming-to-find-oneself” (Zu-sich-selbst-finden).”60  For Gadamer, the Heideggerian 
                                                
57 It was just this aspect that led Habermas to claim that Gadamer “urbanized” the Heideggerian linguistic 
“backwoods.” 
 
58 Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 23. 
 
59 P. Christopher Smith notes this use of “von mir aus” in Heidegger’s discussion of prohairesis and 
phronēsis in his article “Phronesis, the Individual, and the Community.  Divergent Appropriations of 
Aristotle’s Ethical Discernment in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” Gadamer 
verstehen/Understanding Gadamer, 171f. 
 
60 Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 23. 
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interpretation of phronēsis was problematic precisely because it failed to be oriented toward the 
other: “more and more I found that Heidegger’s inability to acknowledge the other was a point of 
weakness in him.”61  In short, for Gadamer, Heidegger’s understanding of phronēsis was not an 
ethical concept at all.62  By contrast, Gadamer understood that phronēsis is required precisely 
because ethical actions must be undertaken – in our words and deeds – in which you and I are 
here together.  For Gadamer, the underlying philosophical backbone of phronēsis – to be sure a 
point that remains implicit in Aristotle – is that it takes into conscious consideration the concrete 
ethico-political situation of I and Thou.63   
Having seen how Gadamer’s understanding of phronēsis is importantly different from 
Heidegger’s, we can now further highlight the role of phronēsis in Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
ethics. What does Gadamer’s ethical conception of phronēsis have to do with hermeneutics, the 
interpretation of texts?  The hermeneutical problem of trying to become aware of the determining 
role of our own presuppositions (our Vorurteile; our involvement in tradition) in relation to the 
text we are trying to understand, is not primarily a methodological issue.  Rather, it is an ethical 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
61 Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 22. 
 
62 What was it then?  I concur with the work of P. Christopher Smith who shows how Heidegger uses 
“phronēsis” to name a kind of theoretical (!) “Überlegung” (consideration) that the individual thinker 
must employ so as to “see for oneself” what everybody (man) is blind to.  Heidegger uses “phronēsis” as 
a metaphor for the “intellectual intuition” or “seeing” (aisthesis) that the solitary phenomenologist must 
possess in order to be a great and not “unsachlich” (unimportant) thinker.   P. Christopher Smith, 
“Phronesis, the Individual, and the Community.  Divergent Appropriations of Aristotle’s Ethical 
Discernment in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” Gadamer verstehen/Understanding 
Gadamer, 170-177.   
 
63 “Phronēsis, or reasonableness, is nothing other than the conscious side of action, practical knowing.  
Whenever we take note of this conscious side of the distinction between I and Thou, then we have 
phronēsis.”  Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 54.   
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task – namely, the same hermeneutical-ethical task that faces us whenever we try to lend an ear 
to the words of another, regardless of whether they were written down long ago or are being 
spoken to us by another living person face-to-face.  In short – we are to become wise interpreters 
whose responses to the other’s words reveal an appropriate and responsible understanding at 
work.  This entails a disposition of responsible openness and receptivity to that which may 
appear to us as initially strange; and even in the most rigorous academic research, we have to 
become persons capable of hearing a voice that is not our own.  For Gadamer, the hermeneutic 
task is essentially bound up with the cultivation of the sort of character disposition that reaches 
out to the other and provides an interpretive space in which they may speak to and challenge our 
own presuppositions.  By contrast, not to cultivate this kind of hermeneutic disposition is to 
remain entrenched in what we presume to already know: “the genuine meaning of our finitude or 
our thrownness consists in the fact that we become aware, not only of our being historically 
conditioned, but especially of our being conditioned by the other.  Precisely in our ethical 
relation to the other, it becomes clear to us how difficult it is to do justice to the demands of the 
other or even simply to become aware of them.  The only way not to succumb to our finitude is 
to open ourselves to the other, to listen to the “Thou” who stands before us.”64  “Hermeneutic 
entrenchment” – i.e., guarding ourselves against the other, against what we do not immediately 
understand, or against what we suspect may threaten our prior understanding – is overcome to 
the extent that we cultivate a disposition toward responsible receptivity and open listening.  What 
Gadamer calls the epistemic “miracle of understanding” (Wunder des Verstehens) is, in the end, 
                                                
64 Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 29. 
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coextensive with the metaphysical wonder of goodness, in which we encounter the other in a 
concrete ethical situation, such that Gadamer can say, in a profoundly un-Heideggerian way, 
“metaphysics…shouldn’t simply be dissolved; it should be carried back into the ethical question 
instead.”65 
The Heir to Practical Philosophy? Hermeneutic Phronēsis after Truth and Method 
In order to show the fruitfulness of the interpretation of Gadamer’s understanding of phronēsis, 
which I have laid out in this present, and the previous, chapter, this section opens up a sorely 
underexplored issue that concerns the general status of Gadamer’s work in and beyond Truth and 
Method.  In short, in this section I raise a question concerning the extent to which Gadamer’s 
work is merely descriptive of, or by contrast in fact makes normative claims about, the 
hermeneutic process; and, moreover, I make use of the account of phronēsis I have been 
developing in order to show how it can be used to resolve this question.   
What, in the end, does Truth and Method or “philosophical hermeneutics” accomplish, so 
far as its retrieval of phronēsis is concerned?  If all the work we have done thus far in this 
chapter has been to outline the ethical underpinnings of the interpretive task, does this mean that 
Truth and Method is making a fundamentally normative claim - that is to say, a claim about what 
interpreters “should” and “must” do, what understanding “should” be like, and so on?  Is the aim 
of Truth and Method to “make” us good qua interpreters?  If so, this would seem to contrast with 
Gadamer’s famous assertion that the intention of Truth and Method was merely meant to 
describe and enlighten the nature of the hermeneutic process.  The purpose of Truth and Method, 
                                                
65 Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy, 31. 
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Gadamer writes, “was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what 
happens to us over and above our wanting and doing.”66  Later, in an article from 1976, Gadamer 
echoes this claim, and seems to explicitly distance himself from interpreting his work in any 
normative sense:  “the hermeneutics that I characterize as philosophic is not introduced as a new 
procedure of interpretation or explication.  Basically it only describes what always happens 
wherever an interpretation is convincing and successful.  It is not at all a matter of a doctrine 
about a technical skill that would state how understanding ought to be.”67     
And yet, the above quotation is taken from an essay titled, “Hermeneutics as Practical 
Philosophy” – a work, like so many of Gadamer’s post-Truth and Method pieces, which 
explicitly links hermeneutics to practical, social-ethical realms of concern.68   Furthermore, we 
must wonder how, throughout Truth and Method, Gadamer was able to write about what the 
interpreter “must” (muß) do or “cannot” (darf nicht) do if she or he “wants to understand at all” 
(wenn er überhaupt verstehen will).69  Is Gadamer himself confused about the status of his own 
work; and what does this mean for his retrieval of phronēsis?  In what sense is hermeneutic 
phronēsis really a virtue that must or should be cultivated?  Does Gadamer’s work as a whole 
merely describe “how things are” for the hermeneutic process, or does it also – even if only 
indirectly – provide some normative council and protreptic descriptions of how the hermeneutic 
                                                
66 Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxv-xxvi. 
 
67 “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” Reason in the Age of Science, 111.   
 
68 A trend that has been taken up by scholars across disciplines ranging from the humanities to 
architecture, psychology, healthcare, and law. 
 
69 This language runs throughout the entirety of Truth and Method, but for the instances alluded to here, 
see especially Truth and Method, 333. 
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process “should” be viewed and undertaken?70  In short, what did Gadamer mean by claiming 
that “philosophical hermeneutics” was a form of “practical philosophy”?71   
 Although this issue is a rather under-discussed one, Gadamer himself appears to have 
grasped it, even if his response necessitates some careful elaboration.72  Gadamer has at least 
provided us a way forward for developing a fuller response – namely, by relating these questions 
about philosophical hermeneutics and the normativity of Truth and Method, to the Aristotelian 
tradition of “practical philosophy.”73  For the readers of this dissertation, this may come as no 
surprise, given the dissertation’s central focus on phronēsis.  However, this has not been as 
obvious to some of Gadamer’s otherwise excellent interpreters.  For example, two prominent 
scholars who have discussed the problem of the normative dimension of Truth and Method 
(Alasdair MacIntyre and Lawrence Hinman) have both raised the problem correctly, and yet 
responded to it insufficiently; “insufficiently,” moreover, in the same way and for the same 
reason:  namely, by failing to relate their reading of Truth and Method to Aristotle’s practical 
philosophy.74  In failing to do so, they thereby deprive themselves of a way to make compatible 
                                                
70 This issue is somewhat related to the previous chapter’s discussion of whether or not the task (Aufgabe) 
of application (Anwendung) is something that takes place “automatically” or instead requires some 
“purposeful” act on the part of the interpreter. 
 
71 Cf. “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” Reason in the Age of Science.  
 
72 Cf. the last paragraphs of “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” Reason in the Age of Science. 
 
73 By this term, applied to Aristotle’s works, I refer to the three works on Ethics (EE, NE, MM), as well as 
the Politics, Rhetoric, De Anima and so on. 
 
74 An especially surprising omission in MacIntyre’s case. Cf. Lawrence Hinman, “Quid Facti or Quid 
Juris?”; and MacIntyre, “Contexts of Interpretation.  Reflections on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and 
Method.” 
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Gadamer’s claims that (1) Truth and Method is not about what interpreters ought to do, although 
(2) understanding is a praxis, which requires the virtue of phronēsis. 
 Both Hinman and MacIntyre claim that when Gadamer says that “philosophical 
hermeneutics” or Truth and Method is not at all concerned with changing the actual practices of 
interpreters (e.g., those working in the humanities), that Gadamer is simply mistaken about his 
own work: MacIntyre writes, “if I have not misinterpreted Gadamer, his views stand in the most 
radical of oppositions to our current academic practice…Yet Gadamer refuses to recognize any 
such radical implications.”75  Hinman and MacIntyre – quite rightly – see consequences of 
Gadamer’s work beyond merely describing the hermeneutic process, and so they claim that our 
understanding of Truth and Method must run counter to Gadamer’s self-interpretation.  In this 
sense, Gadamer is too modest (or simply incorrect) when he says of Truth and Method that “it is 
quite evident that one must learn method to do the work of a humanist. I am, I hope, a good 
interpreter and a philologist.  As a thinker I just wanted to propose a better understanding of what 
we are doing in the humanities.”76  For Hinman and MacIntyre, Gadamer’s attempt to provide a 
“better” – i.e., clearer and more enlightened – account of the nature of interpretation itself has 
consequences that should lead to the alteration of our interpretive praxis.  However, in contrast to 
Hinman and MacIntyre, by relating Gadamer’s comments back to Aristotelian practical 
philosophy – as Gadamer himself does, as we will see below – we are able to show that Gadamer 
                                                
75 Yet compare Gadamer’s comment in Truth and Method (321), in which he recognizes the “radical” 
implications explicitly: “We are quite aware that we are asking something unusual [Ungewohntes] of the 
self-understanding of modern science [Wissenschaft].”   
 
76 Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” 78. 
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is not confused about his own work, and that his seemingly contradictory comments do in fact 
cohere.    
On the one hand, Truth and Method does not yield another methodology for good 
interpretation – i.e., the form of 19th century hermeneutics that Gadamer is, in part, arguing 
against.  There is no teachable “art” of interpretation in the manner of a technē, as I discussed in 
the first section of this chapter, and to that extent, Gadamer emphasizes that his work is only 
“theory” or only “reflection” on one’s practice, and is not meant to correct the concrete praxis of 
actual individual interpreters.  The normative claim that would tell the interpreter “how” to 
interpret by laying out the steps one must follow – e.g., “follow the principle of first mention 
when reading scripture” – is, at best, for Gadamer, a mere heuristic suggestion or possibly 
helpful tool. 
On the other hand, however, heuristic suggestions and interpretive devices are not the 
only way in which something can be normative for us as interpreters.  This is Gadamer’s point in 
turning to phronēsis, and it is the distinction between the normativity of technē and phronēsis 
that both Hinman and MacIntyre miss in their discussions of Gadamer’s work.77  Gadamer’s turn 
to phronēsis reminds the reader of Truth and Method that even the best, most insightful work of 
(practical) philosophy can never obviate the urgent need for lived phronēsis at the actual moment 
of concrete action in the life of the interpreting agent in this here-and-now singular (hermeneutic 
or moral) situation.  Gadamer’s consistent effort to not let his work be read as the formation of a 
hermeneutic method is thus an ethical, protreptic spur intended to remind the reader that it is 
                                                
77 I will discuss another – very fecund – piece of MacIntyre’s on Gadamer’s work in the conclusion to this 
dissertation. 
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always they who must decide and act rightly even though, or just because, even the best 
formulation of moral or hermeneutic heuristic rules must still be “applied” in singular, concrete 
contexts: “In whatever connection, the application of rules can never be done by rules.  In this 
we have just one alternative, to do it correctly or to be stupid.  That is that!”78 
Gadamer notes that Aristotle himself makes a similar point in his Nicomachean Ethics.79  
On the one hand, a work of practical philosophy – i.e., a philosophical reflection on human(e) 
praxis – “should also contribute to the goodness of human life,” although “that is a very hard 
thing to accomplish.”80  It is hard to accomplish because behind, before, and after all our 
philosophical reflection on praxis stands the educative force of cultivated “habit,” tradition, 
ethos, circumstance and chance, and so on.  Thus Aristotle claims that his lectures on ethics will 
be of no use to someone who is not “already good” – a claim that still shocks the student of today 
who wonders if they are at least “good enough” to benefit from the lectures.  The same is true for 
the hermeneutic tasks we all face: “anything said by way of a theoretic description of the forms 
of right living [or right interpreting] can be at best of little help when it comes to the concrete 
application to the human experience of life.”81   
That said, there is still a sense in which Truth and Method (or the Nicomachean Ethics) – 
as a work of practical philosophy – has consequences for those who attempt to learn from that 
                                                
78 Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” 80.  The proptreptic tone here is 
quite similar to several passages in the Nicomachean Ethics, which I discussed in the second half of 
Chapter Three. 
 
79 Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” 83. 
 
80 Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” 83. 
 
81 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” Reason in the Age of Science, 112. 
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work.  To explain this, Gadamer relies on Aristotle’s well-known image of the archer who, 
seeing the target more clearly, may be more likely to hit it.  In applying this metaphor to his own 
work on hermeneutics as a form of practical philosophy, Gadamer provides us with a way to 
understand how it is possible for him to say that, although (or just because) his work is not 
normative like a technē, it nevertheless describes what every interpreter “must” do – i.e., 
cultivate phronēsis. 
Gadamer’s first point is assumed to be an entailment, albeit an unstated one, of 
Aristotle’s use of the metaphor of the archer and the target.  Being able to see a target more 
clearly does not exhaust the actual praxis involved in hitting the mark: “Aristotle insists that it 
[i.e., practical philosophy] has a subordinate function.  He tells us that it is like the man who tries 
to hit the goal as an archer, and Aristotle compares his own function with this man…The hunter 
and the archer concentrate on a little piece of the whole…that [i.e., the concentration on the 
center] is not, however, the full art of this sport but just an addition so as to make it easier.”82  
The experience with the bow and arrow, the steady breathing, the appropriate amount of tension 
and relaxation, and so on, all go into the full praxis of actually hitting the concrete target.  In 
Aristotle’s case, the “full praxis” is everything that goes into living the good life as a whole (to 
eu zēn holōs).  For this, practical philosophy can at best only be of help through clarification and 
heightening our self-understanding. 
How do things stand with the hermeneutic act?  What is the equivalent of “the good life 
as a whole” for hermeneutics?  Gadamer writes, “with respect to hermeneutics and the 
                                                
82 Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” 83.  Gadamer makes the same 
point in the “Afterword” to his 1998 translation and commentary on Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
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humanities as a whole we have the task of subordinating both our scientific contribution to the 
cultural heritage and academic education to a more fundamental project of letting the tradition 
speak to us.”83  “Letting the tradition speak to us” – the full praxis of hermeneutics is therewith 
aimed toward a goal that is just as abstract and in need of clarification as Aristotle once saw with 
the abstract goal of “living well” (euprattein, eudaimonia).  Gadamer continues, “this is 
hermeneutics: to let what seems to be far and alienated speak again…Moreover, it should speak 
not only in a new voice but in a clearer voice.”84  For the concretization of that goal, neither the 
best hermeneutic method, nor Gadamer’s Truth and Method or any other form of “practical 
philosophy” can replace the responsibility that faces every interpreter – to become phronimos.   
Gadamer’s claim that each interpreter must undertake to become phronimos stands in an 
ambiguous relation to MacIntyre’s review of Truth and Method, which claimed that, for 
Gadamer, “between practice, even intellectual practice,…and the understanding of our 
practice, there is so clear a distinction to be drawn [by Gadamer], that the understanding of 
practice is not itself part of the transformation of practice.”85  MacIntyre is acutely aware that his 
own interpretive practice has indeed been changed in light of Gadamer’s work, precisely because 
it transforms the reader’s understanding of the hermeneutic act.  In that respect, I agree with 
MacIntyre.  However, I do not think that Gadamer himself separated understanding and practice 
as drastically as MacIntyre claims.  It seems to me, instead, that Gadamer does recognize that a 
                                                
83 Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” 83. 
 
84 Gadamer, “Practical Philosophy as a Model of the Human Sciences,” 83. 
 
85 Boldface mine. Alasdair MacIntyre, “Contexts of Interpretation.  Reflections on Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method,” 46.  
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change in one’s understanding of something (such as one’s hermeneutic practice) will have 
consequences for one’s practical dealings with it.  What Gadamer wishes to emphasize, however, 
is simply that such a change does not entail that one could necessarily formulate a set of 
procedural rules or methodologies that would correspond to the newfound understanding of the 
practice.  “Practical understanding” is always a wider phenomenon than any codified method can 
encompass.  In short, only by becoming wiser, more humane, practitioners – that is to say, by 
cultivating phronēsis – can we become the sorts of interpreters, which the other (qua text) needs 
us to be if we are to listen and formulate responsible responses to what is said.  This is why 
Gadamer speaks of a “reciprocity” between “theoretical interest” and the bedrock “primacy of 
practice,” and it is precisely at this point that Gadamer sees the strongest link between 
“philosophical hermeneutics” and the whole tradition of Aristotelian “practical philosophy”:  
The great tradition of practical philosophy lives on in a hermeneutics that becomes aware 
of its philosophical implications…In both cases [i.e., philosophical hermeneutics and 
Aristotelian practical philosophy], we have the same mutual implication between 
theoretical interest and practical action…The connection between the universal desire to 
know and concrete practical discernment is a reciprocal one.  So it appears to me, 
heightened theoretic awareness about the experience of understanding, and the practice of 
understanding, like philosophical hermeneutics and one’s own self-understanding, are 
inseparable.86 
In other article, Gadamer echoes the same point:  
[This] is the point of philosophical hermeneutics. It corrects the peculiar falsehood of 
modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the anonymous authority 
of the sciences and it vindicates again the noblest task of the citizen - decision-making 
according to one’s own responsibility - instead of conceding that task to the expert.  In 
                                                
86 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” Reason in the Age of Science, 112.  To be fair, this 
essay is later than MacIntyre’s review (though not Hinman’s).  My point in this section has not been to 
criticize MacIntyre per se, but merely to use MacIntyre’s misunderstanding to clarify the normative 
element within Gadamer’s work.  
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this respect, hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the older tradition of practical 
philosophy.87 
Perhaps Gadamer’s frustration with the criticisms of his work leveled by Betti, Apel, and others 
also applies here to those who fail to understand aright the normative sense at work in his 
philosophical hermeneutics as practical philosophy:  “They all mistake the reflective claim of my 
analyses and thereby also the meaning of application [Anwendung] which, as I have tried to 
show, is essential to the structure of understanding.  They are so caught up in the methodologism 
of theory of science that all they can think about is rules and their application.  They fail to 
recognize that reflection about practice is not methodology.”88  “Reflection about practice is 
not methodology” because coming to new insights about oneself and ones actions (as interpreter 
or as social agent) – that is to say, coming to a deeper self-understanding – does not at all imply 
that one has learned new rules or procedures.   
 What predominates Gadamer’s interest in discussing his own work, and what seems to 
have lead some scholars astray, is his continual emphasis that, despite the “reciprocity” that 
exists between theory and practice, which helps us to understand ourselves better and our 
ultimate end more clearly, we will never “complete” the task indicated in the dictum “know 
thyself.”  Because of this, no “practical philosophy” can ever become a technē: the “human 
sciences,” the “moral sciences,” will always remain more “human” and more “moral” than they 
will “science.”  “What separates it [i.e., practical philosophy] fundamentally from technical 
expertise,” Gadamer writes, “is that it expressly asks the question of the good…All this holds 
                                                
87 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics and Social Science,” 316. 
 
88 Truth and Method, 580. Boldface mine. 
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true for hermeneutics as well.  As the theory of interpretation or explication, it is not just a 
theory.”89 
 Understanding why Gadamer insists that his Truth and Method cannot tell interpreters 
“what to do” also explains one other common refrain at work in Gadamer’s writings, which 
relies on his understanding of phronēsis as an inherently social concept: namely, the hermeneutic 
place of friendship and solidarity.  There is no isolated reading, but rather we all understand and 
interpret as persons in community (or persons in historical communities): readers of texts must 
deliberate together and ask for advice.  This gives hermeneutic sense to the “acknowledgements” 
page at the front of a book (or dissertation) – for it attempts to name a few important aspects of 
the community that made the individual’s work a possibility at all.  Interpretation, understanding, 
is necessarily related to and takes place within a hermeneutic community and the traditions that 
have shaped that community over time.  When Aristotle considered that it is perhaps better to 
philosophize together with others, his comment revealed a misunderstanding of the nature of 
human thinking, since it presumed that it would be possible to philosophize “alone” at all.90  
After Gadamer’s work, we today can no longer oppose the self-sufficiency of the ideal thinker 
against a community of friends.  The texts and conversations that energize and support our 
thinking – as with the very languages and concepts within which we think, read, and interpret – 
                                                
89 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” Reason in the Age of Science, 93. 
 
90 Cf. NE, X.7, 1777a30-35. 
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are all so many voices of other persons speaking to, and into, our hermeneutic lives here-and-
now.91 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to show how Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis was motivated by a 
deeply ethical concern for how to appropriately receive, listen, and respond to the words of 
another – a concern, which orients not only the specific hermeneutics presented in Truth and 
Method, but in fact runs throughout his “philosophical hermeneutics” as a kind of “practical 
philosophy.”   
 In one way, then, this dissertation has achieved the goals set out at in its introduction: 
namely, to provide a philosophical response to the question of the relationship between reading 
and ethics; to provide an historically and hermeneutically sensitive retrieval of “phronēsis” as a 
conceptual tradition that developed from Homer to Aristotle; and to systematically explain how 
Gadamer’s philosophical work provides a proper, reasonable, and (partially) hermeneutically 
self-aware way or road toward meeting those goals.  
 In another sense, however, there is still much more to be done if we were to offer a full 
philosophical “ethics of reading” – but that is a much larger project, which goes beyond the 
focus of this dissertation merely on the specific role of phronēsis for reading and interpreting 
texts.  In the Conclusion of this dissertation, I will briefly outline a few ways in which 
Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis for a hermeneutic ethics itself remains incomplete.  The glaring 
absence of, or at best the under-discussed and de-emphasized place in Gadamer’s work of, 
                                                
91 I tried to show one example of this in Aristotle’s own case in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, by 
outlining the great extent to which his use of “phronēsis” is deeply dependent on a tradition stretching 
back from Plato and Isocrates, to Hippocrates, Heraclitus, and Homer, and, from there, into the dark. 
279 
 
 
 
affectivity and character in the development and manifestation of phronēsis dogs the legitimacy 
of our basic claim that phronēsis is necessary for reading and interpreting well.  Therefore, in the 
conclusion of this dissertation, I offer the outlines of my own view concerning the place of 
affectivity and character in the hermeneutic act.  Only by reminding ourselves, again and again, 
that our interpretive praxis is dependent not only on “tradition,” “history,” and “language,” but 
also, and in a much more personally concrete way, on our affective life as on our character 
“habits,” can we place in proper perspective and correctly outline the full complexity of 
hermeneutic understanding.
 
 
280 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN EMOTIONALLY HEALTHY HERMENEUTICS 
 
“Even as I take notice of the range of our disagreements, however, I become all the more aware 
of how often I have been better able to articulate my own thought by reflecting upon Gadamer’s 
arguments and insights…It may be that in the future others will be able to advance the 
hermeneutic enterprise further, but, if so, it will only be because they have first been able to learn 
what Gadamer has taught.” - Alasdair MacIntyre “On Not Having the Last Word: Thoughts on 
Our Debts to Gadamer” 
 
What Has this Dissertation Done So Far? 
The purpose of this dissertation, as laid out in the introduction, was to argue for a particular view 
concerning the general relationship between ethics and the interpretation of texts; and, more 
specifically, to do so by outlining the basis for a hermeneutic ethics grounded in Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis.  However, because Gadamer’s understanding of the concept of 
phronēsis is philosophically tied to his hermeneutic views about the nature of concepts as forms 
of tradition(s), I first took the time in Chapter One to reconstruct what it means, 
“methodologically,” to do philosophy within the mode, style, or tradition of philosophical 
hermeneutics.  The first chapter resulted in a Gadamerian view about the nature of concepts as 
dynamic historical traditions in which thinkers (implicitly or explicitly) move, and for which 
thinkers are responsible. 
 On the basis of this Gadamerian view of concepts, I then turned explicitly to the 
retrieval of phronēsis in order to show as concretely and as historically accurate as possible, how 
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indeed the ancient Greek concept of phronēsis is best understood not first and foremost as an 
ahistorical, abstract idea, but rather as the name for a particular historical tradition.  Thus, in 
Chapter Two I showed how this tradition began initially with the Homeric phrēn-phronein word 
family, and was slowly transformed via the “application” of the language to different domains of 
usage – i.e., especially in the Hippocratic medical texts, and in the proto-philosophy of 
Heraclitean thought, which marks the earliest use of the lexeme phronēsis.  In Chapter Three, I 
then showed how this early historical tradition blossomed via its incorporation in and 
transformation by the Platonic dialogues and the Isocratean rhetorical treatises.  Finally, I 
showed how Aristotle became the principle (re-)founder of the tradition of phronēsis – its locus 
classicus – through the robust analyses contained in his practical philosophy.  Although the 
philosophical tradition of phronēsis in a way begins with Aristotle, Chapter Two and Three 
demonstrated that Aristotelian phronēsis is not without its own deep, long, and important history.  
By understanding in detail the trajectory of that tradition – its typical themes and questions – I 
was able (1) to provide one concrete example of the Gadamerian claim that concepts are 
intrinsically related to an historical tradition, as well as (2) to eventually confront Gadamer’s 
own contemporary retrieval of phronēsis with some aspects of the historical tradition of 
phronēsis that remained forgotten or only implicitly understood in his work. 
 In Chapter Four and Chapter Five, then, I turned to Gadamer’s explicit retrieval of the 
concept of phronēsis for his hermeneutics, and argued for an ethical interpretation of this 
retrieval.  For Gadamer, the concept of phronēsis is tied to the “fundamental problem of 
hermeneutics” – i.e., the problem of application (Anwendung) – and therewith indicates that the 
hermeneutic process is a fundamentally practical task confronting every reader.  In Chapter Five 
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I substantiated the ethical character of this practical task of interpretation by showing how 
Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis for hermeneutics reveals the responsibilities and complexities 
of appropriately responding to the words of another (as found in a text). 
 I have argued why and how, for Gadamer, hermeneutics must undergo an “ethical turn” 
– or rather an ethical return – in order to clarify the most fundamental questions about the nature 
of interpretation.  The activity of reading is an intrinsically ethical task, whose excellent 
performance necessitates the wisdom of phronēsis.  Gadamer’s retrieval is both a further 
historical development in the long tradition of the concept of phronēsis, as well as a further 
historical development in the long tradition of the discipline of hermeneutics.  Gadamer’s work 
participates in an historical tradition by providing the philosophical meeting point between two 
previously different streams of inquiry – namely, concerning practical wisdom, and 
interpretation (of texts).  Put differently, Gadamer’s work enacts a “fusion of horizons” through 
the confrontation between ancient practical philosophy, and contemporary hermeneutic theory.  
What follows is therefore my own first attempt to explain what I have learned “and perhaps 
could only have learned” from Gadamer.1 
What Still Needs to be done? 
Outlining the historical development of the concept of phronēsis revealed a key sense in which 
Gadamer’s retrieval is in fact lacking as a retrieval of phronēsis – specifically, in its inattention 
to the role of emotion and character.  This, of course, is not to say that Gadamer’s retrieval is 
problematic as such, but simply that it is partial, and in need of further development.  Moreover, 
                                                
1 Alasdair MacIntyre, “On Not Having the Last Word: Thoughts on Our Debts to Gadamer,” 
Gadamer’s Century, 157. 
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Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis is partial in just such a way that it hinders our ability to more 
fully understand the ethical nature of the hermeneutic act, since it generally overlooks or 
downplays the realm of affectivity and character, which, for Aristotle, was inseparable from 
phronēsis.  Such a hindrance must be addressed, since it touches the very core of this 
dissertation’s concern with the relationship between ethics and the interpretation of texts.  What 
should be kept in mind, however, is that this insight has been made possible through the 
historical work done in the earlier chapters of this dissertation.  Going back to the sources, 
retrieving once again “for ourselves” and reconstructing the historical tradition, has altered and 
enriched our understanding of phronēsis as such.  Thus, by structuring the dissertation in such a 
way that attempted to be faithful to a Gadamerian way of doing philosophy – that is, by trying to 
enact or model Gadamer’s hermeneutic claims – we are now in position to critically dialogue not 
only with Gadamer’s work, but also with the work of other thinkers who share some common 
presuppositions with philosophical hermeneutics.2   
 What then is it about Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis specifically that is left unsaid or 
forgotten, and that has key significance for our understanding of the relationship between 
hermeneutics and ethics?  As I have occasionally gestured at throughout this dissertation, there is 
urgent need for some attention to be given to the character, disposition, or affective side of 
phronēsis, inasmuch as phronēsis – properly so-called in an Aristotelian sense – is the 
intertwinement of the intellectual virtue with the virtues of disposition and right-feeling.  I do not 
mean, however, that Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis is lacking only in a specifically 
Aristotelian sense.  For, as has been seen in the earlier historical chapters of this dissertation, the 
                                                
2 Here I think most immediately of Paul Ricoeur, Luigi Pareyson, and Jürgen Habermas. 
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role of affectivity and disposition has been an utterly central feature of that tradition, whose 
earliest roots lay in the Homeric phrēn (heart).  Even still, putting things in this way might make 
it seems as though the problem were merely historical – i.e., that Gadamer’s retrieval of the 
tradition of phronēsis was merely historically inaccurate.  That claim, however, would be to 
unduly separate philosophy, history, and language – the connection between which formed the 
content of Chapter One of this dissertation.  Philosophically, then, to the extent that Gadamer’s 
retrieval is lacking in this historical sense (i.e., by forgetting the phrēn), it may leave us with an 
excessively “intellectualistic” account of the hermeneutic act, and thereby of a hermeneutic 
ethics.3   
What I wish to emphasize here is not that Gadamer’s interpretation of phronēsis lacked 
an ethical dimension – that is precisely what I have emphasized in the previous two chapters.  
Rather, I simply wish to emphasize that his retrieval of phronēsis fails to consider the place of 
emotions or affective dispositions as being an intrinsic aspect of the whole hermeneutic 
phenomenon, and which therefore need to be philosophically accounted for in any hermeneutic 
ethics.  In short, Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis requires a corresponding retrieval of the phrēn 
for a hermeneutic ethics.  Until hermeneutics confronts, or rather re-confronts, the role of 
emotion and character in the interpretation of texts, its philosophical work will remain blind to 
the phenomena of understanding and interpretation in their fullness.  Throughout the rest of this 
conclusion, I explain why Gadamer may have neglected this aspect, and I offer my own thoughts 
                                                
3 This is perhaps evidenced in the secondary scholarship on Gadamer.  At least to the extent that I am 
familiar with the literature, I have yet to find a work which even has a place for “affectivity,” “character,” 
“disposition,” or “emotion” in an index, let alone a substantial philosophical discussion of its place in a 
hermeneutic ethics. 
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on how a retrieval of this aspect might proceed.  In doing so, I indicate a direction for 
contemporary hermeneutics, which has been largely unexplored – namely, for some scholarly 
engagement with contemporary philosophy of emotion. 
What is Missing in Gadamer’s Retrieval of Phronēsis and Why is it Missing? 
The excellent hermeneuticist will be a kind of phronimos.  Gadamer’s work shows us why this 
must be the case, as well as specifically how the ancient intellectual virtue of phronēsis manifests 
itself throughout the process of interpretation.  However, the retrieval of phronēsis opens up 
questions that Gadamer has left unattended, and perhaps did not see.  As Alasdair MacIntyre 
points out, by making his claims “in this Aristotelian way, Gadamer opens up still further critical 
questions, questions that arise from his interpretation of phronēsis.”4  MacIntyre too sees that the 
Gadamerian enterprise only begins with the initial retrieval of phronēsis, and that much more 
philosophical work still needs to be done.  Yet, MacIntyre proceeds in a different direction than 
the one I am proposing.  In in his essay “On not having the last word: thoughts on our debts to 
Gadamer,” MacIntyre raises the question of to what extent hermeneutic phronēsis can avoid 
larger metaphysical questions: “hermeneutics so viewed is a sub-discipline of ethics and…just as 
an Aristotelian ethics presupposes an Aristotelian metaphysics, so a hermeneutics informed by 
Aristotelian concepts will have very much the same presuppositions.  But if that is so, the 
philosophical commitments of hermeneutic inquiry extend beyond hermeneutics into 
metaphysics.”5  MacIntyre’s point here is well taken, and perhaps necessitates a renewed 
                                                
4 MacIntyre, “On Not Having the Last Word: Thoughts on Our Debts to Gadamer,” 168. 
 
5 MacIntyre, “On Not Having the Last Word: Thoughts on Our Debts to Gadamer,” 169. 
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discussion of one of the very same questions that Plato and Aristotle argued over – namely, does 
the phronimos need to understand metaphysical and theoretical philosophy in order to exhibit 
phronēsis?6  Yet, there is another way in which Gadamer’s reliance on phronēsis raises new 
questions, not so much by requiring that we connect ethics to some other area of philosophy, as 
MacIntyre argues, but rather by requiring that we highlight ethical features that are in fact 
intrinsic to the concept of true phronēsis, but which Gadamer himself did not address – i.e., the 
role of the virtues of character and affectivity.  Gadamer’s reliance on the concept of phronēsis is 
somewhat overly “intellectualistic” inasmuch as it neglects the relationship between the 
intellectual virtue and the whole realm of character and affectivity.7  
MacIntyre himself briefly mentions the matter of hermeneutic character virtues, but 
seemingly without realizing that this is not something Gadamer has actually developed: “For so 
long he [i.e,. Gadamer] exemplified both in his person and in his writings the moral dimension of 
the hermeneutic project.  He has been for much of our time the phronimos of hermeneutics, the 
exemplary practitioner of the hermeneutic virtues, both intellectual and moral.”8  High praise 
indeed, but, what in fact are “hermeneutic moral virtues”?  Who has given an account of these or 
discussed how they relate to phronēsis more generally?  Once it is understood that phronēsis is 
inseparable from the realm of character and affectivity, a question arises – why did Gadamer 
                                                
6 MacIntyre’s conception of phronēsis in this essay seems to me to be more “Platonic” than 
“Aristotelian.”  For the Platonic Aristotelian background to this issue, see my discussion throughout the 
second half of Chapter Three. 
 
7 Furthermore, insofar as the thrust of MacIntyre’s conception of phronēsis requires that the phronimos 
also be metaphysician, it only exacerbates the “intellectualistic” worry that I am raising here.  
 
8 MacIntyre, “On Not Having the Last Word: Thoughts on Our Debts to Gadamer,” 171. 
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neglect an explicit analysis of this issue?  It seems to me that there are two reasons for this, both 
of which led to the over “intellectualization” of the hermeneutic process.   
 The first issue concerns the philosophical views that Gadamer was arguing against in 
Truth and Method.  It seems to me that by combatting the “sentimentalism” of romantic 
hermeneutic and romantic aesthetics, Gadamer was perhaps hesitant to still find a legitimate role 
for affectivity to play in the act of interpretation.  For example, one chief aim of Gadamer’s 
critique of romantic aesthetics and romantic hermeneutics was to recover the view that artworks, 
as with the whole realm of texts in the disciplines of the humanities, are able to make truth 
claims and, more generally, to make meaningful epistemic contributions to our knowledge and 
understanding of the world and of ourselves.  In other words, Gadamer rejects the dichotomous 
view that would place “science” and “truth” on one side as opposed to the side of “art” and 
“feelings.”  Neither science, nor art, has sole access to truth.  However, in order to show how an 
artwork can make truth claims, or how a novel can teach us something, Gadamer chastens 
romantic hermeneutics for its reliance on opaque concepts like “sympathy,” “life-feeling,” or the 
“emotional experience” of the interpreter.  These concepts for Gadamer - and here I agree with 
him - are inadequate hermeneutic bases for interpretation. 
 However, when Gadamer retrieves the concept of phronēsis as the basis of his 
hermeneutic ethics, he does not correspondingly retrieve an appropriate understanding of the 
hermeneutic role of affectivity.  His critique of romantic hermeneutic results in, as it were, 
throwing the affective baby out with the bathwater.  Gadamer’s hermeneutic phronimos, in other 
words, does not seem to have much need for affective emotion or character in the process of 
interpretation.  That Aristotle makes very clear that the concept of phronēsis is inseparable from 
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and dependent upon all the virtues of character and affectivity does not seem to play a vital role 
in Gadamer’s retrieval.  Thus, it may be that Gadamer was no longer able to see a positive 
hermeneutic role for affectivity to play after having to battle against the tide of romantic 
hermeneutics, which rested on the intuitive basis of “empathy” and “co-feeling” with the spirit of 
an author.  But intuition, co-feeling, and so on – the affective hallmarks of the German romantic 
hermeneutics Gadamer was arguing against – are not the only types of affectivity.   
 A second possible reason why Gadamer neglected the hermeneutic function of 
character and affectivity, may be because he thought he had accounted for it via his conceptions 
of “tradition” and “hermeneutic presuppositions.”  After all, tradition is in many respects similar 
to the ethos of a particular educational and cultural climate, and it is in many respects the 
tradition(s) or the ethos that shapes our character by teaching us what habits should be cultivated 
or not.  Thus the character dispositions of the phronimos will be oriented by and concretized 
within a particular social-historical tradition.  Likewise, the (often) unconscious “hermeneutic 
presuppositions” that we bring with us to a text guide our understanding of that text much like 
affective dispositions and emotions do - namely, by tending to direct our attention toward or 
away from some things rather than others, and by orienting our reactions to what we encounter. 
 However, even if we grant that Gadamer might offer an implicit account of the 
hermeneutic role of character and affectivity via these concepts of “tradition” and “hermeneutic 
presuppositions,” we are still far from an account of hermeneutic character virtues or affective 
dispositional virtues.  This is because we are not mere slaves to historical tradition or to our 
hermeneutic presuppositions.  Rather, as we become aware of some of our “hermeneutic 
presuppositions,” or as we occasionally are able to take some distance from the ethos in which 
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we were raised, we thereby become responsible for considering whether to reaffirm, alter, or 
reject those presuppositions or aspects of a tradition.  Similarly, as we come to awareness of our 
dispositional and affective tendencies, we thereby become responsible for considering whether to 
reaffirm, alter, or reject those tendencies in the role that they play in shaping our understandings 
and reactions to what we experience.  For example, if I come to understand that I have a 
tendency to avoid discussions of a particular topic because it makes me uncomfortable, I can 
then decide whether or not I ought to affirm, or work to alter that tendency.  Likewise, if I 
discover that I tend to impatiently react to what I do not understand by quickly rejecting it as 
nonsensical, then I become responsible for how I respond to that newfound self-insight - i.e., will 
I practice becoming a more patient person in the face of confusing or difficult ideas, or not?  If 
Gadamer is correct in claiming that the interpreter requires something like phronēsis, then we 
will also need something like a conception of character and affective virtues that must likewise 
be cultivated.  The concepts of “tradition” or “hermeneutic presuppositions” are perhaps, if 
anything, more like the so-called “natural” dispositional tendencies that many people have “by 
birth” that Aristotle discusses.9  
Perhaps Gadamer’s own hermeneutic situation required that he take the step of moving 
beyond the philosophically insufficient hermeneutics of 19th century German romanticism.  
However, in order to properly “apply” Gadamer’s work to our own hermeneutic situation today, 
it may be necessary to rethink the still common “hermeneutic presupposition” in which there is a 
strict division between “thinking” and “feeling.”  In this way it may become possible to craft a 
hermeneutic ethics that not only does justice to its foundations in Gadamer’s work, but also does 
                                                
9 Cf. NE VI.13 1144b1-10. 
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justice to the hermeneutic phenomenon as it occurs in the acts of reading, discussing, and 
interpreting. 
Retrieving the Phrēn - the Heart of Understanding 
Applying Gadamer’s retrieval of phronēsis to today’s hermeneutic situation requires, as I have 
said, a retrieval of the “phrēn” or “heart” of understanding.  Reconnecting phronēsis and phrēn 
means, hermeneutically, a reconnection of the intellectual virtue with the affective and 
dispositional life of the hermeneuticist.  In what follows, I can only gesture at this unexplored 
area of hermeneutics, and outline a few of the majors themes and questions that it would need to 
explore.  In particular, (1) I provide a few concrete examples that show how affectivity is 
relevant to the hermeneutic process in general, and (2) I conclude by briefly gesturing at a few 
possible examples of “hermeneutic character virtues.” 
 In order to display phronēsis in one’s living or in one’s interpretation of a text, the 
person involved must not only have insight into the salient features of the given situation, but 
also some self-understanding of who they are as the individual who must decide and act here and 
now.  To know oneself involves knowing one’s tendencies, typical urges, and character - in 
short, to be aware and mindful of one’s affective and dispositional life.  Mindfulness of our 
emotional life entails not that we detach ourselves from it, or attempt to deny its admittance into 
the present situation, but rather that we bring it into our awareness.  In the case of hermeneutics, 
for example, it is possible to read a text in a spirit of anger or frustration, and fail to consider the 
extent to which that affective disposition is possibly hindering one’s ability to interpret the text 
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well.10  In any case, the first point to be emphasized is this: hermeneutic mindfulness cannot be 
done if one does not even consider that one’s emotional and dispositional life may have a bearing 
on the interpretation of texts.  Admitting that dispositional habits and emotions may be involved 
in one’s reading practices does not entail advocating any kind of hermeneutic emotivism or 
retreat into hermeneutic romanticism.  Rather, it is simply to take ownership of the fact that the 
affective life of the reader is one of the necessary and unavoidable components to the 
hermeneutic situation in which a text is read and understood.  Phronēsis thus requires the ability 
to, as Jerome Veith writes, “apply our affectivity in deliberation.  All circumstances engage our 
emotions in some way, and these emotions in turn ‘help to interpret or compose the very 
situations in which they are responses.’ Yet the crucial point is that the interpretation be accurate, 
and this depends on the virtue of the deliberator, the tendency to feel the right emotions...The 
phronimos’ capacity to find this mean entails responding affectively to situations in the way 
actually called for by circumstances.”11  Although Veith comments here are only about Aristotle, 
and not at all about hermeneutics, their application to the act of interpretation is clear, since texts 
too engage our emotions in varying ways. 
Not only are emotions and dispositions hermeneutically relevant insofar as they may pre-
dispose our understanding of a text (whether that pre-disposing helps or hinders our interpretive 
efforts), but they are also relevant for a hermeneutic ethics insofar as the hermeneutic task 
requires the reader to respond to the text appropriately - and this may include also an appropriate 
                                                
10 The anger or frustration may not even be related to the text at all, but might simply be the mood one is 
in as one sits down to read. 
 
11 Jerome Veith, “Phronesis as Self-Knowledge,” 22.  Veith is here quoting from C.D.C. Reeve’s 
commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.   
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affective response.  Affective “neutrality” in the interpretation of texts may be neither possible 
nor desirable.  If and when, for example, teachers read a text with students that puts forward a 
morally abhorrent view, they are given a double task: both to give a fair, careful representation of 
the view, as well as to model an appropriate way of responding to it.  Remaining utterly 
dispassionate, or adopting what psychologists call a “flat affect” when teaching might not be 
modeling “neutrality” from the perspective of students, but rather the modeling of a seemingly 
unconcerned, aloof posture - a posture which, further, might only serve to confirm many 
students’ presuppositions that philosophy is “only” a theoretical game that does not touch the 
lived (e.g., emotional) life of the participants.  Relatedly, teachers may need to help students to 
name their own emotional reactions to texts or ideas precisely so that those students can 
understand the text better.  Again, the psychology of “retrenchment” - wherein an individual 
seems not to understand something because it raises feelings of discomfort, threat, or fear – can 
serve as a reminder to teachers that the hermeneutic relevance of emotions cannot be simply 
bypassed in the effort to facilitate student learning. 
 One further example of the relevance of affectivity for hermeneutics - one which also 
occurs in the teaching context - concerns the way in which beginning students learn the skill of 
reading.  Beginning students who are given difficult texts to read may need to rely on other 
interpretive strategies for making sense of the text than simply conceptual or logical abilities, 
which indeed they may only be just beginning to practice in the first place.  It is not unusual for a 
student to be unable to express their understanding of a text in conceptual terms, but still be able 
to make statements about their own affective sense of what the text seems to be saying.  In other 
words, one of the first points of hermeneutic contact for students is precisely the interpretive 
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result of their affective engagement with the text.  No doubt this engagement is insufficient for 
becoming a more expert reader or for developing the ability to think in other terms, but that does 
not mean it is illegitimate tout court.  It may be that the classroom is too small of a space for 
students to develop entirely new habits of character and feeling, but giving students the 
opportunity to cultivate some metacognitive understanding or self-awareness of their own 
tendencies and emotional responses (to texts) is to make at least some progress in modeling true 
hermeneutic phronēsis.  The above examples, however, show merely that affective and character 
dispositions are relevant for philosophical hermeneutics in general.  But what are hermeneutic 
character virtues?   
What character virtues might be “internal” to the excellent practice of interpretation?  In 
fact, there is already one disposition that has long been recognized as a centerpiece of excellent 
interpretation.  The modern recommendation of a hermeneutic “principle of charity” can be 
found explicitly in many thinkers, and, implicitly, it can be traced back at least to St. Augustine.  
The hermeneutic virtue of charity – whose full account lies outside the scope of this dissertation 
– has long established itself as virtue internal to the excellent practice of reading.  Similarly, the 
so-called “hermeneutics of suspicion” may provide another example of a kind of character virtue 
that the excellent hermeneuticist will display – namely, the right balance of trust and suspicion, 
or even hope and fear, in the reading of texts.  Both charity and suspicion provide examples of 
potential forms of dispositional and affective relations that are possible to take in relation to 
texts.  The hermeneutic phronimos, in this case, will be the one who knows when to display 
some critical suspicion towards the text, and when to seek out a more charitable interpretation of 
something that may, at first glance, have seemed worthy of suspicion.  One the one hand, the 
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wise enactment of hermeneutic charity and hermeneutic suspicion requires phronēsis, but, 
phronēsis itself is not identical to a character disposed toward a proper blend of charity and 
suspicion.  In other words, it is not enough to say, as Gadamer does, that one must know how to 
apply the text to oneself.  For the process of “application” (Anwendung) will also engage one’s 
dispositional tendencies, and the best hermeneuticist will be the one whose reactions to the text 
are appropriate.  That is to say, the best hermeneuticist will know when to react with either more 
suspicion or more charity in the course of trying to understand a text.   
Nevertheless, although charity and suspicion are fine examples of the kind of 
hermeneutic character virtues that I am trying to gesture toward here for future research, there is 
at least one particular form of affective disposition that seems to be to clearly fundamental for 
excellent interpretation, but which has largely gone unrecognized – namely, the virtue of 
patience.12 
Patience is a requisite hermeneutic virtue not simply for the concrete fact that it takes 
time, often a very long time, to read.  The reader prone to impatience or distraction may of 
course have difficulty understanding what is being said.  Certainly in this case the need to re-read 
may be experienced as an annoying disruption of what one might otherwise hope to be a simply 
straight forward progression of reading one sentence after another, from the beginning of a text 
straight through to its end.  The patient reader will know how and when to pause, re-read, start 
again, back up even further, re-read some more, and so on.   
                                                
12 The thoughts that follow have been somewhat inspired by Matthew Pianalto’s recent work, On 
Patience. Reclaiming a Foundational Virtue, as well as Henri Nouwen’s chapter on “Patience,” in his 
book, Compassion. 
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However, patient reading not only accepts that the praxis of reading is not 
straightforward – after all, one does not even always read a sentence straight through from left to 
right, but might re-read some clauses in different orders.  Rather, to read with patience is also to 
understand a much more fundamental truth of hermeneutics – namely, that one may not, and 
often will not, understand what the text is trying to say after a first reading.  Patience is thus 
closely related also to persistence.  One must not only “wait patiently” as one reads a text – for 
example, to wait patiently in the expectant hope that the meaning of the text will become clear at 
some point before one finishes the book.  One must also “patiently persist” again and again, 
often by being willing to re-read again and again the same piece in the hope that one will 
eventually understand, and that the text will eventually begin to speak clearly, etc.   
There is also a pedagogical relevance to recognizing that the hermeneutic act requires the 
disposition of patience.  Students are often trained to read for “efficiency” by being taught the 
supposed reading skills of “skimming” or “scanning” a page in order to look for “key terms.”  
Efficient reading and patient reading may often become opposed to one another, as in the case of 
reading a work of philosophy, a poem, or a sacred text.  Lacking a patient hermeneutical 
disposition, the reader may quickly grow frustrated at the sheer opacity and “meaninglessness” 
or “uselessness” of, for example, Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  Likewise, how many times does one 
need to read Plato’s Symposium or the book of Job before one “understands” – particularly if we 
agree with Gadamer that understanding is in the end not separable from the moment of 
application to one’s own life. 
No doubt there are other forms of character disposition that may have significant 
hermeneutic relevance – for example, perhaps courage or gratitude.  Furthermore, this area of 
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hermeneutic character virtues, which I have tried to briefly gesture toward here, will also require 
some engagement with the work of contemporary philosophy of emotion, virtue epistemology, 
and so on.  The point I wish to conclude on, however, is simply this: by retrieving the concept of 
phronēsis for the discipline of hermeneutics, Gadamer has in a very real way said more than he 
seems to have realized.  I have tried to offer an account of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics as grounded in the concept of phronēsis, and to show how, on his own terms, there 
remains much that was left “unsaid.”  To the extent that I have been able to uncover this 
“unsaid” in Gadamer’s hermeneutic ethics it was only precisely by working within his own terms 
in order (1) to reconsider the whole historical development of the tradition of phronēsis, and (2) 
to keep in view the extent to which the hermeneutic act engages the intellect as much as one’s 
emotions and character.      
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